Burying the Dead in East Asia

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Countries seeking to reconcile—for strategic, economic, or other reasons—have created compatible historical narratives as part of the reconciliatory process. This involves demonstrating respect and empathy for one another's suffering. Whereas compatible narratives among Germany and its neighbors reflect their efforts at reconciliation, history problems between Japan and South Korea reflect their continued strategic distance. This article describes the harmonization of the French and German narratives of World War II, and outlines the strongly divergent narratives of Japan and South Korea. If someday Seoul and Tokyo decide that reconciliation is strategically important, they will need to change the way they remember the war—they will need to mourn each other's dead. The article concludes by offering elements of a shared narrative that Japan and South Korea might craft in order to support political reconciliation.

Keywords: Japan, South Korea, reconciliation, memory, apology, history, alliance, cooperation

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After the U.S. Civil War, the bodies of soldiers, from North and South, lay scattered across the American countryside. As the United States began its process of reconstruction after the war, to remedy this desecration, Washington worked to collect, identify, and bury its war dead in the nation's first national cemeteries. That is, the Northern war dead. Confederate soldiers were deemed traitors, terrorists, so their bodies were left to rot. As Drew Gilpin Faust has powerfully chronicled, this policy had powerful and lasting ideational and institutional effects that divided the country, fueled powerful resentment, and can still be felt today.[1]

After World War II, the countries of East Asia similarly mourned only their own war dead. Japan focused on the "Pacific War," remembering its victimization in the atomic bombings rather than the invasions and atrocities its army carried out on the continent.[2] The

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1 Drew Gilpin Faust, *This Republic of Suffering: Death and the American Civil War* (New York: Knopf, 2008).

2 James J. Orr, *The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001); John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999).

Republic of Korea (ROK) remembered hardship and suffering during the years of Japanese occupation, including Japan's program of cultural annihilation, forced labor, and the women rounded up by the Japanese to serve as wartime sex slaves.[3] Just as mourning divided the American North and South after their terrible war, East Asia's divisions are reflected in differing memories of the war years. The region remains rife with resentment, distrust, and suspicion, and frequently experiences enervating diplomatic crises over historical issues.[4] In particular, Japan and the ROK, despite their numerous shared interests and values, have tense relations and are eschewing cooperation.[5]

This article explores the connection between reconciliation and historical narratives. It argues that the process of reconciliation, initiated for strategic or other reasons, requires the creation of compatible historical narratives. As part of this, countries must recognize and show empathy for one another's suffering. Reconciliation between Germany and its contemporary partners is reflected in their shared narratives of the war. By contrast, the ongoing "history problem" between Japan and South Korea reflects their strategic distance. If someday conditions change such that Seoul and Tokyo decide that reconciliation is

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3 On the "comfort women" see Yoshimi Yoshiaki, *Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery in the Japanese Military during World War II*, trans. Suzanne O'Brien (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); C. Sarah Soh, *The Comfort Women: Sexual Violence and Postcolonial Memory in Korea and Japan* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).

4 On the region's "history wars," see Jennifer Lind, *Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008); Alexis Dudden, *Troubled Apologies Among Japan, Korea, and the United States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008); Thomas U. Berger, *War, Guilt and World Politics after World War II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Yinan He, *The Search for Reconciliation: Sino-Japanese and German-Polish Relations since World War II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

5 On history issues impeding Japan-ROK cooperation see "A Lost Deal for South Korea and Japan," *The New York Times*, July 7, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/08/opinion/sunday/a-lost-deal-for-south-korea-and-japan.html?_r=0; Jeffrey W. Hornung, "The Silent Treatment Won't Stop Japan," *The National Interest*, May 22, 2013, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-silent-treatment-wont-stop-japan-8496. Also see Jeffrey W. Hornung, "South Korea's Irresponsible Diplomacy With Japan," *The Diplomat*, September 12, 2012.

strategically important, each side will need to change the way they remember the war. They will need to mourn each other's dead.

Section 2 of the paper builds the theoretical logic of this argument. Section 3 provides empirical support, describing war memory in post-World War II West Germany and France, and showing how their recognition and respect for one another's victims fit into a broader reconciliatory narrative that supported political rapprochement. Section 4 turns to the Japan-ROK relations, describing Japanese and South Korean memory of the war, and showing how both sides neglect to display empathy for the suffering of the other. Japan has demonstrated some through apologies and other gestures, but this has been accompanied by a rival narrative that downplays, denies, or denigrates Korean suffering. South Koreans, for their part, have shown little in the way of acknowledgment or empathy for Japanese wartime suffering. Section 5 concludes.

"Our Blood is the Same Color": Mourning, Threat, and Reconciliation

Far from being primordial or unchanging, national identities and memories are constructed and changeable.[6] Leaders create identities and remember the past in ways that support their political goals. Facing security threats, leaders mobilize their people for war by crafting a hostile narrative toward adversaries.[7] Such narratives emphasize an adversary's

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[6] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Revised (New York: Verso, 2006); Hugh Trevor-Roper, "The Invention of Tradition: The Highland Tradition of Scotland," in *The Invention of Tradition*, ed. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 15-41.

[7] Barry R. Posen, "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power," *International Security* 18, no. 2 (October 1993): 80-124; Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996); Stephen van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," *International Security* 18, no. 4 (April 1994): 5-39.

history of predation, and the suffering the adversary inflicted. They focus on a country's own victims, and demonize the foreign perpetrators who harmed them as imperialists or monsters. Any suffering that the adversary might have endured in the past is ignored. In addition to mobilizing a country to fight foreign adversaries, hostile narratives can serve important domestic political goals: they may divert attention from domestic problems, legitimize a leader's rule, and create support for defense spending (which, in authoritarian countries, is frequently used for domestic repression).[8]

Sometimes, though, reconciliation with a former adversary is desirable. After all, alliances (known as external balancing) are a powerful means for addressing threats in the international system.[9] However, countries pursuing an alliance will find this process complicated if they engage in demonizing or scapegoating one another. Denying or glorifying past violence fuels distrust and threat perception.[10] Cooperation calls for reconciliation—leaders must build domestic support and trust in the other country so that their people will view it as an appropriate ally and partner.

Political scientists have thus argued that countries seeking cooperation and reconciliation must "harmonize" their historical narratives.[11] To improve relations, narratives must be cognitively consonant rather than dissonant. Namely, one country's narrative must be compatible with the other country's pre-held beliefs about themselves, their country, and the world. The narrative must attend to what negotiation and mediation experts call a country's "core concerns" or

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[8] Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind, "Pyongyang's Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in North Korea," *International Security* 35, no. 1 (July 2010): 44-74.

