

The Characteristics of Japanese Colonial Rule in Korea

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This paper was written as part of a larger project to cast comprehensive light on the goal of the 1910 ‘annexation of Korea’ by Japan and the characteristics of Japanese colonial rule in Korea from the perspective of the ‘imperialistic plan for the modern age.’ The paper examines Japan’s colonial policy in the Korean peninsula during the so-called fascist era, the most revealing period in terms of the nature of Japanese rule in Korea. Contrary to what is popularly believed, Joseon was not for Japan a simple war supply base in its plan to conquer the Asian continent and build a continental empire. Joseon was, instead, a strategic pillar for the Japanese enterprise for regional dominance and territorial expansion, considered crucial to guarantee the success of this plan. The Government-General of Korea mobilized both human and material resources to assist Japan’s war effort. Under the slogan of ‘*Naeseon Ilche* [內鮮一體, Japan and Korea are one entity],’ the Government-General urged the people of Joseon to view themselves as Japanese and espouse Japanese goals and values, and imposed on them the same obligations as Japanese citizens. This forcible, top-down approach to the assimilation of Joseon people was aimed at the full integration of Joseon into Japan’s national sphere; a step essential for ensuring the success of its invasion of neighboring Manchuria. Manchuria was to provide Japan with natural resources and raw materials, indispensable for industrial production needed to support its invasion of the rest of the Asian continent.

To make Joseon effectively a part of Japan, the Japanese brandished the slogan of ‘*Naeseon Ilche*’ and other similarly manipulative slogans, calling for its people to become Japanese subjects. These slogans are deceptive insofar as they were mere pretexts for forcing citizens’ duties on the people of Joseon without recognizing them accompanying rights as citizens. In sum, the goal was to have people of Joseon serve the Japanese nation and work to ensure the welfare of its people. This ideology of assimilation touted by the colonial administration was aimed at increasing Joseon’s contributions to Japan’s war effort, and as a matter of fact, led to the creation of a yet more powerful mobilization system to tap its human and material resources. Two of the examples in which this pursuit was taken to its highest level are the so-called ‘*Naeseon Ilche*’ campaign and the ‘Joseon New System’ campaign, both launched during the fascist era.

Keywords: National Mobilization Campaign, *Naeseon Ilche* or *Naisen Ittai* [內鮮一體, Japan and Korea are one entity], Joseon New System Movement, Rule under the Government-General of Korea, Special nature of Joseon

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I. Introduction

This paper, written as part of a large project aimed at casting light on the goal of the annexation of Korea by Japan and the characteristics of Japanese colonial rule in Korea from the perspective of ‘imperialistic plan for the modern age,’ focuses on the Japanese rule of Korea during the fascist era, a period most indicative of the defining features of Japanese colonial rule. The chief priority of the Japanese colonial administration ruling the Korean peninsula during the fascist era was, as is popularly known, to turn it into a war supply base for its continental invasion. But, in reality, this was far from the only role Japan had in mind for Korea, in its expansionist enterprise. It suffices to remember why Japan ‘annexed’ Korea in the first place to realize that the latter was literally the cornerstone of the plan for its continental expansion, guaranteeing the success of this plan. As is well known, Japan’s victory in the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War provided a huge momentum for its expansionist project, catapulting it into the position of a new East Asian imperialist power. External expansion, in other words,

‘war to conquer colonies,’ was essential for Japan’s ability to overcome its handicap as a latecomer in the modernization race and rapidly grow into a global contender. Catching up with the West and joining the club of colonial powers was precisely the goal of the so-called ‘imperialistic plan for the modern age.’ In order to realize this goal, the island nation felt that it must gain a footing in the Asian continent. The Korean peninsula was, therefore, deemed the crucial stepping stone Japan needed to bring under its control. This way, Japan could use the Korean peninsula as its war supply base, an essential first step toward giving concrete shape to this grand modern-age plan. Becoming a continental power was for Japan a prerequisite to becoming a member of the club of world powers.

It was during a period when Western capitalist countries started to enter the scramble to gain colonies in other parts of the world, using their well-developed heavy industry, that Japan opened its ports first to the United States and later other European countries. By opening up the country, Japan benefited from advanced technology from the West and achieved rapid growth. As a latecomer in the capitalist world, Japan sought to maintain an amiable relationship with the UK, the United States and other advanced industrialized countries, as it relied on the latter’s technology and institutional knowledge for catching up. At the same time, to compensate for its small domestic market and limited natural resources, a severe disadvantage for Japan hopeful to grow into a modern power on a par with Western countries, it soon looked beyond its own borders, invading countries in the region. Bolstered by its victory in the First Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War, Japan concluded the Anglo-Japanese Alliance with the UK and became the only East Asian nation to join the ranks of the global powers.

One can distinguish roughly three stages in Japan’s development into a world player: the first stage is the period during which Japan first came into contact with the West and embarked on a project for fostering the growth of modern industries, using advanced technology and capital

of Western powers. During the second stage, Japan acquired colonies, thus giving itself the market and capital needed to grow into a modern industrial nation and succeeded in catching up with Western industrialized countries. During the third and last stage, its competitiveness reached a yet higher level, enabling Japan to emerge as an East Asian imperialist power on a par with Western imperialist powers. Colonization of other Asian countries was, therefore, instrumental to Japan's ability to rapidly industrialize itself and join the club of advanced industrialized countries, with the lands it colonized providing the markets and capital it needed for its transformation into a regional power.

In line with this imperialistic and expansionist enterprise of the modern Japanese nation, the Korean peninsula was made into a war supply base; but it was not just a beachhead for continental invasion or a simple war supply base, for that matter. The Korean peninsula, in fact, was not like any other occupied territories, and occupied a far more important role in this plan of expanding to be a part of the continent and then a member of the club of world powers. During the second and third stages of its growth into an imperialist power, Japan launched a large-scale modernization project in Joseon, thereby linking the latter's modernization process with its own development into a modern industrial nation. This relationship of interdependence between the two countries largely owed to the special situation of Japan as a latecomer in the capitalist world which needed to quickly narrow the gap with Western powers in an international environment made unfavorable for it, as the latter had already begun to perceive it as a threat.

