

The Russian Empire's Perception of Asia and Korean Immigrants (1891-1910)

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Duality in the Russian perception of Asia at large and Korean immigrants in particular is reflected in the Russian Empire's policy. The defeat of Tsar's Russia in the Crimea War was the reminder of the European hostility against Russians, and this brought forth the reappraisal, by the Russian intellectuals, of the Russian relationship with Europe. Debate on the Russian relationship with others culminated in the division of the main stream of thought into Slavism and Europeanism. The former, cognizant of fundamental differences between Russia and Europe, stressed the Russian individuality and uniqueness. The other, by contrast, regarded Russia as part of Europe and stressed the historical and cultural homogeneity.

Danilevskii was the most prominent proponent of Slavism, highly critical of the traditional wisdom that regarded Asia as backward and regressive and Europe as representing progressivism. He was honestly serious about making a fair evaluation of Asian civilization. Slavism found its manifestation in the Russian policy marked by compassion for Asians and the earliest Korean immigrants to the Maritime Siberia. This set into motion a series of policies which encouraged the integration of Korean immigrants into Russians.

Europeanism downgraded Asian civilization and justified the imperialistic incursions of Christian countries into Asia. The sense of cultural superiority, coupled with the reigning "yellow phobia" after the Russo-Japan War, shifted the policy from integration to a forced segregation and exclusion. The dichotomized view of the world accounts for the shift of the Russian policy toward Korean immigrants.

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I. Introduction

The policy of the Tsar government toward Korean immigrants in the Russian territory highlights alternation between integration and segregation. The Russo-Japan War (1904-1905) was the turning point of the policy shifting from friendly gestures of integration to a forced segregation. The turnabout of the policy was the result of a structural linkage which brought the policy toward Asia at large to bear on that toward Korean immigrants in particular. Depending on the intent of its policy toward Asia, the Russian perception of Korean immigrants was manifested in its policy alternating between integration and segregation. When the Russian policy turned in favor of integration, the Korean immigrants were favored in the distribution of land and in their bid to

¹ This essay reflects a revised version of a paper “The Russian Policy toward the East Asia and Korea” included in *Hankuk Minjok Yeonku Sa* (Study on History of Nationalistic Movements in Korea), vol.55, 2008 June.

obtain citizenship. The reverse case imposed various forms of restrictions on their freedom to move around and their quest for jobs.

This policy shift had a lot to do with the Russian, particularly intellectuals', perception of Asia and the world. Russian intellectuals were divided into two mainstream thoughts, Slavism and Europeanism; the former upholds Slavic superiority as the source of ideological or institutional models worth to be emulated by others, while the latter is reliant on the European experience in the quest for a model which fits the Russians. Russian intellectuals found themselves torn apart between these two ideological imperatives. Such a duality is also reflected in the understanding of the Russian identity that constitutes a frame of reference for policy formulation in relation to Asia and Korean immigrants. Trapped between the Western and Eastern civilizations, Russian intellectuals were involved in a heated debate on whether to be aligned with the West or the East. This dichotomy was not only the child of intellectual discourse; Russians have traditionally been divided into Slavism and Europeanism on the subconscious level, if not given an outlet. Intellectual alternation between the two mainstreams of thought found its manifestation in policy alternation between integration and segregation. The duality of Russian perception provides useful insight into the Russian policy toward Korean immigrants who founded their first settlements in the Pacific rim of Siberia. An analytical examination of how this policy affected the fate of Korean immigrants provides clues to the process of Korean society being formulated and some elements which marked it apart from other ethnic groups. In this vein, this study represents an attempt to address a question; "why Korean immigrants failed to take root in their initial settlements." It explains the visceral pain of dislocation, as reflected in a daunting journey, accompanied by prohibitive human sacrifices.

This study was started with an extensive review of literature bearing on the dual streams of thought as reflected in the two prominent ideologists, N. Ya. Danilevskii and V. S. Soloviev, with specific reference

to how their thoughts have affected the Russian policy toward Korean immigrants. To achieve this goal, the study proceeded in accordance with the procedures set forth as follows. To begin with, Danilevskii's "Russia and Europe" was examined, for it was held to have done justice to anti-Europeanism and Asian culture, together with Soloviev's "Three Pieces of Dialogue," advocating an inexplicable path to alliance with the Western Europe in relation to "yellow phobia" reigning after the Russo-Japan War. Second, the study includes an investigation into the formation of a Korean diaspora in the Maritime Siberia and some factors that characterize it apart. The Russian policy toward the Korean immigrants fits the frame of integration and segregation. Third, the defeat of the Russian Empire in the Russo-Japan War was invitations to an emerging fear of the yellow race and the Russian policy toward Korean immigrants shifted its gear to a forced segregation. How "yellow phobia" affected the formation of policy is subject to examination. This study is ultimately aimed to shed light on the ideological background for the Russian policy toward Korean immigrants, marked by inconsistency and contradiction.

II. Ideological Background for Russian Policy toward East Asia

1. Slavism and Alliance with Asia

From the late 19th century, Russian intellectuals found themselves torn apart between Slavism and Europeanism which have undergone a peculiar pattern of change in the process of their manifestation in policy formulation. In reaction to the Russian quest for an ideal model in the European experience, a segment of Russian intellectuals advocated the Russian uniqueness and individuality in their intellectual history. The focal point of their theoretical contention was whether Russia could be considered in separation from the Western Europe. The former advocated an inexplicable relationship, particularly historical and religious, of

Russia with Europe, whereas the latter insisted that there were the Russian elements which fit a particular pattern and that the path to a rosy Russian future should be sought in relation to Asia. The duality of the Russian policy toward Asia and Korean immigrants is rooted in the dichotomized stream of the Russian thought.

As we are well aware, the 19th century saw the Russian Empire pushing for an imperialistic expansionism in competition with other European rivalries. In this particular time frame, it was an irresistible attempt to seek alliance with other regions or countries. Taking an independent course of development was to run counter to the stream of history. Dichotomy between Slavism and Europeanism was the product of a particular time frame which inspired the Russians to seek a new path of its life attuned to the changing stream. Far from being an outcry for a syncretic approach, a colossal change that was taking place made it imperative to come up with a specific political path by way of coping with new challenges. Scientific and technological advance was invitations to the global prevalence of a capitalistic economic system, and this universal principle paradoxically brought forth an urge to seek a viable alternative to transcend the bound of traditional value structure and present a path of survival in the increasingly impersonalized world.