[9] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979).

[10] Lind, *Sorry States*.

[11] Charles A. Kupchan, *How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010); He, *The Search for Reconciliation*.

"core interests"—its sense of autonomy, appreciation, affiliation, and status.[12] Attending to such concerns will "build rapport and a positive climate for problem-solving negotiation."[13]

Central to a country's identity are the accomplishments of its heroes, and the suffering its people have endured. Recognition and respect for such actors and their experiences is thus a core concern for any group or nation. Ignoring or disrespecting core concerns, including valued national symbols and experiences, is thus counterproductive to reconciliation. As Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton argue, "Trampling on those interests tends to generate strong negative emotions."[14] Failing to acknowledge a country's suffering—or worse, belittling or disrespecting it—will sustain distrust and impede cooperation.

In the Middle East, deeply hostile relations are reflected in an unwillingness to respect other countries' suffering. Israelis are outraged by Tehran's lack of recognition of Jewish suffering in the Holocaust. Prominent Iranian leaders have denied the Holocaust, calling it a myth used to justify the creation of Israel.[15] As one *Jersusalem Post* op-ed argued,

> Tehran's denial of the Holocaust and its statement that it is a 'great deception' ignite Israeli anger. Its statement that Israel was founded upon 'a lie and a mythical claim' touches the innermost cultural nerves of the Israeli habitus, and Ahmadinejad's statement that 'this germ of

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[12] Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton, *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In*, 3rd ed. (New York: Penguin, 2011), 32.

[13] Ibid.; Jay Rothman, *From Confrontation to Cooperation: Resolving Ethnic and Regional Conflict* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1992), 153; Jodi Halpern and Harvey M. Weinstein, "Rehumanizing the Other: Empathy and Reconciliation," *Human Rights Quarterly* 26, no. 3 (August 2004): 561-583.

[14] Fisher, Ury, and Patton, *Getting to Yes*, 32.

[15] Thomas Erdbrink, "Reporting Iran's News, But Speaking for One Side," *The New York Times*, September 27, 2013; Alan Cowell, "Iran's Leader Repeats His Denial of the Holocaust," *International Herald Tribune*, September 19, 2009.

corruption will be wiped off' reawakens old horrors.[16]

Efforts at reconciliation in the Middle East are supported by calls for empathy for the other peoples' suffering. One author dispraised fellow Muslims for ignoring the Holocaust. "Only 'our' tragedies matter," lamented Mehdi Hasan: "Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Chechnya roll off our tongues." To reduce threat and promote trust, Hasan argues, "On Holocaust Memorial Day let us stand side by side with our Jewish brethren and together mourn the deaths of six million innocent souls."[17] Furthermore, in civic groups designed to promote reconciliation among Israelis and Palestinians, participants learn about the tragedies experienced by the other side. According to these groups, "it is critical to learn the other side's narrative, because the only hope for ending the bloody struggle is through empathy and reconciliation." Says Ben Kfir, an Israeli participant who lost his daughter in a Palestinian attack: "Our tears taste the same; our blood is the same color."[18]

Reconciliation and Mourning in Post-World War II Europe

At the end of World War II, years of war and occupation left the French bitter and fearful toward their former German conquerors. Nevertheless, strategic conditions encouraged Paris and Bonn to forge a path of reconciliation and partnership in European economic institutions and in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). French and West German recognition of one another's suffering was part of a broader reconciliatory

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[16] Gad Yair and Behzad Akbari, "Iran and Israel: Humiliation, fear, post-trauma and reconciliation," *Jersusalem Post*, August 27, 2012.

[17] Mehdi Hasan, "I Am Shamed by Muslim Attitudes to the Holocaust," *The Times*, January 27, 2012.

[18] Rina Castelnuovo, "Bereaved," *The New York Times*, July 13, 2013.

narrative that supported their rapprochement.[19]

France and West Germany after World War II found themselves in strategic conditions that encouraged cooperation and reconciliation. Europe's conventional military balance overwhelmingly favored the Soviet Union as the Soviet army was occupying the eastern portion of Germany and was poised to invade west. Soviet military dominance meant that NATO's early plans to severely limit West German power were infeasible. The reality was that, without German military forces, NATO could not defend itself against the Soviet threat. Yet, empowering the West German military represented a major change for French and NATO policy. As Marc Trachtenberg writes, "If West Germany was to be a real partner in military terms, she could no longer be treated as an occupied country. Political relations would have to be recast and put much more on a basis of equality and mutual respect."[20]

During the 1950s, the threat of war was constant, with frequent crises over Allied access to Berlin. The American strategy for containing the Soviet Union—given U.S. conventional inferiority—was, in the event of a Soviet invasion, to immediately use nuclear weapons.[21] These war plans created great alarm among NATO's European members, given that the nuclear war would be fought over their territory.[22] Paris and Bonn found the U.S. strategy so alarming, they drew together in search of an alternative. Over the years of 1958 and 1962, culminating in the signing of the Élysée Treaty, the two countries, led by Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer, pursued official rapprochement. Over these years

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[19] On the reconciliatory French narrative, see Jennifer Lind, "Getting to No: Narratives and Reconciliation in Japan-ROK Relations" (Paper Prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, August 28-September 1, 2013).

[20] Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 102-103.

[21] Daryl G. Press, *Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 84.

[22] Ibid., 94.

the two countries would transform their memories of the war and would recognize the suffering of the other side.

1. West German Memory and Mourning

In the early years after the war's end, West Germany took responsibility for the war and paid reparations to Israel in 1952.[23] Still, its narrative of the war overwhelmingly emphasized its own victims—the prisoners of war languishing in Soviet prison camps; the ruined, bombed-out cities; the 15 million expelled Germans from Eastern Europe.[24] Then, in the 1960s, the West Germans began to more clearly acknowledge—within their leaders' statements, textbooks, commemoration, and legal trials—the suffering that they had inflicted upon Europe. Bonn began prosecuting perpetrators of World War II human rights abuses. Between 1960 and 1979, the Bundestag held four important debates that resulted in extending (and later repealing altogether) the statute of limitations on crimes of murder, which permitted ongoing prosecutions for wartime violence.[25] The Bundestag also continued to expand reparations paid to victims.