Bringing Joseon, located just across a sea strait, under Japan's sway was easy, and this ailing country with a crumbling economy and antiquated, pre-modern systems was unable to put up meaningful opposition. However, even as their ruler failed to do so, the people of Joseon, a country with a long history and rich tradition, and a deep-seated sense of cultural superiority vis-à-vis their island neighbors, fiercely resisted the latter's attempt at colonizing their country. This was

also one of the things that made Joseon a special colony for Japan, forcing the latter to craft a special colonial policy adapted to it. To be able to suppress the resistance of the people of this old country, proud of their history and traditions and perceiving themselves culturally superior to their colonizers, the Japanese needed to display, for example, their industrial and technological strength to show that it was they who were superior, at least based on modern yardsticks. To make people of Joseon accept its rule, the Government-General had to create a powerful mechanism to ideologically control them as well as undertake a wholesale reform of Joseon's society, setting up modern institutions. As a result, the colonial ruling system in Joseon became organically linked to that in Japan, with its industry also integrated as part of the latter's industrial system. Meanwhile, the Governor-General of Korea was given complete control and authority over the colony. Two salient features of this rule which took into consideration the special characteristics of Joseon were as follows: First, by granting complete and unlimited power over the colony to the Governor-General, they created a powerful colonial government and governing institutions. The Governor-General, for instance, controlled all three branches of the government, including the legislative, judicial and the executive branch. The other defining characteristic of the Japanese rule of Joseon was its emphasis on the ideological control of colonized people, consisting in creating a perception of Japan's superiority over Joseon so as to undermine their sense of cultural superiority. Through this close integration of Korea and modernization projects launched there, Japan attempted to overcome its geographical disadvantages as an island country at the outer edge of East Asia and further its goal of creating a modern industrial nation located within the Asian continent.

This paper, written as part of a larger project to develop a comprehensive understanding of the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910 and the nature of Japanese colonial rule, is in continuity with my earlier works on how the special place occupied by Joseon in the

Japanese expansionist enterprise was reflected in the colonial policy adopted there; in other words, in the ruling system of the General Government of Korea, constituted after the Russo-Japanese War, designed to be closely in line with its continental invasion plan (Jeon, 2004, 2006, 2009, 2010a, 2010b). The focus of this paper is the so-called fascist era in Japan, roughly coinciding with the period of the Second Sino-Japanese War, during which the defining characteristics of Japan's colonial rule in Korea were the most obviously on display in various colonial projects.

The significance of the present study lies in its focus on the political meaning and role of the colonial Joseon to Japan, which shaped the characteristics of Japan's colonial rule, whereas previous studies on the Korean society during the fascist era of Japan mostly concentrate on the latter's exploitation and oppression of Korea (W. Choi, 1989, 1996; Y. Choi, 1997; U. Kim, 1988; Kang, 1994, 1996; Miyata, 1985; G. Park, 1988; Shin, 1995). The study also looks into the administrative unification that the fascist-era Japan pursued with its colonies (Mizuno, 1997) and the political independence guaranteed to the Government-General of Joseon, the difference often neglected in former studies. Taking these aspects into consideration, this paper re-examines the meaning of the fascist-era Japan's colonial policy of Joseon.

II. *Naeseon Ilche* – The Ideological Façade of Japan's Deception and Exploitation

1. *Seonman Ilyeo* and *Naeseon Ilche*: Ideologies that Link Manchuria, Joseon and Japan

In 1937, when Japan, with the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, went to the wartime system, the Government-General of Korea shifted the focus of its colonial policy to 'establishing new roles and characteristics for Joseon in the new age' (Suzuki, 1939). Minami, the

Governor-General at that time, had been discussing the special situation of Joseon, setting it apart from Japan, to launch an industrial policy promoting agriculture at the same time as a secondary industry to increase productivity, already since his appointment in August 1936 (Jeon, 2009, pp. 147-159). When the Second Sino-Japanese War broke out, he immediately shifted to a new wartime policy, consisting in realigning Korea's industrial system — former Governor-General Ukaki's policy of agriculture-industry parallel growth — into a war industry-centered system; hence also turning the country into a war supply base. The ideology, fashioned to win the hearts and minds of Korean people for this effort, was '*Naeseon Ilche* [內鮮一體],' meaning literally that Joseon and Japan are one entity (Bang, 2003). This was in line with Ukaki's *Naeseon Yuhwa* [內鮮融和, Harmony between Japan and Joseon], a policy that he adopted in 1931 when the Manchurian Incident broke out. With this policy, he elevated Joseon's place from a mere extended territory of the empire of Japan to the core and pursued the industrialization of Joseon (Jeon, 2009, 2010b).

Later, this same slogan of *Naeseon Ilche* was taken to its fully-realized form as the so-called 'Tennonization [皇民化]' ideology aimed at making Koreans into loyal subjects of the Japanese emperor, a step considered by the Government-General essential to set up the total mobilization system. Further stress was placed, during this period, on the fact that Joseon, now turned into Japan's beachhead for its continental campaign and war supply base, was an integral part of the campaign in political, economic as well as military terms. *Naeseon Ilche* was, therefore, a deceptive ideology used to manipulate people of Joseon to further the goal of making them espouse Japan's national goals and mobilize them for their foreign campaigns. It was the slogan that crystallizes the essence of the 'Tennonization policy' (Park, Mizuno, Utsumi & Takasaki, 1989), implemented in parallel with the project to set up a 'fascist colonial system' in wartime Joseon (Jeon, 2004).

Governor-General Minami declared, at his inauguration, five

guiding principles for his term: *Gukche Myeongjing* [國體明徵, Clearly-established national and government systems], *Seonman Ilyeo* [鮮滿一如, Joseon and Manchuria are one and the same], *Gyohak Jinjak* [教學振作, Promote education and learning], *Nonggong Byeongjin* [農工並進, Parallel growth of agriculture and industry] and *Seojeong Swaesin* [庶政刷新, Political reform]. Minami, meanwhile, declared *Naeseon Ilche* (*'Naisen Ittai'* in Japanese) as the fundamental value underlying his administration and Japan's basic principle for governing Joseon, which overrode all other policy lines ("Showa 16-Chief Secretary Office", p. 341; "Showa 16-Police Affairs"¹, p. 722; Government-General of Korea [GGK], 1940b, p. 336). During his term, he invested particular effort in two of the five principles; namely, *Seonman Ilyeo* (Joseon and Manchuria are one and the same) and *Nonggong Byeongjin* (Parallel growth of agriculture and industry). *Seonman Ilyeo*, an idea deriving from the Japanese line of external policy in which Japan and Manchuria would be two parts of an inseparable whole, argues for the oneness of Joseon and Manchuria on the basis of their proximity to each other. These two neighboring regions must therefore, according to this logic "be made into one" (GGK, 1940b, p. 337) and "be together and prosperous as one" (GGK, 1940a, p. 409). This notion served as the rationale for the war industry development initiative which got in full swing with the Second Sino-Japanese War reaching its high point. In other words, it provided justification for the parallel agriculture and industry development policy of Governor-General Minami, which, in turn, was indispensable for the