It was against this background that new efforts were made to perceive the world not in terms of the inherently confrontational and conflicting relationship between the West and East but a mutually complementary relationship. Standing at the center of the intellectual circle was Danilevskii (1822-1885). In his “Russia and Europe,”² Danilevskii argues that distinction between Europe and Asia is nominal, and this statement is held to be a categorical denial of any difference between the two. He was critical of the current thought that regarded Europe as symbolic of historical progressivism toward the consummation

² N.Y. Zen'kovskii, *Russkie Mysliteli i Evropa*, Moskva: Respublika, 1997, p.60.

of self and Asia as static, inert and backward.³ It is, he argues, badly flawed to use the same yardstick in explaining differences between Europe and Asia. He further says “European, Asiatic, or African are misnomers made by mankind.”⁴

By contrast, Danilevskii argued for the re-examination of “European superiority” by stressing a new role of Russia as a mediator between the West and East. This theory came from his intransigent opposition to the conventional wisdom that viewed those critical of European superiority as conservatives stagnated in back waters of an advancing stream. This conventional wisdom, he asserted, stirred aspirations of Russians to champion the European model and the fear that made them dither before the inescapable role of Russia as a mediator between the two different hemispheres. Another line of his argument is that European superiority persuaded Russians into a blind acceptance of European mores and institutions with the resultant consequences of deleterious effect on the Russian motivation. This argument led him to the conclusion that the Russian alliance with one or the other deprives Russia of the ground for defining its new role contributive to the world at large.⁵

Danilevskii’s criticism of European superiority dovetails with the global trend antithetical to European regionalism. His theory is based on that Europe has more Asiatic elements than other regions, and it is nonsensical to regard it as a regional particularism. This argument went so far to aver that Europe is part of Asia and there is no structural difference that characterizes Europe from Asia. The European continent was empty of people, inducing Arians to migrate to inhabit much of the European continent. Arians also inhabit a sizeable portion of Asian

³ N.Y. Danilevskii, “Rossiya i Evropa,” *Klassika geopolitiki XIX vek*, edited K.Kovlev, Moskva: Izdatel'stvo AST, 2003, pp.332~335.

⁴ N.Y. Danilevskii, pp.332~335.

⁵ N.Y. Danilevskii, pp.347~350.

continent. To those who regarded Asia as backward and stagnant, Danilevskii raised questions; “What was happening at the eastern end of the Asian continent, while piles of human wisdom and accomplishments were dramatized into a creative force in the European peninsulas?”: “Why did ancient Greece and Rome disappear into the dusts of history despite the fact that they were not confrontational with progressivism and experienced something that had not betided China?”⁶ Danilevskii stressed geographical terms in defining Europe as located at the western end of and Asia at the eastern part of Asian land mass. Enlightening and westernizing the East, he asserts, cannot be justified.⁷ Pride in progressivism is not the particularistic legacy of Europe. The world comprises countries endowed with varying degrees of faculty to progress and those liable to stagnate due to the lack of this trait, irrespective of where they are located. It just happened that the European continent is rich in the countries pertaining to the former; it is not that such countries do not exist in the other parts of the world. Some of the eastern countries are better endowed the factors which bolster their advance. Stating that they are lagging behind the Western countries is based on the relative concept of development. Among these countries, Danilevskii cited China as an example that fits the case he described. Some centuries ago, according to his statement, China excelled any of the European countries in productivity and industrialization particularly in dying materials, pottery, textiles, and lacquered furniture. Agricultural productivity in particular placed China far ahead of the European countries.⁸ He reminded that China had a pool of well-trained scientists to carry out a systematic study on the celestial world when Greek rulers were caught in the fear of the mystical comets. The ancient civilization of

⁶ N.Y. Danilevskii, p.454.

⁷ N.Y. Danilevskii, pp.382~385.

⁸ N.Y. Danilevskii, p.354.

China was the fertile ground for literature, philosophy and ethics. It is not fair, he said, to treat Chinese culture as incompatible with progressivism despite the historical fact which attested to their innate faculty.⁹ The conventional wisdom that denies any chance for the presence of other civilizations than the German-Roman, he argues, leaves much to be refuted.¹⁰ He placed Slavism at the center of new civilizations to replace a decrepit German-Roman civilization.

Russian expansion toward the East was started against this ideological background and was intensified with the construction of a trans-Siberian railroad started in 1891. In August 1892, Bute, after appointed to the Secretary of Treasury Department, filed a report to Tsar on the significance of the trans-Siberian railroad: “The construction of a trans-Siberian railroad is a monumental event in the world history. It opens a new chapter of the Russian history and will bring fundamental changes in the international economy. It will make it possible to strengthen the Russian military in the Pacific board and place Russia in the vantage ground in trade with the Pacific countries. It will bring various forms of benefits, political, economic and cultural, to both the Western Russia and Siberia. It will widen the horizon for the global expansion of trade.” His optimistic view of the Russian expansion was based on that Russia was accorded not only the vantage ground for activating its role as a mediator between the western and eastern countries but chances for direct trade with Asian countries by sharing borders with them. The trans-Siberian railroad was designed to maximize the geographical advantage of Russia which sits astride between the West and the East. This monumental task dovetailed with his far-sighted industrial plan to offset debts incurred by loans from Europe with earnings from trades with the Asian countries. The Russian expansion

⁹ N.Y. Danilevskii, pp.399~391.

¹⁰ N.Y. Danilevskii, pp.642~644.

toward the East bolstered its process of industrialization. For the success of industrialization, Bite thought, Russia needed both the West as the source of capital and the East as the market for their products. The complementary relationship between the West and the East, mediated by Russia, provided the ground for the Russian Empire to lay out a plan to restructure the world order.

As the railroad construction entered into its third year, Bite placed under the Treasury Department the Special Committee for the Promotion of Trade with Asian countries. He showed a greater concern for trades with China, Korea and Japan in particular for the following reasons. While the heartlands of China and Korea were not easily accessible by the European traders, Russians were favored with easy access. Second, the populations of the three countries, put together, were estimated at four 470 millions and the expected trade volume at 750 million ruble. The three countries offered the market for the Russian products. Third, Moscow asserted itself as the trade center in Russia. With the completion of the trans-Siberian railroad, it would obviously become the trade center for the world. Moscow was expected to be the most prosperous trade center for the Russian products – silks, teas, and furs – to enter the European market and for the manufactured goods from Europe to enter the Asian markets. On 25 October 1893, Bite commissioned Kobeko, Chairman of the Special Committee, to lay out measures to promote trades with China, Korea and Japan. A variety of measures were hammered out to maximize the utility of the trans-Siberian railroad.

