Naval Memorials in Germany and Japan: Narratives of a "Clean War" Represented in Public Space

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The objective of this paper is to examine the strategies adopted in postwar Japan and Germany to construct positive images of war, or images that suggest that the conflicts involved were, at least in part, "clean" wars. While these two countries are usually considered rare cases of states that have addressed their wartime past in highly critical ways, both have supplemented self-critical reflection with selectively defined "positive" elements designed to help their citizens deal with the realities of a history of aggressive war, war crimes, and genocide.

Keywords: historical memory, naval memorials, reconciliation, historical revisionism, Japan, Germany

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1. Introduction

The twentieth century is often referred to as the "century of war." The first half of the century was characterized by "hot wars" and the second half by the Cold War; both periods saw large numbers of people killed in armed conflicts. While the toll of human suffering and loss throughout the twentieth century cannot be overlooked, this period also witnessed continuous efforts by political and military authorities to soften the impact of war through favorable coverage in the popular media and through policies of commemoration and memorialization during the postwar period.[1] It is said that the first victim in a war is truth. Yet, even in the process of reshaping memory *after* a war, for governments, military authorities, and large sectors of society, the truth counts for less than the desire to remember and transmit "bright" stories of past wars, as historian

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1 Cf. Susan L. Carruthers, *The Media at War* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000); Paul Rutherford, *Weapons of Mass Persuasion: Marketing the War Against Iraq* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004).

George Mosse has so aptly observed in the case of World War I.[2] Mosse's observations have lost none of their force in the twenty-first century, as will be shown below.

The objective of this paper is to examine the strategies adopted in postwar Japan and Germany to construct positive images of war, or images suggesting the conflicts involved were—at least in part—"clean" wars. While these two countries are usually considered rare cases for having addressed their wartime past in highly critical ways, Germany generally more so than Japan, both have supplemented self-critical reflection with selectively defined "positive" elements designed to help their citizens deal with the realities of a history of aggressive war, war crimes, and genocide.[3] This paper attempts to show that, in both cases, these "positive" elements often come from the history of naval warfare.

In what follows, an examination will unfold on how naval memorials in both countries have been constructed and utilized to reshape the image of war in the public consciousness and to build positive narratives around at least one sector of military forces involved as having fought an honorable and "clean" war. Because Germany and Japan were both responsible for countless war crimes, including atrocities against civilians and genocide, it has been difficult for either country to construct a positive image in postwar public memory of their involvement in World War II. From time to time, both countries have witnessed the emergence of "historical revisionism"—political and intellectual movements aimed at presenting and rewriting national history in a more favorable light. The most well-known examples of this phenomenon are the "historians' debate" (*Historikerstreit*) in 1980s

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2 George L. Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

3 For a recent comparison of strategies adopted by Japan, Germany, and Austria to address their wartime pasts see Thomas U. Berger, *War, Guilt, and World Politics after World War II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

Germany and the movement of historical revisionism that has been active in Japan since the 1990s.[4] However, revisionist views of Japan and Germany's wartime history have generally been rejected by society at large.[5] Nevertheless, a trend has been apparent in both countries to single out particular episodes from their history of naval warfare and present them as part of a narrative of "clean" war. After discussing some recent cases in which similar strategies were employed, a number of German and Japanese monuments that commemorate sailors killed in naval battles will be reviewed and a search will be made for their place in creating popular historical consciousness and war memory in postwar Germany and Japan.

2. War and the Media in the Twenty-First Century

Beginning with the Second Boer War (1899-1902), the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), and the First and Second Balkan Wars (1912-1913), the "century of war" that characterized the twentieth century built to a climax with the First and Second World Wars, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. Although warfare has taken a different turn as we enter a new millennium, war as a method of resolving conflict shows no sign of

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4 See James Knowlton and Truett Cates, trans., *Forever in the Shadow of Hitler?: Original Documents of the Historikerstreit, the Controversy Concerning the Singularity of the Holocaust* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993); Richard J. Evans, *In Hitler's Shadow: West German Historians and the Attempt to Escape from the Nazi Past* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989). For the case of Japan, see Sven Saaler, "Chapter Three: History and Public Opinion," in *Politics, Memory and Public Opinion: The History Textbook Debate and Japanese Society*, DIJ Monograph Series, vol. 39 (Munich: Iudicium, 2005).

5 See Saaler, "Chapter Three: History and Public Opinion." Having said this, a new wave of historical revisionism is gaining traction in Japan as this paper is being written, strongly supported by none less than the Prime Minister, Abe Shinzō. Cf. Hayashi Hirofumi, Tawara Yoshifumi, and Watanabe Mina, "*Murayama Danwa-Kōno Danwa" Minaoshi No Sakugo* [The Error of Revising the "Murayama Declaration" and the "Kôno Declaration"] (Kyōto-shi: Kamogawa Shuppan, 2013); Sven Saaler, "Sengo no Nihon to Doitsu ni okeru 'kako no kokufuku' [The Process of 'Overcoming the Past' in Postwar Japan and Germany]," *Nihon no Kagakusha* 48, no. 8 (2013): 18-23.

abating. We are now faced with a situation in which war has become a perpetual phenomenon in the form of the so-called "war on terrorism." While wars were traditionally declared by one state against another, and the ensuing armed conflict was fought by regular military forces, the lack of a clearly defined opponent in the "war on terror" has particularly led the West into a quagmire of "never-ending war ."[6]

Despite anti-war demonstrations throughout the West and Japan regularly voicing opposition to this new type of warfare, they have failed to challenge the pervasive influence of the most firmly entrenched supporters of war in our time—a certain strand of politicians obsessed with issues of "national security," pro-war pundits, military establishments, and industrial complexes. In the United States, Europe, and Japan, media institutions have failed to make any serious attempt to oppose war. Often, this is a result of pressure or "guidance" from governmental and/or military authorities. In fact, pressure by governments to control the media is growing. In December 2013, the Japanese Diet passed the "Bill on the Protection of Designated Secrets," tightening its control over classified material, particularly on foreign and security affairs, and equipping itself with an array of tools to suppress investigative journalism. While freedom of the press in Japan has generally been given a low rating among the industrialized democracies, these most recent developments will undoubtedly lead to further deterioration in press freedom in the country.[7]

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[6] This very fact has led to the emergence of doubts over the legality of this new kind of warfare. Because war can only be declared by states against other states in the framework of international law, some scholars consider the concept of declaring a "war on terror" to be mere rhetoric and irrelevant. See, for example, Chalmers Johnson, *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic*, (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004). Kindle edition. Furthermore, at the time George W. Bush declared his "war on terror," Osama bin-Laden, the leader of the terrorist group Al-Quaida, had already declared war on the United States. Cf. Chalmers Johnson, *Dismantling the Empire: America's Last Best Hope*, (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2010). Kindle edition.

