

Chinese Mass Media's Perception of Korea during the Second Sino- Japanese War

Comparative Analysis of Views Taken by
Newspapers Affiliated with the Kuomintang
and the Communist Party of China

LEE Jaeryoung, Dankook University

Journal of Northeast Asian History,
vol. 5 no. 2 (Dec 2008), 121-168

*Copyright © 2008 by Northeast Asian History Foundation. All Rights Reserved.
No portion of the contents may be reproduced in any form without
written permission of Northeast Asian History Foundation.*

Chinese Mass Media's Perception of Korea during the Second Sino-Japanese War

This study attempts to review how China viewed Korea by means of comparative analysis of articles carried by newspapers affiliated with either the Kuomintang (i.e. *Central Daily News*) or the Chinese Communist Party (i.e. *Xinhua Daily* and *Liberation Daily*) during the Second Sino-Japanese War. The focus is made on the view adopted by the Chinese parties concerning the advocacy for unity among East Asians, Korea-related newspaper articles, and the matter of recognizing the Provisional Government of Korea or postwar plan.

The two parties were of one voice in speaking up for the unity among East Asians from the early stages of the Second Sino-Japanese War as they shared the objective of anti-Japan resistance, but it was only an external strategy to emerge victorious in the Chinese revolution. The liberation or independence of oppressed people of neighboring countries was not at the top of their agenda. At first, newspapers affiliated with the Communist Party introduced ceremonies held by Koreans in memory of the March First Movement of 1919 or those killed in anti-Japan struggles as examples of the joint struggle against Japan, but they gradually used them as the basis of advocating the need for a Communist revolution. Newspapers affiliated with Kuomintang started showing a sense of superiority over Koreans in their articles from the Cairo Conference, as they felt confident about their victory in the war against Japan.

Following the end of the Pacific War, the Communist Party remained supportive of Korea's independence, regarding Koreans as friendly neighbors who shared a similar history and fought together against Japan. However, it became sensitive to the Soviet Union's influence and changes in international situation, while maintaining Sinocentrism. Although the Kuomintang government of China provided support for the Provisional Government of Korea, it adopted the U.S. policy toward Asia in an effort to secure a solid status in the international community in the postwar era. Such being the case, there was a considerable gap between the friendly gestures of Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party as expressed by newspapers affiliated with them and real behaviors adopted by them concerning the support for Koreans' independence movement and the recognition of the Provisional Government of Korea.

Keywords: Second Sino-Japanese War, Chinese view of Koreans, *Central Daily News*, *Xinhua Daily*, *Liberation Daily*, Unity among East Asians, March First Movement, Recognition of the Provisional Government of Korea, postwar plan, Koreans' independence movement, United front against Japan, Sino-Korean relations

Chinese Mass Media's Perception of Korea during the Second Sino-Japanese War

Comparative Analysis of Views Taken by Newspapers Affiliated with the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China

LEE Jaeryoung, Dankook University

I. Foreword

Korea and China made efforts to break free from their status as a colony or a semi-colony after they were invaded by Japan and by western imperialist powers in the early 20th century. The struggle in the war of resistance against Japan brought the two countries closer together based on geographical, historical, and cultural relations. The diverse support provided by China was a great help to the Koreans in the struggle for liberation from Japanese colonial rule. However, the sincerity of the intentions of the Chinese government was doubted by the Koreans due to the dual attitude towards the Korean independence movement, the withdrawal of the recognition of the Provisional Government of Korea, and the attempt to place the Korean Restoration Army under Chinese control. It is necessary to examine how the Chinese government looked upon Korea and what kind of plan they had for postwar Korea. The study should look at whether China planned to establish mutually friendly and cooperative relations in recognizing the Provisional Government of

Korea as capable of playing a key role in a Korea that would become independent following liberation. Or whether China planned to return to the traditional protector-protectorate relations which had prevailed under the Sinocentric view of the world during the Second Sino-Japanese War when the two countries looked similar in terms of the outward appearance at least. It is necessary to examine the situation shared by the two countries in the war of resistance against Japan and the struggle for independence, with the focus on the view of Korea taken by the KMT and the CCP, the two groups having formed a Second alliance with each other at the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War.

The evaluation of the Korean and the Chinese views of each other and the exchanges between them in early modern times was influenced by non-academic factors due to realistic constraints, such as the different political systems of the two countries and the ideological confrontations between them. Following the reform of China and opening-up in 1978, the relevant materials became accessible. The normalization of diplomatic relations between Korea and China in 1992 led to active research on the modern history of bilateral relations. Previous studies shed light on the bilateral relations during Japanese colonial rule of Korea, with the focus on the Chinese view of and support of the independence movement carried out by Korean nationalists, including the Provisional Government of Korea and the Korean Restoration Army. They pointed to the duality of the Chinese view of Koreans. This view held a negative perception that the Korean movement had given the Japanese an excuse to invade China and the positive view concerning the formation of a joint front against Japan amid the situational conditions involving China and Japan, the subjective conditions of the Korean independence movement, and the objective conditions of the international situation (Ch'u Hōn-su, 1987; 1989, pp. 281-82). Previous studies used the Chinese proverb, "When the lips are gone, the teeth are cold," to describe Sino-Korean relations. This metaphor was about the Chinese provision of support for the Korean independence movement

and the fact that Chinese approval of the Provisional Government of Korea was based on private ties rather than formal relations due to the different situations of the two countries in the early 20th century (Hu Chunhui, Translated by Shin Süngha, 1978; O Kyōngp'yōng, 1996; Ch'oe Pongch'un, 1997). The role of those engaged in the struggle against Japan (such as the Korean Volunteer Army, or the independence movement of Korean leftists, including the Northeast United Front against Japan) was not properly appraised in the midst of the turmoil caused by the division of the country into two following the liberation from Japanese colonial rule and the fierce ideological confrontation that ensued.

Attempts have been made to shed light on the inherent Sinocentrism that has lasted since the establishment of the Republic of China through diverse channels. These examinations include the transformed Sinocentrism apparent in the way that Koreans and Chinese look at each other through concrete examples, such as the Wanbaoshan Incident and the boycotting of Chinese merchants in Korea in the 1930s (Yu Yongt'ae, 1998; Park Myōnghŭi, 2004; Lee Jaeryung, 2004). However, few studies were carried out on the period of the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), during which the relations between Korea and China developed from an informal and inactive support to an open and positive solidarity. Towards end of the Pacific War, the conflict between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Communist Party of China (CCP) intensified in China. China could not play a substantial role or exercise a particular influence on the postwar fate of Korea and the bilateral relations became less important than before. Only a few relevant studies have been carried out, making it hard to adopt a systematic and diachronic approach to the subject of Korea and Chinese bilateral relations that address the mutual views of each other.

Following the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries, Koreans could gain access to the historical materials kept by the CCP, newspapers, and magazines published in the People's

Republic. Analyses were conducted in earnest of the political, military measures and diplomatic roles adopted by the KMT and the CCP in the 1940s concerning the issue of Korean independence, along with the views of Koreans (Chang Seyoon, 1993 and 1995). Recently, reviews have been made of some of the articles carried by leading Chinese dailies (such as the *Central Daily News* and the *Liberation Daily*) to examine how the Chinese viewed Koreans at the time of the liberation of Korea in 1945 and to define the characteristics of the relations between the two countries as shown by the postwar plan, with the focus on the transformed nationalism of China in modern times (Chang Un, 1995; Sök Kōnguk, 1995; Kim Chihun, 2004, 2006; Lee Jaeryung, 2006).

It is necessary to compare and analyze the newspapers affiliated with either the KMT or the CCP to gain an overall grasp of the Chinese view of and policies towards, Korea in the period following the Second Sino-Japanese War. Concerning the bilateral relations during the Japanese colonial rule of Korea, it is hard to form an objective judgment based on only one of the relevant factors, such as the internal situation of China, the relations between China and Japan, the international situation, and the problems involving the Provisional Government of Korea, all of which were interrelated. Following the Incident of July 7th 1937, the KMT and the CCP joined forces in the struggle against Japan. In the process, the Chinese showed different views and took different measures with regard to Korea, depending on the issue in question. This paper makes a comprehensive analysis of the Chinese view of Korea by comparing the perspectives of the KMT and the CCP-affiliated central newspapers concerning the slogan for solidarity among East Asians raised following the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, the articles concerning Korea (including those on Korea's March First Movement of 1919), the issue concerning the approval of the Provisional Government of Korea, and the postwar plan.

During the period of Chinese resistance against the Japanese invaders, the *Central Daily News* (*Zhongyang Ribao*), the *New China*

Daily (Xinhua Ribao) and the *Liberation Daily (Jiefang Ribao)* were the leading KMT and CCP-affiliated newspapers. The KMT started issuing party newspapers with a national circulation in 1928. In the post-Northern Expedition (1926-1927) period, these papers met 60-70% of the local newspaper requirements. The leading central newspaper of the KMT, the *Central Daily News*, was issued in 12 areas, including Nanjing, Chongqing, and Shenyang (Pang Hangi, 2001, pp.354-356). The articles on Korea had a great effect and played a central role in forming the Chinese (let alone the KMT's) view of Korea. The leading newspapers of the CCP were the *Liberation Daily* (issued in Yanan) and the *Xinhua Daily* (issued in KMT-governed areas). The CCP started discussing the formation of a united front against Japan with the KMT in February 1937 and the KMT allowed the issuance by the CCP of newspapers in KMT-governed areas. As a result, in December 1937, the first issue of the weekly *Qunzhong* was issued in Wuhan, followed by the *Xinhua Daily* the following January. After Wuhan was occupied by Japanese troops in October 1938, the headquarters of the *Xinhua Daily* moved to Chongqing, where the daily was issued until it was stopped by the KMT in February 1947. The *Liberation Daily* (another CCP-affiliated newspaper) was launched by the Party Central Committee in Yanan in May 1941. Both the *Xinhua Daily* and the *Liberation Daily* took great interest in the Korean independence movement. However, the analyses of the relevant situation showed different views from each other due to the differences in the target areas (Liu Jialin, 1995. pp. 274-306).