The most influential proponent of Russian expansion toward the East was Uhktomskii, a journalist-turned intellectual favorite with the Russian imperial court. His thought was tied up to the Russian alliance with Asia. He was actively associated with Badmaev, a medical doctor resident in Tibet and accompanied the crowned prince, Nikolai, to his tour of the world. As an ardent admirer of Ghinggis Kahn in support of a centralized government, Badmaev made a remarkable contribution to the formulation of an ideological underpinning for the Russian eastward

expansion, with a lavish support given by Bite and Uhktomskii.. In his report filed to Alexander Third on the Russia's Tasks in the East Asia, he set his eyes on the ultimate annexation of China into Russia.¹¹ His policy suggestion struck the chord of Uhktomskii. In relation to China, he warned against a coercive colonial rule; he argues for an approach that would stir Chinese to a voluntary respect for Tsar. The fact that the ruler of Ch'ing China was of the Manchurian origin, however, generated a heated debate on the Russian treatment of the Chinese royal court. Badmav went even so far as to conceive a plan smacking of a gambit, that is, to capitalize on dissident Mongolians and Tibetans who had once dominated China to breed rebellious ferments among Chinese against the Chinese court as a prelude to Russian annexation of China. The implication is that Russia should forestall the European powers in getting into the heartland of China to thwart their predatory thrust. Badmaev succeeded, through Uhtomskii, in persuading Tsar into believing that the future of Russia resided in Tibet, Mongolia and China. At the same time, his risk-taking plot offered a motive for Russians to condemn him as a foolhardy dreamer.¹²

Uhktomskii accompanied Nikolai Second, when he was the crowned prince, in a tour of the world (1890-1891). This tour led him to conclude that the Russian Empire was headed toward a showdown with Britain, regarded as a clash with the European imperialism, and that the former was shouldered with the mission of liberating people from the European colonial yoke. His argument found its manifestation in the Russian protection of Manchurian court. In 1898, Tsar concluded an agreement with Ch'ing China on the proposed lease of Ryusoon and Dairen Uhktomskii was critical of Foreign Secretary Muraviev's divisive policy toward China and suggested the desirability of restoring an

¹¹ B. A. Romanov, *Rossiya v Manchurii (1892-1906)*, Leningrad, 1928, pp.82-88.

¹² I. B. Lukayanov, "Vostochnaya politika Rossii i P.A.Badmaev," *Voprosy Istorii*, no.4, 2001, pp.114-115.

alliance with Ch'ing China that would allow Russia to build the Manchurian railroad hopefully to be connected to the trans-Siberian railroad. His standing for the Russian alliance with Asia survived the occupation, by the allied forces, including Russian troops, of Beijing in 1900 to lift the seize, by Boxer rebels, of the foreign legation quarter. He was unshaken in the belief that Russia should be responsible for mitigating the imperialist-imposed rebellions and stabilizing the social order of Asian countries.¹³ The location of Russia between the West and East activated its role as a mediator in breaking through the stalemate created by the West and East confrontation. Uhktomskii¹⁴ insisted that Russia should have its force reserved to restore the static order of Asia which had been so much disturbed by the predatory expansion of the Western powers. His argument implicates the dictum that Russia set its eyes on the day when it dominates Asia in the way Ghinggis Kahn did in the 12th and 13th century. The Mongolian dominance in Asia set up an uplifting model worth for Russia to pattern after.

2. Europeanism and Russian Alliance with Europe

The major proponent of Russian affiliation with Europe was Soloviev (1853-1900), poet and philosopher. He downplayed the importance of Asian civilizations and justified the imperialistic incursions of the Christian world into a backward Asia. Asian people, according to his view, have shown ethnic-centered proclivity that was expressed in their parochial view of the world and thus denied the opportunities to advance in contrast with the historical progressivism characteristic of Europe. Asians, notably Chinese, indulge in “their culture fit all” and demanded

¹³ E. E. Uhktomskii, *K sobytiyam v Kitae, Ob otnosheniyakh Zapada i Possii k Vostoku*, Saint-Petersbug, 1900, p.1.

¹⁴ E. E. Uhktomskii, *Pered groznym bydyshim, K russko-yaponskomu stolknoveniyu*, Saint-Petersbug, 1904, pp.6~7.

that all heterogeneous cultures should be integrated into one. Russia, adjacent to the Asian continent, has an irrevocable mission to instill in the minds of Asians the Christian values. His remarks warned against a voluntary isolation of Russia from the Western world by reckless confrontations. Russia, according to his prophesy, is destined to clash with China and it is necessary to maintain an alliance with Britain and France which had colonies south of the Russian border.¹⁵

Soloviev hypothesized that Russia would have to shift the gravity of its power to East Asia where it will find a greater share of its influence, should it be impossible to exercise its influence in Turkey. This prophecy was predicated on the Russian affiliation with Europe, and Russian success in the East Asia largely rested on its alliance with Britain in particular.¹⁶ The necessity of concluding a treaty with Britain was advocated for the following reasons. First, discords between Russia and Britain are signs of foolhardy acts, tantamount to showing the schism of a family. Second, Russians are inherently better familiar with the people who gave birth to Shakespeare and Byron than Chinese with yellow skin. It is necessary, therefore, to conclude a treaty that guarded against the escalation of cultural conflicts into hostilities.¹⁷ Soloviev's affiliation with Europe underscores a bond of Russians with the European that is based on the shared Christian values and ethnic superiority both had demonstrated.

Behind Soloviev's standing for the Russian alliance with Europe were two assumptions. One was a strategical advantage to be brought by the Russian alliance with Europe. If the yellow race, with Chinese

¹⁵ B. V. Mezhuev, "Modelirovane ponyatiya natsional'ny interes na primere dal'ne vostochnoi politiki Rossii kontsa XIX-nachala XX veka," *Zhurnal Polis*, no.1, 1999, p.12.

¹⁶ V. C. Soloviev, "Tri razgovora o voine, progresse i kontse vseмирnoi istorii, so vklucheniem kratkoi posti ob antihkriste i s prilozheniyami." *Russkie Filosofiy o voine*, edited by I.S. Danilenko, Moskva: Kuchkovoe Pole, p.143.

¹⁷ V. C. Soloviev, p.144.

constituting the majority, knew that the Russian advance into Asia was supported by Europe, Russia would enjoy wider choices of policy options with regards to Asia. By contrast, a hostile relationship between the two would prompt yellow people to launch armed attacks along borders on Russia. There would be two fronts that would disperse the Russian defensive forces apart over 10,000 verst. Another has to do with a cultural motive which would place Russians in a position to enlighten Asians in tandem with Europeans. Russia enjoys a vantage ground in performing this mission due to its geographical proximity. Viewed from the necessity to breakthrough Asian resistance, the Russian alliance with Europe is an imperative.¹⁸ The necessary condition for thwarting the Mongolian thrust and enlightening Asia was peace in Europe and nothing short of an alliance with Britain guarantees it.¹⁹

It was worthy of attention that Russian foreign policy gravitated toward Soloviev's stand after Russia was defeated in the Russo-Japan War. After the war, Russia was struggling with double imperatives, that is, to maintain a vested share of its influence on one hand and to resist Japan's northward thrust on the other. The evolving situation gave urgency to the establishment of an alliance with Britain which had been hostile to Russia. The conclusion of the Anglo-Russo Convention in 1907 provided a motive for Russia, Britain and France to form an axis of triple entente. Subsequently, the Russian policy toward Korean immigrants turned repressive, as practiced by Unterberger, Governor General in Maritime Siberia.