[7] According to the figures compiled by the NGO "Reporters without Borders" (http://www.

As a result of the tightening controls on information by political and military authorities in Western countries as well as Japan in recent years, the media has generally opted to portray modern warfare as "clean," and thus bolster the image of a given conflict as a "just" war among the general public and worldwide opinion.[8] This kind of distortion is of course not unique to the twenty-first century: strategies for rehabilitating the image of war have remained remarkably consistent over time. In particular, a strong emphasis on the supposedly "clean" side of *naval* warfare has a long pedigree stretching from the twentieth century until the present day.

The first question to be addressed is: Why should naval warfare become singled out as a means of establishing a positive narrative of a "clean" war? First, this phenomenon stems from a number of perceived differences in the popular image of ground warfare as opposed to war at sea, and in the organizational structure of the army and the navy. The following distinctions in particular can be noted:

- Symbolism of color: While the army is associated with fighting in "dirt" and "mud," the navy fights in "water," a symbol of purity. Furthermore, in contrast to the navy's white uniforms, army personnel usually wear uniforms of a "dirty" brown or khaki color.
- Remoteness of naval battles from the home country: In general, naval battles take place on the open sea, far from countries engaged in conflict. News of such naval battles reaches public knowledge only intermittently.

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reporter-ohne-grenzen.de/), Japan was ranked as follows in terms of freedom of the press: 28 in 2002, 44 in 2003, 43 in 2004, 37 in 2005, 51 in 2006, 37 in 2007, 29 in 2008, 17 in 2009, 12 in 2010, 22 in 2011/12, and 53 in 2013. These figures indicate that the information policy of the center-left government of the Democratic Party of Japan (2009-2012) contributed to a marked improvement in the freedom of the press in Japan, while the advent of a right-wing government under Prime Minister Abe Shinzō in late 2012 led to a sudden decline.

[8] Cf. Carruthers, *The Media at War*; Rutherford, *Weapons of Mass Persuasion*.

- Number of casualties: Land battles have a reputation for producing enormous casualties and damage, whereas losses sustained in naval engagements are perceived as being relatively light.
- Methods of combat: Naval battles, until the present, are perceived as being "noble" in character, following "chivalrous" rules.
- War crimes: Naval warfare is considered to be largely free of atrocities and war crimes. Evidence of this perception can be found in the Nuremberg War Crime Trials (1945-1946) and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE, Tokyo Trial, 1946-1947), where only a very few naval officers stood trial and none were included among those sentenced to death.[9]
- Modernity and tradition: While the navy is often seen as a "modern" and "advanced" organization which values new technology and military logic, the army is viewed as instead prizing "tradition" and "spirit," an institution where blind obedience replaces reason.

When we look at the recent example of the 2003 Iraq War fought by the West as a part of their "war on terror," the distinctions involved in these conventional images of the navy and army become apparent. Constrained by geographical conditions, large numbers of ground troops were committed to this war in a country almost landlocked. Nevertheless, it was through the United States navy and air forces that images of fighting entered public consciousness, with planes taking off from aircraft carriers to launch attacks. Apart from a few scenes of U.S. tanks shelling and destroying distant Iraqi tanks that seemed to show little resistance, and

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[9] Among the 24 defendants of the Nuremberg trials (1945-1946), through which the leadership of Nazi Germany was prosecuted for crimes committed during the 1939-1945 war, only two were naval personnel. Neither was among the twelve defendants sentenced to death. Admiral Carl Dönitz was indicted for his role in ordering "unrestricted submarine warfare" and received a sentence of ten years in prison. Erich Raeder, Commander in Chief of the German navy from 1928 to 1943, was sentenced to life imprisonment, but was released in 1955. The 28 defendants at the Tokyo trials (1946-1947) included 15 army officers and only three naval personnel.

U.S. troops bringing down a statue of Saddam Hussein, the media rarely showed U.S. and British ground units engaged in combat with the Iraqi army. On the other hand, the media frequently broadcast images of the U.S. Navy launching cruise missiles and of "smart" bombs hitting targets in Iraq. These are the images still likely to remain in the minds of many.[10] Moreover, it was from the deck of the aircraft carrier USS *Abraham Lincoln* that President George W. Bush proclaimed victory to the world's media after alighting from a fighter plane.

The preferential treatment given to naval activities during the conflict was a result of the U.S. government and military's attempt to deploy "weapons of mass persuasion" and to construct a positive image of the war.[11] The American mass media feared that reporting on "dirty" land battles might trigger an anti-war response by the American public—precisely what had happened during the Vietnam War.[12] Thousands of American soldiers had lost their lives in that conflict, and each time images of the war dead were broadcast in the media, they added fuel to the anti-war movement. As a result, the American government and military have become extremely sensitive to the way casualties are reported and have strengthened their regulation of the media in this area.[13] Accordingly, during the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War, the American government enforced rigid controls on information, and graphic battle scenes and images of dead and bloodied American soldiers were subject to censorship. In response to this overt government control of the media, a number of intellectuals decried the decay of American democracy and predicted the demise of republicanism.[14] A similar debate

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[10] Rutherford, *Weapons of Mass Persuasion*, 56. See also John W. Dower, *Cultures of War: Pearl Harbor, Hiroshima, 9/11, Iraq* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2010), 117, chap. 5 passim.

[11] Rutherford, *Weapons of Mass Persuasion*.

[12] Ibid., 67, 151.

[13] Carruthers, *The Media at War*.

[14] Chalmers Johnson, *Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic* (New York: Metropolitan

broke out in Japan in late 2013, following the passing of the "Bill on the Protection of Designated State Secrets."[15]

Now, Germany and Japan will be considered as to how, in the postwar period, these two countries employed strategies aimed at popularizing positive images of naval warfare in order to deflect attention from war crimes, genocide, and public memories of a war marked by an exceptional degree of brutality.