West Germany also began educating its youth about the suffering Germans had inflicted upon their neighbors. Bonn participated in multilateral UNESCO textbook commissions, and textbooks began to reflect greater coverage of German atrocities. Concentration camp sites were memorialized with educational exhibitions.[26] West German

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[23] Description of West German memory drawn from Lind, *Sorry States*, chap. 3.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Jeffrey Herf, *Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 338; Harold Marcuse, *Legacies of Dachau: The Uses and Abuses of a Concentration Camp, 1933-2001* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 214.

[26] Rudy Koshar, *Germany's Transient Pasts: Preservation and National Memory in the Twentieth Century* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 246. On German education, see Lind, *Sorry States*, chap. 3; Marcuse, *Legacies of Dachau*.

historiography shifted away from emphasizing the suffering of Germans, and began to focus more on German crimes—a significant departure from previous scholarship.[27]

Leaders began apologizing for past atrocities and issuing apologies. Willy Brandt famously knelt at Poland's Warsaw Ghetto memorial in 1970, and Helmut Schmidt visited Auschwitz-Birkenau to mourn its victims.[28] In 1985 on the fortieth anniversary of Bergen-Belsen's liberation, Chancellor Helmut Kohl gave a speech in which he enumerated, and exhorted Germans to remember Nazi crimes.[29] West German leaders began to observe May 8 anniversaries of the German defeat as occasions to mourn and apologize for German-inflicted suffering.[30] Notably, Bundestag President Richard von Weizsäcker gave a famous speech in 1985 that detailed the suffering of specific victims of German aggression. "We remember especially the six million Jews who were killed in German concentration camps," von Weizsäcker declared, "We remember all of the peoples who suffered in the war, especially the unspeakably many citizens of the Soviet Union and the Poles who lost their lives." The President went on to enumerate many other victims: Germans; Sinti and Roma; people who lost their lives for political or religious convictions; and people who died in resistance movements.

After unification, Germany continued to remember and mourn the suffering it inflicted on its victims. Leaders offer frequent apologies, and

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[27] Saul Friedlander, "Some German Struggles With Memory," in *Bitburg in Moral and Political Perspective*, ed. Geoffrey H. Hartman (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 26-42; Marcuse, *Legacies of Dachau*.

[28] See Herf, *Divided Memory*, 346; Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, *A History of West Germany: Democracy and its Discontents, 1963-1988*, 2nd ed., vol. 2 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 446.

[29] Geoffrey H. Hartman, ed., *Bitburg in Moral and Political Perspective* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 244.

[30] In addition to von Weizsäcker, May 8 speeches were given by Federal president Gustave Heinmann (1970) and President Walter Scheel (1975). On May 8, see Jeffrey K. Olick, "Genre Memories and Memory Genres: A Dialogical Analysis of May 8, 1945 Commemorations in the Federal Republic of Germany," *American Sociological Review* 64, no. 3 (June 1999): 381-402.

commemoration (notably the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe and numerous other monuments in Berlin) reflects candid admission of atrocities.[31] At the Neue Wache memorial in Berlin, a plaque which reprints von Weizsäcker's speech specifically recognizes those who suffered in World War II (See Figure 1). Teaching contemporary history is prominent in German education. As Yasemin Soysal writes, textbooks provide "extensive and negative coverage of the Nazi history as a time of violence, persecution, death, and destruction."[32]



Figure 1. Plaque at the Neue Wache Memorial, Berlin

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[31] James A. Young, "Berlin's Holocaust Memorial," *German Politics and Society* 17, no. 3 (Fall 1999): 54-71.

[32] Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, "Identity and Transnationalization in German School Textbooks," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 30, no. 2 (June 1998): 57.

The French recognized and praised West German's candid and empathetic narrative of the war. Upon unification, the French did worry that German remembrance might become less self-reflective. For example, Daniel Vernet of the newspaper *Le Monde* wrote, "This seems to be the hour in which Germans rediscover themselves as victims."[33] Nevertheless, this was not the case. On the dedication of the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, an article in *La Croix* commented that sixty years after the war's end, Germany showed that "she observes her past squarely and that her democracy rests on the conscience of the Shoah."[34] *Le Monde* praised "the acceptance within Germany of its historic responsibility vis-à-vis the victims of Nazism."[35]

2. French Memory and Mourning

As a victim, not a perpetrator, the French might have been excused for focusing on their own wartime tragedies, and for refusing to remember German suffering. The Germans, after all, were to blame for the invasion and occupation of France, and for the maelstrom they unleashed on Europe. However, as the French and West Germans pursued reconciliation in the late 1950s, the French began to demonstrate respect and empathy for the Germans.

Early on, de Gaulle and Adenauer in 1962 held a joint mass at Reims Cathedral to commemorate suffering in two world wars and to foster a spirit of reconciliation. That year, de Gaulle also made a famous speech to German youth at Ludwigsburg during his visit to Germany. "I

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[33] Daniel Vernet, "Analyse de l'autoflagellation a l'autocompassion," *Le Monde*, January 16, 2003; also Marcel Tambarin, "L'Avenir Du Passé: La Polémique Walser-Bubis," *Allemagne d'aujourd'hui* 149 (September 1999): 32.

[34] Blandine Milcent, "L'Allemagne veut regarder son passé en face et au Coeur de Berlin," *La Croix*, May 10, 2005.

[35] Henri de Bresson and Georges Marion, "Depuis soixante ans, les difficiles étapes qui ont mené à une commémoration commune," *Le Monde*, June 5, 2004.

congratulate you for being young Germans, which means you are the children of a grand people," he said, "Yes! A grand people, who at times committed in the course of their history great errors…but who also enriched the world, who bequeathed it a rich spiritual, scientific, and philosophical heritage." His remarks were said to have "immense emotional impact." "De Gaulle," said one commentator, "taught Germans to recover their national pride."[36] In other words, instead of discussing Germans in a manner that threatened their core values, de Gaulle enhanced Germany's core values (its national esteem and pride).

Later, the French continued to recognize German wartime suffering. In 1984, French President Francois Mitterrand gave a speech in Volgograd (formerly Stalingrad) during a visit to the Soviet Union. "The world has changed," he declared. "Enemy countries" had been called upon to build with the others "Europe and peace." The French president praised Soviet efforts during the war, but did so in a way that showed respect for Germany. Namely, Mitterrand said the Soviet contribution to the Allied war effort was their tying down of "four million fine, brave Germans."[37] He also spoke of the German enemy as victims. "Let us not forget those soldiers who were then on the opposite side," he said, "but with whom, as survivors, we have become reconciled —Germans, Rumanians, Italians, Hungarians—all those who suffered and fell on this soil far from their homes, absurd victims of a suicidal system."[38] Helmut Kohl praised Mitterrand's speech, conveying his "thanks for what you said about German soldiers in Stalingrad." He commented, "Your remarks are inspired by the Europe of today. It is also a matter of Franco-German relations, and that will have a tremendous

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[36] Quotes from Cécile Leconte, "Resurgence De La Question Identitaire en Republique Federale," *Allemagne d'aujourd'hui* 149 (September 1999): 102-103.