In his thesis to be brought to light after his death, entitled "Three Pieces of Dialogue," Soloviev sounded a warning knell against a renewed Mongolian invasion into Europe and an imagined phobia of yellow race to be dramatized into reality.²⁰ Yellow phobia turned out to

¹⁸ V. C. Soloviev, p.143.

¹⁹ V. C. Soloviev.

be one of the motives for the birth of a United Europe, representing the very beginning of a scenario galvanizing an effort to be free from an imagined “yellow domination.” The renewal of Mongolian invasion, according to his theory, will bring all European countries into a unified front to resist and raise them to a new height of civilization, far from the traditional one marked by materialistic orientation. He prophesized the arrival of an ultra-national force that would bring Europe in its entirety into a new form of theocracy, uniting Christianity and secular rulers, for the incarnation of utopia. His theory was an outgrowth of an imagined yellow phobia and European superiority, espousing a dialectical process of history leading to a utopia.

The Asia-Europe relationship imagined by Soloviev is divided into two periods; one is the early 20th century which sees a dominant Asia sweeping Europe and the other is the 21st century and thereafter which sees Europe liberated from the Asian yoke and build a united Europe which brings all sectarians of Christianity and secular rulers into a theocratic utopia to continue for a millennium. The Asian barbarianism and belligerence, according to his logics, is the motive for the birth of a millennium utopia. The dissipation of Asian idealism constitutes a stepping stone leading to the arrival of an European utopia, an integrated whole designed to achieve a lofty goal. Asia is referred to as a brutal force and Europe represents a terminal point of human experiments with devices to improve human conditions, that is, the incarnation of a lofty goal. The role of yellow race is well described in his poem titled “Pan Mongolism.” “Pan Mongolism, sounding fierce and brute, turn sweet and soft to my ears. As if it succumbed to a God-intended greater fate befalling us.”²¹

Soloviev defined the 20th century as destined to see the fiercest war,

²⁰ V. C. Soloviev, “Kratkaya povest’ ob Antikhriste” *Russkie Filosofiy o voine*, edited by I.S.Danilenko, Moskva: Kuchkovoe Pole, pp.208~209.

²¹ V. C. Soloviev, p.208.

disputes and coup d'état. The genesis of this massive earthquake, he believed, was in Japan where pan Mongolism was rearing its head in the form of an intellectual movement in the late 19th century. "Pan Mongolism demonstrates its formidable power by uniting Japan with China with a far-pervasive impact on the world." This fear is well described in his thesis; "Japan, so adept in emulating others, is the hotbed for pan Mongolism grown out of the amalgamation of Hellenism, pan Germanism, pan Slavism, and pan Islamism they smattered through the window of foreign experiences. Pan Mongolism is a rallying call to bring all Asians into a joint front to fight their way, under Japanese hegemony, through European resistance.

In the early 20th century, the disorderly world stirred by the European engagement in wars against Islamic countries worked to the advantage of Japan. Ensured of the world's apathy to the Asian continent, Japan colonized Korea, occupied Beijing, overthrew the Manchu government by allying with rebellious progressives, and seated a puppet Manchu regime in its place. Japan also enlisted support from a faction of Chinese conservatives who, given two evil forces, moved in favor of Japan representing a less evil against the Western Europe intent on encroachment into their country. China was driven into a maelstrom to the extent that stirred a fear of an imminent Chinese subjugation to the predatory Western imperialists. Japan was considered a counter-weight to the Western powers gradually tightening their grip on the fate of China. The turning wheel of imperialism brought Christian missionaries to exert a deleterious impact on the spiritual structure of Chinese, and it was the time when a majority of Chinese had turned their back against the Western powers. Confronted with a common foe, conflicts between ethnically similar groups paled into insignificance. Pan Mongolism advanced by Japan, Chinese conservatives thought, would provide an opportunity to remedy all fallacies of their flirting with the Western imperialism. Japan will say to Chinese; "Brothers, we will wrestle arms from the white dogs and put them to rout. The expulsion of white evils

from China will give an opportunity for Chinese to build a nation genuinely committed to serve the Chinese interests. You have been caught up with the fantasy of the Western utopia overwhelming the pride in your own culture and history. The time is ripe for return to a cold head. We will present a path to serving our common interests.”²²

The scenario he set forth unfolds along the following path: “Russia, Britain, France and Germany are all intent to dismember China to erase the vestige of its millennia-long existence. The Chinese acceptance of the warning signals will help to strengthen pan Mongolism. Japan builds a strong navy and move its naval base to China to restructure its military forces in preparation for new challenges. The Japanese military officers replace the European instructors in training Chinese soldiers and invite Mongolians, Tebetans and Manchurians to join the Chinese military forces. Japanese forces, in alliance with the Chinese, launch invasions into Indo-China and incorporate it into its territory by driving out British forces from Burma. These invading hordes are reinforced by marshaling four million in Turkistan, march into the Central Asia and middle and central Russia across the Urals. Russia is incapable of blocking their thrust, although it is possible to mobilize forces from Poland, Latvia and Finland. Outnumbered by the Chinese forces, Russia is sure to be defeated. The Chinese troops march toward Germany, and France, taking advantage of a besieged Germany, launch a retaliatory attack on it. Germany is laid vulnerable to the Asian aggression. Obviously, Germany is defeated at the hands of Chinese. In the meantime, immigrant workers in Paris break into revolt and extend welcoming hands to the marching Chinese. Within one year after the Chinese occupation of Europe, all western countries are reduced into subject states to their master, China.”²³

²² V. C. Soloviev, p.209.

²³ V. C. Soloviev, pp.210~212.

“The Chinese forces go back to the Eastern front, while leaving a segment of the forces to remain in Europe, to launch another attack against the United States and Australia. The Asian occupation of Europe, an apparent reincarnation of Monolian dominance, continue for another half a century, and there is the fusion of the two different cultures in the wake of a cross-infiltration that continues for a good while, heralding the revival of the historical fact achieved by Alexander the Great. The course of events results in (1) a massive movement of Chinese and Japanese workers to Europe, (2) social and economic conflicts caused by the resettlement of working forces, (3) a sustained suppression by the Chinese ruling elite of rebellious elements through the agency of secret police. This causes a succession of European revolts, fueling a sustained movement to win European independence. There is a Europe-wide network of secret police in reaction to the European resistance that gains momentum with the passage of time, with a resultant invitation to the return of Chinese forces to intervene. The inexperienced offspring of the earlier Chinese conquerors are defeated by allied European forces. Earlier, the disintegrated front of European countries led them to be subordinated to China. The new united European front to emerge triumphant over Chinese provides the base for the birth of a United Europe, far removed from the earlier political frame.”²⁴

What is stated above is the summary of “Three Pieces of Dialogue” published in 1900, the year Soloviev died. He earmarked the 20th century in its entirety for a succession of wars. Pan Mongolism that was fermented in the 19th century Japan, he viewed, as the cause for the revival of Mongolian yoke that had been imposed on Europeans in the 13th century. Alliance with Europe, he argues, offers the way to cope with what is expected of the dramatization of a dormant yellow phobia.