Notable is that Korea and China did not maintain a consistent political or diplomatic partnership during the Second Sino-Japanese War as inter-country relations could not be carried out on an equal footing due to serious internal strife and confusion. In the 1930s, the KMT led by Chiang Kaishek started to reinforce the status as the central government after accomplishing the goal of national unification following the successful Northern Expedition. The CCP faced a crisis while trying to expand influence through the Soviet movements in rural areas, due to the

guerilla warfare launched by Chiang Kaishek to destroy the Communists. Faced with invasion by Japan the KMT and the CCP held conspicuously different views on priority issues with the former stressing the importance of stabilizing internal politics and the latter giving priority to the formation of the national resistance front against the Japanese. The respective central newspapers publicized internally coordinated political views with the aim of attracting public opinion.

Concerning the Korean issue, the newspapers of each party clearly showed which issues they held shared views on. This enabled researchers to acquire a broad understanding of the relations between Korea and China in that period by checking the views held by each side. It also makes it possible to see the policy directions taken by China in the period ranging from the establishment of the People's Republic of China to the Korean War and up to present. This provides the framework for developing a consciousness to obtain an objective grasp of the changes in the relations between Korea and China caused by the ongoing efforts of China to emerge as a world power and the trend towards new Sinocentrism based on historical facts.

II. Chinese war of resistance against Japan and the advocacy of unity among East Asian Countries

The armed clashes between China and Japan that started with the Marco Polo Bridge Incident on July 7, 1937, appeared to have been settled by the two sides with the signing of the protocol asking for the simultaneous withdrawal of military forces. However, the KMT government led by Chiang Kaishek decided to wage an all-out war against the Japanese troops by mobilizing the central army at the Lushan meeting, because the Marco Polo Bridge Incident was regarded as *casus belli*. From that point, the second formation of the united front between the KMT and the CCP made rapid progress and in August 1937, the Red Army was incorporated into the KMT Forces as the 8th Route Army.

At that time, Chinese mass media highlighted the need for the formation of a united front among East Asians against Japanese imperialism and gave particular attention to the Korean independence movement. Through this action they could inform the world of the reality of the Japanese invasion of neighboring countries. The weekly *Qunzhong* (a CCP-affiliated newspaper) appraised the March First Movement in Korea as a glorious event for Koreans, introducing the Korean armed struggles for independence (which had been stepped up following the September 18th 1931 Incident) and pointing to the fact that the 2nd and 7th Armies of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Allied Army were mostly composed of Koreans. (Xu Dixin, 1938) *Qunzhong* also stressed the fact that many Koreans had joined the Chinese war of resistance against Japan, undaunted by either Japanese threats or conciliatory gestures. Concerning the issue of the Koreans who had settled in Gando (or *Jiandao*) in East Manchuria that was a cause of conflict between Koreans and Chinese, *Qunzhong* said, “Let’s establish an autonomous province for the Koreans in Gando after joint efforts for successful resistance against the Japanese invaders.” (Liang Song, 1938) This was a proposition for the formation of a united front between the Koreans and Chinese in the struggle against the Japanese for the Korean achievement of the right for self-reliant survival.

The advocacy of a united front among East Asians against the Japanese imperialists was mostly made by the CCP. The *Xinhua Daily*, a CCP-affiliated newspaper in KMT-governed areas, stressed that the Korean and Chinese “brethren” should form a united front in the revolutionary war against Japan and introduced the situation of Joseon (a Japanese colony) in detail in the article concerning Korean leader Kim Ku (*Xinhua Daily*, 5 February 1938). It also stressed the need for solidarity among weak countries in East Asia and the Soviet Union in the struggle against Japan and international imperialism.

The strategy of the CCP for the war of resistance was based on the joint struggle involving oppressed nations from the start that stressed the

leading role of Chinese and Koreans in saying, “The decisive victory of Chinese war of resistance and the success of Korea’s national liberation movement can be attained by their formation of a united front in a joint struggle.” (*Xinhua Daily*, 2 March 1940) It also said, “The victory of Chinese war of resistance means a guarantee for Korean liberation. Korean participation in Chinese war of resistance means a way of reinforcing their national liberation.” (*Xinhua Daily*, 29 August 1941) In the ensuing period, the *Xinhua Daily* concentrated on the need to bring about the collapse of the enemy by providing support for the anti-Japan movement waged by the Koreans, Taiwanese, and Vietnamese. In addition, it spread skepticism about the war among Japanese troops, saying, “All the people of China, the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Australia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and particularly Koreans, Taiwanese, Vietnamese, and even Japanese civilians, should form a united front against fascism” (*Xinhua Daily*, 25 December 1941).

In the need for a joint struggle against fascism, the *Liberation Daily* published in the home of the CCP’s revolution carried articles using strongly worded expressions. The East Asian anti-fascism rally held in Yanan under the leadership of Mao Zedong in November 1941 criticized the slogan of the Japanese imperialists regarding the “Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere” and urged all East Asians to form a united front against Japan (*Liberation Daily*, 31 October 1941). Participants in the rally resolved to form an anti-fascism alliance, organize a volunteer army to take part in the battles against the Japanese being waged on the Huabei frontline, and establish Eastern Institute of Nations (東方民族學院) (*Liberation Daily*, 1 November 1941). Organized under such circumstances, the Jinchaji Chapter of the Huabei Korean Youth Association announced that they along with the Chinese youth would play a leading role in an effort to destroy the Japanese fascists (*Liberation Daily*, 21 December 1941). The number of Korean volunteers who joined the 8th Route Army in the war of resistance against Japan increased along with the number of casualties (*Jinchaji Daily*, 13

October 1942). The CCP emphasized the need for friendliness between the countries and said that only the war of resistance against Japan could bring about the true liberation of Koreans and Chinese (*Liberation Daily*, 31 July 1942). The promotion of anti-fascist solidarity by the CCP among Chinese, Koreans, and Taiwanese, along with Japanese workers, farmers, and enlisted servicemen in the promotion of a unified anti-Japanese national frontline was based on the view of the war of resistance against Japan as an extension of a worldwide struggle against fascism following the Marco Bridge Incident.

The advocacy of the CCP of solidarity among East Asians against Japan was intended to help ordinary Chinese people clearly understand the nature of the war of resistance against Japan and distinguish enemies from friends in the war of resistance. The purpose was to spread anti-war sentiment among ordinary Japanese and develop revolutionary organizations in Korea and Taiwan. This was done in an effort to establish a united anti-imperialism and an anti-Japan frontline among ordinary Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, and Taiwanese. It actively utilized the Korean national liberation movement that had continued following the March First (independence) Movement of 1919 in Korea, providing preferential treatment to revolutionaries from Korea and Taiwan with support for those engaged in resistance activities against Japan and reinforced the ideological education of Chinese troops (Shi Simin, 1938). The results of the joint struggle against Japan were maximized through the armed activities of the Northeast Anti-Japanese Allied Army, the Korean Volunteer Army, and the Korean National Front Federation. They were also used as a means of propaganda and education aimed at the public in attempts for a China-led solidarity against imperialism and Japan among East Asians.

The *Central Daily News* of the KMT pointed out that workers and farmers in Korea, Taiwan, and Japan had ultimately suffered more as a result of Japanese oppression and exploitation following the September 18th 1931 Incident, and that the Chinese war of resistance had been

waged since the Marco Polo Bridge Incident on July 7, 1937. It saw the people of weak East Asian countries (including Korea) in the provision of warmhearted support for the Chinese war of resistance as an effort to win independence by joining in the “righteous war” (*Central Daily News*, 15 November 1937). The Korean participation in the Chinese war of resistance was part of the independence movement and contributed to the goal of world peace. Chairman Sun Ke of the Sino-Korea Culture Association who played a leading role in the joint activities in which Chinese and Koreans participated during the Sino-Japanese War period said, “The main purpose of the war of resistance was to establish a permanent peace in East Asia and build solidarity with other countries of the world by driving away the Japanese invaders and making a step towards freedom and independence” (*Central Daily News*, 12 October 1942). Because of the activities of the Sino-Korea Culture Association, a classical Chinese literature course was launched, a Korean language course was started in the Oriental Language School, and courses on issues related to Korea were adopted at national universities in China. Books on Korean history, geography, revolutions, and culture were also published along with frequent lectures on Korean issues (*Central Daily News*, 16 October 1942; Shi Yuanhua, 2007).

At that time, Korean and Taiwanese independence activists were greatly interested in the Chinese war of resistance against Japan. On the first anniversary of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Kim Yaksan, the leader of the Korean National Revolution Party, contributed an article to the *Xinhua Daily* that said, “Koreans and Chinese should form a united front to destroy Japanese imperialism. The oppressed people of Korea, Japan, and Taiwan should join forces to drive away the Japanese fascists” (*The Xinhua Daily*, 7 July 1938). He saw the revolutionary movements in Korea and China as inseparable from each other in both the spiritual and physical sense, and in the respective aims of waging a war of resistance and gaining independence through mutual cooperation (*Xinhua Daily*, 29 September 1940). Foreign Minister Cho Soang of the

Provisional Government of Korea also said that Koreans were one of the leading peoples in East Asia and that the complete independence of Korea should be a top priority as far as establishing a permanent peace in the region was concerned (*Central Daily News*, 18 March 1945).

Liu Qiguang, the Representative of the Taiwanese Voluntary Army in Chongqing, saw the Chinese war of resistance against Japan as an attempt to help maintain universal justice and world peace in addition to being a matter of survival and independence for the Chinese. Following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident he also said that, “China had assigned itself the mission of leading the oppressed peoples of East Asia and liberating them” (*Xinhua Daily*, 9 October 1940). The Representative of Taiwan showed a different perspective from the leaders of the Provisional Government of Korea by stressing the leading role of China in the advocacy of solidarity among East Asians. Ma Yi of the CCP said, “Victory in the Chinese war of resistance will no doubt lead to the success of the Korean revolutionary movement. Likewise, progress in the Korean revolutionary movement will help bring about victory in China’s war of resistance,” this pointed out to the close relevance between the Chinese war of resistance and the Korean struggle for independence (*Xinhua Daily*, 6 July 1940). Liang Hanco (an official in charge of propaganda in the Sino-Korea Culture Association) saw the relationship between the Korean revolutionary movement and the Chinese war of resistance as the union of the liberation of the oppressed peoples in East Asia (either morally or on the principle of nationalism) in a political philosophy known as the “Three Principles of the People.” This philosophy stated that a Chinese victory in the war of resistance was a certainty in terms of geography, economy, and the nature of the revolution (*Central Daily News*, 20 December 1943). It is noteworthy that it clearly stressed a leading role of China in setting forth the Three Principles of the People as the guiding principle concerning the need for solidarity among East Asians, stressing the moral sense of responsibility of China and referring to the Chinese victory in the war of resistance as

the top priority.