[37] Seth Mydans, "Mitterrand, Despite Criticism, Sees Better French-Soviet Ties," *The New York Times*, June 23, 1984.

[38] Seth Mydans, "Mitterrand Visits Stalingrad Sites," *The New York Times*, June 24, 1984.

Figure 2. Ceremony at Verdun Cemetery, 1985

effect."[39] The following year, Mitterrand and Kohl joined hands to commemorate the French and German war dead together at Verdun cemetery. This event—and the famous photo of the pair—formed a key focal point of Franco-German reconciliation after the war (See Figure 2).

On the fiftieth anniversary of the German surrender, May 8, 1995, Mitterrand gave remarkable impromptu remarks in which he emphasized the bravery of German soldiers during the war. "I have not come to underline the defeat," he said, "because I knew how much strength there was in the German people, its qualities, its courage, never mind what uniform it wore or even what motivated the soldiers who were about to die in such great numbers." Mitterrand said, "They were courageous. They were prepared to die. For a bad cause, but what they did had nothing to do with that. They loved their country."[40] Mitterrand's remarks

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[39] Tilo Schabert, *How World Politics Is Made: France and the Reunification of Germany*, ed. Barry Cooper, trans. John Tyler Tuttle (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2009), 37.

[40] See de Bresson and Marion, "Depuis soixante ans, les difficiles étapes qui ont mené à une commémoration commune"; Craig R. Whitney, "Mitterrand Criticized for Words on German War Dead," *The New York Times*, May 12, 1995.

triggered outcry back in France, with many protesting that the only brave Germans were those who had resisted the Nazi regime, rather than those who carried out its violence.[41]

Contemporary French rhetoric has followed Mitterrand's lead in honoring German suffering during World War II. Nicolas Sarkozy said on Armistice Day in 2009 that the two countries were commemorating not one people's victory over another, but an ordeal that was "equally terrible on both sides." He commented, "German orphans wept for their slain fathers in the same way as French orphans. German mothers felt the same pain as French mothers as they stood before the coffins of their fallen sons."[42] The reconciliatory narrative acknowledged and honored both French and German heroism and suffering.

Blood of Different Colors: Japan and South Korea

After the end of World War II, both Japan and South Korea found themselves navigating a new world. Japan was exhausted and destroyed by years of terrible war—its people dead, hungry, or scattered across Asia; its military smashed, and its sovereignty lost to the United States, which was now governing Japan through an occupation authority. Koreans, for their part, were recovering from thirty-five years of annexation and occupation by Japan, and all the violence and trauma that was part of that devastating experience. More devastation—in the Korean War—would soon come.

In stark contrast to the case of the West Germans and the French, the external security environment did not encourage rapprochement between Japan and South Korea after the war. To be sure, Seoul confronted dire strategic conditions, but it solved its security problems

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[41] Whitney, "Mitterrand Criticized for Words on German War Dead."

[42] Alan Cowell and Steven Erlanger, "France and Germany Use the Remembrance of a War to Promote Reconciliation," *The New York Times*, November 12, 2009.

through alliance with the United States. Alliance with Japan was not an option after 1945 because it had been demilitarized by the United States, and was under military occupation until 1952. For its part, Tokyo was terrified of being dragged into a Korean crisis, and in the early postwar years was repudiating American efforts to create a regional NATO-like alliance that included South Korea.[43] Alliance with the United States was thus the best option for South Korea in its security competition with the North. Thus, strategic conditions in East Asia did not encourage reconciliation between Japan and the ROK.

1. Japan's Memory and Mourning

Japan's memories of the war focused for many years exclusively on Japanese victimhood.[44] The postwar narrative blamed the war on a small military cabal, who had hijacked the country and carried out a misguided policy that had been devastating to Japan. According to this view, the Japanese people were victims of this cabal.[45] This "renegade" view exonerated the many people in Japanese politics and society who had been complicit or in favor of the war such as the Emperor, industrialists, and other elites. It is a view that continues to be a common framing of the war's origin. In the early years after the war, Japan exclusively mourned its own victims of the war. In its reparations policy, Tokyo remunerated only domestic victims. Three million Japanese—who had become refugees or had been ethnically cleansed from the dissolved empire—had arrived destitute in Japan, were politically mobilized, and were

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[43] John Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System* (London: Athlone Press, 1988), 50-51.

[44] This survey of the Japanese narrative has been drawn from Lind, *Sorry States*.

[45] Steven T. Benfell, "Why Can't Japan Apologize? Institutions and War Memory since 1945," *Harvard Asia Quarterly* 6, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 4-11; Dower, *Embracing Defeat*; Orr, *The Victim as Hero*.

demanding state assistance. The Japanese government compensated them, war veterans, and victims of the atomic bombings (*hibakusha*).

By contrast, victims of Japanese atrocities received no reparations. Although Korean victims of forced labor immediately began demanding unpaid wages, Tokyo paid compensation not to the victims, but to the corporations who had brutalized them: thirty-five companies divided an indemnity of fifty-six million yen (about $560 million) for losses sustained during the war.[46] Tokyo denied the existence of forced laborers as the government of Kishi Nobusuke claimed that "voluntary contract labor" had worked in wartime factories. Not only was Korean suffering not acknowledged, some Japanese argued that Koreans had benefited from Japanese occupation and governance. While negotiating normalization with Seoul in the 1950s, Japanese diplomat Kubota Kenichirō responded to Korean reparations demands by arguing, "Japan also had the right to demand compensation from Korea because for 36 years Japan has changed Korea's bare mountains to a flourishing country with flowers and trees."[47]

Japanese commemoration in the early years also mourned only domestic victims of the war. Starting in 1963, Japan held an annual National War Dead Memorial Service on August 15, the day of the surrender. This service had been unofficially conducted since 1958 by the Japan Veterans Friendship League and the Japan War-Bereaved Families Association, who celebrated the day in order to "enshrine the heroic spirits of all those who died for the country in the War of Greater East Asia."[48] Chief Cabinet Secretary Kurogane Yasumi told the press that the

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[46] William Underwood, "Mitsubishi, Historical Revisionism and Japanese Corporate Resistance to Chinese Forced Labor Redress," *Japan Focus*, February 11, 2006, http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=9703.