Soloviev’s view of historical process was endorsed by S. N.

²⁴ V. C. Soloviev, p.213.

Trubetskoy, a champion of liberalism. He served as chief editor for Saint Petersburg News published by Uhktomskii. Trubetskoy was critical of the immaturity of European diplomacy and he, in this respect, had a shred of anti-Europeanism which accords with Uhktomskii stand for Russian alliance with Asia. However, they were poles apart in explaining what motivated them to take a particular position with regard to the Russian alliance with others. Uhktomskii took an anti-Europeanism stand to seat Tsar in a position to lead the Asian countries. Trubetskoy believed that the surest way to eliminate Chinese threat is to dismember China between European powers and deplored the failure of the European countries to form a united front to achieve this goal, an undesirable result he attributed to the pursuit of their own interests. He pointed out that it was one of the greatest diplomatic misconducts Russia had ever committed that Russia did not do anything to keep Britain from concluding an alliance treaty with Japan, while its diplomacy was shifting its gear to alliance with China.²⁵

Four years after the death of Soloviev, Uhktomskii published a booklet entitled “*The Dangerous Future*” which provides an account of the Russo-Japan War. In this booklet, he pointed out Soloviev’s flawed hypothesis about pan Mongolism. The legacy of Ghinggis Kahn was not passed on to Asians or Chinese but to Russians under the reign of Tsar. Pan Mongolism, whatever it might be, was incapable of inspiring Asians or Chinese to wage a colossal war against the Europeans. Even the catchword “Asia for Asians” failed to capture the passion of Japanese to wage the war. Such passions that were displayed by great conquerors of the world are running in the artery veins of Russians. The Russian Empire is accoutered with a great military leader, an all-time winner of war, and sturdy people, all required for the achievement of this great

²⁵ S. N. Trubetskoy, “*Smert’ V.S.Solovieva 31 iyulya 1900 g. Kniga o Vladimire Solovieve,*” Moskva, 1991, p.294.

mission.²⁶

As Russian expansion toward the East Asia was gaining momentum, the Russian intellectuals agreed on the need for a partner it was to be allied with, but they were split asunder over whom it should be allied with. Some stood for alliance with Asia and others for alliance with Europe. The duality of the Russian perceptions spoke for the agony of Russian intellectuals over the Russian identity which was blurred by sitting astride between the two land masses. Alternation between the two stands is reflected in the Russian policy toward the East Asia. The conclusion of an alliance treaty with China in 1896 was based on the pro-Asian sentiment. This treaty gave Russia the vantage ground for Russian advance into Manchuria. Russia stood on the side of China to thwart the Japanese thrust into China. Contrary to the image of a helper, Russia laid open its predatory scheme by occupying Port-Arthur in 1898 and joining the Western allied forces in suppressing Boxer's rebels and dismembering China. Doing so, Russia implanted the image of a predator in the minds of Asians. The military operations of Russia in China culminated in the seclusion of Russia from Europe and Asia. The seclusion was the result of its own acts responsible for a series of events leading to the defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japan War. Russia failed to play the role expected of a mediator in reconciling the Western predatory expansionism with a static Asia.

III. Integration Policy toward Korean Immigrants

The Beijing Treaty concluded between Ch'ing China and the Russian Empire in 1860 consigned the Chinese territory east of Ussurisk to the latter. The untamed land was invitations to the migration of Koreans, and Korean immigrants received the same treatment as offered to the Russian

²⁶ B. V. Mezhev, p.14.

peasants and were favored in the distribution of land and in their bid to obtain citizenship. The earlier immigration of Koreans to Maritime Siberia was motivated by an urge to avoid the self-perpetuated poverty.

The immigration of Koreans to the Maritime Siberia traces its origin to 1856 when the land belonged to Ch'ing China. Since the land was consigned to Russia after the Beijing Treaty was concluded, it is fair to regard the earliest migration of Koreans to the Russian territory as started in 1860. The migration of Koreans to Vladivostok was made on land or by sea until 1863, but a majority of Koreans, composed of seasonal workers, moved individually to the virgin land in summer and returned in autumn. After 1863, Koreans migrated by family unit, and the first settlement began with thirteen households. In 1864, Korean settlers rose in number to 3,080 in sixty households to be divided into ten settlements. The existing three settlements, Yanchihinsk, Ajiminsk, and Sijiminsk, were created at this time.²⁷ Thereafter, they made their way to the heartland of the Yuzhno-Ussurisk region.

As the number of Korean immigrants increased, various problems were spawned. Major problems were associated with the overt control of the Korean government, chafed to see its citizens move beyond borders, and the increasing number of illegal immigrants. The illegal immigrants included in a large part, deserters subject to legal punishment at home. The Korean government raised issues with the indiscriminate acceptance, by the Russian authorities, of these people. The Korean local governments in the border regions were irritated by inability to collect charges for the issuance of passports and entry visas. On the part of the Russian government in this region, that local Russians were outnumbered by Korean immigrants was the source of apprehension. This led the Russian government to promote a plan to encourage Russian peasants to move to the region. In 1884, the post of governor general was instated to

²⁷ *Russian State Historical Archive of the Far East*, F. 87. Op.1. Delo, 278, Listy, 50-54.

be in charge of administration in Priamur region, and two years later, Tsar instructed the governor general to report on the administrative and judiciary reform plan and the required number of administrators. The total number of population in this region at the time a report was made was 755,993, including 12,050 Koreans and 16,101 Chinese. The number of Russians who had migrated until 1890 was 16,101. For three years since 1883, Russian peasants migrated from Chernikovski with the state support, but the number was 4,710. Migration from Odessa to this region cost 600 ruble per family. Those who moved on their own expense numbered 2,873 and they were better off in this region than those whose migration was financed by the government. An imperial edict was issued to encourage self-supported migration with the promise of 600 rubles of loan to be made available upon arrival in Vladivostok. The loan was to be paid off over thirty three years. This edict was effective in moving 17,000 ~ 19,000 peasants from the Yuzhno-Ussurisk region.²⁸

Much of the far-eastern region remained barren and the cultivation of the barren land was the matter of life or death to the local people. The land was in need of more people. Therefore, a plan was promoted to move prisoners to regions east of Baikal Lake. These new arrivals swelled the population of Zabaikal region. They were simply law violators exiled into Siberia, but their life style was not different from those of the Western Russians.. Of those prisoners, Jewish were marked apart as villains to be guarded against. Normal Jewish in the Western societies were placed under the watchful eyes of people. On this ground, we can imagine how the Jewish prisoners were treated by the new settlers in the virgin lands. Local magistrates filed petitions exhorting the government to stop sending these prisoners. Despite the flow of petitions, the Russian government promoted a plan to set up a Jewish autonomous district in this region. Korean settlers in Maritime Siberia numbered 3000