3. Naval Memorials in Postwar Germany

The twentieth century witnessed ever-increasing numbers of civilians suffer under wartime conditions, in addition to military personnel. As a result of the advent of "total war," the effects of armed conflict ceased to be limited to professional military personnel, and encompassed civilians and ordinary citizens now mobilized as soldiers in armies of previously unimaginable size. Prior to the nineteenth century, wars had mainly been fought by mercenaries and professionals under the leadership of the aristocratic class. In this military culture, little consideration was given to the war dead. Fallen soldiers were usually simply buried on the battlefield, or their corpses burnt in order to prevent the spread of disease. No special consideration was given to preserving their "memory," at least not that of the rank and file.

From the nineteenth century, ordinary citizens began to play a larger role in European warfare. A decisive milestone in this development was the policy called *levée en masse*, or mobilization of the masses, which was initiated by a revolutionary government of France following

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Books, 2006).

[15] "Kill the Secrecy Bill," *The Japan Times*, November 21, 2013, sec. Editorial; "Mr. Abe's Undemocratic Secrecy Bill," *The Japan Times*, October 25, 2013, sec. Editorial. For similar criticism of attempts by the government of Great Britain to limit the scope of investigative journalism, see "British Press Freedom Under Threat," *The New York Times*, November 16, 2013, sec. Editorial.

the French Revolution of 1789. The increasing numbers of commoners giving their lives for the state or "nation" required new ways of dealing with the war dead and of disposing their bodies, but also new ways of mourning, commemorating and memorializing fallen members of the new citizen armies. Especially as a result of the Napoleonic Wars in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, governments throughout Europe began building "war memorials" to honor, memorialize, and commemorate their war dead.

The custom of honoring fallen soldiers spread rapidly after World War I (1914-1918) when numbers of the war dead reached unprecedented heights of almost 20 million in total. As the enormous extent of casualties and destruction sustained during the war became more widely known, European governments invented new forms of memorial and commemorative markers in an attempt to explain and justify death on such a vast scale, and invest the conflict with significance in the minds of the public.[16] The unprecedented number of fallen soldiers made it necessary to erect large numbers of grave markers and monuments to honor them. In addition to building memorials in soldiers' hometowns, there was a move to create institutions dedicated to preserving their memory in the capitals of Europe. Because of the high number of fatalities some countries suffered, and because it was impossible to identify many of the war dead, the idea of the "tomb of the unknown soldier" was developed. This new form of memorial was adopted throughout the 1920s in Great Britain, France, Italy, Greece, and a number of other countries. The fact that the war dead could no longer be honored individually attests to the fact that the belligerent states were no longer capable of managing the consequences of the wars they had started.

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[16] On changes in commemoration of the war dead following World War I, see Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers.*

Figure 1. Douaumont

Major symbols of this crisis for civilization were the enormously costly battles fought in Belgium and France. In 1916, Germany launched an all-out offensive around the French city of Verdun. Ten months of intense trench warfare killed 150,000 German soldiers and 170,000 French soldiers.[17] In the Battle of the Somme, the death toll was even higher.[18] Today, war cemeteries around Verdun, particularly the ossuary of Douaumont holding the remains of thousands of unidentified soldiers, remain as a testimony to the tragedy of World War I.

In sharp contrast to the battles of Verdun and the Somme as symbols of the brutality and carnage of World War I, naval battles fought in the same war have retained a relatively "clean" image in public

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[17] In addition, more than 200,000 French and 190,000 German troops were wounded at Verdun. Today, the Battle of Verdun is remembered as an archetype of the tragedy of war, and the battle site is now an important cultural monument for Europe and its efforts for peace among nations.

[18] Over the battle's duration of five months, 200,000 French, 420,000 British, and 430,000 German soldiers lost their lives.

memory. In Germany, however, the elements making for a positive image of naval warfare were not present at first. Throughout the war, the German navy failed to fight any decisive battle against Great Britain's Royal Navy, its main enemy. Despite investing heavily in creating a large-scale navy during the first decade of the twentieth century, the majority of the German fleet remained rusting in their bases until the end of the war. The battle of Jutland in 1916, the only large-scale encounter involving German and British naval forces, failed to create a decisive victory for either side. While its expensive battle fleet remained inactive, the German navy in World War I was chiefly engaged in pursuing its blockade of Great Britain with cheaply produced submarines. However, the strategy of unrestricted submarine warfare around Great Britain's coasts would eventually lead to complications and incidents, resulting in an outcry from the international community. Germany's sinking of the USS *Lusitania*, an American passenger vessel, in 1917 led the United States to enter the war. Such incidents did nothing to improve the image of the German navy's performance in World War I. The navy's image was further tarnished from a mutiny by German sailors in the naval port of Kiel near the end of the war in November 1918. This rebellion acted as the fuse which set off the 1918-1919 "German Revolution" and eventually led to the collapse of the German Empire. Conservatives in postwar Germany decried this "revolution" as part of the nation's betrayal by "unloyal" and "un-German" elements, a claim that would develop into what came to be known as the "stab-in-the-back-legend."[19] Against this background, it was difficult to construct a "clean" and heroic image of the German navy in post-World War I Germany.

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[19] On the "stab-in-the-back legend" in Germany, see the classic work by Joachim Petzold, *Die Dolchstoßlegende: Eine Geschichtsfälschung im Dienst des deutschen Imperialismus und Militarismus* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1963). See also more recent discussions in Rainer Sammet, *"Dolchstoß": Deutschland und die Auseinandersetzung mit der Niederlage im Ersten Weltkrieg (1918-1933)* (Berlin: Trafo-Verlag, 2003); Alexander Watson, "Stabbed at the Front," *History Today* 58, no. 11 (2008): 21-27.

Nevertheless, in 1925, a proposal was presented for a national monument to sailors killed in the war.[20] Why was such a memorial proposed? First, notwithstanding the navy's poor performance during the war, it was not that difficult to encourage the public to accept an image of a "clean" naval war because of the overall differences between land and naval warfare discussed above. Second, in an atmosphere where numerous war cemeteries and memorials were being built for the victims of land battles, the navy was concerned to claim a memorial for those who had died in naval warfare.

Eventually, the "Memorial in Honor of the German Navy" (*Marine-Ehrenmal*) was built on the outskirts of Kiel, near the town of Laboe following a ten-year construction period.[21] The unveiling ceremony took place in 1936.[22] After World War II ended in Europe in May 1945 with Germany's unconditional surrender, the memorial was confiscated by British forces. Accepting that the Laboe monument had no direct connection with Nazi ideology, nor with glorifying war, the British returned it in 1954 by placing it under the control of the German Naval Association Deutscher Marinebund, where it remains to the present day.[23]

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[20] Thorsten Prange, *Das Marine-Ehrenmal in Laboe: Geschichte Eines Deutschen Nationalsymbols* (Wilhelmshaven: Brune, 1996), 5. A number of small, local memorials had been built prior to 1925 in north German port cities. Ibid., 12-13.