[47] Lee Won-Deog, "Perception of History and Korea-Japan Relations," in *Korea and Japan: Past, Present and Future*, ed. Young-sun Ha (Seoul: Center for International Studies, Seoul National University, 1997), 83.

[48] Herbert P. Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan* (New York: Harper Collins, 2001), 658.

ceremony showed "the entire nation's sober desire to offer its sincere tribute to the more than 3 million whose sacrifice has given us today's peace and development." At the ceremony, "the emperor read a message of regret, condolence for bereaved families, and appreciation to the dead."[49] Foreign victims are not commemorated on this or any other day.

The Hiroshima Peace Park and its museum built in 1952 commemorate Japanese victimhood in the atomic bombing. An annual ceremony remembers Hiroshima victims every August 6. The defining symbols of the park are the ruins of a domed building, and the statue of a young girl, Sasaki Sadako, who died in 1955 of leukemia caused by radiation. Sadako and her 1,000 origami cranes have become a symbol of the Hiroshima attack and Japanese victimhood known to schoolchildren all over the world. Furthermore, Tokyo's Yasukuni Shrine also commemorates Japan's suffering and loss. The shrine honors Japan's war dead, and has generated controversy because it is a Shinto religious shrine, and because among those honored, there are the 13 men convicted as Class-A war criminals in the Tokyo Trials. Several Japanese leaders have abstained from visiting out of respect to neighbors and domestic critics and many Japanese people favor honoring the nation's fallen at the less controversial, secular Chidorigafuchi cemetery.[50] Neither site highlights the suffering Japan inflicted upon others.

For many years, Japanese textbooks did not acknowledge foreign victims. Discussion of atrocities (and hence of foreign victims) was actively stricken from textbooks as per the orders of the Ministry of Education (MoE) textbook screeners, who evaluated textbooks not only for accuracy, but also for patriotism.[51] Historian and textbook author

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[49] Orr, *The Victim as Hero*, 139, 137.

[50] Jennifer Lind, "Beware the Tomb of the Known Soldier," *Global Asia* 8, no. 1 (Spring 2013): 87-93.

[51] Nishi Toshio, *Unconditional Democracy: Education and Politics in Occupied Japan, 1945-1952* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1982); Ienaga Saburo, "The

Ienaga Saburo was told to delete references to rape by Japanese troops. He was informed by the MoE that "The violation of women is something that has happened on every battlefield in every era of human history. This is not an issue that needs to be taken up with respect to the Japanese Army in particular."[52] Thus, for many years after the war—reflected in leaders' statements, textbooks, commemoration, and reparations policy—Japan mourned only its own victims.

Over time, Japan's memory would expand to include the suffering of the Chinese, Koreans, and others in conquered territories. Japanese leaders began apologizing to other countries in the 1960s. Though early statements were rather vague, later ones were more forthcoming about Japanese violence and the suffering it caused. Notably, Nakasone Yasuhiro gave a speech at the United Nations in 1985, regretting "the untold suffering the war inflicted upon peoples around the world and, indeed, upon [Japan's] own people."[53] (The *Los Angeles Times* noted, "Nakasone's apology was unusual in a hall where many other commemorative speakers have used the occasion to attack their country's foes and to defend their own policies.") Later, Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro's 1993 apology delivered in South Korea explicitly detailed the wrongs done to Koreans by the Japanese. He said,

> During Japan's colonial rule over the Korean Peninsula, the Korean people were forced to suffer unbearable pain and sorrow in various ways. They were deprived of the opportunity to learn their mother tongue at school, they were forced to adopt Japanese names, forced to provide sex as 'comfort women' for Japanese troops, forced to

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Glorification of War in Japanese Education," *International Security* 18, no. 3 (December 1993): 113-133; Orr, *The Victim as Hero*.

52 Kim Hyun Sook, "History and Memory: The 'Comfort Women' Controversy," *Positions* 5, no. 1 (1997): 79.

53 "Nakasone, at U.N., Offers Apology for World War II," *Los Angeles Times*, October 23, 1985.

provide labor. I hereby express genuine contrition and offer my deepest apologies for my country, the aggressor's, acts.

Hosokawa was also the first prime minister to invite representatives from other nations to participate in Japan's annual National Memorial Service for the War Dead on August 15, referring to Asian war victims as well as Japanese in his speech.[54] Over the years, in that service, it became routine for Japanese leaders to discuss the suffering of Asians during the war, and to offer Tokyo's remorse and condolences. For example, Abe Shinzō said in 2007, "Our country caused considerable damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly Asian countries. … On behalf of the (Japanese) people, I offer deep remorse and express my heartfelt condolences to those who were killed."[55] An important Japanese apology was Murayama Tomiichi's given in 1995, fifty years after Japan's surrender. The Murayama statement acknowledged that Japan "caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries." Successive governments have referenced the Murayama statement as Tokyo's official policy.

In Japanese education, educators sought to increase awareness of Japan's past atrocities, and their efforts were facilitated by the MoE reforms.[56] In 1982, Tokyo added the conciliatory "Asian Neighbors' Clause" to MoE guidance, requiring textbook screeners to take into consideration the views of Japan's former victims. Other MoE guidance required officials to screen books only for facts rather than patriotic content. Textbook coverage of the war and greater discussion of Japanese atrocities has thus increased. Yet, many books continue to be vague on such topics. One study finds that within commonly used textbooks, there

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[54] *Asahi Shinbun*, November 7, 1993; Wakamiya Yoshibumi, *The Postwar Conservative View of Asia* (Tokyo: LTCB International Library Foundation, 1998), 254.

[55] "Abe shows true colors in war memorial speech," *The Asahi Shimbun*, August 16, 2013.

[56] Ienaga, "The Glorification of War in Japanese Education"; Orr, *The Victim as Hero*, 89-105.

are some discussions of the Nanjing Massacre, forced labor, and the imperial sex slaves. However, "One clear lacuna is the almost complete absence of accounts of Japanese colonial rule in Korea."[57] Additionally, the MoE for many years censured textbook coverage of Japan's Unit 731 atrocity of carrying out gruesome medical experiments on Chinese and Allied civilians and prisoners of war. Although litigation led by Ienaga resulted in this restriction being lifted, Japanese textbooks have yet to discuss this topic.[58]

Japan's leaders also drew some attention to foreign victims through commemoration. Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki in 1991 visited Tapgol Park in Seoul, which remembers Korean independence movement leaders, and bowed before the memorial there.[59] Ten years later, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō visited a former prison in Seoul that the Japanese had used to torture and execute Korean independence activists. He laid a wreath and in his statement said, "When I looked at things put on display [in the museum], I strongly felt…regret for the pains Korean people suffered during Japanese colonial rule. As a politician and a man, I believe we must not forget the pain of [Korean] people."[60] Over time, then, Japan's memory of the war has expanded to include the people who suffered as a result of Japanese occupation, invasions, and atrocities.