¹ The full names of the cited documents are "Information material for the 79th session of the Imperial Diet, **Showa 16 (Chief Secretary Office)** document) [昭和16年 第79回帝國議會 説明資料(官房文書)]" and "Information material for the 79th session of the Imperial Diet, **Showa 16 (Police Affairs)** document) [昭和16年, 第79回 帝國議會 説明資料(警務)]", which I have abbreviated here for the sake of convenience. Most of the primary sources used here are from *Iljeha jeonsi chejegi jeongchaek saryo chongseo* [日帝下 戰時體制期 政策史料叢書, *Collection of Policy History Sources during the Wartime System Period of Colonial Korea*], a multi-volume collection of documents. The pages correspond to the ones in the referred volumes of the *Collection*.

successful implementation of the project to make Joseon into a beachhead and supply base for the continental invasion planned by Japan. In sum, this was the ideological framework for turning Joseon into a veritable front line for Japan's expansion into the continent, to all intents and purposes.

Manchuria, in *Seonman Ilyeo*, was an essential region to execute the Japanese expansionist continental policy. The notion of Joseon and Manchuria being one and the same based on the two regions' geographical proximity ultimately serves the argument that Japan and Manchuria are one and the same, since the Japanese also argued that Joseon is an integral part of Japan, whose practical consequence was shifting an important share of war efforts for conquering Manchuria to Joseon, as its strategic outpost. Indeed, *Seonman Ilyeo* was a slogan paired with *Naeseon Ilche* as the rationale for mobilizing people of Joseon for whichever of Japan's self-serving causes of the day to more effectively tap the human and material resources of the colony. Through the slogan of *Naeseon Ilche*, *Seonman Ilyeo*, in other words, the argument that Joseon and Manchuria are one, indirectly asserts that Manchuria is part of Japan by the intermediary of Joseon, thus expanding its territorial sphere. On the other hand, this was also a way of emphasizing the importance and value of Joseon as a colony that is an integral part of the Japanese empire. Therefore, the significance of the adoption by Governor-General Minami of the policy to develop Joseon into a supply base for Japan's continental campaign upon the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War should not be reduced to its practical dimension. Instead, this policy tying Japan's fate with Joseon's attests to the Japanese vision that the two were inextricably bound together.

As has been mentioned earlier, Minami qualified the notion of *Naeseon Ilche* as a fundamental principle of Japanese rule of Joseon, overriding all other policy lines or priorities. In other words, this idea stresses the fact that Joseon is already an inseparable part of Japan and, therefore, must espouse the same values as the latter, so as to share the

same national identity. In sum, *Naeseon Ilche* demanded that people of Joseon should fulfill their duties and responsibilities as Japanese citizens. For Japan to be able to effectively carry out their expansionist goal in the Asian continent, it had to make Joseon into a loyal partner fully embracing this goal, and for this, people of Joseon should be transformed into full-fledged Japanese subjects. Later, when the war became prolonged, the Government-General, as it further expanded its mobilization system, increasingly urged the people of Joseon to fulfill their duties as Japanese. This obviously was a scheme to mentally condition them to accept the colonial administration's ever-increasing demand for goods, labor and manpower to meet the magnifying need for supplies and fighting forces amidst an intensifying and protracted war (Jeon, 2004, pp. 632-633).

2. The Reality of *Naeseon Ilche*

After putting into place a wartime mobilization system under the *Naeseon Ilche* concept, the Government-General of Korea immediately proceeded with measures aimed at making Joseon effectively a part of Japan by turning its people into Japanese subjects. The Government-General held forth as to how "All are equal," making it the state principle of Joseon, or exhorted the new subjects of Japan to "Contribute to the imperial destiny" by an ever-stronger loyalty to the Japanese emperor (GGK, 1940b, p. 336), adding that these ideas had consistently served as guiding principles in governing Joseon for past Governors-General (ibid.). The Government-General stressed that Joseon people must stand united behind Japan's effort to build a prosperous Asia, calling their loyalty an absolute prerequisite for the success of this effort (GGK, 1942, p. 365). To ensure the effectiveness of the wartime mobilization system, the Government-General used words like "*bongi* [本義, fundamental meaning]" to describe *Naeseon Ilche* ("Showa 16-Police Affairs", p. 722), making this concept the centerpiece of the colonial campaign to

establish an ideologically-based control over Koreans.

However, Joseon people's response to this all-out campaign by the Government-General proved rather disappointing. As the Government-General itself admitted, the public sentiment of Joseon people did not "meet the current state of affairs." Thus, to shore up this faltering campaign of *Naeseon Ilche*, the Government-General went for a new story line in which the slogan for harmony between Japan and Joseon [內鮮融和, *Naisen Yuhwa*],² launched around the time of the Manchurian Incident, was now, through the Second Sino-Japanese War, moving on to its next phase of maturity, in other words, the *Naeseon Ilche* vision. This fable, in which the union of Japan and Joseon would grow increasingly closer, was created out of a need to show progress made in this project; as well as a need for justifications for persevering in its implementation. Under the official line of discourse, therefore, with the *Naeseon Ilche* campaign ready to go to the next level, now that people of Joseon were treated in the same way as Japanese, the Government-General shortly launched the National Mobilization Campaign ("Showa 16-Chief Secretary Office", pp. 341-347). From April 1938, the colonial administration started a conscription program to take able-bodied Joseon men to the war front, a radical departure from previous practice in the Korean peninsula, which had been limited to harnessing war resources. In 1939, it amended some provisions of the Joseon Civil Affairs Ordinance to require Koreans to adopt a Japanese-style surname and first name, effective of February 1940, under the pretext of eliminating discrimination against the latter and promoting equality between them and Japanese. This was followed by stepped up measures to force Koreans to speak and write Japanese, calling the latter '*kokugo* [國語, national language].' All of these measures were implemented under the official narrative that,

² About the details of the Government-General's policy of Joseon-Japan unity in years following the Second Sino-Japanese War, see Jeon (2009, 2010b).

thanks to the success of the *Naeseon Ilche* campaign and progress in the assimilation of Joseon people, they had got now to a point where the latter should be granted the right to receive equal treatment as Japanese citizens; carrying a Japanese name and having to speak Japanese were, therefore, referred to by the Government-General as privileges. In other words, these measures constituted a chapter in the *Naeseon Ilche* campaign, where Joseon people finally earned the recognition as Japanese.