In the 1930s and after, Chiang Kaishek put into practice indoctrination programs that focused on the one-party rule of the KMT based on “Three Principles of the People” by Sun Yat-sen. During that time, he did not see the Japanese invasion as an urgent matter that had to be settled on a priority basis and took a passive approach in following the flow of the international situation. The need for solidarity and cooperation among weak East Asian countries raised by the KMT was no more than a hollow slogan. As for Mao Zedong, he said the following about the strategy of the war of resistance,

The victory of China mostly depends on the expansion and reinforcement of its capability, along with the hardships imposed on the enemy and international aid. We can impose hardships on the enemy through our persistent war of resistance on a long-term basis, forcing it to exhaust its energy in a war of attrition. We will also isolate the enemy through diplomatic activities. It is also indispensable to pursue the policy of forming a united front against the aggressors in cooperation with the people of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. The longer Japan’s war of invasion lasts, the more solid the foundations of such a united front become (*Xinhua Daily*, 1 March 1939).

The strategy of Mao Zedong against the Japanese imperialists was to reinforce the capability of China, isolate the enemy through a protracted war, and to secure the isolation of Japan from the international community by establishing a united front against it. Noteworthy is that the CCP intended to form a joint front with ordinary Japanese people, separating them from the fascist government and putting class liberation on a par with national liberation. In the post-Sino-Japanese War period, the CCP worked to establish a united front among East Asians against imperialism by trying to integrate the efforts of Japanese workers, farmers, and enlisted servicemen who were against the war. This

included the independence struggle of Koreans and Taiwanese, with the Chinese war of resistance in the aim of forming a united front among the oppressed minorities based on internationalism rather than on carrying out a national struggle only for the liberation of the homeland, while looking for a chance to form a joint front with the Soviet Union.

During the Japanese colonial rule of Korea, the relations between Korea and China were tipped in favor of China. They were likely to change as required by the situation surrounding China. Likewise, in the relations between the CCP and the Korean independence activists, the revolution in Korea was already defined as one taking place in a peripheral region, while the idea that victory in the Chinese revolution would naturally lead to victory in the Korean revolution was prevalent. Koreans in Manchuria (an ethnic minority in China), had to follow the Comintern's one-party-per-country principle and the Chinese revolutionary line (Kim Changsun, 1989, p.120). The CCP saw the Korean independence movement within the framework of the international united front against Japan and stressed the need for a joint struggle against the Japanese fascists among oppressed East Asian nations. It never gave up on Sinocentrism and wanted Koreans in China to be loyal members (Han Sangdo, 2002, pp. 134-135).

The KMT and CCP-affiliated newspapers highlighted the need for a war of resistance and for a united front against Japan among the oppressed East Asians from the beginning of the war of resistance. The KMT concentrated on uniting the capability of oppressed East Asian countries in of waging a war of resistance against Japan into one combined effort, with the nationalist government playing a central role and adopting the "Three Principles of the People" as a guiding principle. By contrast, the CCP stressed the importance of a people's revolution through the formation of a united international front against fascism among Chinese, Koreans, Taiwanese, and Japanese. After all, the advocacy of a united front among East Asians by both the KMT and CCP-affiliated newspapers was part of the strategy for reaching the

shared objective of saving the homeland from Japanese invaders and ensuring the ultimate victory of the Chinese revolution, although they spoke for the liberation of all oppressed East Asians.

III. Chinese View of Korea in Chinese articles on commemorative ceremonies

Both KMT and CCP-affiliated newspapers carried articles about Korea, and particularly about the ceremonies held for the March First Movement in Korea, National Humiliation Day (referring to 29 August 1910, the day on which Korea seceded sovereignty to Japan), the June 1926 independence Movement, and commemorative ceremonies for Koreans who died during the independence movement. With the Chinese waging a struggle of resistance against Japan in earnest jointly with other oppressed East Asians, the Chinese mass media paid considerable attention to the March First Movement in Korea, which showed continuing involvement of Korea in the independence movement in the face of harsh Japanese oppression.

In March 1931, the *Central Daily News* carried an article about a ceremony held by Koreans to commemorate the declaration of independence made in March 1919 for the first time since the establishment of the KMT government in Nanjing (*Central Daily News*, 2 March 1931). In March 1933, the daily commented in an editorial on the significance of the Korean independence movement and stressed the importance of unity among the movement activists based on the lessons taught by the Xinhai Revolution of 1911 (*Central Daily News*, 2 March 1933). In the following year, the daily went so far as to print the contents of the speeches made by the leaders of the Provisional Government of Korea, including Kim Ku and Cho Soang, as well as an article about the ceremony held by Koreans in commemoration of the March First Movement in Korea (*Central Daily News*, 2 March 1934). In the ensuing period, the daily did not carry an article about the ceremony held by

Koreans in commemoration of the March First Movement in Korea for some time.

In the period following the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, the respective press coverage by the KMT and the CCP of the March First Movement in Korea differed considerably, with the CCP-affiliated newspapers taking a more positive attitude. After the first article on the March First Movement in Korea appeared in the *Xinhua Daily* in 1938, the number of articles on the movement showed a steady increase every year; 11 in the *Xinhua Daily*, 11 in the *Liberation Daily*, and three in the *Central Daily News* in 1943 (Liu Jinzhi, 1999). The high interest expressed by both KMT and CCP-affiliated newspapers in the March First Movement in Korea indicated the importance attached by them to the joint struggle against Japan and the symbolism of the movement as an example in connection with the Chinese war of resistance. The Chinese view of the March First Movement in Korea appearing in both the KMT and the CCP-affiliated newspapers changed.

In 1938, on the occasion of the 19th anniversary of the March First Movement in Korea, the *Xinhua Daily* carried a long commentary on the independence Movement. Concerning the background to the movement, it pointed to the harsh colonial policy of Japan, including the relentless control of the military police and the regular police, and the economic exploitation of Koreans as slaves. It also said that the movement was influenced by the principle of national self-determinism declared by American President Woodrow Wilson, and stimulated by the continued struggle by brethren both in and out of the country. Concerning the significance of the movement, the daily spoke highly of it, saying that it had dealt a severe blow to the Japanese colonists, had displayed the Korean spirit and Korea's ability to achieve independence and self-reliance, and had set an example for the Chinese to follow in their struggle for national liberation (*Xinhua Daily*, 1 March 1938).

In 1939, the *Xinhua Daily* carried an article urging the formation of a united front among the oppressed East Asian peoples against all

aggressors. It stressed the significance of the March First Movement in Korea had for the Chinese, and argued the need for the formation of a united front (ideally with the participation of the Soviet Union) against fascism and for national liberation through the Chinese war of resistance (*Xinhua Daily*, 28 February 1939). It also called for the formation of a united front among the enlisted servicemen of China and Japan and the peoples of Korea and Taiwan, and stressed the need to inform the whole world of the Chinese war of resistance in cooperation with the people of the oppressed East Asian countries in China. It also talked about the need to hold international rallies against the Japanese aggressors in cooperation with ethnic Chinese all over the world (*Xinhua Daily*, 1 March 1939).

Concerning the background to the movement, in contrast with what it had said before, it stressed the characteristics as a people's movement. It stated that Koreans were stimulated by the Xinhai Revolution of China, the victory of the socialist revolution in the Soviet Union, and the emergence of independence movements in small and weak countries in Asia and Africa in the post-WWI period. It also saw the socialist movement started in 1923, the establishment of the Great Korean Independent Labor League in 1925, the Kwangju Student Demonstration in 1929, and the Wonsan General Strike and the launch of the Shin'ganhoe (New Trunk Society) in 1930 in the context of the people's movement and the movement for the formation of a unified national front. It also introduced Korean (i.e. the Northeast Anti-Japanese Allied Army, the Korean Volunteer Army, and the Korean Revolutionary Army) participation in the Chinese war of resistance against Japan in the period following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident (*Xinhua Daily*, 1 March 1939). The CCP was engaged in proactive propaganda, publicizing the need for the Chinese war of resistance and international significance in press reports on ceremonies held in commemoration of the March First Movement in Korea. It placed Chinese war of resistance against Japan, the national liberation movement of Koreans and Taiwanese, and the

anti-war movement of ordinary Japanese firmly within the framework of the anti-fascist movements carried out by East Asians.

In 1940, it introduced small events held nationwide in commemoration of the March First Movement in Korea (*Xinhua Daily*, 1 March 1940). It analyzed the background to the movement, the causes of the failure, and the significance in the form of expert commentaries. It pointed to the following four factors as the causes of the failure of the movement. First, the absence of a revolutionary class party: It said that, while farmers accounted for a majority of the population in the economically backward nation, landowners enjoyed a dominant position under the protection of the Japanese colonists. The capitalist class lacked political or economic capability, and the number of those belonging to the proletariat was too small to push ahead with the revolutionary strategies of their own party. The movement ended in failure due to the small proletarian class and the lack of a liberal party, such as the communist party, to lead them. Second, the lack of revolutionary ideologies: It said that the leaders of the March First Movement in Korea only attempted to appeal to people's patriotism as members of an organization characterized by feudalism and religious faith. Third, it stressed the lack of ability to use revolutionary power through international solidarity. Fourth, it pointed to Korean inferiority in terms of objective capabilities, compared to the power of Japan (*Xinhua Daily*, 28 February 1941). The CCP pointed to the need for a communist revolution by concentrating on the causes of the failure of the movement rather than on the symbolism of the unified national front as a leading movement.