Despite Japan's increased attention to past victims, its neighbors remain frequently dismayed about Japanese remembrance because of two features of the Japanese narrative. The first is the reluctance among moderate conservatives to engage in contrition given their preference for

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[57] Daniel Sneider, "Divided Memories: History Textbooks and the Wars in East Asia," *Nippon.com*, May 29, 2012, http://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a00703/.

[58] Sonni Efron, "Japan's High Court Rules Against Rewriting History," *Los Angeles Times*, August 30, 1997.

[59] Paul Shin, "Japanese Prime Minister Says Visit Promotes Better Relations," *Associated Press*, January 10, 1991.

[60] "PM Koizumi Visit ROK President Kim Dae-Jung; Protesters Rage," *Mainichi Shimbun*, October 15, 2001.

a more "patriotic" nationalism. This is a common feature within any democracy. Moderate conservatives in countries all over the world favor narratives that emphasize positive aspects of their country's past, and oppose historical narratives that draw attention to past atrocities.[61] As part of such an effort, in his second stint as Prime Minister, Abe discussed possibly re-examining and replacing the Murayama apology and the Kōno statement with a more "forward looking" statement.[62] At the 2013 war memorial ceremony on August 15, observers noted that Abe withheld the traditional remorse and condolences extended to Asian victims. Abe instead highlighted the suffering and sacrifices of Japanese people. "I will never forget," he said, "that the peace and prosperity we are enjoying now was built based on the sacrifice of your precious lives."[63]

Similarly, conservatives in Japan have objected to South Korea's installation of a statue across from the Japanese embassy in Seoul—the statue of a young Korean "comfort woman" with an empty chair beside her. Tokyo's position is that this statue is illegal, because the 1961 Vienna

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[61] On struggles among liberals and conservatives in domestic debates about repentance and history teaching see Mitt Romney, *No Apology: The Case for American Greatness* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2010); Martha C. Nussbaum, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism," in *For Love of Country*, ed. Joshua Cohen (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996), 2-20; Gary B. Nash, Charlotte Crabtree, and Ross E. Dunn, *History on Trial: Culture Wars and the Teaching of the Past* (New York: Vintage Books, 2000); Robert Guyver, "The History Working Group and Beyond: A Case Study in the UK's History Quarrels," in *History Wars and the Classroom: Global Perspectives* (Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing, 2012), 159-186; Thomas Sowell, "Does Patriotism Matter?," *National Review*, July 2, 2008, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/224921/does-patriotism-matter/thomas-sowell.

[62] Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Kōno Yōhei on the result of the study on the issue of "comfort women," Ministry of Foreign Affairs (August 4, 1993) at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/women/fund/state9308.html; also "Abe eyes statement that would supersede 1995 government apology," *The Asahi Shimbun*, January 5, 2013.

[63] Ayako Mie, "By Omitting Words, Abe Speaks Volumes," *The Japan Times*, August 15, 2013; Ida Torres, "PM Abe Omits Remorse over Japan's WWII Actions in Anniversary Speech," *Japan Daily Press*, August 15, 2013, http://japandailypress.com/pm-abe-omits-remorse-over-japans-wwii-actions-in-anniversary-speech-1533961/.

Convention on Diplomatic Relations stipulates that host countries should not "impair the dignity" of embassies. Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujimura Osamu criticized the construction of the monument as "extremely regrettable," while Japan's ambassador to South Korea, Bessho Kōrō, said that the statue "was not helping solve the problems in Japan-South Korea relations."[64] The conservatives' rejection of this symbol—their perception of the statue as an assault on Japanese dignity—reflects that they view those victims as outside and indeed, inimical to a patriotic Japanese historical narrative. As it is to be argued below, the statue and Tokyo's reaction to it illustrates tremendous distance in Japanese and South Korean mourning.

A second and much more inflammatory feature of Japanese remembrance is a tendency among far-right conservatives not only to demur from a confrontation with past atrocities, but to actively deny them. For example, in the Nakasone cabinet, Education Minister Fujio Masayuki challenged the view that Japan had engaged in aggression in its conquest of Korea. He argued, "Japan's annexation of Korea rested on mutual agreement both in form and in fact. As such, the Korean side also bears some responsibility for it…." Thus, Fujio concluded, "A large portion of the blame should be allocated toward Korea also."[65] Several Japanese conservatives, notably Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintarō, have declared the Nanjing Massacre a "myth" or "fabrication" made up to tarnish Japan's image. Furthermore, the sex slaves of the Imperial army, referred to in Japan as "comfort women," attract particular attention among Japanese conservatives. Some insist, despite historical evidence and survivor testimony to the contrary, that the women were prostitutes

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[64] Gil Yun-hyung, "Japanese Ambassador Says Comfort Woman Statue Is 'Not Helping,'" *The Hankyoreh*, April 18, 2013, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/583456.html.

[65] Published in *Bungei Shunjū*, October 1986, 122-133; also see Lee, "Perception of History and Korea-Japan Relations," 107.

who worked willingly for money. Diet member Okuno Seisuke expressed this view in 1996, concluding that the women thus deserved no special reparations and this view has been echoed by numerous other prominent politicians and opinion leaders.[66] In 2007, Prime Minister Abe Shinzō declared there was no evidence that the women were coerced. This view remains widespread today in Japan, and continues to trigger diplomatic rows when expressed.[67]

In sum, Japan's memory of the war has focused on its own victims: soldiers who perished, atomic bombing victims, and other Japanese stories of suffering. Over the years, Tokyo would increasingly acknowledge the suffering of people in neighboring nations who suffered from Japanese violence. However, Japanese contrition has led to conservative backlash in which some conservatives argue for moving forward from the past, while others actively disrespect or deny victims' suffering.

2. South Korea's Memory and Mourning

South Koreans have mourned only Korean victims of the years of war and occupation, showing no acknowledgement of Japan's wartime suffering and conquest. This has been part of a narrative that emphasizes Japanese brutality and untrustworthiness.[68]

From the early years after the war, Koreans focused on the

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[66] Russell Skelton, "Seisuke Okuno: 'Comfort Women "Did It for Money,'" *Sydney Morning Herald*, June 6, 1996.