²⁸ *Russian State Historical Archive of the Far East*, F. 1. Op.1. Delo, 1383, Listy, 4-36.

and the number reached its peak in 1886 and 1887 and began sliding down after those with legal passports were allowed to pass the border. Koreans were not so easily accessible to jobs as Russians were at this time, but they were highly commended for being industrious and hard workers.²⁹

Baron Korf, Governor General, was of the opinion that Russians, among others, should be responsible for the cultivation of these barren lands. His idea was reversed by S. M. Duhovskoy, new Governor General of Priamur, who were in favor of foreign workers, and his assignment to the governorship raised the issue of Korean workers to be looked at in a new angle. Korean workers were favored in the distribution of land and their applications for citizenship did not encounter any problem.. He thought that Korean workers deserved a favorable treatment, for enriched Koreans show a greater loyalty to Russia. Russification of Koreans, he believed, would maximize their contribution to Russian development.³⁰

Even for the Koreans who had resided in the region with Korean citizenship, he was willing to grant them citizenship, should they apply for it., because they were used to the Russian law and administration. The reputed industriousness of Koreans outshined any cause for expulsion. Should they be expelled, it would be the waste of human resources on the part of Russia. Expelled Koreans were liable to reside in Manchuria and their sense of working ethics would enrich the peripheral regions of China adjacent to Russia. Duhovskoy granted Korean residents in border areas – Suiphon and Posiet – Russian citizenship and explored ways to encourage them to stay out. They were entitled to the same shares of land as Russians. Effective from January 1, 1896, the law obligated them to serve corvee and pay taxes whereby they could lay

²⁹ *Russian State Historical Archive of the Far East*, F. 1. Op.2. Delo, 1048, List, 20.

³⁰ *Vsepoddanneishii otchet Priamurskogo general-gubernatora za 1893-1895 gg*, Saint-Peterburg, 1896, pp.28~29.

claim to the same share of favor as Russians were entitled to from the government. Koreans were prohibited to wear a top notch on the top of hairs as a way to hasten their assimilation into Russians. Along with this, Koreans settlements were embraced in an autonomous administration district.³¹

In 1895 there was an oath of allegiance by Koreans in Suiphoon, followed by those in Posiet in 1896 and the oath of allegiance spread to all Korean residents in the Far-Eastern region. It included not only Koreans with Russian citizenship but also those with Korean citizenship. This hastened the formation of collective settlements for Koreans which Duhovskoy believed to encourage more Koreans to move to the Russian territory. From 1894, Duhovskoy allowed Koreans to lease the state-owned land and establish their settlements as far as possible from the borders of Korea, and it was for this reason that new settlements, Alexandrev and Mihailovka , were shaped along the Hor River basin far moved from Habarovsk. Duhovskoy made it easier for Korean residents to obtain Russian citizenship, but he thought that the farther their settlements from their hometown, the better for their assimilation into Russians. As a result of this policy, there were 11,311 Koreans with Russian citizenship, 2,400 with Korean citizenship and 3000 who moved in later, forming the third wave, in 1884.³²

N. I. Grodekov who replaced Duhovskoy continued to follow the suit of his predecessor. In 1898, he organized a special committee to deal with matters related to the settlement of Koreans and Chinese in a professional manner. According to the new provision enacted by the committee, all Korean residents who had lived longer than five years were given Russian citizens and those forming the third wave were

³¹ *Russian State Historical Archive of the Far East*, F. 1. Op.1. Delo, 1317, Listy, 1-10ob, Report on the Administrative Autonomy of Chinese and Korean Societies in the Russian Territory, April 18, 1893.

³² Rich peasants purchased this certificate at 50-70 rubles to reside in different names.

allowed to resettle near Habarovsk. Even those who migrated in 1900 and thereafter were given Russian citizenship. The Russian policy accommodative of Koreans was part of a grand design to expand the share of Russian influence in the Far-Eastern region. The Koreans, by obtaining Russian citizenship, were included among the state-subsidized peasants, and the Russian government intervened into their private life by forcing them to cut off their top notch of hairs. Each family was given a 1.09 hectare of land, and the treatment of Koreans on an equal basis with Russians obligated them to serve corvee and pay tax as Russian did. At the same time, those with Korean citizenship were not allowed to cultivate land. It can be said that the Russian government employed all possible means to expedite the assimilation of Koreans into Russians.

The consistent policy pursued by the two governor generals brought a rapid growth of Korean immigrants to the Russian territory. In 1894 9,980 Koreans moved by sea to Priamur, including 3,995 to settle in Vladivostok and 5,985 forced to move to Amur. In spring, 1895 new Korean settlements came into being at Yuzhno-Ussurisk regions. An official estimation in 1895 placed Koreans at 18,400 in Priamur. Those in Maritime Siberia, estimated at 12,857 in 1891, increased to 32,380 in 1902.³³ The Russian policy in the two decades, 1880-1890, was to make the best use of resourceful Koreans to cultivate the untamed land and to promote the relocation of Russian peasants into the tamed land. The rapid growth of Korean residents brought forth the influx of low-paid workers into cities and resulted in a marked gap between enriched Russian peasants and foreign tenants. The consistent pursuit of accommodative policy by two governor generals, Duhovskoy and Grodekov, in succession, were invitations to the massive wave of immigrants in the early 20th century.

³³ *Russian State Historical Archive of the Far East*, F. 702. Op.7. Delo, 40, Listy, 117-121, The Explanatory Message to Project of Decrees Concerning Chinese and Korean Citizens, Living within Piamursky General-Gubernia, 1901.

IV. Segregation Policy

The accommodative policy of the Russian government toward Koreans turned around to a coercive segregation after the Russo-Japan War in 1905. Exhausted by the war and deprived of energy to advance, the Russian Empire abandoned the policy of expansion in favor of pragmatic policy geared to rapprochement and compromise. A.P. Izvolskii, the post-war minister of Foreign Affairs, moved to conclude a treaty in 1907 with Britain which had remained hostile to Russia. This treaty went a long way to invite the so-called “Triple Entente” which ensured a peaceful milieu for the Tsar government to seek a reformative way out of the vortex it was mired into. The Russo-Britain Treaty might well be considered consistent with Soloviev’s support for Russian alliance with Europe in view of its role in eliminating hostility that had separated the two countries. At the same time, this diplomatic move heralded the turnabout of the Russian policy toward Koreans to exclusiveness and segregation espoused by “yellow phobia” and racism. A policy shift to this effect was manifested in the new policy initiated by P. F. Unterberger, Governor General of Priamur in 1906. He opined that Russians should be the mainstream of immigrants to the new land. His policy was linked to P. A. Stolypin’s agricultural reform (1906-1907) which focused on enriching Russian peasants with a resultant massive migration of Russians from the western Russia. 259,470 Russians moved to the far-flung eastern theatre to be divided into 167,547 (64.57%) in the oceanic board of Siberia and 91,923 (35.43%) in Amur. Along with the migration of peasants, non-farming population, estimated at 23,008, arrived to engage in mining and railroad construction. An official estimation in 1917 placed the total number of Russians and Ukrainians in the Far-Eastern region at 748,300 in comparison with 67,708 in 1882.