In reality, however, as the war became a protracted one, this series of measures was prompted by the need to force greater sacrifices on the people of Joseon under the total mobilization system, as made clear by the National Mobilization Campaign. The campaign was a new system movement of Joseon that corresponds to the Japanese one, and its purpose was to “promote a big organization that is a major war supply base to the continent and that returns and incorporates all its products of industry, economy and culture to Japan, by reinforcing the idea that Joseon and Japan share one mind and blood — through *Ileok Ilsim* [一億一心, lit. one thousand million one mind] and *Naeseon Ilche* — and by having them understand ways to be true subjects of the Tenno” (“Showa 16-Chief Secretary Office”, p. 347). This was a carrot-and-stick approach of a kind adopted by the Government-General to bring people of Joseon to accept that yet more labor and material resources be funneled into Japan’s expansionist war. The colonial administration, however, described it as concrete strides made in the *Naeseon Ilche* campaign, extending to people of Joseon rights equal to those enjoyed by Japanese, urging them to stand united for the national cause (of Japan), ostensibly to elicit Korean cooperation for the success of the National Mobilization Campaign (“Showa 16-Administrative Affairs”, p. 602; “Showa 16-Police Affairs”, pp. 467-468).

At that time, having concluded the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, Japan had its eye set firmly on its future as a ‘great nation,’ with the idea of building a new world order with the two European allies.

To further this goal, Japan felt that it had to tighten ties with its allies, and sought to build a “close relationship of partnership between the East and the West.” At the same time, Japan was working on the blueprint of another project, known as the ‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,’ (Defense and Education Division of the Joseon Coalition for Total National Mobilization [DED], June 1941, p. 55) giving itself the leadership position in the new world order. The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere project was so conceived that it would be both planned and carried out unilaterally by Japan, even as it was to reflect the unique moral and cultural traditions of Asia. It should be noted that this plan by Japan to create an Asian empire was very much about defiance, as the latecomer in industrialization and capitalism, against the West.

The Japanese leadership had indeed convinced itself that the Western world, where societies pursue independence, forming individual nation-states, instead of grouping together in a regional community like the ‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’, would eventually see weak countries that are not self-sufficient mushroom, and the eventual demise of its international order (ibid.). This prognosis, shaped under the influence of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere project, was, therefore, critical of the Western order, even though Japan was at the time compelled to cooperate with Western powers out of its present needs. Japan’s view, in which the imperialist pursuit of Western industrialized societies and the desire for independence of their colonies were both problems seen as stemming from the flawed notion of nation-state, justified the need to build an Asian regional community of which it would of course be the leader.

This becomes much clearer, if one examines the way in which the dominant ideology praised social thinking in the East, contrasting it with the West. Asian societies, they say, from its smallest unit in the form of families to the state, its largest unit, are modeled on the pattern of a family, and as nations, they are hence comparable to large families. Japan, for instance, is a society resting on the bond between the emperor,

the heavenly son, and his subjects, whose relationship is not unlike that between a father and his children (DED, June 1941, p. 56). This, in a nutshell, was the basic idea behind the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere. This ideology gave Japan a free pass for its expansionist ambition, disguising the latter as an attempt to liberate Asian colonies from Western powers and build a whole-new type of Asian empire based on Asian values, and allowing it to proclaim that what it was seeking was distinct from Western imperialism. The Japanese described the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere project as the realization of an “Eastern ethical ideal” for peaceful cohabitation and harmony. In other words, by building such a Japan-led regional community, the old order created by Western imperialist powers would be abolished, giving way to a new order, manifesting the spirit of Japan.

Meanwhile, for the Government-General of Korea, the *Naeseon Ilche* campaign not only could assist its rule of Joseon, but could also help magnify Joseon’s role in this blueprint for a Japan-led Asian empire, creating the new world order and world peace, which was bound to enhance its prestige (ibid.); a very tantalizing prospect indeed. These were certainly motivations enough for the Government-General to relentlessly forge ahead with the *Naeseon Ilche* campaign, as it did. *Naeseon Ilche*, therefore, became an indispensable ingredient in the Japanese expansionist plan, and it was inevitable that this served as the basis, when the war reached its high point, for the demand made on people of Joseon to make equal sacrifices as Japanese for the ‘urgent national’ cause (DED, June 1941, p. 57).

To draw maximum support for the Japanese war effort from the Korean peninsula, the Government-General, therefore, coupled an ideological campaign under the slogan of *Naeseon Ilche* with a mechanism to mobilize human and material resources, to transform it into a veritable war supply base. For example, the launch of the National Mobilization Campaign was accompanied by a renewed call for uniting Joseon people under the banner of *Naeseon Ilche*. Needless to say, the

goal of the *Naeseon Ilche* campaign was to indoctrinate people of Joseon to make them into docile subjects to the Japanese imperial crown. The colonial administration, for instance, urged Joseon people to free their mind of all personal priorities or ties (national identity as people of Joseon) to serve the greater good (Japan's national interest) and to become truly loyal subjects (*ibid.*).

The idea of Joseon people becoming Japanese under the slogan of *Naeseon Ilche* was, of course, a mere ploy to better persuade them to cooperate with the colonial administration's mobilization projects. In sum, it was to be able to say to Joseon people that it was their duty as Japanese citizens to accept to make human and material sacrifices when 'their' country was at war. The proof is that 'becoming Japanese' did not include the people of Joseon being awarded any of the rights or benefits that normally come with duties of citizenship.