[21] Prange, *Das Marine-Ehrenmal in Laboe*, 19-22.

[22] Ibid., 112-116.

[23] For details on the Marinebund, see http://www.deutscher-marinebund.de/.



Figure 2. The Laboe Naval Memorial

The Laboe monument is dominated by a central 72-meter tower.[24] Since the majority of German naval personnel killed in World War I were submarine crewmen, this tower is suggestive of the shape of a submarine as well as a ship's sail. The design of the memorial was the result of a public competition and the funds to build it were donated from around the country, collected by the German Naval Association.[25]

In addition to the tower, the German naval memorial consists of a public square and a historical exhibition space. Within the tower, visitors enter the "Hall of Honor" (*Ehrenhalle*), which had originally been located in the area now occupied by the permanent exhibition before the war. At the center of the Hall of Honor, there is an inscription reading

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[24] For visual impressions, see the various pamphlets and visitor guides to the memorial: *Das Marine-Ehrenmal*, 3rd ed. (Wilhelmshaven: Deutscher Marinebund e.V., 1962); *Das Marine-Ehrenmal Des Deutschen Marinebundes* e.V., 4th ed. (Wilhelmshaven: Deutscher Marinebund e.V., 1974). See also the memorial's website, which includes a visual tour: http://www.deutscher-marinebund.de/geschichte_me_english.htm.

[25] Prange, *Das Marine-Ehrenmal in Laboe*, 32-58.

"They died for us." Flanking this legend, the numbers of those who died in naval warfare during both world wars are displayed as "1914 to 1918—35,000, 1939 to 1945—120,000."

Next to the tower is a square for holding ceremonies, below which visitors will find the "Consecration Hall" (*Weihehalle*), containing a "Register of Honor" inscribed with the names of the 35,000 naval personnel killed in World War I. The hall is decorated with German naval flags dating back to the founding of the nation, along with a place for floral tributes as well.

Situated behind the tower at the opposite end of the square is the "History Hall" (*Historische Halle*), a permanent exhibition of German maritime history.[26] The memorial's pamphlet dating from the 1960s places a strong emphasis on the continuity of Germany's maritime history from antiquity to the modern period.[27] This publication shows that the 1960s version of the exhibition attempted to create a glorified image of German naval actions by, for example, portraying the 1916 Battle of Jutland in a positive light and treating German submarine warfare in World War I in an upbeat manner.[28] Even in the context of World War II, the exhibition praises submarine warfare as "highly successful due to the fighting spirit of the crewmen."[29] In addition, it portrayed in a heroic light naval missions to evacuate German nationals residing in Eastern Europe just before the end of World War II.[30] As this version of the exhibition was conceptualized in the anti-communist atmosphere of 1960s West Germany, it would have been relatively easy for visitors to accept at face value this narrative of fellow Germans being rescued by the navy as they fled from the Soviet Red Army.

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[26] For more information on how the "History Hall" has changed over time, see Ibid., 149-159.

[27] *Das Marine-Ehrenmal*, 3rd ed. (1962), 10.

[28] Ibid., 25.

[29] Ibid., 29.

[30] Ibid., 15.

Figure 3. The covers of the 1960s (left) and the 1970s (right) pamphlets

From the latter half of the 1960s and into the 1970s, however, "coming to terms with the past" made rapid progress in West Germany, a process that did not leave the Laboe memorial untouched.[31] During the student protests of 1968, the monument was inscribed with protest graffiti, and criticized as "revisionist" and glorifying war. The memorial area was even briefly occupied by students of Kiel University.[32] From that time, various local administrative bodies considered changing the character of the Kiel monument from a "memorial glorifying the Navy" into a "peace memorial."[33] In particular, the memorial's inscription "They died for us" became a stone of contention. This phrase is commonly found on war memorials, not only in Germany. Critics of the

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[31] On this process, see Geoffrey H. Hartman, ed., *Bitburg in Moral and Political Perspective* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1986).

[32] Prange, *Das Marine-Ehrenmal in Laboe*, 197-198.

[33] Ibid., 199.

Laboe memorial have pointed out that the referent of the word "us" is unclear. In the context of World War II, it is usually assumed in Germany that the war dead perished from aggressive Nazi policies. However, the inscription in the Laboe memorial seems to imply that the sailors died for a vaguely defined group of members of the German nation who survived the war. A publication produced by a group of German university students in 1985 notes that the monument has functioned as both a Mahnmal, a memorial displaying a warning to future generations, and as a site for "hero worship." In their opinion, the wording "they *believed* that they were going to die for us," would be more accurate, since the sailors did not know anything about the German nation's future, and thus could not have possibly died for those that would survive the war.[34] Eventually, the memorial received a new dedication in 1996 with the intention of emphasizing its role as a peace memorial: "Memorial to all those who died at sea and for peaceful navigation in free waters."[35]

Tracing changes in the exhibition from the 1960s through to the 1970s makes it apparent that the exhibits and their accompanying descriptions also underwent a drastic revision. In contrast to the 1964 edition of the pamphlet, the 1974 printing did away with the traditional gothic or old German altdeutsch font. The later pamphlet no longer emphasizes modern Germany's connection to ancient "Germanic tribes," and contains only a brief reference to the navy's role in the World War II evacuation of Germans from Eastern Europe.[36] These revisions reflected the changes to the memorial itself as noted above. The 1960s edition filled one whole page with the phrase "They died for us" in large gothic letters, whereas in the revised version, those words were replaced with a

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[34] Laboe-Gruppe der Evangelischen Studentengemeinde Kiel, ed., *Sie glaubten, für uns zu sterben das Marine-Ehrenmal Laboe: Stätte der Mahnung oder der Heldenverehrung?* (Kiel, 1985).

[35] Heinrich Walle, "Das Marine-Ehrenmal Laboe: Gratwanderung von Touristenattraktion Zu Totengedenken," *MarineForum* 85, no. 9 (2010): 50-52.