The *Xinhua Daily* saw that a new change had occurred in the modern revolutionary movement of Korea that included the emergence of liberal and populist organizations through the March First Movement in Korea. Following the movement, it said that, the socialist movement had started with the launch of national-scale organizations, which had led workers and students through political and economic struggles. It spoke

highly of the Korean Volunteer Army and the Korean Youth Battlefield Mission Corps that fought bravely on the frontlines in China. I called them, “our dear friends and faithful partners who displayed the spirit of internationalism in their participation in the Chinese war of resistance against Japan,” in analyzing the Korean March First Movement from the perspective of the national liberation movement and the communist movement (The *Xinhua Daily*, 1 March 1940). The March First Movement in Korea was used by the CCP as a propaganda tool concerning the need for a unified front against Japan and the need to support the revolutionary communist movement.

In 1941, both the *Central Daily News* and the *Xinhua Daily* carried an article concerning the events held by the Provisional Government of Korea in commemoration of the movement and the Letter to the Korean Brethren in China. The Provisional Government of Korea stressed in the letter that the Korean Volunteer Army and the Korean Restoration Army were achieving a great deal by participating in the war of resistance against Japan thanks to the support of the Chinese government and people, drawing attention to the substantial results of the joint struggles waged by Koreans and Chinese (*Xinhua Daily*, 1 March 1941). However, the *Central Daily News* reported on specific events, rather than showing a friendly and positive attitude by citing the entire text of the announcements made by the Provisional Government of Korea or making a commentary, as the *Xinhua Daily* had done. This revealed the differences in the way the KMT and the CCP viewed the March First Movement in Korea (*Central Daily News*, 1, 2 March 1941; *Xinhua Daily*, 1, 2 March 1941).

The Pacific War (which started when Japan launched a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor) had an immediate impact on the Second Sino-Japanese War, capturing international attention and greatly changing the status and role of China in the international community. In the midst of such a change, China became optimistic about an inevitable victory in the war of resistance against Japan, and began to think about how the

international order in East Asia should be organized, including the future of Japanese colonies, such as Korea and Taiwan. The Korean independence movement activists in China sought internal unity, stressing the national legitimacy as descendants of Tan'gun (the legendary founder of the Korean nation) in step with the development of a favorable situation. They also coped with the changes in the situation both in and out of the country by reinforcing the capability for armed struggles and expanding the organization of the Provisional Government of Korea (*Xinhua Daily*, 1 March 1942). They felt that the only proper way to win the complete independence of Korea (the key to the settlement of the East Asian issues) was to enhance the status of the nation in the international community. The goal was to establish a balance of power in the region by building up the internal capability of the Korean Provisional Government and the participation of Korea in the Pacific War.

Right after the commencement of the Pacific War, the Chinese mass media took more interest in the Korean independence movements. The matter of approving the Provisional Government of Korea was discussed in earnest. In the reappraisal of the Korean independence movement, they said that the movements carried out prior to the March First Movement in Korea consisted of scattered and isolated actions carried out by a small number of activists. Whereas those actions following it were well organized and showed populist characteristics, drawing the participation of a wide range of workers, farmers, ordinary people, and young people that included students. They also paid attention to the fact that the revolutionary sectarian organizations that had emerged spontaneously had all been assimilated by nationalist or socialist movements, while modern revolutionary political parties were being organized in place of them. The struggle of revolutionary theories was taking place in the post-March First Movement period and completely vanquished the vague or ambiguous patriotism and the anti-Japanese ideology. This shift was coupled with the wish for the restoration of

statehood and inaccurate political views in the sector of political ideology (*Xinhua Daily*, 1 March 1942). The Chinese mass media saw that the March First Movement in Korea served as a turning point for the Korean independence movements to become populist organizational movements and socialist movements spread as a result (*Central Daily News*, 24 February 1942; *Xinhua Daily*, 1 March 1942).

The *Xinhua Daily* referred to Koreans as “China’s brotherly people”, saying that the March First Movement in Korea was the starting point for a Korean national democratic revolution and could be compared to the May March First Movement in China. It gave advice to Koreans, saying that unity among Koreans in foreign countries was a top priority in consideration of the experience of the Xinhai Revolution in China (*Xinhua Daily*, 28 February 1942). Changes in the international situation following the start of the Pacific War caused the Chinese to take a more positive and proactive stance on the Korean issue. Speeches made by Chinese people, such as Ma Chaojun, Huang Shaogu, Shao Yulin, and Wang Pengsheng, at Korean ceremonies held in commemoration of the March First Movement in Korea displayed a friendly view of Korea and a determination to promote greater solidarity with Korea. The Koreans were referred to as brethren and it was said that it was necessary for the peoples of the two countries to cooperate more closely, expressing the hope that arms would be supplied to the Korean independence movement (*Xinhua Daily*, 1 March 1942).

As for reports by the *Central Daily News* on ceremonies held in 1942 in commemoration of the March First Movement in Korea, it showed increased interest in the Korean issue and discussed it in greater detail than before, although the CCP-affiliated newspapers were more proactive in the reporting (*Central Daily News*, 2 March 1942). All the CCP-affiliated newspapers (both central ones, such as the *Xinhua Daily* and the *Liberation Daily*, and provincial bulletins) carried articles concerning the March First Movement in Korea (*Jinchaji Daily*, 4 March 1942). CCP-affiliated newspapers advocated international solidarity

against fascism and provided information on the scheduled events commemorating the March First Movement in Korea, reporting on the scenes, commemorative speeches made on the event day, and introducing the significance of the movement in editorials and commentaries.

The Chinese reports on the March First Movement in Korea in 1943 showed a dramatic increase from the past in terms of volume, with the CCP-affiliated mass media taking a proactive stance. At the ceremonies held in 1943 to commemorate the movement, many dignitaries from both the KMT and the CCP (such as Zhang Ji, Shao Lizi, Gu Weijun, Zhu Jiahua, Zhou Enlai, Tao Xingzhi, and Wang Yisheng) attended, showing that they were taking a greater interest in the Korean issue. Gu Weijun, the Chinese Ambassador to the United States said, “Korea is a country that has a very long history, and the Koreans are our brethren. We are closely related to each other, as lips and the teeth are. The joint struggle waged by Chinese and Koreans against Japan is a way to liberate humanity” (*Xinhua Daily*, 2 March 1943). There were many other articles introducing the significance of the March First Movement in Korea and advocating the formation of a united front between China and Korea against Japan (*Liberation Daily*, 1 March 1943).

The *Central Daily News* and the *Xinhua Daily* made frequent reports on the resistance activities against Japan carried out by the Korean National Revolutionary Party and the Korean Restoration Army, describing them as good examples of the joint struggle of Koreans and Chinese. The CCP-affiliated press introduced the Korean National Revolutionary Party’s platform, policies, and activities in detail, while KMT counterparts focused on the activities of the Korean Liberation Army (*Xinhua Daily*, 26 February 1943; *Central Daily News*, 26 February 1943). It is noteworthy that, unlike in the past, the *Xinhua Daily* envisaged a bright future for the Korean national liberation movement due to the unity displayed by independence movement activists. Seeing that the Provisional Congress of Korea had passed a

resolution on the unity of the various parties and factions at the 34th session, the CCP expressed expectations regarding the role of the Provisional Government of Korea, saying, “We are sure that the Provisional Government of Korea will be the basis of the revolution in that country. We also expect that more democratic countries of the world will approve it.” It also asked the provisional government to carry out more proactive activities in Korea, as the progress of the national liberation movement would ultimately depend on the situation of the domestic revolutionary movement (*Xinhua Daily*, 1 March 1943). This shows that the CCP focused attention on the Korean issue on the need to invigorate the revolutionary movements in Korea, and that the major interest of China was shifting to the question of how to settle the overall situation in East Asia after the Pacific War.

At that time, the Yanan-based *Liberation Daily* carried many articles on the March First Movement in Korea. It proposed that Koreans should “establish a party composed of Marxist/Bolshevik revolutionary activists in compliance with the flow of the times and form a united national front against Japan” (*Liberation Daily*, 1 March 1943). This shows a shift in the view of the CCP over the Korean independence movement from that of a national liberation struggle to that of a class liberation struggle.

In 1944, press reports in China on the March First Movement in Korea showed that, compared to the past, the *Central Daily News* was taking a more proactive stance, while the relevant press reports of the CCP were becoming noticeably inactive. In an editorial concerning the anniversary of the March First Movement in Korea, the *Central Daily News* said, “1944 will be the year in which Japan’s defeat is decided. The three Allied Powers have made a joint guarantee for Korea’s freedom and independence,” showing that it regarded the Cairo Declaration of December 1943 as a guarantee for the independence of Korea. It said, “As a result of the first Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), Korea was occupied by Japan, whereupon Japan started looking for an opportunity

to occupy Manchuria. Eventually, the national revolutionary movements in China and their counterparts in Korea made progress in lockstep with each other, winning the Allied Powers' approval" (*Central Daily News*, 1 March 1944). This showed that the Chinese saw Korean freedom and independence as a process of the Chinese national revolution and the Korean Peninsula as a gateway for the Japanese invasion of the Asian Continent. The aim of the Chinese government was to "restore the lost land and maintain Sinocentrism," in blocking Japanese threats that were doing harm to the security of the Asian Continent. It held the view that the Chinese national revolution could not reap ultimate success without Korean freedom and independence.

In 1944, press reports in China on the anniversary of the March First Movement in Korea also dealt with expected problems concerning the Korean issue in the postwar period. They made a proposal that the groundwork for peace in East Asia be laid by uniting the Korean independence movement activists under the leadership of the Provisional Government of Korea and ensuring cooperation with China. They also asked the Allied Powers for the large-scale supply of arms so that the anti-Japanese guerrillas could engage in operations in cooperation with them (*Central Daily News*, 1 March 1944). Following the Cairo Conference in December 1943, the KMT government of China led by Chiang Kaishek saw a heightened status in the international community, confidence in securing victory in the Second Sino-Japanese War, and expectations to play a leading role in the settlement of the overall situation in East Asia in the postwar period.