It was hardly realistic that a people with a strong sense of national identity, like the people of Joseon, could be made to accept, virtually overnight, Japan as their state and see themselves as one with its people. The Government-General was also well-aware of this. The colonial administration realized that to successfully indoctrinate people of Joseon, it needed to re-educate them through more powerful ideological concepts ("Showa 16-Police Affairs", pp. 469-470). Seeing how the *Naeseon Ilche* campaign produced no real results, no matter how they tried, the Government-General complained, adding that people of Joseon only demanded rights as Japanese citizens, when they had made little progress in becoming imperial subjects. Just because they were not immediately given equal treatment as Japanese before the law, they called into question the whole notion of *Naeseon Ilche* as mendacious, and this attitude precisely revealed that they were not truly imperial subjects and that the goal of *Naeseon Ilche* was yet to be attained, according to the colonial administration (DED, June 1941, p. 58). The Government-General, therefore, decided that the *Naeseon Ilche* campaign was never meant to immediately eliminate all discriminatory rules applying to

Joseon people, but rather to gradually eliminate them based on the progress made in them becoming imperial subjects by accepting to fulfill their duties as citizens. In sum, Joseon people first had to accept duties as citizens, and the grant of accompanying rights would be conditioned on it. The Government-General stressed that the decisive factor for removing all legal and institutional obstacles to the equal treatment of Joseon people was the loyalty shown by the latter to the Japanese state, and the goal of the *Naeseon Ilche* project was precisely to promote loyalty to the Japanese empire (DED, June 1941, pp. 60-61).

Nothing more than a propaganda operation geared to mobilizing human and material resources for Japan's expansionist war, the *Naeseon Ilche* campaign was aimed at manipulating people of Joseon to do the colonial administration's bidding. Concrete measures taken under the pretext of treating Joseon people equally as Japanese such as the requirement to adopt a Japanese name and to only use Japanese clearly show what the real nature of this campaign was. These measures were intended to undermine Korean people's sense of self-identity to better subject them to the so-called duties of citizens, imposed on them even as they were being refused an equal legal status to that given to Japanese. The colonial administration went as far as to attribute the persistence of institutional discrimination against Joseon people to their stubborn resistance to assimilation, calling it the 'special nature of Joseon people,' and claiming that 'educating them', in other words, the top-down approach to mobilization, was the only solution.

Later, when the tide in the Pacific War turned against it, the need for resources grew yet larger, increasing demand on the wartime mobilization system under the slogan of *Naeseon Ilche*. At last, the colonial administration started to discuss measures to visibly reduce inequality between Joseon people and Japanese. Mandatory public education and the right of political participation were among the issues discussed at this time. The official argument of the Government-General was that the elimination of institutional obstacles to Joseon people's

enjoyment of rights equal to those of Japanese was something that had to come about naturally with education and the maturity of the civic society (DED, June 1941, pp. 57-58), but that in Joseon, the situation was such that this development did not take place, and the prolonged war was not conducive to this process, either. Nevertheless, the Government-General went ahead with overhauling laws and institutions to bring them closer to those in place in Japan, justifying this decision by the ‘good progress’ made in the *Naeseon Ilche* project over the ten years since the Manchurian Incident, and by the fact that Joseon had now become, thanks to the success of this project, like “true brothers to Japanese” instrumental to Japan’s war effort (Joseon Coalition for Total National Mobilization [JCT], 1945, p. 512). However, in reality, this decision had nothing to do with the progress made in the *Naeseon Ilche* project, as said the Government-General. It was simply because at that time, Japan was in such a dire need for war supplies and fighting force that the Government-General had no other choice but to buy Joseon people’s cooperation with the rights they had been demanding. To be able to increase procurement from Joseon, the Government-General, in other words, made major concessions to its people. This back-and-forthing and the carrot-and-stick approach in the policy of the colonial administration were, in fact, to more forcibly mobilize human and material resources from Joseon. From this point on, under the *Naeseon Ilche* campaign, ‘each and every man and woman of Joseon’ was enlisted in the ‘total mobilization movement,’ which meant ‘fulfilling their respective duties’ for the best outcome of the war by becoming one and cooperating, with the military and government in their support for the war.

What the Government-General of Joseon aimed at, with *Naeseon Ilche*, was Japanization of Joseon people, i.e., demanding them to fulfill their responsibilities and duties as Japanese ‘citizens’. However, that the campaign was but a ploy to facilitate the wartime mobilization of Joseon people is made clear by the fact that the latter were imposed duties as Japanese citizens, but not the rights that should come with them. The

colonial administration, even as they at last started to talk about granting the same civil rights as those given to Japanese, when the war reached a point that the colonial administration was forced to step up the mobilization of Joseon people, nothing really came of this discussion, and this would remain the case until the very end of the war. Under the logic of *Naeseon Ilche*, Joseon and its people were indeed part of Japan and its people, but only insofar as the former assist and support the latter by sharing their responsibilities and duties. The colonial administration ramped up this deceptive discourse on the unity between Japan and Joseon with the start of the ‘New System’ project.

III. The National Mobilization Campaign and the New System Movement - Paving Ways for Japanese Expansion

1. Reinforcement and Reform of Total National Spirit Mobilization Campaign

When the Second Sino-Japanese War grew into an all-out war, fought across Manchuria and China, the Japanese colonial administration in the Korean peninsula began the so-called “New System” movement. In October 1940, Governor-General Minami undertook the reform of wartime mobilization systems in place in the Korean peninsula to realign them to support the ‘National Mobilization Campaign.’ This was part of the effort to build a ‘new national system’ for creating a national defense system, equally advanced as the one in Japan, for Joseon. The Total National Spirit Mobilization Campaign, meanwhile, was aimed at solidifying the place and position of Joseon within the expanding empire of Japan, upon the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, by selecting Joseon as the chief war supply base for the continental campaign (Jeon, 2004, pp. 629-630). This initiative was coupled with another campaign to mentally condition the people of Joseon so that they

full-heartedly espouse the goals of the Japanese empire, in other words, to inculcate in them the idea that they and Japanese people were one and the same and should serve their nation (i.e. Japan) with one mind: ‘*Naeseon Ilche* (Japan and Korea are one entity)’ and ‘*Hyeopsim Jaeryeok* (United mind, talent, and might)’ (GGK, 1940b, p. 336). As the Second Sino-Japanese conflict rapidly spiraled into a massive-scale war, the Government-General of Korea sought to diversify Joseon’s industry so that it may be a self-sufficient war supply base, when necessary, while investing particularly heavily in war industries (Mitarai, 1942, pp. 40-41). This found its concrete form in the so-called policy for the parallel growth of agriculture and industry, and the colonial administration pressed ahead with the *Naeseon Ilche* campaign to assist its mobilization efforts. For the Government-General, the Total National Spirit Mobilization Campaign to harness human and material resources from the Korean peninsula was an important pillar for Japan’s continental expansion project (GGK, 1940b, p. 336). The ability to effectively procure manpower and goods from Joseon mattered even more for the success of the war, as it gained in scope. The *Naeseon Ilche* campaign and the resulting mental acceptance, on the part of Joseon people, of exploitative demands to meet the war needs held the key for the Government-General, for its ability to continuously and effectively procure war supplies. The Total National Spirit Mobilization Campaign was, hence, in continuity with the *Naeseon Ilche* campaign, and was meant to take it to the next level (GGK, 1940b, p. 337).