Koreans rose in number from 10,761 in 1882 to 100,000 in 1917. According to an official estimation, there were 78,100 Chinese and 4,900 Japanese in 1916. Unterberger were highly speaking of the

industriousness of Koreans but critical of their proclivity to stick together and to build their own state in Russia. An increase in immigrants brought a relative shrinkage of land to be distributed, and this, he considered, was an immovable stumbling block to the Russian attempt to colonize the region. He intransigently opposed the granting of citizenship to Koreans. A given land, he thought, would serve to strengthen their assertiveness to build their own kingdom. The defeat of Russia at the hands of Japanese laid Russians open to another attack. From a defensive viewpoint, it was undesirable to see Koreans increase in number particularly amid the reigning “yellow phobia” since they remained a potential threat to the very existence of Russians.³⁴

Unterberger’s negative perception of Koreans in Russia was first reflected in his epistle addressed to the Secretary of Interior Affairs, dated 8 March 1908. “The victory in the Russo-Japan War entitled Japan to a greater share of its influence in the East Asia. Japan’s rise to lordship over Korea was the factor which repelled Koreans out of the country in ever growing number. The growing difficulty of distributing land to Korean immigrants did not discourage them from coming into the Russian territory. They bypassed the forbidden route to Russia and managed to lease land from the state, landlords, and churches. They cultivate land far flung beyond the reach of the administrative authority. A sizeable portion of Korean immigrants are not peasants by occupation. They started their career as mining workers, and the passage of time enabled them to lease land and to settle down as tenants in the Korean communities.”³⁵

The danger of enlarged Korean communities was made clear on the part of the governor general. First, the Russian policy of the Far-Eastern region focused on converting the sparsely-populated Priamur into a

³⁴ B. D. Pak, *Koreitsy v Rossiskoi imperii*, Irkutsk, 1994, pp.97–98.

³⁵ *Russian State Historical Archive*, F. 394. Op.1. Delo, 37, Listy, 2-3, Priamursky region General-Governor Unterberger’ Report to Minister of internal affairs, 8 March 1908.

densely populated region. The central concern of the Russian government was with immigration-related issues. Even a small piece of land was so precious to a Russian peasant. In case where Koreans secured a vast farmland, the expulsion of Koreans would be so much problematic. An increasing number of Koreans in the Pacific board of Siberia would weaken the position of Russians. Second, the hypothesis that the Russian citizenship of Koreans and their religious conversion to the Greek Orthodox Church would make it a lot easier for them to assimilate was groundless. The majority of Koreans who had lived for longer than 40 years in Yuzhno-Ussurisk region, for example, were bent to retain their ethnic identity and remain secluded from Russian neighbors. Third, should another war break out with Japan or China, their allegiance could not but be questioned. There was a potential danger of prompting them to organize an intelligence network that would favor Japan or China. The integration of Koreans into Russia would work to the advantage of Japan and this was why Japan or China encouraged their people to migrate into the Russian territory. Any policy that favors Koreans with the right to tenant farming would deprive the Russian peasants of an opportunity to become an independent farmer in their own right. The Russian peasant would resign themselves to lethargy, stagnancy and drinking.³⁶

The negative perception of Unterberger had an adverse impact on Koreans who had obtained Russian citizenship. His concern was expressed in his stressing the importance of making accurate family registries of Koreans so that it would make his surveillance easier. Koreans are characterized by a strong tendency to set a great store by land. "Their primary concern is to settle in their own land, and Koreans with Russian citizenship tried to expand their farmland to provide the

³⁶ *Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire*. F. Tikhookeanskii stol, 1896-1908, Delo, 1089, List, 39, Report of Priamursky region General-Governor Unterberger 'Concerning the Korean Problem, 1908.

base for the enlarged communities for Koreans with Korean citizenship. This tendency was an added impetus to Korean immigration.” He found it not easy to eliminate such Koreans. “In reality, it was impracticable to expect cooperation from Russian peasants, since they were more prone to hire low-cost workers. The compelling need for labor forces put them to compete for Korean workers.”

Unterberger further expounds his views about Koreans in the aforementioned epistle. “To convert Priamur into a viable habitat for Russians, it is important to encourage Russian migration to this region. However, the vast land occupied by Koreans make it difficult to expel Koreans to leave room for Russians to settle down. The Russian government will run into a formidable opposition of Koreans with the consequent weakening of Russian resistance. It is almost impossible to russification Koreans. The Korean communities that are ever enlarged by the influx of new immigrants will turn the course of events to the disadvantage of Russia, should a war break out with Japan. The tenant system is discouraging to Russians who dreams of improving their fate. It is difficult to expect Russians to fight with passion and a sense of personal sacrifice to the greater good of the country. Koreans lack allegiance to Russia and it is dangerous to be affiliated with such inert people.”³⁷

The negative attitude of Unterberger was given voice at his meeting with V. V. Grave, a plenipotentiary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, in October 1910. “In no way denying the contribution of Koreans to the cultivation of barren land, the problem is that their occupation of vast land is an invitation to their relatives to migrate and this led to the birth of another Korean settlement. I am not in a position to espouse any policy that distributes land to Koreans, since it does work to the benefits

³⁷ V. V. Grave, *The Chinese, Koreans and Japanese in Priamuskyy Region*, Saint-Petersburg, 1912, p.137.

of Russia. I am not an enemy of Koreans; I simply do not agree with the policies of my predecessors.”

His stand in favor of the Russian benefits enlisted the ardent support of Russian bourgeois whose conservative trend gave a chauvinistic orientation to the policy. The conservative support was made clear in Ryubatovichi’s remarks: “For the last four years, the migration of Koreans into the Far Eastern region is spreading like a contagious disease. The situation has been worsened to the extent that Koreans occupy most of land. A large number of Koreans are illegal immigrants. Russians have completely been excluded from the farm land. Other occupations like trade, manufacturing industry, cottage industry, transportation and what not are turning their helms over to Koreans or Chinese. Koreans are quick to do away with forestry; they burn wood and plant seeds. Having harvested its fruition, they move away to somewhere else. They are a new type of predatory farmers. The places where they lived are left with nothing to be seen.” The Koreans in Posiet are estimated at 30,000. One third of them are illegal immigrants and two third are uncontrollable.” Ryubatovichi advanced a conclusion: “Koreans are the creators of evil. And this evil destroys Russians who are closely associated with them. The presence of Koreans in Posiet colors its history with a sad experience. Koreans are not different from Jewish who refused to be assimilated into Egyptians. Jewish left Egyptians with nothing except making their habitat a waste land. The same is repeated by Koreans in Russia. If they are deprived of land, they will become another Jewish in other fields of work. They will become uncanny traders, should they be driven out of their land, more dismal than yellow peasants. We have to come up with a novel idea about how to expel Koreans out of their settlements.”³⁸