[36] *Das Marine-Ehrenmal Des Deutschen Marinebundes e.V*, 4th ed. (1974), 12.

less confronting phrase in roman font—"They died on every ocean."[37] These revisions prepared the memorial for its re-invention into a "peace memorial" and to receive the above-mentioned new dedication in 1996. Despite these developments, one commentator pointed out in 2010 that "until a few years ago, the exhibition still retained elements of imperial navy propaganda."[38]

In 2014, the German naval memorial, together with the adjacent U995 submarine display (established in 1971), continues to attract large numbers of visitors.[39] Over the 50 years between 1954 and 2004, the memorial drew 140 million visitors and remains one of the most heavily visited tourist attractions in the region.[40] No doubt influenced by the naval memorial's popularity, the Federal Air Force of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) erected a "Memorial in Honor of the German Air Force" in 1962, and in Ehrenbreitstein Fortress in the city of Koblenz, the Federal Army erected a "Memorial in Honor of the German Army" in 1972. The chronology is significant: erecting a naval memorial in the 1920s and 1930s and upholding it in the postwar period was a relatively simple matter, but it was not until the 1970s that a memorial for the German *army* was built.

The debate about how best to commemorate and honor German soldiers killed in battle surfaced again at the turn of the twenty-first century. This time, the discussion was over troops dispatched overseas, particularly the thousands of soldiers Germany had sent to Afghanistan as a part of NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). More than 50 German soldiers have so far lost their lives in the line of

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37 Ibid.

38 Walle, "Das Marine-Ehrenmal Laboe," 51.

39 *Das Marine-Ehrenmal Des Deutschen Marinebundes e.V*, 4th ed. (1974), 165.

40 Dieter Hartwig, "Das Marine-Ehrenmal in Laboe: Kontinuität und Wandel einer nationalen Gedenkstätte," in *Nordlichter: Geschichtsbewußtsein und Geschichtsmythen nördlich der Elbe*, Beiträge zur Geschichtskultur 27 (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2004), 413-438. Walle, "Das Marine-Ehrenmal Laboe," 50-52.

duty in Afghanistan—the first instances of "war dead" in postwar Germany.[41] Following a long debate, the concept of "postwar war dead" has gained acceptance in Germany. In 2009, the "Memorial in Honor of the Federal Armed Forces" (*Ehrenmal der Bundeswehr*) was built within the grounds of the Ministry of Defense in Berlin.[42] Whether this development suggests that Germany will be a stronger participant in military operations around the globe in the future, or whether it represents a localized reaction to the fact of German casualties in a particular theatre of war, remains to be seen.

4. Naval memorials in Japan

Of the many memorials in Japan commemorating naval battles, there are three that stand out. Two of them are dedicated to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905: the Memorial Ship *Mikasa* in Yokosuka and the series of memorials commemorating the Battle of Tsushima on the Tsushima islands. The third memorial is related to World War II: the Yamato Museum in Kure, which commemorates the construction and wartime service of the Japanese battleship *Yamato*. This giant warship was sunk in 1945 while launching a *kamikaze* suicide attack, with over 3,000 of its 3,300 crewmen lost. The museum has garnered an unexpected popularity in recent years, partly due to the appearance of the *Yamato* in postwar Japanese film and popular culture.

4a. The Yamato Museum

The Yamato Museum in Kure opened in 2006 and has since logged

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[41] http://www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/Breg/DE/Afghanistan/afghanistan.html.

[42] Website: http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pPKUVL301JTUvOzUPL3UjKLUvFygfEG2oyIA6T6FxA!!/.

around one million visitors every year.[43] Of the memorials and history museums in Japan, the only others that can boast a similar number of visitors are the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, the Edo-Tokyo Museum in Tokyo, and the memorials and museums in Okinawa.[44] In an apparently contradictory pattern of behavior, many people take in the display of destructive military power in the Yamato Museum and then continue their "sightseeing" at the Peace Memorial in Hiroshima, the city destroyed by an atomic weapon in the same year the *Yamato* was sunk. The *Yamato*'s popularity is related to the rise of conservative historical revisionism in Japan from the 1990s, and also to the commercialization particularly of the *kamikaze* image and the battleship *Yamato* in popular culture. Historical revisionists have continued their attempts to change the contents of Japanese school history textbooks and thus fundamentally alter Japanese views of history. They have also frequently attacked the history textbooks currently in use in schools, and published textbooks of their own which claim that Japan's wars—in particular World War II—were not wars of aggression, but of self-defense.[45]

Although the revisionists' efforts over the past 15 years have generally ended in failure, they have had some impact on Japanese society. Notably, the Japanese image of the *kamikaze* fighter and war in general has undergone some change. This is visible, for example, in the constant stream of films celebrating *kamikaze* units and the *Yamato* in particular.[46] For instance, the 2005 film *Otokotachi no Yamato* (Men of

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[43] There is a tendency for history museums to emphasize their long "tradition," despite the fact that the majority of history museums date from the 1980s and later. In Japan, the National Museum of Japanese History (often abbreviated to *Rekihaku* in Japanese) opened in 1983. Most of Japan's remaining memorials and history museums were built between the 1990s and 2000s.

[44] A majority of the visitors to the Okinawa memorials are junior high and high-school students. Visitor numbers were provided to the author by the museums surveyed. On the Okinawa memorials, see Julia Yonetani, "On the Battlefield of Mabuni: Struggles over Peace and the Past in Contemporary Okinawa," *East Asian History* 20 (December 2000): 145-169.

[45] See Sven Saaler, *Politics, Memory and Public Opinion* (Munich: Iudicium, 2005).

[46] For a more detailed treatment on the role of *Yamato* in postwar popular culture in Japan, see

the Yamato) was made on a 25-billion-yen budget and earned the largest amount of revenue of any Japanese film released that year. The year 2009 saw the release of *Uchūsenkan Yamato fukkatsuhen* (Space Battleship Yamato Returns), and in 2010, *Uchūsenkan Yamato* (Space Battleship Yamato), starring Kimura Takuya, was produced with a 20-billion-yen budget. *Uchūsenkan Yamato* had been a popular science-fiction anime series since the 1960s, but it had been terminated with the 1983 production *Uchūsenkan Yamato kanketsuhen* (Space Battleship Yamato, the Final). However, *Yamato*-related movies achieved a new popularity in the 1990s. Involved in the planning, production, and funding of several of these films was former Tokyo mayor Ishihara Shintarō, now a member of the Japanese Diet. Ishihara, a notorious populist and right-wing ultranationalist, had previously lent his support as "general production advisor" and scriptwriter to the 25-billion-yen film *Ore wa kimi no tame ni koso shi ni iku* (I Will Die Only For You) from 2007, another movie glorifying *kamikaze* pilots. Although this film cost 18 billion yen to produce, it was a failure at the box office, earning less than 10 billion yen.