More or less immediately after the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, on July 22, 1937, Governor-General Minami stressed, in a speech held in an extraordinary meeting of provincial governors, the importance of exalting ‘national spirit’ among the people of Joseon. It was based on the instructions from Minami³ that the ‘Joseon Central

³ The Governor-General said the following to be clearly to be conveyed to people of Joseon to

Information Committee' was established shortly after, with the stated purpose of 'correctly assessing the situation facing the nation and promoting national spirit.' This committee, having its seat inside the Government-General building, was chaired by the General Director for Political Affairs, and was composed of various bureau chiefs of the Government-General and its Chief Secretary, with department heads of each bureau serving as secretaries. The committee was intended to educate the people of Joseon so as to 'exalt the national spirit of Japan' by creating a clear awareness of the situation facing the nation among people, building 'national unity [舉國一致]' and arousing 'patriotism [盡忠報國]' through a concerted effort between the Government-General and all institutions under it. The Joseon Central Information Committee later gave birth to the Joseon Coalition for Total National Mobilization, established on July 7, 1938, the first anniversary of the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, to serve as the central organization to keep the patriotic spirit of the nation alive. This organization was, in sum, intended to tighten the control over 'Japanese national' movements in a manner to exalt the national spirit of Joseon people (GGK, 1940b, p. 338).

The creation of more organizations whose role was the mental control of Joseon people was also accompanied by the creation of new organs within the Government-General. In April 1940, the Committee for Total National Spirit Mobilization was established along with a board of directors. One of the highest deliberative bodies within the Government-General, the Committee for Total National Spirit Mobilization was responsible for deliberating on issues of importance related to mobilizing

make them understand the situation faced by the 'nation': (1) The attention of the residents of the peninsula should be drawn to the critical nature of the current national situation; (2) Given that they are one and the same as Japanese people, they should be made aware of the fact that the empire of Japan is the stabilizing power for East Asia and its leader; and (3) They should be made to have a comprehensive understanding of the situation in China (GGK, 1940b, p. 337).

citizens and establishing basic guidelines for mobilization, and also planned and guided national movements in close collaboration with the Joseon Coalition for Total National Spirit Mobilization (ibid.). The affairs of the Committee, its board of directors, and the affairs of the Joseon Coalition for Total National Spirit Mobilization, meanwhile, were coordinated by the staff of the Government-General's Chief Secretary's archive department.⁴ Organizations within the Government-General were overhauled and re-organized into "tripartite cooperative organizations between the military, government and people," (GGK, 1940b, p. 342) in a manner to increase the efficiency of internal and external activities of the Government-General.

The purpose of the Joseon Coalition for Total National Spirit Mobilization was to thoroughly inculcate the notion of *Naeseon Ilche* in people of the Korean peninsula, in addition to other values such as 'national unity,' 'fortitude and endurance' and 'patriotism', to accelerate their transformation into subjects to the Japanese empire. About this movement, the Government-General stated that its goal was to "create a mindset and a mental system so that our countrymen of the peninsula would have fortitude enough not to be affected or impressed by events like the Chinese incident, and also other major events touching, for instance, relations with the Soviet Union or the United States" (GGK, 1940b, p. 344). The Joseon Coalition for Total National Spirit Mobilization

⁴ In March 1940, the Japanese colonial administration established a set of rules titled "Rules on the Handling of Classified Documents of the Government-General of Korea," setting high security standards for classified documents, commensurate with the special importance of Joseon as the war supply base of Japan. An officer was assigned to oversee the handling of classified documents for each bureau and department under the Chief Secretary's Office, and the head of the Archives Department was made to coordinate duties of classified document-handling officers and general affairs officers. The Archives Department of the Chief Secretary's Office was responsible for all documents of the Chief Secretary's Office ("Showa 16-Chief Secretary Office", p. 303). The fact that the activities of the Joseon Coalition for Total National Spirit Mobilization were overseen by the Archives Department of the Chief Secretary's Office, in charge of handling classified information, as part of its duties, gives a measure of this organization's importance for the colonial administration.

was not, if we heed the Government-General, a temporary organization to exhort people in the Korean peninsula for the purpose of the Second Sino-Japanese War, but was meant to promote permanent civic values under the overriding ideal of *Naeseon Ilche*. Hence, the Government-General sought to constitute it in such a way as to sufficiently empower it to carry out this goal. To effectively bring the whole Korean peninsula under the central organization, village-level and other smaller coalitions were created, along with the so-called 'Patriotic Units.' These low-level coalitions and units were inter-linked in a manner to form a nationwide network. Although the Joseon Coalition for Total National Spirit Mobilization was technically a 'peripheral organization,' not directly affiliated to the Government-General, with its vast network reaching to farthest corners of the country, this organization played, in reality, a key role in mental control of the colony, thereby providing precious assistance to the colonial rule of Joseon by Japan (GGK, 1940b, p. 345).

2. The Meaning of 'Joseon New System' Movement

Such strengthening of the Total National Spirit Mobilization Movement by the Government-General was consistent with the principle of *Naeseon Ilche*, proclaimed by Minami, appointed Governor-General in August 1936, as the fundamental value underlying all five governing principles for Joseon and the basic line of Japan's rule over Joseon ("Showa 16-Chief Secretary Office", p. 341; "Showa 16-Police Affairs", p. 722; GGK, 1940b, p. 336). But, this was prompted, as has been mentioned already, by the ever-increasing need for mobilizing the human and material resources of Joseon, as the war became protracted, making it necessary to strengthen the mobilization systems, and hence, fortify the propaganda machine.