The reports made by CCP-affiliated newspapers on the March First Movement in Korea were shorter in 1944, apparently because of the dominant position of the KMT both in and out of the country. They based optimism concerning Korean independence on the favorable international situation that had emerged following the Cairo Conference, stressed the importance of continued unity among friends in the struggle against Japan, as well as introduced the successful activities of the

Korean independence League and the Korean Volunteer Army to readers. Concerning the future of Korea, they expressed opposition to the trusteeship of the country to foreign powers and called for the democratic countries of the world (including the United States) to recognize the Provisional Government of Korea (*Xinhua Daily*, 1 March 1944; *Jinchaji Daily*, 1 March 1944).

In 1945, press reports in China on the March First Movement in Korea stressed the importance of unity among Korean independence movement activists, rather than commenting on the background to and significance of the movement or advocating solidarity between Koreans and Chinese in the armed struggle against Japan as they had done before. On 1 March 1945, they printed a report on the declaration of war against Germany by the Korean Provisional Government made on the previous day, rather than carrying articles on events commemorating the movement (*Xinhua Daily*, 1 March 1945; *Central Daily News*, 1 March 1945). In the commentary on the March First Movement in Korea, the CCP pointed to the unarmed and non-organizational status of the movement as the reason for failure, predicting that the revolutionary capability of Korea would be reinforced within two or three years (*Liberation Daily*, 3 March 1945). Both the KMT and CCP-affiliated newspapers showed interest in how to settle the Korean issue and expected political hegemony on reports on the March First Movement in Korea, a few months prior to the end of the war.

Press reports in China also covered stories concerning the anniversary of the Korean independence movement organizations in China, such as the Provisional Government of Korea, the Korean National Revolutionary Party, and the Korean Volunteer Army. Frequent reports were made on the annual ceremonies held in commemoration of the troops of the Korean Volunteer Army killed in the war of resistance against Japan. The CCP was very proactive in making reports on such ceremonies, referring to those who had set an example for others to follow. Local Chinese party members, politicians, uniformed soldiers,

and civic organizations jointly held funeral ceremonies for such people. Usually, high officials of the CCP headquarters and Chinese, Korean, Taiwan, and Japanese organizations attended such ceremonies, renewing a resolve to wage an anti-fascist struggle (*Xinhua Daily*, 28 February 1942). Press reports on funeral ceremonies for those killed in the fight against Japan spoke highly of the sublime internationalism they displayed in helping in the national liberation war of China and the heroic patriotism they showed for their homeland. The CCP-affiliated papers placed more emphasis on the national liberation war of China (*Liberation Daily*, 20 September 1942). They said that the indomitable spirit of struggle shown by Korean activists should be taught to ordinary Chinese as an example to follow (*Xinhua Daily*, 29 August 1942).

The authorities in of the Jijinluyu district (冀晉魯豫邊區) instructed that the facts concerning the heroic acts of Koreans for example, be introduced in textbooks for students, and promulgated an ordinance requesting the protection of Koreans in Japanese Army-occupied areas (*Jinchaji Daily*, 30 April 1943). They also welcomed Koreans wishing to move out of Japanese Army-occupied areas, providing support for the needy (*Xinhua Daily*, 10 January 1943). The policy of the CCP towards Koreans was focused on the formation of a united front against Japan in the name of anti-fascism through battles and various ceremonies, including funerals and the positive engagement of Koreans in Japanese occupied areas. However, reports by the *Central Daily News* on commemorative ceremonies were mostly issued just for creating an image, as the KMT government of China seemed fully confident of victory in the war following the Cairo Conference in December 1943, and acted as if it were a guardian of the Korean people.

IV. Issue of recognizing the Provisional Government of Korea and the postwar plan

Following the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Provisional

Government of Korea made efforts to obtain the recognition of the international community, setting it as a top priority. In March 1941, it asked the United States President and the governments of China, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union to approve it, to commence diplomatic relations with it, to increase United States aid to China and Korea in the fight against Japan (including military supplies, and engineers), and to allow Korean representatives to attend peace conferences and international organization meetings (Im Kyesun, 1987; Hong Sunok, 1989; Kim Hüigon, 2004) (*Xinhua Daily*, 29 August 1941). Speaker Kim Kiwon of the Provisional Congress of Korea, asked for the prompt approval of China of the Provisional Government of Korea, stating that the internal strife among independence movement activists had been settled at the periodical session of the Congress on October 15, 1941 (*Xinhua Daily*, 3 October 1941). He also asked the Chinese mass media to urge the governments of friendly countries to promptly recognize the Provisional Government of Korea (*Central Daily News*, 3 October 1941).

In the period preceding the start of the Pacific War, the KMT government of China remained skeptical about the approval of the Provisional Government of Korea, pointing to the qualifications and abilities of members. It continued though to provide financial aid to it from the end of 1941 in consideration of the personal reputation of Kim Ku and the long-maintained bilateral relations.

On the 23rd anniversary of the establishment of the Provisional Government of Korea in April 1942, the issue of the approval of the Provisional Government of Korea drew the attention of the Chinese press (*Xinhua Daily*, 10 April 1942). In November 1942, leaders of the Provisional Government of Korea met a team of British delegates visiting China and asked for prompt national recognition (*Xinhua Daily*, 27 November 1942). On the first anniversary of the start of the Pacific War, Chairman Sun Ke of the Sino-Korea Culture Association said, “We must restore Korea to its status as an independent country right after defeating the enemy in order to establish permanent peace in the Pacific

region. The Allied Powers should approve the Provisional Government of Korea promptly, and Koreans should continue to make efforts to destroy Japan” (*Central Daily News*, 9 December 1942; *Xinhua Daily*, 9 December 1942). In December 1942, the KMT finalized a plan to approve it ahead of all other countries in the world. Later in a press interview held in London, KMT government Foreign Minister Soong Tseven said, “Upon the defeat of Japan, we will recover Manchuria; and Taiwan and Korea will become independent countries. The Chinese understand that recently Britain and the United States gave up all vested rights in China.” This indicating that China would play a leading role in the establishment of a new international order in East Asia after the end of the war and made it clear that the Korean issue would be handled separately from those of the northeast regions of China and Taiwan (*Central Daily News*, 6 August 1943).

After the start of the Pacific War, the United States regarded China as a major ally in the war against Japan and paid increased attention to the possibility of using it as leverage against the Soviet Union in the plan to reorganize the postwar international order. President Theodore Roosevelt included China as one of the co-signatories of the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting held in Moscow in September 1943 and raised the status of China to one of the four leading powers in the world. The Cairo Conference held in December of the same year again raised the status of China in connection with the United States plan for the postwar world.

The *Central Daily News* of November 29, 1943, made a report on the Cairo Conference. On December 5 it became the first news media to report on the result of the meeting (i.e. the guarantee made by the leaders of the three leading powers of the United States, Great Britain, and China) for Korean independence after the end of the war. The report said, “Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek personally attended the Cairo Conference and achieved a great success. The leaders of China, the United States, and Britain guaranteed Korean freedom and independence through a communiqué, disclosing the concrete policy of the United

States and Britain towards Asia in the postwar period for the first time.” The daily said that the Provisional Government of Korea should pay attention to the revolutionary movements within the country and participate in the invasion of the Japanese mainland by Allied Powers, while the Allied Powers should approve the Provisional Government of Korea promptly so that it could build the leadership towards the people (*Central Daily News*, 5 December 1943). The KMT government of China disclosed the intention to help Korea become an independent country and help the Provisional Government of Korea gain homeland leadership in the process of reorganizing the postwar world order.

At the Cairo Conference, Chiang Kaishek provided firm support of Korean independence and volunteered to assume the role of a guardian and spokesman for Korea. Chiang Kaishek (who made his debut on the stage of international diplomacy with United States support) paid full attention to having Korean independence guaranteed. In contrast, Theodore Roosevelt thought that Korea should go through a certain period of trusteeship before gaining independence. Winston Churchill objected to the early independence of Korea in consideration of the British position towards existing colonies (Ku Taeyŏl, 1995. p.109). The problem was that Chiang Kaishek was limited in what he could do on the diplomatic stage, as he relied heavily on the support of Theodore Roosevelt. In the end it was agreed that Korea would be allowed to gain independence “at an appropriate time”.

China at that time concentrated on combining the capability of the Korean independence movement with that of the Allied Powers, taking advantage of the favorable international situation formed after the Cairo Conference. The *Central Daily News* foresaw that Japan would be defeated by the end of 1944 and that the freedom and independence of Korea would be based on the joint guarantee by the three leading powers. It said that Koreans should continue to engage in the struggle against Japan for freedom and independence, as the struggle against Japan was the aim of the Korean revolution and the key to the Chinese revolution

(*Central Daily News*, 1 March 1944).

With national independence becoming an established fact through the Cairo Conference, the Korean independence movement factions rapidly closed ranks under the leadership of the Provisional Government of Korea. At the 36th session held on April 20, 1944, the Provisional Congress of Korea amended the Provisional Constitution to reinforce the rights of the President and Cabinet members and increase the number of Vice Presidents to two. It put priority on the unity of various political factions and the establishment of democratic centralism. The Korean independence Party, the Korean National Revolutionary Party, and the Korean National Liberation League openly expressed support for the Provisional Government of Korea led by President Kim Ku (*Central Daily News*, 26 April 1944). At that time, both the KMT and CCP-affiliated newspapers recognized the Provisional Government of Korea as representing Korea. However, the KMT paid attention to the Provisional Government of Korea, the unity of various factions under the leadership of Kim Ku, and the restoration of the leadership, while the CCP emphasized democratic centralism and the formation of the unified national frontline against Japan (*Xinhua Daily*, 26 April 1944).