[67] On Abe see Colin Joyce, "Japanese PM Denies Wartime 'Comfort Women' Were Forced," *The Telegraph*, March 3, 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1544471/Japanese-PM-denies-wartime-comfort-women-were-forced.html. On the controversy over Osaka mayor Hashimoto Tōru see "Japan WWII 'Comfort Women' Were 'Necessary'-Hashimoto," *BBC News*, May 13, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-22519384; Jennifer Lind, "The Limits on Nationalism in Japan," *The New York Times*, July 25, 2013.

[68] Discussion of the South Korean narrative toward Japan has been drawn from Lind, "Getting to No."

suffering that Japan inflicted upon them. "They invaded our land, slaughtered our patriotic brethren like flies without any feeling and took our youth to battlefields, hard labor, and death," blasted a 1948 *Chosun Ilbo* op-ed.[69] Vitriolic rhetoric by South Korean President Syngman Rhee reflected intense distrust of Japan, as did scholarly writing at the time. Chong-sik Lee reported that Koreans after the war "share[ed] the feeling that the Japanese are not to be trusted," and that they harbored "deep-seated suspicion or fear of Japanese motives."[70] As Victor Cha argues, central to the South Korean identity that developed after the war was "anti-Japanism." Cha notes that the principal holidays of the Republic of Korea (ROK)—Independence Day on March 1 and Liberation Day on August 15—"celebrate Korean patriotism through remembrance of the struggle for independence from Japanese colonial rule."[71]

South Korean history textbooks that discuss the wartime period emphasize Korean suffering. "The majority of the photos are of Korean historical figures who fought for Korea's political independence, leaders of the Korean Liberation Army, or people who suffered because of Japanese colonization policies such as comfort women or student soldiers." Individual Japanese people, except for Governor-General Itō Hirobumi, are "invisible." The suffering of any Japanese people is rarely mentioned and "any positive influences of the Japanese occupation…are not discussed."[72] One study of textbooks in East Asia finds that the

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[69] Quoted in Cheong Sung-hwa, *The Politics of Anti-Japanese Sentiment in Korea: Japanese-South Korean Relations Under American Occupation, 1945-1952* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 6.

[70] Lee Chong-Sik, "Japanese-Korean Relations in Perspective," *Pacific Affairs* 35, no. 4 (December 1962): 321-322.

[71] Victor D. Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 20.

[72] Suh Yonghee and Yurita Makito, "International Debates on History Textbooks: A Comparative Study of Japanese and South Korean History Textbook Accounts of the Second World War," in *Contemporary Public Debates Over History Education*, ed. Eirēnē Nakou and Isabel Barca (Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing, 2010), 162.

"narrative of the wartime period" taught to South Korean young people is nearly entirely focused "on the oppressive experience of Koreans under Japanese colonial rule and on tales of Korean resistance to their overlords." The study argues:

> The larger wartime context for Japan's increasingly desperate and forced mobilization of Koreans for the war effort—namely the quagmire of the war in China and the mounting retaliatory assault of the Americans after 1942—is not provided. South Korean textbooks barely mention the outbreak of war in China in 1937 or the attack on Pearl Harbor, and in the case of the main textbook published by the government there is no mention at all of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.[73]

Korean commemoration similarly focuses on Korean suffering. As noted earlier, citizens' groups installed a statue outside the Japanese embassy that remembers the victims of the wartime sex slave program.[74] A poised young woman in traditional Korean dress sits in a chair with an empty chair beside her. The statue commemorated the 1,000th "Wednesday protest" in front of the Japanese embassy where protests are conducted by supporters who urge Japan's full recognition of the atrocity.

Other landmarks in Seoul glorify Korean violence against Japan. A statue of Admiral Yi Sun-shin (1545-1598) stands along with a reproduction of one of his "Turtle Boats" that was instrumental in the defeat of the mighty Japanese navy in the sixteenth century. Another South Korean hero is Ahn Jung-geun, who assassinated Itō Hirobumi, Japan's first prime minister, in Harbin, China in 1909, and has come to

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[73] Sneider, "Divided Memories: History Textbooks and the Wars in East Asia." Results of the study covered in this article have been published in Shin Gi-Wook and Daniel C. Sneider, eds., *History Textbooks and the Wars in Asia: Divided Memories* (New York: Routledge, 2011).

[74] The women's rights movement in South Korea, and the scandal of sex tourism in the 1980s, led to these characters being included in Korea's wartime narrative only recently. Soh, *The Comfort Women: Sexual Violence and Postcolonial Memory in Korea and Japan*.

symbolize Korea's independence movement.[75] Ahn is commemorated in a memorial hall in Seoul erected in 2009 (the one hundredth anniversary of his death by execution) at the former site of a Japanese Shinto shrine. At a recent soccer game in which the ROK national team was playing their Japanese counterpart, Korean fans unfurled massive banners of Yi and Ahn.[76]

In a gesture reflecting particular hostility, Seoul has used the heroic narrative of Ahn (regarded by Japanese as a terrorist or assassin) as it has reached out to Japan's adversaries. Representatives from both North Korea and South Korea participated in a ceremony at the Ahn Jung-geun memorial hall in Seoul. "Today we carry Ahn in our hearts," said Father Ham Se-ung. "The hearts of 80 million Koreans, North and South, are Ahn's tomb."[77] South Korea has also used Ahn's symbolism as it has deepened its relations with China at a time when Sino-Japanese relations are worsening. In 2013, Chinese and Koreans dedicated a memorial hall at Harbin, China, at the train station where Ahn assassinated Ito.[78]

A prominent part of the South Korean narrative is expression of the view that Tokyo has not acknowledged its violence against Koreans, and that it must do so before it can be a trustworthy partner.[79] In 1964, shortly before normalizing relations, ROK President Park Chung-hee said, "The Japanese people, especially Japanese leaders, should reflect on what they did to us during the past 36 years." Park argued, "Japan's normal reflection on and legal expression of its regret for its past aggression

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[75] Nozomu Hayashi and Akira Nakano, "S. Korean President Proposes Memorial of Anti-Japanese Hero in China," *The Asahi Shimbun*, June 20, 2013, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/AJ201306290072.

[76] "Korean Fans Raise Banners of Anti-Japan Heroes at East Asian Soccer Final," *The Asahi Shimbun*, July 29, 2013, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201307290096.

[77] Gil, "Japanese Ambassador Says Comfort Woman Statue Is 'Not Helping.'"