This policy fathered by Minami, one can say, was updated and expanded, through these institutional reforms, to meet the new requirements of the day, after the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese

War; in other words, to draw a greater level of sacrifice from the people of Joseon to further the Japanese expansionist goal. From the Joseon Central Information Committee, set up soon after the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War, to the Joseon Coalition for Total National Spirit Mobilization, the Government-General of Korea made steady efforts to build a fine-tuned system to bend the minds of people of the Korean peninsula to make them cooperative and quash the will to resist. At the same time, under the slogans of *Seonman Ilyeo* (Joseon and Manchuria are one and the same) and *Nonggong Byeongjin* (Parallel growth of agriculture and industry), two of the five principles proclaimed by Minami, the Government-General also progressively increased productivity in Joseon to make the latter better apt at meeting war procurement needs. Both fronts of the Government-General's policy served one goal; the goal of transforming the Korean peninsula into a war supply base for Japan's continental invasion. As has been discussed earlier, under the idea of *Seonman Ilyeo*, in other words, Joseon being one and the same as Manchuria, the Korean peninsula had to be at the forefront of the effort to bring the latter under Japanese control, especially as it was also an inseparable part of Japan. Through undertakings in the two above-described directions, the Government-General, therefore, completed an effective, working wartime mobilization system to enlist Joseon in making Japan's territorial ambition a reality (GGK, 1940b, p. 339).

For this occupied territory to claim a central place in the Japanese empire's continental expansion plan, what was needed foremost was a solid and stable, well-designed mobilization system. One of the major steps made toward this direction was integrating the Joseon Coalition for Total National Spirit Mobilization, on September 11, 1940, into the executive branch of the Government-General, in accordance with the relevant guidelines by the Japanese Ministry of Interior, creating a unified nationwide system for mobilization (JCT, 1945, p. 495). Meanwhile, while following the basic framework of the New System

Movement in Japan, the Government-General wanted to build a 'New System for Joseon' on Joseon's own initiative, by updating the National Mobilization Campaign and having the Joseon Coalition lead it (JCT, 1945, p. 496). Carrying out the New System Movement in Joseon on its own initiative was no small feat reflecting favorably on the Government-General. By boosting the status of Joseon in the Japanese sphere, it also enhanced the status of the Government-General (Jeon, 2009).

The details of the New System Movement in Joseon were as follows: First, the initiative was carried out under a reporting structure having the Governor-General at its top, assisted by the General Director for Political Affairs, and agencies of the Government-General and national movement organizations were also joined it, forming a truly nationwide movement. All existing national movements aimed at re-educating people of Joseon for their assimilation, and their substructures, such as village-level coalitions and patriotic units, were integrated and consolidated into this new structure for the implementation of the New System project. Also unlike with previous national movement organizations for which participation was on a voluntary basis, it was mandatory for all organizations and individuals to participate in the New System Movement. Movements like rural development movements and chambers of commerce and other organizations in urban areas were also merged into this umbrella movement (JCT, 1945, p. 497).

The real reason why the Joseon Coalition was absorbed as part of the New System Movement by the Government-General was, in fact, to merge rural development activities with those of the Joseon Coalition (JCT, 1945, p. 500). The goal of rural development campaigns was to improve the economy of rural households, in other words, enhance the economic lives of individuals, while the Total National Spirit Mobilization Movement by the Joseon Coalition was aimed at mentally reforming the Joseon society. Now, the Government-General believed that these two goals had to be pursued together through one comprehensive solution. By consolidating organizations involved in these two types of

activities into one and launching related efforts under the leadership of a single organization, the Government-General hoped to generate a maximum of synergy (JCT, 1945, p. 503). The Government-General thus set up a far-reaching and powerful semi-public mobilization system through the Joseon Coalition for Total National Spirit Mobilization to better exploit resources available in the Korean peninsula, calling it the ‘Joseon New System Movement,’ the Joseon counterpart to the New System Movement in Japan.

Unlike the New System Movement in Japan where reform initiatives took place separately for different sectors of the society, in the Joseon New System Movement, such initiatives were carried out at the same time for national movements and government institutions, by integrating the pre-existing National Mobilization Campaign (“Showa 16-Administrative Affairs”, pp. 601-602). In fact, the so-called New System Movement amounted to nothing more than further expanding the wartime mobilization system in place in the colony. It is not surprising that such a project was carried out more effectively in Joseon, given the absolute and unlimited power granted to the Governor-General. Also due to Joseon being a colony, political initiatives were excluded from the scope of the New System Movement. The Government-General said, for instance, that the New System in Joseon was only an organization for practicing national values, attached to the executive branch of the government (JCT, 1945, pp. 473-474), and politics had no place in it. Even as the Government-General stressed relentlessly the notion of *Naeseon Ilche*, it could not allow political reform initiatives to be part of this movement, as they would necessarily challenge political restrictions placed by Japan on the colony; hence, giving fuel to the Korean desire for national independence. By so portraying the New System Movement as an organization and a campaign for practicing national values, dissociated from activities of political nature, the Government-General, while mobilizing resources, sought to escape rights issues related to the same resources or silence any protests.

The New System and the National Mobilization Campaign, therefore, were simply about increasing yet further the role of the Korean peninsula as the war supply base for the Japanese continental invasion, using the experiences gained from the Total National Spirit Mobilization Movement. The New System in Joseon was, on the one hand, a movement to take the indoctrination attempt under the *Naeseon Ilche*, emphasizing the common roots of people of Joseon and Japan and their common destiny as subjects to the Japanese empire to its next level, to ensure that the former continuously play the role of the war supply base for the latter, and on the other, to create a total mobilization system in the literal sense, by merging all industrial, economic and cultural movements into one single movement (“Showa 16-Chief Secretary Office”, p. 341). Having the previous Total National Spirit Mobilization Movement as its core concept, the New System Movement absorbed all existing national movements including rural development movements in farming and fishing communities (GGK, 1942, pp. 365-366). The ultimate goal of this movement was to defend the empire of Japan in this final stage of the Pacific War by investing all available resources in the Korean peninsula (JCT, 1943, p. 104). This was also certainly to enhance the position of the Governor-General of Korea in the Japanese political scene, as it solidified the Korean peninsula’s role as the pillar of the war Japan waged in the Asian continent.