Concerning the idea of restructuring the Provisional Government of Korea, even the KMT members of the Sino-Korea Culture Association took a very positive attitude. Sun Ke foresaw that Korea would win independence earlier than previously thought, through the reinforced leadership capability of the Provisional Government of Korea after the reorganization and the unification of all factions. Sun Ke said that the freedom and independence of Korea was one of the aims which the democratic countries sought to achieve through participation in the war against Japan, and that the Allied Powers could strengthen the combat capability against Japan by quickly approving the Provisional Government of Korea (*Xinhua Daily*, 29 May 1944). Shao Lizi, the Upper House Chief Secretary of the KMT said that all those in China and among the Allies who were interested in Korean affairs wished for the

unity of Korean political organizations, stressing that this would be a sure way to guarantee the victory by the Allied Powers (*Central Daily News*, 29 May 1944).

The Chinese people stressed the importance of unity among the Korean independence movement activists more than anything else in the reorganization of the Provisional Congress of Korea. Sun Ke expressed a deep faith in the capability of the Provisional Government of Korea in the struggle against Japan and urged the Allied Powers to approve it. Wang Pengsheng appeared to note the continued relations between Korea and China in early modern times and thereafter by comparing the Korean independence movement with the revolutionary process in China. Generally, the reports of *Central Daily News* on Korea in the post-Cairo Declaration period were characterized by very detailed, positive, and optimistic views.

In 1945, the *Central Daily News* carried the requests made by the Korean independence movement leaders for the approval of the Provisional Government of Korea more often than before. At the San Francisco Peace Conference, the Provisional Government of Korea set up an 8-member delegation headed by Syngman Rhee to inform other attendees of the current situation of Korea as a colony of Japan (*Central Daily News*, 19 April 1945; *Xinhua Daily*, 27 April 1945). They did their best to inform others of their long-term plan for struggle against Japan. They also tried to win legal status as part of the Allied Powers, which the United States rejected (*Central Daily News*, 13 May 1945; *Xinhua Daily*, 14 May 1945). Han Kilsu, the Chairman on the Korean side of the Chinese-Korean People's Association asked for the clarification on the position of the United States State Department on the issue of Korean independence among the items contained in the Cairo Declaration, but to no avail (*Central Daily News*, 22 May 1945). As for the rumor that the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union had decided to put Korea under the sphere of influence of Soviet Union after the end of the Pacific War at the Potsdam Conference, the United States State Department

denied it (*Central Daily News*, 23 May 1945). Both the KMT and CCP-affiliated newspapers carried articles denying the existence of such a decision (*Central Daily News*, 28 May 1945; *Xinhua Daily*, 28 May 1945). The CCP-affiliated papers took a more proactive stance in carrying the denial (*Xinhua Daily*, 10 June 1945; *Liberation Daily*, 11 June 1945).

In connection with the plan of the KMT government for the postwar situation in East Asia, the *Central Daily News* regarded the Cairo Declaration as the basic principle. The Cairo Declaration stipulated that, “All the territories Japan has stolen from China since the first Sino-Japanese War, including Manchuria, Taiwan, and The Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.”, “Korea shall become free and independent¹¹,” and “The islands Japan has occupied under mandatory rule since WWI shall be restored to their original status.” The daily also said that it would be in the joint interest of China, the United States and the Soviet Union to put a complete end to the Japanese policy of expansion on the Asian Continent, adding a warning that the continuation or revival of Japanese policy would pose a serious threat to all of them. (*Central Daily News*, 13 June 1945),

At that time, Japan attempted to provoke a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, along with trying to isolate China in an effort to maintain the policy of expansion on the Asian Continent. The *Central Daily News* said that China, the United States and the Soviet Union should form a joint front to defend Korea and Manchuria from the Japanese imperialists. It added, “putting the Cairo Declaration into practice will be a perfect way of defending the country’s territories, administration and sovereignty, in addition to helping Korea gain its independence.” This set the establishment of a united front with the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union as the core diplomatic polity.

Concerning the reorganization of the Provisional Government of Korea, the CCP saw that the Chinese approval of the Provisional

Government of Korea would be the basis of future cooperation between Korea, China, and the Allied Powers, pointing to the Korean participation in the Chinese war of resistance in Japanese-occupied areas, including Manchuria (*Xinhua Daily*, 29 May 1944).

Following the Cairo Declaration, the CCP-affiliated press took a greater interest in the Korean issue. The *Xinhua Daily*, said that only a persistent anti-Japanese fascist struggle could guarantee Korean independence. It also gave a pep talk to Koreans, saying that Korea could someday join the ranks of leading world democracies and as a country boasting a long and splendid history, that the Korean culture was in no way inferior to those of Japan as attested by the iron-clad ships (or *kōbüksōn*) invented under the leadership of Admiral Lee Sunshin (*Xinhua Daily*, 21 December 1943). It also stressed the long history (3,000 years) of ties between China and Korea, saying that Korea had maintained longer relations with China than any other country in East Asia. It encouraged the revolutionary warriors of Korea to build internal unity, reinforce the struggle against the enemy, and collaborate with international anti-fascist movements (*Xinhua Daily*, 29 August 1943). The CCP welcomed the intention of the Allied Powers to guarantee Korean independence and asked Koreans to intensify domestic struggles against Japan. I stated that ultimately independence could only be achieved through the struggle and expression of the wish for a solid unity between China and Korea as brethren that had maintained relations for thousands of years and fought side by side against the Japanese imperialists.

In connection with the plan for the overall postwar situation in the region, the CCP stressed the need for collaboration between Korea and China as well the movement of Korean independence activists. As for the direction of the revolutionary struggle waged by Koreans, it put emphasis on the need for domestic revolutionary activities, apparently keeping in mind the post-liberation composition of the government, showing a switch from the past when it focused on the war of resistance against

Japan. It advocated anti-fascist solidarity among oppressed peoples, but expressed a strong opposition to the plan for the joint management by international organizations of countries that used to be colonies. It said, “Our advocacy of collaboration should not be viewed as one for the international joint management of the colonies. What they say about Koreans’ lack of administrative experience is no more than an excuse. Putting Korea into a state of international joint management will be like using violence to put an end to violence. That will serve as the worst obstacle to the aim of building up anti-fascist unity and create a latent factor for a future war.” This statement shows that the CCP saw the plan for the trusteeship administration in Korea as an obstacle to anti-fascist unity. It said that under the Atlantic Charter all nations and peoples should be allowed to restore freedom and organize their government freely (*Xinhua Daily*, 29 August 1943). The position of the CCP towards Korea remained sensitive to the influence of the Soviet Union and to changes in the international situation, although it referred to the historically long and friendly ties between the two countries due to pragmatic needs. The view of Korea remained changeable depending on strategic needs and the surrounding circumstances, rather than being based on a self-reliant judgment.

When the defeat of Japan looked inevitable, *Central Daily News* carried articles stressing the need for closer collaboration between the Provisional Government of Korea and the Allied Powers, and saw an opportunity for the Provisional Government of Korea to act as a direct party in the struggle against Japan (*Central Daily News*, 17 July 1945). When the Soviet Union declared war against Japan on 8 August 1945, it showed a wariness of Soviet expansion southwards and reported on the United States plan to put Korea in the Chinese theater of operations and combine China with Vietnam (*Central Daily News*, 10 August 1945). In contrast, the *Xinhua Daily* report highlighted the blockade by the Allied Powers of the coasts of the Korean Peninsula and the Korea Strait, and the advance of the Soviet Union into Manchuria, where it occupied two

provinces across the Heilongjiang, while Soviet fighter-bombers strategically bombed important areas along the railroad (*Xinhua Daily*, 8, 11, 13-15 August 1945; *Liberation Daily*, 14, 15 August 1945). However, the *Central Daily News* focused on the dark side of the Soviet troop movements, including the fierce resistance of Japanese troops to the Soviet attack on a lighthouse in Rajin, and the Japanese sinking of six Soviet torpedo ships near a lighthouse in Ch'ōngjin (*Central Daily News*, 14, 15 August 1945).

CCP-affiliated newspapers started reinforcing propaganda activities, encouraging Koreans enlisted in the Japanese Army to join leftist independence movement organizations (such as the Korean independence League) after the war (*Liberation Daily*, 12 August 1945). On August 11, 1945, Commander-in-Chief Zhu De of the Chinese Communist Army ordered all Korean revolutionary activists in Yanan to reorganize the Korean Volunteer Army and march towards Manchuria. Chief Kim Paekyōn of the Korean Independence League announced that his troops would fulfill their duty by joining the Soviet troops advancing into the Korean Peninsula, destroying the Japanese fascists, and liberating the Korean people (*Liberation Daily*, 15 August 1945). The CCP took prompt and concrete steps towards expanding influence in Manchuria and Korea after the end of the war. With the unconditional surrender of Japan on 15 August, the Korean independence League and the Korean Volunteer Army tried to return home to Korea, but were stopped by Soviet troops at the Yalu River.

V. Summary

With the Marco Bridge Incident of July 7, 1937 precipitating the Second Sino-Japanese War, the KMT government of China began reinforcing relations with Korea, which had remained inactive and had been maintained mostly between individuals. The relations between Korea and China entered a new phase as the United States joined the Pacific War

against Japan. Predicting victory in the war, the KMT government sought to have the role and status of China upgraded in the process of organizing the postwar world order, with the focus on establishing a new order in East Asia and securing Korean independence. China took greater interest in the direction of the Korean independence movement. This interest was reflected in the reports carried by both the KMT and CCP-affiliated newspapers.

From the early period of the war onwards, both the KMT and CCP-affiliated newspapers spoke out in favor of a total war of resistance against Japan, and stressed the need for a joint struggle uniting the oppressed peoples of East Asia. The KMT in particular focused on unity among oppressed East Asians in the war of resistance against Japan and on the leading role of China in the plans for the overall postwar situation in the region. The CCP emphasized the liberation of the people and the revolutionary struggle through the international anti-fascist solidarity among Chinese, Koreans, Taiwanese, and ordinary Japanese. From the 1930s, the Nanjing Nationalist Government of China aimed to run the country with the strong leadership of the party, taking an inactive attitude against the Japanese invasion, and trying to follow the changes in the flow of the international situation. The slogan adopted by the KMT concerning solidarity between oppressed East Asians for the war of resistance against Japan was rather a different version of Sinocentrism focusing on a conceptual cause that lacked realistic efficacy.