Ishihara was also responsible for the original script of *Space Battleship Yamato Returns* in 2009. The continuing popularity of the *Yamato* series reveals that the image of a "noble naval war" has permeated the consciousness of the Japanese public. One further aspect of popular attitudes to the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) is its association with "technological advancement." In the twenty-first century, the IJN

Hiromi Mizuno, "When Pacifist Japan Fights: Historicizing Desire in Anime," in *Mechademia 2: Networks of Desire* (Minneapolis, MN: University Of Minnesota Press, 2007), 104-123. While writing this paper, the movie "Eternal Zero," which portrays the last days in the life of a *kamikaze* pilot, became a major success. It remained on top of Japan's box office for eight consecutive weeks since its release on December 21, 2013. In the first seven weeks after its release, it earned 6.98 billion yen (see http://www.filmbiz.asia/news/eternal-zero-tops-japan-bo-for-8th-week). On the ongoing debate surrounding the movie, see Mark Schilling, "Debate Still Rages over Abe-Endorsed WWII Drama," *The Japan Times*, February 20, 2014.

has come to be seen as a "modern," "progressive" and technology-driven organization. By building a giant battleship such as the *Yamato*, the navy intended to demonstrate Japan's technological prowess. In postwar Japan, the notion of Japanese technological superiority still holds a great deal of weight. However, two important points have been overlooked in the adulation bestowed on the *Yamato*. First, the battleship was already outdated by the time it was completed—the heyday of "great battleships" had waned after World War I. What is probably more important is that although the ship might have been a technological achievement of some sort, it was, above all, a killing machine. In this regard, it was similar to the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima, a city very close to the naval town of Kure, the *Yamato*'s home base. Like the *Yamato*, the atomic bomb that destroyed two Japanese cities has also been hailed by some as a technological achievement to be celebrated.

These ambiguities notwithstanding, today the *Yamato* has become a symbol of technological advancement and has been associated with the idea of postwar Japan's resurgence as a "technology superpower." Removed from its historical context, the *Yamato* has been memorialized as an exemplar of Japanese technological achievement. Thus, despite the currency of its unofficial name "Yamato Museum," the institution is officially known as *Kure-shi Kaiji Rekishi Kagaku-kan*, the Kure City Maritime History *Science* Museum. The primary objective of the *Yamato* exhibit is not to reflect on the war, but rather "through the battleship *Yamato* [to convey the] importance of technological advancement and peace."[47] Although the phrase "to convey the importance of […] peace" is also included in the museum director's official message on the museum's website and in the explanation of the museum's "concept," the main focus is on "technological advance" and the extent to which prewar Japan's advanced level of technological development contributed to the

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[47] http://www.yamato-museum.com/concept/message.html, accessed March 15, 2013.

country's postwar economic growth.[48] The terms "peace" and "splendor of science and technology" (*gijutsu no eikō*) are transposed in the English and Japanese versions of the museum's visitor guide. In the Japanese version, science and technology are mentioned first, whereas in the English version, "peace" takes first place: "We wish to convey to the future the history of 'Kure' which made the Battleship Yamato, the importance of peace and the splendor of science and technology." However, the museum's English-language visitor guide accessible online contains no further explanation of "the importance of peace," but rather focuses on the history of maritime technology in Kure.[49] This is a reflection of the historical reality that the battleship *Yamato* had no relation to peace, but was a warship of terrible destructive power.

4b. Mikasa

Another historical episode that has contributed to the construction of a positive image of naval warfare in Japan is the Russo-Japanese War, and especially the Battle of Tsushima (1905). To commemorate this naval battle, the warship *Mikasa*, the flagship of Admiral Marquis Tōgō Heihachirō during the Battle of Tsushima, was turned into a memorial in 1920. It was later moved to its current location at Yokosuka in 1926 where it was turned into a memorial and "preserved as a symbol of the pride and confidence of the Japanese people."[50] The name Tōgō became widely known after this celebrated engagement, helping Japan gain a reputation as a great military—and especially naval—power. Like the allure surrounding the *Yamato*, the Battle of Tsushima retains a positive image in Japan.

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[48] http://www.yamato-museum.com/concept/policy.html, accessed April 15, 2014.

[49] http://www.yamato-museum.com/concept/pdf/ref09_3_eng.pdf, accessed April 15, 2014.

[50] See the website of the Mikasa Memorial: http://www.kinenkan-mikasa.or.jp/siryou/mikasa.html, accessed March 12, 2012.

This is reflected in the development of the number of visitors to the memorial. Annual visitors to the memorial ship *Mikasa* reached a high-water mark of around 300,000 in 1962, but declined steadily into the 1990s, dropping below 100,000 for the first time in 1994. Between 1994 and 2008, numbers stabilized at around 100,000 visitors. However, as a result of the growing popularity of the Battle of Tsushima in popular culture, visitor numbers rose throughout the 2000s. Partly responsible for this was the centennial of the Russo-Japanese War and, closely related, the growth of popular films and television dramas dealing with this crucial military conflict. The novels of writer Shiba Ryōtarō (1923-1996) are particularly noteworthy in this context. Shiba's novels, many of which have spawned highly popular TV dramatizations, have strongly influenced the general public's historical awareness. For example, between 2009 and 2011, Japan's national television station NHK broadcast a dramatization of one of Shiba's most popular works, *Saka no ue no kumo* (Clouds Above the Hill), garnering wide attention in society and sparking heated discussion.[51] The main characters are two servicemen, one an army officer and the other a naval officer, whose story served to emphasize the image of a "clean" naval war.[52] Hardly surprising, visitor numbers to the *Mikasa* swelled during the years that *Clouds Above the Hill* was broadcast on NHK—from 117,000 in 2008 to 156,000 in 2009, reaching a new peak of 175,000 in 2011.The Memorial itself explicitly attributes this increase to the popularity of the television

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[51] Shiba's lengthy novel was published in English in 2013: Shiba Ryōtarō, *Clouds above the Hill: A Historical Novel of the Russo-Japanese War*, ed. Phyllis Birnbaum, trans. Juliet Winters Carpenter and Paul McCarthy (London and New York: Routledge, 2013). On other memorials relating to Shiba, see Tatsushi Hirano, Sven Saaler, and Stefan Säbel, "Recent Developments in the Representation of National Memory and Local Identities: The Politics of Memory in Tsushima, Matsuyama, and Maizuru," in *Japanstudien: Jahrbuch Des Deutschen Instituts Für Japanstudien*, vol. 20, 2008, 247-277.