VI. Conclusion

In Japan’s plan for expanding into the Asian continent and building a regional empire, Joseon was not slated simply to be a beachhead or a war supply base. For the Government-General of Korea, Joseon’s role was far greater than such functional roles; it literally had to guarantee the success of Japan’s imperialistic and expansionist ambition as the key strategic outpost. The Government-General readied Joseon to play this key role in the anticipated war in the Asian continent during the fascist era in Japan.

As the war grew larger in scope and became protracted, this naturally necessitated the strengthening of the mobilization system to tap human and material resources from Joseon. As a way of making people of Joseon accept the increasing level of sacrifice demanded from them, the Government-General brandished the slogan of *Naeseon Ilche*, declaring that people of Joseon and Japan were one and the same and urging the former to embrace the idea that they were subjects of the Japanese empire and, therefore, also duties as Japanese citizens. Using this top-down approach and through forcible means, the Government-General of Korea sought to draw loyalty and sacrifice from people of this colony bordering Manchuria, a region critical in Japan's continental expansion plan for natural and mineral resources to support industrial production. *Naeseon Ilche*, a campaign urging people of Joseon to become one with Japanese people, was in itself a move to expand the Japanese sphere, but was also an indispensable step for further territorial conquests in the Asian continent, using Joseon as a launch pad.

This policy direction, pursued throughout Japan's occupation of the Korean peninsula, was first adopted at the initial establishment by Terauchi of the Government-General, enjoying quasi-omnipotence, at the same time as the issuance of the so-called 'Imperial Rescript on the Reform of the Government-General' in which the principle of *Ilisi Dongin* (all are equal) was explained. Despite the official claim that Joseon was an integral part of Japan, as revealed by the designation of Japan as '*naeji* (inner land),' as opposed to Joseon, the latter was an '*oeji* (outer land)'; in other words, outside the realm governed by the Constitution of the Japanese Empire (Jeon, 2006, pp. 141-142). This basic conception of the relationship between Japan and Joseon remained unchanged throughout the 35 years of Japanese rule, even during the period when Saito declared the shift in the Japanese way of ruling the Korean peninsula, proclaiming 'cultural rule,' and discussed granting the right of political participation to Koreans (Jeon, 2008). Governor-General Ugaki, for instance, who launched the call for unity between Japan and Joseon

following the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident in 1931, stressed the importance of Joseon's place and role in the Japanese sphere and undertook industrialization projects. But, even then, Joseon was a mere 'outer land,' and nothing was done in terms of removing discriminatory measures in place, against its people. Equality between Japanese and people of Joseon, declared as one of the basic principles in the annexation of Joseon, was, therefore, a mirage, maintained to keep the colonized people more pliant and to manipulate them, when needed, to bring them to do whatever necessary to push forth Japan's expansionist plans, including mobilization of labor and fighting force and resources.

In 1936, when Governor-General Minami took office, he brandished the slogan of *Naeseon Ilche*, one of the five principles that were said to be the guiding value of his administration, along with *Seonman Ilyeo* (Joseon and Manchuria are one and the same) and the parallel development of agriculture and industry. This stress placed on the identity between the two peoples signaled some major changes in Japan's treatment of people of colonial Joseon. But, even this was a mere ploy to facilitate Japan's plan to set up a mobilization system to enlist people of Joseon for its war effort. In other words, with the Second Sino-Japanese War now underway, the colonial administration was set to transform the Korean peninsula into a war supply base, and *Naeseon Ilche* was an argument to create a favorable disposition toward the demands they were going to place on its people. The colonized people had to be ideologically conditioned ahead of the mobilization of tremendous amounts of human and material resources through the mobilization system to be set up by the Government-General. The *Naeseon Ilche* campaign was, in a way, a bargaining chip, insofar as it was a promise for a greater level of equality, to be able to mobilize more people and resources from Joseon, needed to support a war that was growing in scope and becoming protracted, even if it amounted to no more than vain promises. That being said, discussions about removing discriminatory rules against people of Joseon took a more concrete turn with the launch of the *Naeseon Ilche* campaign.

So did discussions about mandatory public education and the right of political participation.

Yet, as is well-known, none of the discussions related to rights of Joseon people resulted in any concrete outcome. The slogan of *Naeseon Ilche* only served as the rationale for forcing duties as Japanese citizens on the people of Joseon, without granting any accompanying rights as citizens to them. To the contrary, under the pretext of eliminating institutional discrimination, they launched the so-called New System Movement, the Joseon counterpart to the New System Movement in Japan, which helped create a yet more powerful and yet more exploitative mechanism for wartime mobilization.

From '*Ilsi Dongin* (All are equal)' to '*Naeseon Ilche* (Japan and Korea are one entity),' all of these slogans were aimed at the assimilation of Koreans. The extent of assimilation urged under the slogan of *Naeseon Ilche* was literally that Joseon was part of the Japanese nation, and that its people were Japanese citizens. However, in reality, the people of Joseon did not become Japanese, nor did Joseon become part of Japan. People of Joseon were, in fact, made into sub-citizens living in the 'outer land,' destined to serve the 'inner land,' Japan, to ensure its welfare.

During the colonial rule of Joseon, Japan resorted to slogans like *Naeseon Ilche*, urging the assimilation of its people, to manipulate them in order to have them assist its goal of territorial expansion. The statement that people of Joseon were Japanese was a form of double-speak, used to impose on people of Joseon duties as Japanese citizens, and not the rights as citizens; in sum to serve the welfare of Japanese people. This manipulative notion, promoted by the Government-General with no intention of guaranteeing legal rights and protection as citizens, provided the basis for the increasing emphasis on the role of Joseon in the Japanese pursuit of its territorial ambition and assisted it in submitting people of Joseon to the ever-growing demand for mobilization. The wartime mobilization system in the Korean peninsula, meanwhile, was expanded and became ubiquitous in its scope and penetration. The high

point of this relentless pursuit to divert an entire country's resources for the benefit of Japan was the so-called fascist era during which the slogan of *Naeseon Ilche* was coupled with the 'New System Movement.' Nothing can be more telling of the nature of Japanese rule in Korea than this well-oiled machine of exploitation under the name of the unity of and equality between the colonized and the colonizers.

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