The CCP regarded ordinary Japanese at that time as a target of efforts to form a united front, separating them from the fascist government, and was in pursuit of both national liberation and class liberation. It sought to establish unity between oppressed East Asians and ordinary Japanese in anti-war movements. In such a process, Korean revolutionary activists played a crucial role in the propaganda aimed at the enlisted servicemen of the Japanese Army and ordinary Japanese in the anti-war and anti-aggression struggle. The CCP attached importance to a continued grassroots struggle, without showing any particular

interest in the struggle for patriotism and justice carried out until the early 1930s under the leadership of the Provisional Government of Korea. The CCP adopted a strategy for the war of resistance based on unity against anti-imperialism and anti-Japan, integrating Japanese anti-war activists (i.e. workers, farmers, and enlisted servicemen) and Korean and Taiwanese independence fighters into the total war of resistance by China. It sought to establish a unified front among the oppressed minorities based on internationalism focused on the national liberation of China, while looking for an opportunity to collaborate with the Soviet Union. In the process, the CCP tried to maintain a leadership role in such a front. It was only a strategy aimed at winning the final victory in the Chinese revolution, although both the KMT and CCP-affiliated newspapers were advocating unity among oppressed East Asians under the anti-Japan banner. What the CCP really intended to achieve was not a mere solidarity in the true sense of the word, in placing priority on the liberation and political independence of the peoples of neighboring countries.

There are several ways of understanding the views of Korea adopted by the Chinese press. One way is to analyze the commentaries (made periodically on a long-term basis) on the ceremonies held by Koreans in commemoration of such historical events as the March First Movement in Korea, the National Humiliation Day (29 August 1910), the June 10, 1926 Incident, and the annual ceremonies held in commemoration of those killed in the struggle against Japan. The Chinese press (especially the CCP-affiliated papers) paid particular attention to the March First Movement of Korea in the midst of the national effort to form a unified national front against the Japanese following the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War. The deep interest of the CCP-affiliated newspaper in the March First Movement of Korea stemmed from the importance of a symbolic association with the advocacy of unity among East Asians in the struggle against Japan.

The views and evaluations of the March First Movement in Korea

carried in KMT and CCP-affiliated newspapers differed from each other, and were influenced by the prevailing circumstances in China. At first, the *Xinhua Daily* spoke highly of the willingness of Koreans to struggle for independence, recognizing the March First Movement as a national liberation movement and a good example for those engaged in the joint struggle against Japan. However, in the 1940s, the *Xinhua Daily* and the *Liberation Daily* started focusing on the cause of the failure and the present significance of the movement rather than on the importance of the symbolism for the national liberation struggle, attempting to associate it with the need for the Communist revolutionary movement. As for the *Central Daily News*, it simply carried reports on events held to commemorate the movement, but took a newly positive attitude in carrying reports about Korean independence from 1943, after it became the focus of worldwide attention following the Cairo Conference. Most of the reports were about the recognition of the Provisional Government of Korea, and pointed to the importance of unity among independence movement activists and the domestic activities of Koreans.

The CCP-affiliated press took a proactive attitude in reporting on the communiqués announced by the Provisional Government of Korea, the Korean Volunteer Army, the Korean National Front Federation in commemoration of past events, or carrying editorials or feature articles about the Korean independence movement. In contrast, the *Central Daily News* simply introduced the relevant developments of an event or the statements made by related people. Among the reports on ceremonies held in commemoration of past events other than the March First Movement, the majority were taken from the obituaries of members of the Korean Volunteer Army who had been killed in the Chinese war of resistance against Japan. They said that the Chinese should learn from the indomitable spirit shown by the Korean revolutionary activists. This shows that the CCP was trying to push ahead with the joint struggle involving Chinese and Koreans against Japan on the basis of an anti-fascist revolution strategy, utilizing various commemorative events to

engage Koreans in Japanese-occupied areas in China. The reports about Korea carried by the *Central Daily News* were written just for the sake of image, revealing a sense of superiority towards Koreans following the Cairo Conference and basking in the glow of an anticipated victory.

The December 1941 start of the Pacific War had an impact on the Second Sino-Japanese War. The issue of Korean independence emerged as an international issue. The approval of the Provisional Government of Korea became a major issue in the relations between Korea and China. Following the Cairo Declaration, the articles about the Korean issue carried by the *Central Daily News* were mostly long, positive, and optimistic. Amid such an atmosphere, the Korean independence movement activists joined forces under the leadership of the Provisional Government of Korea in expectation of the forthcoming end of the war. Both the KMT and the CCP, which had pointed out the disunity among the Korean independence movement activists, welcomed the reorganization of the Provisional Government of Korea. The KMT focused on the need for unity under the stewardship of the Provisional Government of Korea and for the restoration of the leadership, while the CCP emphasized the need for the formation of a unified national front against Japan and the adoption of democratic centralism. These different approaches revealed a conspicuous gap in the views of the KMT and the CCP. At that time, the CCP-affiliated press remained friendly towards Korea due to the historical and geographical proximity of the countries and the realistic need for a joint struggle against Japan, but they could not free themselves from the influence of the Soviet Union and the changes in the international situation towards the end of the war. The view of Korea by the CCP was swayed by external conditions.

In the discussion concerning the future of Korea with the United States, the KMT government of China expressed a strong desire to see the United States recognize the Provisional Government of Korea, judging that it would be in the national interest to support the Provisional Government of Korea, with which it had maintained ties over a long

time. However, the United States government never had any plan to recognize it from the outset nor did it want the Chinese government to do so, and maintained this stance until the end of the war. In the face of such an attitude on the part of the United States, the KMT government of China did not make a definite decision to recognize the Provisional Government of Korea. The Korean issue, which had been handled by the sole judgment of China after the start of the Pacific War, became an international issue that had to be discussed with the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union. In such a situation, China attempted to raise its status in the international community by following in the United States in terms of a strategy for carrying out the war and diplomatic policies.

The relations between the Provisional Government of Korea and the KMT government of China were something close to official ones in substance. The approval of the Provisional Government of Korea by the KMT could have opened the way for normal exchanges between the two countries after Korean independence was secured. During the period of the war of resistance against Japan, there was a conspicuous gap between the actual policies adopted by the KMT and the CCP and the expressions of friendliness towards Koreans carried by newspapers on matters concerning support for the Korean independence movement and recognition of the Provisional Government of Korea.

Select Bibliography

REFERENCES

1. Newspapers

Central Daily News

Jinchaji Daily

Liberation Daily

Xinhua Daily

2. Primary Historical Sources

Ch'u, Hōnsu. *Materials concerning the Korean Independence Movement*, vol. 1-4. Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1975.

Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica. *Historical Materials concerning the Korean Independence Movement kept by the Kuomintang Government of China*. Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1988.

Kuomintang Central Committee and Committee for Compilation of the Party's History-Related Materials, ed. *A Collection of Literature on the Chinese Revolution*, No. 33-72-73. Taipei: Zhongyang Wenwu Gongying She (中央文物供應社), 1977.

Liu, Jinzhi et al., ed. *A Collection of Documents on China-Korea Relations (1919-1949)*. Beijing: China Social Science Publishing House, 1999.

Office of Management of the Site of the Korean Provisional Government, ed. *Report on the Compilation of Historical Records on the Korean Independence Movement and Korea-China Relations (1910-1949)*. Beijing: People's Literature Publishing House, 2000.

Shi, Yuanhua. *Korean Independence Movement in China (1919-1945)*. Shanghai:

People's Publishing House, 1995.

Yun, Pyöngsöök. *A Collection of Materials concerning the Korean Independence Movement: China*. Söngnam: Academy of Korean Studies, 1993.

Zhang, Cunwu. Zhongfu Zhao, Chunhui Hu, eds. *A Collection of Materials on China-Korea Relations in the Early Modern Period*, vol. 1-12. Taipei: National Archives and Records administration, 1990.

3. Books

Association for the Historical Study of the Korean National Movement, ed. *Korean Independence Movement and China in the 1930s*. Seoul: Kookhak Community Corp., 1998.

Ch'a, Sangch'öl. *United States Policy concerning the Korean Peninsula circa 1945*. Seoul: Chisik Sanöp Publishing, 1991.

Ch'u, Hönsu. *History of the Korea Provisional Government*. Ch'önan: Independence Hall of Korea, Institute for the Korean Independence Movement Studies, 1989.

Ch'u, Hönsu. *Korean Independence Movement and the Provisional Government*. Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1995.

Chen, Shuer. *The 100-Year History of China-Joseon Relation*. Taipei: 神州國光社, 1951.

Jeong, Yongdae. *History of Diplomacy: The Provisional Government*. Söngnam: Academy of Korean Studies, 1992.

Jeong, Yonguk. *U.S. Policy towards Korea circa 1945*, Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 2003.

Fang, Hanqi. *Complete History of China's Newspaper Industry* (中國新聞事業通史), vol. 2. Beijing: Renmin University of China, 1996.

Han, Sangdo. *Korean Independence Movement in Chinese Revolution*. Seoul: JipMoonDang, 2004.

Han, Xinru. *History of the Xinhua Daily (1938-1947)*, vol. 1. Beijing: 中國履中出版社, 1987.

Ho, Chunhui (trans. by Shin Süngha). *Korean Independence Movement in China*, Seoul: Dankook University Press, 1978.