[52] See the website of NHK Matsuyama, http://www.nhk.or.jp/matsuyama/sakanoue/; http://www.nhk-ondemand.jp/program/P200900052300000/index.html, accessed March 12, 2007.

serialization.[53] As expected, after the end of the show, visitor numbers slightly declined to 167,000 in 2012 and 2013.

The debate over the depiction of the Russo-Japanese War in popular culture has to be seen against the background of the vigorous discussion in Japan in recent years over such issues as the nature of popular historical consciousness and the history textbook controversy. While the main point of contestation here is how Japan's role in the Asia-Pacific War (1931-1945)—the East Asian theater of World War II—is to be interpreted, the image of the Russo-Japanese War as presented in NHK's *Clouds Above the Hill* also drew sharp reactions from Japanese historians.[54] Shiba's image of the war in this novel was largely uncritical: he emphasized the heroism of the main characters and depicted the conflict as a "clean" and honorable affair. Shiba's glorification of Japan's military prowess and his neglect of the role played by Korea in his stories has led to criticism of what has been termed "the Shiba view of history" (*Shiba-shikan*) by historians.[55] In his defense, Shiba as a novelist was not engaged in recreating historical events; his "fictional" world does not accurately depict—or even attempt to depict—historical facts as such. Nevertheless, a number of Japanese historians have strongly

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[53] Kōeki Zaidan Hōjin Mikasa Hozon-kai, *Heisei 24do jigyō hōkokusho* [Activity Report, 2012], n.d, 8.

[54] See Sven Saaler, "Bad War or Good War?: History and Politics in Postwar Japan," in *Critical Issues in Contemporary Japan*, ed. Jeff Kingston (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), 137-148.

[55] Nakatsuka Akira, *Shiba Ryōtarō no rekishikan: Sono "Chōsen-kan" to "Meiji Eikō-ron" o tô* [The Shiba View of History: A Critique of Its View of Korea and of the Idea of a "Glorious Meiji Era"] (Tokyo: Kôbunken, 2009); Nakatsuka Akira, Yasukawa Junosuke, and Daigo Satoshi, *NHK Dorama "Saka no ue no kumo" no rekishikan o tō: Nisshin sensō no kyokō to shinjitsu* [A Critique of the Historical Viewpoint of the NHK Drama "Clouds above the Hill": Fabrication and Truth Regarding the Russo-Japanese War] (Tokyo: Kōbunken, 2010); Nakamura Masanori, *'Saka no ue no kumo' to Shiba shikan* ['Clouds above the Hill' and the Shiba View of History] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2009); Harada Keiichi, *'Saka no ue no kumo' to Nihon kin-gendaishi* ['Clouds above the Hill' and the Modern and Contemporary History of Japan] (Tokyo: Shin Nihon Shuppansha, 2011).

criticized NHK for "using public funds to spread a distorted view of history."[56]

Shiba himself had anticipated such criticisms of *Clouds Above the Hill*, fearing reactions that his narrative might be charged with glorifying militarism or used for this purpose, and he spoke out explicitly against turning the novel into a television or film drama.[57] It is important to note here that, despite constructing a bright image of the Russo-Japanese War, Shiba strongly opposed the glorification of the Asia-Pacific War (1931-1945). In an essayistic piece published in 1997, he wrote:

> That war [the Asia-Pacific War, 1931-1945] caused suffering for many non-Japanese peoples. Although there may have been no explicit intention of territorial expansion […], it was a war of aggression (*shinryaku sensō deshita*). But it was the U.S., Britain, France, and Holland on whom Japan declared war: it attempted to seize the oil reserves in those nations' overseas territories. To that end, Japan attacked the British stronghold in Singapore and American bases in Corregidor [in the Philippines]. Thus, at that time the Japanese people understood the war was a fight against the Euro-American powers. […] Some [seek to defend Japan's actions in Asia by arguing] that as a result of the war, the countries of Southeast Asia were able to gain their independence. However, even if this were true, Japan's real intention in Southeast Asia was […] to secure oil. In order to protect its access to oil supplies, Japan attacked the neighboring American and British bases, and built defensive bases throughout the region. If Japan's actions had really stemmed from the noble [literally, holy] intention of liberating countries from colonialism, it would first have had to give up its own colonies in Korea

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[56] Nakatsuka, Yasukawa, and Daigo, *NHK Dorama 'Saka no ue no kumo' no rekishikan o tō*, 162.

[57] Nakatsuka, *Shiba Ryōtarō no rekishikan*, 21.

and Taiwan.[58]

While "the Shiba view of history" is centered on the Russo-Japanese War as this passage illustrates, Shiba was strongly critical of Japan's policies of aggression during the Asia-Pacific War. As a result of his popularity in Japan, the Shiba view of history—or at least this aspect of it—has come to function as a bulwark against historical revisionism, a movement which aims to affirm and promulgate the "noble intent" of the Greater East Asia War.

4c. Battle of Tsushima / Tsushima War

Another memorial institution gives us a certain insight into the complex nature of the Russo-Japanese War. Between 2004 and 2005, a number of memorial events marked the 100th anniversary of the conflict. They included the erection of a series of memorials and commemorative stones on Tsushima, the island group midway between Japan and Korea that gave its name to the Battle of Tsushima. Whereas in Japan, the 1905 naval battle is usually called the "Battle of the Japan Sea" (*Nihon-kai kaisen*), this name has never been recognized in Tsushima itself, whereas in English, local people refer to it as the Battle of Tsushima (*Tsushima kaisen*) or even as the "Tsushima War." In order to publicize their claim to the name "Battle of Tsushima," the locals planned a memorial to the war on the island in 2004 and completed it the next year.[59]

The group behind the planning, fundraising, and building of this memorial went under the name of the "Tsushima Committee for the Advancement of History and Honorable Commemoration." From the

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[58] Shiba Ryōtarō, *Kono kuni no katachi* [The Shape of This Country], vol. 4 (Tokyo: Bungei shunjū, 1997), 241.

[59] For details, see Hirano, Saaler, and Säbel, "Recent Developments in the Representation of National Memory and Local Identities."



Figure 4. The Monument of Peace and Friendship, Tsushima

materials that the group has publicly released, the memorial evokes a strange combination of local nationalism and what might be described as a universal humanism.