The racist perception of Unterberger manifested itself in a

³⁸ V. D. Pesotsskii, *The Korean Problem in Priamursky Region*, Saint-Petersburg, 1913, p.101.

consistent segregation policy that continued throughout his term of office. He dispatched a strong-worded order to the Military Affair Branch of the Maritime Provincial Government, stipulating the following: “(1) prohibit the granting of the state-owned land to immigrants with foreign citizenship, (2) prohibit the employment of foreigners, (3) replace Korean and Chinese employees in the state-operated firms and profit-yielding projects reliant on leasing the state-owned land, (4) denial of any favor to immigrants until a special plan is laid out to block the influx of yellow races, including Koreans in particular, and (5) additional instatement of police forces, in nineteen police stations, eight interpreters, and police cavalry forces made up of 101 units.” The expense required for the implementation of the order was supposed to come from the tax revenue collected from Koreans and Chinese.

Unterberger’s order was based on the rationale described below. In fifty years, the Russian population will reach 300 million. The western Russia is so much crowded to leave any room for accommodating an increased portion of population. In no way is it possible to colonize other countries. Siberia is the sole palliative to the mounting pressure of population. Taking possession of Siberia and Priarmur is an urgent need. The loss of this region will make it unavoidable to repel a significant portion of Russian population out of the country. The exodus of surplus population will result in the loss of geese which lay golden eggs. By having access to ports along the Pacific board, Russia will be able to export goods aboard ship. Should the ports be handed over to other countries, Russia will be reduced into a subject state to these countries. The major exports are timbers and raw materials produced in the far-flung part of Siberia. Relying the transportation of these materials on the trans-Siberian railroad to Europe is a risky gambit which will deprive Russia of its competitive edge.³⁹

³⁹ Russian State Naval Archives in Saint-Petersburg, F. 418. Op.2, Delo, 292, Listy, 1-9, Report

In 1908 Unterberger organized a consultation body including governors, trade representatives, and key figures representative of Priamur farmers to discuss in a professional manner matters related to yellow races at large and Koreans in particular. He pointed out the undesirability of tenant system for its adverse impact on the government policy to motivate Russian peasants to do shares of their role in activating the economic development of local regions. A specific reference was made to the predatory manner of cultivation, obsessed with short-term benefits. There were 3,360 Russian peasants in Posiet whose land had been shrunk with the massive influx of Koreans. A survey on eight Russian villages and two Korean villages to determine the extent to which they were reliant on tenants in farming disclosed that Korean peasants in the two villages were directly involved in farming, whereas Russians peasants all were reliant on tenants who leased peripheral lands. The Committee was led to the conclusion that the evolving situation gave urgency to a policy that set limits to foreign tenants. This concern was reflected in an action to reduce the foreign employees in the state-operated firms and to dislocate Koreans with Russian citizenship to the northern part of the Pacific board of Siberia and Amur.⁴⁰

This conclusion reflects the protective concern of the state for the interests of its own citizens. The dramatic turnabout of the policy from integration to segregation was a foregone conclusion for the Tsar government which had suffered a humiliating defeat in the Russo-Japan War and the pain of social upheavals. The new policy notorious for segregation and seclusion was the corollary of “yellow phobia” instilled in the minds of Russians. It in a way speaks for the loss of confidence on the part of Russia in coping with the challenges of yellow race and this

of Priamursky region General-Governor Unterberger to Naval Minister Dikov, 24 March 1908(Blizadaishie zadach v dele zakrepleniya za nami Priamurskogo kraya v dele zakrepleniya za nami Priamurskogo kraya).

⁴⁰ B. D. Pak, pp.98–99.

provided the motive for its quest for alliance with Europe. It should be noticed, however, that the Russian desire to be independent was so much marred by alliance with Europe.

V. Conclusion

The Russian policy under Tsar in relation to the East Asia at large and Koreans in particular reflects the duality of perception. First, the defeat of Russia at the hands of Franco-Anglo troops in Crimea reminded the Tsar government of a renewed European hostility against Russians, followed by outcries for the reassessment of its pro-European policy. Anti-European ferments out of the Russian disillusionment with Europe were coincidental to “a great upheaval” that followed the liberation of serfs in 1861. It was against this background that the Russian intellectual circle carried out a variety of discourses on the Russian relation with other countries. At the end of discourses, the intellectual circle was torn apart between Slavism and Europeanism. The former, cognizant of colossal differences between Russia and Europe, asserted the Russian particularity in contrast with the latter which defined Russia as part of Europe with a passionate quest for shared cultures.

A prominent proponent of Slavism was Danilevskii who was critical of Europeanism disguised in progressivism and the flawed definition of Asia as backward and stagnated. He tried to do justice to Asian civilization with specific reference to its creativity and put Chinese and Indian civilizations on par with Greek and Roman civilizations. His theory was the reminder of the lingering European hostility against Russia, and the quest for the Russian uniqueness and creativity motivated him to stand for the Russian alliance with Asia. The proposed alliance with Asia was the motive for Russia, among the Western imperialistic powers, to be the first to conclude an alliance treaty with Ch’ing China in 1896. The theory of alliance with Asia manifested itself in the Russian compassion for the Korean immigrants to the Russian territory.

Thereafter, a variety of policies were implemented to encourage the integration of Korean immigrants to Russians.

Second, the advocates of Europeanism downgraded Asian civilization and justified imperialistic incursions into Asian countries. Soloviev, one of the most ardent proponents of Europeanism, stressed the role of Russia adjacent to China, stigmatized as backwardness and stagnation, in transmitting Christian values to Asian countries in preparation for the destined clashes of civilization. He warned against Russia being secluded from or antithetical to the Christian world. Alliance with European countries, he argues, is an irresistible tide, if Russia is to prepare itself for the global thrust of pan-Mongolism. This stand for Europeanism was reflected in the dramatic turnabout of the Russian policy toward Asia from integration to segregation after the Russo-Japan War. Europeanism provided the ideological base for the Triple Entente involving Britain, France and Russia. "Yellow phobia" reigning after the Russo-Japan War was an added impetus to the pursuit, by the local Russian government, of a coercive and suppressive policy that pained the Korean immigrants.

The image of the Maritime Siberia as the shelter for Korean nationalist activists in their fights against the Japanese colonial power was shattered over the rock of Russia's dehumanized policy. The stage for the Korean nationalist front moved from Siberia to China. Standing in favor of Europeanism implicated Russia in the First World War against its intention. Russia paid dearly for having rubbed shoulders with the European countries in resisting the thrust of Nazis and fascism.