- Jiang, Feifei. *History of Korea-China Relation*. Beijing: Social Sciences Literature Publishing, 1999.
- Kim, Hūigon. *A Study of the Provisional Government of Korea*. Seoul: Chisik Sanōp Publishing, 2004.
- Kim, Hangyu. *History of Korea-China Relations*. Seoul: Arche Publishing, 1999.
- Ku, Taeyōl. *A Study of the History of Korea's Relations with Other Countries*, vol. 1-2. Seoul: Institute for Korean Historical Studies, 1995.
- Liao, Yongxiang. *Collection of Xinhua Daily Atricles*, New Edition. Chongqing: Chongqing Publishing, 1998.
- Li, Shengping. *Biographical Dictionary of Modern China (中國近現代人名大辭典)*. Beijing: China International Broadcasting Publishing House, 1989.
- Li, Shengping. *Modern Biographical Dictionary of China (中國近現代人名大辭典)*. Beijing: 中國國際廣播出版社, 1989.
- Liu, Jialin ed. *History of Chinese Newspapers*. Wuhan University Press, 1995.
- Mu, Tao, Sun Zhike. *The Provisional Government in the Republic of Korea in China*. Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Publishing, 1992.
- National History Compilation Committee. *History of the Korean Independence Movement*, vol. 1-5. Seoul: T'amgudang, 1969.
- Pae, Kyōnghān. *Sun Wen and Korea: Sinocentrism and Toadyism*. Seoul: Hanul Academy, 2007.
- Shin, Joobaek. *History of National Movement by Koreans in Manchuria (1920-1945)*. Seoul: The Asian Culture Press, 1999.
- Shi, Yuanhua. *Narrative on the Chinese Communist Party's Support of the Joseon Independence Movement (1921-1945) (中國共產黨援助朝鮮獨立運動紀事)*. Beijing: China Social Science Publishing, 2000.
- Shi, Yuanhua. *New Theory on the Korean Independence Movement's History of Struggle and Sacrifice: New Theory on a Tragic History (韓國獨立運動血史新論)*. Shanghai Renmin Publishing, 1996.
- Shi, Yuanhua. *Study of the Sino-Korea Culture Association*. World Knowledge Publishing House, 2007.
- Shi, Yuanhua. *Theory on Korea's Anti-Japanese Independent Movement (韓國反日獨立運動史論)*. Beijing: China Social Science Publishing, 1998.

- Shi, Yuanhua. "Theory on the Relationship between the Chinese Communist Party and the Korean Provisional Government (論中國共產黨與韓國臨時政府的關係)." In *History of the Korean Independence Movement*. Beijing: Academy Press, 1999.
- Wang, Jing. *History of the Liberation Daily in Yanan*. Beijing: Xinhua Publishing, 1998.
- Xu, Dixin. "Multiple Threats within the Enemy state (危機百出的敵國內部)," *Qunzhong*, vol. 1 (1938. 15 January).
- Xu, Liangzhi. *History of Sino-Korean Relations (中韓關係史話)*. Taipei: Freedom Publishing, 1952.
- Xu, Wanmin. *Modern China-Korea Relations (中韓關係史 近代卷)*. Beijing: Social Sciences Literature Publishing, 1996.
- Yang, Sojŏn. *History of the Korean Independence Movement in China*. Sŏngnam: Academy of Korean Studies, 1996.
- Yŏm, Inho. *Korean Volunteer Army's Independence Movement*. Seoul: Nanam Publishing, 2001.
- Zhang, Liangui. *Joseon, China, and Harbin in International Politics before 1945 (1945年以前國際政治中的朝鮮和中國, 哈爾濱)*. Helionjiang Educational Publishing.
- Fujita, Masanori. *Study of the Chinese Communist Party's Newspapers and Magazines*. Tokyo: Asia Economic Institute, 1976.

3. Research Theses

- Chang, Seyoon. "The Activities of the Korean independence League in Huabei as Reported in the *Liberation Daily*." In *A Collection of Theses on Oriental History on the Occasion of Professor Lee Kongbŏm's 65th Birthday*. Seoul: Chisik Sanŏp Publishing, 1993.
- Chang, Seyoon. "The Chinese Communist Party's View of Korean Independence during the War of Resistance against Japan," In *Study of the History of the Korean Independence Movement* vol.9. Ch'ŏnan: Institute for the Korean Independence Movement Studies, 1995.
- Chang, Seyoon. "The Korean Provisional Government's Diplomacy towards China

- during the Second Sino-Japanese War: With special focus on the Activities of the Korean Liberation Army.” In *Study of the History of the Korean independence Movement* vol. 2. Ch’ōnan: The Independence Hall of Korea, The Institute for the Korean Independence Movement Studies, 1988.
- Chang, Seyoon. “The Kuomintang Government’s View of Korea in the Early 1940s.” In *A Collection of Theses on Modern History of Korea*. Daegu: Publishing Committee, 1995.
- Jeong, Pyōngjun. “Organization and Activities of the Provisional Government of Korea in China (1945-1948).” *Historical Studies* no.55/56.
- Jeong, Yongdae. “A Study of Diplomatic Activities of the Provisional Government of Korea.” In *Legitimacy of the Provisional Government of Korea*. Seoul: Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs, 1997.
- Ch’oe, Pongch’un. “The Provisional Government of Korea and Its Relations with the Chinese Government.” In *Study of the Korean independence Movement* vol.16 (1997).
- Ch’u, Hōnsu. “The Kuomintang Government of China and the Korean Independence Movement.” In *History of the Korean Independence Movement* vol.6. Kwach’ōn: The National Institute of Korean History, 1989.
- Ch’u, Hōnsu. “The Provisional Government of Korea and its Relations with China.” In *Study of Korean History* vol.10. Kwach’ōn: The National Institute of Korean History, 1987.
- Han, Sangdo. *Korean Leftists Overseas and the Korean Issue, the Korean Independence Movement, and the International Environment*. Seoul: Hanul, 2000.
- Han, Sangdo. “Korean independence League in Huabei and the Chinese Communist Party.” In *KHA Bulletin* no.174 (2002), 134-135.
- Hong, Sunok, “The Korean Provisional Government’s Diplomacy towards China (1940-1945): Views of the Korean Liberation Army and the Provisional Government of Korea.” In *Korean Independence Movement and Korea’s Relations with World Powers*. Kwach’ōn: The National Institute of Korean History, 1989.
- Hu, Chunhui. “China’s Diplomatic Efforts on the Issue of Korean Independence.” In *Discussion on Chinese and Korean Cultures* vol.3. Institute of Chinese Studies, Korea, 1975.

- Hu, Chunhui. "Chinese Revolution and the Korean Independence Movement." In *Discussion on Chinese and Korean Cultures* vol.176. Institute of Chinese Studies, 1986.
- Hwang, Minho. "A Study of the Cooperation between Korean Socialists in Manchuria and the Chinese Communist Party in 1930," In *KHA Bulletin* no. 141 (1994).
- Im, Kyesun. "The Chinese Government's Support for the Provisional Government of Korea." *Study of Korean History* vol. 8. Söngnam: Academy of Korean Studies, 1987.
- Kim, Chihun. "The Chinese Communist Party's View of Korea during the Second Sino-Japanese War," *Korean Historical Association Bulletin* no.184 (2004).
- Kim, Chihun. "*Liberation Daily's* View of Korea during the Second Sino-Japanese War." *Salim* no. 25 (2006).
- Kim, Changsun. "The Chinese Communist Party and Leftists in the Korean Independence Movement," In the *History of the Korean Independence Movement* vol. 6. Seoul: National Institute of Korean History, 1989.
- Kwon, Yöngjun. "Diplomatic Contacts between the Provisional Government of Korea and the Kuomintang Government of China during the War of Resistance against Japan: Recognizing the Provisional Government of Korea and Korean Independence." *A Collection of Theses* no.40. The Japan Korean History Association, October 2002.
- Lee, Ch'anwön. "Chinese Intellectuals' View of Korea in Early Modern Times: Joseon written by Huang Yanpei." *Study of Modern History of China* no.24 (December 2004).
- Lee, Hyönhüe. "The Provisional Government of Korea and the Kuomintang Government of China: Mutual Diplomatic Relations." *Korean Society at the Turn of the Century*. Paju: Bopmunsa, 1988.
- Lee, Jaeryoung. "China's View of Korea at the time of the Kuomintang Government in Nanjing: Public Opinion on the Wanbaoshan Incident." *Study of Chinese History* no.31 (August 2004).
- Lee, Jaeryoung. "Understanding of Korea-China Relations in the mid-20th Century: Duality of Chinese Consciousness concerning Korean Independence." *Study of Modern History of China* no.29 (March 2006).

- Liang, Song. "Recounting the Experience and Lessons of the Anti-Japan Partisan Movement in the Northeast." *Liberation Weekly* vol.2 no.36 (1 May 1938).
- Lu, Xiuyi. 抗戰時期中國國民黨政府對在華韓國臨時政府的援助, In *Theory on China-North Korea-South Korea-Japan Relations*, 1996.
- O, Kyōngp'yōng. "Kuomintang Government's Stance on Recognizing the Provisional Government of Korea during the War of Resistance against Japan." *Dongbanghakji* vol. 92 (1996).
- Park, Myōnghūi. "Chinese View of Korea at the end of the Qing Dynasty with a special focus on Chinese Press Coverage at and around the May 4, 1919 Incident." *Study of Chinese Modern History* no.22 (June 2004).
- Shi, Jianguo. "Report on Newspaper Editorials on the Korean Independent Movement." In *New Theory the Tragic History of the Korean Independent Movement*. Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Publishing, 1995.
- Shi, Yuanhua. "Kuomintang Government's Wartime Assistance Policy (1937-1945)." In *A Collection of Theses Compiled in Commemoration of the 60th Birthday of Park Yōngsōk*. Seoul: Publishing Committee, 1992.
- Shi, Yuanhua. "Korean Provisional Government during the Sino-Japanese War." In *A Collection of Theses on the Study of Korea* vol.1." Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Publishing, 1995.
- Shi, Yuanhua. "The Relations between the Chinese Communist Party and the Provisional Government of Korea." In *Study of the History of the Korean Independence Movement* vol.16. Seoul: Association for the Historical Studies on the Korean National Movement, 1997.
- Xie, Junmei. "Chinese Communist Party and the Korean Independence Movement." In *New Theory on the Tragic History of the Korean Independence Movement*. Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Publishing, 1996.
- Yu, Yongt'ae. "Chinese View of Hanseong (Seoul)," *Study of East Asian History* no. 4 (December 1998).
- Zhang, Yun. "Liberation Daily·Xinhua Daily and the Korean Independence Movement." In *New Theory on the Tragic History of the Korean Independence Movement*. Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Publishing, 1995.