One of the group's slogans is "Friendly Wings," a phrase referring to the respect the Russian and Japanese commanders extended to each other during the conflict. An image on the front cover of the group's pamphlet attempts to illustrate this: it shows the victor, Admiral Tōgō, following Western "knightly" tradition by visiting his wounded Russian adversary, who is being treated in the hospital. The same motif was also used on a memorial built in 2005 (see Figure 4). The pamphlet also emphasizes stories of local residents who rescued stranded Russian sailors following the battle. Based on this "bond" between Russian sailors and Japanese civilians, as well as that linking the Russian and Japanese naval commanders, the Tsushima group has attempted to appeal to universal values and provide a model that might contribute to the improvement of current Sino-Japanese relations.

Such emphasis on a universal humanism, however, is undermined by other parts of the group's pamphlet, which demonstrates an unsettling

nationalism arguing that the Battle of Tsushima should serve as a source of revitalization for a "weak Japan."[60]

> One hundred years ago the small, almost unknown nation of Japan was forced into conflict with the then great military superpower Russia. The Japan Sea and the shores of Tsushima became the site of a large-scale, decisive battle. Japan's complete and unparalleled victory in this conflict sent out massive shockwaves and sparked reaction around the world. [...] Just thirty odd years after the Meiji Restoration, Japan had fully realized its reputation as 'Bushido Nippon.' [...] We lament the fact that today Japan has lost its confidence, and we would like to see it regain the courage and moral fiber it once had. Therefore, as proud Japanese citizens [...] we believe that by passing on the memory of May 27 [the date of the battle of Tsushima] to the youth of today and the future, our country, *Nippon*, will be empowered to regain the hopes and dreams it once had.

In this statement, the Tsushima group uses phraseology strongly reminiscent of Shiba's writings in an attempt to create a positive image of the decisive naval battle of the Russo-Japanese War and to stir up nationalist sentiment in contemporary Japan. The group also demonstrates proximity to Shiba's writings by putting the phrase "Last Chapter of Shiba Ryôtarô's Clouds Above the Hill" (*Shiba Ryôtarô gensaku 'Saka no ue no kumo' Saishû-shô*) on the cover of the pamphlet.[61] Nevertheless, attempting to boost nationalism by referring to a war that took place more than 100 years ago evidently has its limitations in contemporary Japan. The commemorative ceremony that took place at Tsushima in 2005 and

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[60] Takesue Yasuo, *'Bushidō Nippon' 'shin no nashonarizumu,' hokori aru 'Nihon-dzukuri' wa, Tsushima kara*... ['Bushido Nippon,' 'True Nationalism,' 'Creating a Proud Japan'—from Tsushima…] (Unpublished pamphlet, 2005).

[61] Ibid.

the erection of the memorial to the Battle of Tsushima attracted little attention at the national level, demonstrating the difficulties involved in seeking to inspire contemporary Japanese through memories of a far-off conflict.

5. Conclusion and Prospects

The memorials discussed in this paper share a tendency to present naval warfare in a positive light and to portray sea battles as chivalrous and "clean" affairs. In both Japan and Germany, naval memorials are primarily intended to address a domestic audience and offer visitors a narrative they can readily identify with. Such memorials are the expression of a particular strand in the politics of memory that aims at reconfirming national integrity following a costly war or reframing national identity. The main strategy used by the architects of naval memorials to achieve this aim is to reassure the public that the war dead died a meaningful death, and that they gave their lives for the survival of the fatherland and its future prosperity. In Germany, early inscriptions on naval memorials typically stated that the war dead died "for us," i.e., for postwar visitors to these monuments. Japanese memorials emphasize the chivalry of sailors and naval officers and the technological achievements of the engineers who built the warships that took part in the battles commemorated. In none of the memorials discussed here can we find any reflection on the causes of war or any mention of its darker side, an aspect of war from which naval forces were not exempt as we know today. The potentially divisive character of such memorials is clear, and the changes made to the German naval memorial during the 1970s reflect the reality that interpretations and representations of naval warfare are subject to criticism and contestation and to change over time.

From what has been said above, it is also evident that such memorials are poorly suited to pursuing an agenda of reconciliation with former opponents. Their narrow focus on attributing meaning to the

deaths of "heroic" sailors rather than questioning war itself reduces their function to a purely domestic one. In an international setting, such memorials can readily become a source of conflict. Logically, there should always be at least two sides involved in discussions of how a particular conflict should be interpreted and commemorated. If historical reconciliation is to be made a priority by a government or a body charged with administering a given memorial, then it needs to take into account (although not necessarily fully adopt) the historical viewpoints espoused by "others" such as former wartime enemies or particular groups of victims. Adhering to a one-sided interpretation of history that ignores outside perspectives will obstruct the process of reconciliation and the re-establishment of friendly relations between former enemy states.

Naval memorials are particularly prone to such narrowness of vision, as pointed out in the introduction. In general, naval memorials tend to celebrate the "heroism," "honor," and "courage" associated with sea battles. While a consideration of naval memorials outside Germany and Japan is beyond the scope of this paper, upon its closing, it might be worth drawing attention to the modification of existing memorials in other countries with the aim of promoting an agenda of reconciliation. For example, when the USS *Arizona* Memorial commemorating the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 was remodeled in 2010, the accompanying exhibition was also revised to include varying historical interpretations and perspectives.[62] Before crossing over to the *Arizona*, positioned offshore in such a way that it appears partly submerged, visitors have the option of entering a small exhibition room that the ticket-entrance staff strongly "recommend" them to see. Far from promoting a one-sided view of American history and Japanese treachery, this new display presents some historical background to the Pearl Harbor

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[62] See http://www.hawaiimagazine.com/blogs/hawaii_today/2010/11/29/Pearl_Harbor_new_visitor_center_opening_December_7; http://news.yahoo.com/pearl-harbor-memorial-host-japan-tea-ceremony-101137517.html; http://pearlharborvisitorcenter.com/mission.htm.

attack, including the history of *Nikkei*-Japanese in Hawaii. These changes were partly prompted by a desire not to offend the memorial's numerous Japanese visitors since Japan is after all an important ally of the United States in the Pacific region. Previously, the USS *Arizona* had been known to Americans and the world only as a reminder of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Day of Infamy," December 9, 1941, when Japanese fighter-bombers attacked the United States fleet out of a clear blue sky. However, in order to foster peace and improve relations with Japan, the view of history that had long held sway has been reexamined even in this highly sensitive location, and the ship is now being used to facilitate reconciliation between former enemies. Such a change of direction suggests that a nation's historical memorialization of its most celebrated naval battles need not function as a permanent impediment to peace and reconciliation in the contemporary world.

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