[78] Emily Rauhala, "104 Years Later, a Chinese Train Station Platform Is Still the Site of Anti-Japanese Rancor," *Time*, January 30, 2014, http://time.com/2609/104-years-later-a-chinese-train-station-platform-is-still-the-site-of-anti-japanese-rancor/.

[79] Drawn from Lind, *Sorry States*, chap. 2.

should precede any cooperation with Japan on our part."[80] A half-century later, South Koreans continue to make similar statements. At the Korean Independence Day celebrations in 2012, President Lee Myung-bak speculated about a visit to Korea by the Japanese emperor, and demanded that he visit the graves of Korean independence fighters. Lee famously visited the disputed Dokdo/Takeshima islands, saying that his visit there was justified because "Japan does not understand the difference between offenders and victims." That August, Lee demanded a Japanese apology for the wartime sex slaves.[81]

President Park Geun-hye in 2013 called upon Japan to apologize in order for the two countries to have close relations. In particular, she stressed the issue of the wartime sex slaves. "These are women who have spent their blossoming years in hardship and suffering, and spent the rest of their life in ruins…. And none of these cases have been resolved or addressed; the Japanese have not changed any of their positions with regard to this." The South Korean president commented, "If Japan continues to stick to the same historical perceptions and repeat its past comments, then what purpose would a summit serve? Perhaps it would be better not to have one."[82]

In sum, the Japanese and South Korean historical narratives strongly diverge. Both countries remember only their own war dead and wartime suffering and their narratives are offensive to each other. South Koreans are distressed by Japan's omissions and outraged by denials of atrocities. The Japanese object to South Korean remembrance such as the comfort woman statue and the glorification of a man (Ahn Jung-geun)

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[80] Quoted in Kwan Bong Kim, *The Korea-Japan Treaty Crisis and the Instability of the Korean Political System* (New York: Praeger, 1971), 45.

[81] "Lee Demands Apology over War Sex Slaves," *The Japan Times*, August 16, 2012.

[82] "Japanese Must Apologize for Brutalities, Insists Park," *The Standard*, November 4, 2013; Lucy Williamson, "South Korea President Park: 'No Purpose' to Japan Talks," *BBC News*, November 4, 2013.

they consider a terrorist.

Burying the Dead in East Asia: Toward Shared Mourning

As noted, strategic conditions in East Asia have not favored close Japan-ROK relations. This may continue, in which case these divergent narratives and frequent bilateral disputes over history are likely to continue. However, domestic and international political conditions in East Asia may change such that in the future Seoul and Tokyo will seek to improve their relations in service of external balancing. Such a strategic shift could result from increased threat perception of China, or from U.S. termination of its East Asian alliances, or both.[83] The shift would need to be profound enough to change the current cost-benefit analysis of political leaders in both Seoul and Tokyo, who both receive domestic political gain from non-reconciliatory narratives, and would be exposed to political risk if they adopted a more reconciliatory narrative that acknowledged the suffering of the other side.[84]

If Japanese and South Korean leaders decide that closer political cooperation is in their interest, they will need to harmonize their historical narratives. As argued earlier, narratives that attack another actor's identity or "core concerns" generate strong negative emotions,

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[83] As Victor Cha argues, Japanese and South Korean leaders sought to improve their relations at times when the United States was perceived as drawing away from the region. Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism*.

[84] On the domestic political costs of reconciliation, regarding controversy over Willy Brandt's *Kniefal* at the Warsaw Ghetto, see Gerd Knischewski and Ulla Spittler, "Memories of the Second World War and National Identity in Germany," in *War and Memory in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Martin Evans and Kenneth Lunn (Oxford: Berg, 1997), 243. On criticism of Mitterrand for praising German soldiers see Whitney, "Mitterrand Criticized for Words on German War Dead." For a theoretical treatment on the domestic political costs of reconciliation, and the domestic political benefits of more nationalistic narratives, see Lind, "Getting to No"; and Lind, *Sorry States*, 179-198.

and obstruct reconciliation.[85] The current narratives in Japan and the ROK attack the other country's sense of identity and core concerns: Japan outrages Koreans because it frequently remembers the past in ways that do not show empathy for their suffering. Most gallingly, Japanese conservatives have suggested that Koreans were not victimized (e.g., that Koreans desired annexation and/or benefited from it, or that the wartime sex slaves were willing prostitutes who made handsome profits from their work).[86] For its part, South Korea's narrative also threatens core aspects of the Japanese national identity: it ignores Japanese hardship and suffering during and after the war, and casts the men whom the Japanese believe to be heroes as monsters and war criminals.

To harmonize the two countries' historical narratives, the two sides would need to recognize and demonstrate empathy for each other's suffering. South Koreans must acknowledge the pressures and threats facing Japan in the early twentieth century that led Tokyo to perceive a national security threat (doing so would not be an endorsement of the aggressive policy Japan adopted in response). South Koreans would also need to acknowledge Japan's losses—in human life, territory, and autonomy—that the Japanese endured during the years of war and occupation. South Korea's narrative of the wartime era would need to have cognitive consonance with Japan's own identity, and attend to Japan's core concerns. The same is true, of course, in the reverse. A Japanese framing of the conflict (i.e., the "renegade view") is useful for reconciliation, so long as it acknowledges that not only Japanese but Japan's neighbors suffered tremendously from the renegades' policies. To date Japan's narrative has emphasized Japanese victims. South Korean, Chinese, and others who suffered from Japanese violence are not adequately acknowledged or identified with.

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[85] Fisher, Ury, and Patton, *Getting to Yes*, 32.

[86] Julian Ryall, "Stupid and Nonsensical: Japanese right rages at 'comfort women' honour," *South China Morning Post*, August 28, 2014.

Given current conditions, it seems improbable that Japanese and South Korean leaders might ever together visit Seoul's statue honoring the wartime sex slaves. Still perhaps someday, facing a different strategic environment, a Japanese leader will respectfully drape a scarf around her neck or bow his head before her. And perhaps someday a South Korean leader will visit the Hiroshima memorial and honor the Japanese (as well as the many Koreans) who suffered from the attack. As highly improbable as this seems in today's conditions, it would have seemed equally improbable in 1945 that someday Germans would commemorate the Normandy landing along with the Allies and yet, such shared commemoration has become commonplace.[87] Perhaps someday, Japan and South Korea will be able to bury the dead together as in Western Europe.

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[87] On German participation in the Normandy landing anniversary ceremonies see Lind, "Getting to No," 30-31.

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