

Asianism after Asianism: Rōyama Masamichi and the Making of a Postwar Asian Order

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During the tumultuous early years of the Cold War, Japanese intellectuals and bureaucrats produced various Asianist thinking and discourses. Many of these intellectuals were social scientists who had advocated the East Asian Community (J. *Tōa kyōdōtai*, 東亞協同体) during the wartime period of 1931 to 1945. Rōyama Masamichi was one of the leading social scientists who developed postwar Asian regional discourses in the 1950s, and much of his Cold War Asianist thinking came from economic development-oriented wartime Pan-Asianism. He called for the Japanese government to actively intervene in government-led economic development plans in Southeast Asian countries, most of which were Japan's former colonies. At the same time, Rōyama and like-minded social scientists aimed to promote Japan's position in a United States-led Cold War Asian order. Their involvement in the making of a Japan-led colonial empire during the wartime period continued to influence Japan's postwar encounter with Asia.

Keywords: The East Asian Community, Rōyama Masamichi, democratic socialism, Asian economic development, Cold War, nationalism in developing countries

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Scholars of Japanese studies tend to argue that memory of the imperial past prevented Japanese intellectuals from developing Asian discourses in postwar Japan. This line of thinking is often linked to another observation, that in the 1950s and 1960s an Asianist perspective only received the attention of progressive Japanese intellectuals who aimed to promote pacifism and non-Western solidarity in the rapidly changing Cold War order. On the other hand, it is widely accepted that conservative Japanese bureaucrats and intellectuals faithfully accepted the American security system and did not develop any Asian discourses of their own. This binary approach, however, needs to be reexamined since a wide range of Japanese intellectuals—progressive, liberal, and conservative—continued to produce their own versions of Asian regionalist ideas as early as the 1950s.

Based on these observations, this article explores how Asian regionalist discourses continued to influence Japanese academia as well as Japan's encounter with a decolonized Asia. In doing so, this study pays special attention to how wartime Asian discourses by Imperial Japan continued and were discontinued in the making of postwar Asian discourses by Japanese intellectuals. Here, it is important to emphasize that the imperialist and

colonial approaches by imperial Japan during the wartime period were not monolithic. The slogan of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere is often considered the epitome of Japan's wartime Asian discourses. In fact, a rival set of knowledge and practice existed, and not all advocates of a Japan-led East Asian empire prioritized spiritual and intrinsic commonness as the basis of an Asian community.

For instance, a group of Japanese intellectuals, social scientists in particular, presented a competing interpretation of the East Asian Community. They were acutely aware of the urgency to convince Chinese and colonial subjects of the "rationality" of a Japan-led Asian community. To create an optimized empire-colony structure for wartime mobilization, they called for imperial Japan to develop colonial economies. By reducing the economic, political, and cultural gaps between metropole and colony, they believed that Chinese and colonial subjects would spontaneously participate in constructing an Asian empire.

Interestingly, it was these "developmentalist" wartime Japanese intellectuals who continued to address the necessity of a Japan-oriented Asianist approach in postwar Japan during the tumultuous period of the 1950s. Since most of these intellectuals were not trained in Marxism or radical social theories, their encounter with Asia differed from that of the so-called progressive intellectuals in postwar Japan who were critical of American-led Asian Cold War policies to create an anti-communist bloc in Asia. On the other hand, they were equally critical of the conservative tendency in Japan to conform to the American system. However, the promotion of the American Cold War policy in non-communized Asian countries was not accompanied by sophisticated drafts regarding the question of how the American system would convert the domestic structure of these newly decolonized Asian states and make them America's partners. It was not until the early 1960s that American policy makers began to seriously consider the possibility of modifying American modernization theory to Asian contexts. This absence of actual Asian discourses in the United States in the 1950s ironically enabled postwar Japanese intellectuals, many of

whom were deeply involved in highly imperialized Asian discourses during the wartime period, to present another set of “Japanized” Asian regionalist thinking in the 1950s.

This article aims to shed new light on the decade of the 1950s by critically examining the resurgence of Asian regionalism in postwar Japan. To this end, this study focuses on the writings of Rōyama Masamichi (1895-1980) in the late 1940s and the 1950s. Rōyama was arguably the icon of the East Asian Community group during the wartime period. Trained in political science at Tokyo Imperial University, he was appointed Assistant Professor in the College of Law in 1922. Heavily influenced by the boom of liberal social science during the Taisho period, he is often considered the pioneer of international politics in prewar Japanese social science. With the publication of *Kokusai seiji to kokusai gyōsei* (国際政治と国際行政, *International Politics and International Administration*) in 1928, Rōyama emerged as a leading political scientist who grappled with the question of restructuring the Japanese domestic political system in the rapidly changing international situation. Beginning in the early 1930s, he became deeply involved in the *Shōwa kenkyūkai* (昭和研究会, Shōwa Research Association) and produced a wide range of writings on wartime Pan-Asianism, emerging as one of the most influential wartime social scientists. For this reason, Rōyama’s wartime writings have been the primary topic of research on Japanese Pan-Asianist discourses during the wartime period.¹ However, his postwar Asian discourse has received little attention in spite of his prolific writings on the Cold War Asian order in the 1950s. After a short period of academic silence at the end of the Asia-Pacific War, he soon regained his scholarly influence as a

¹ Miles Fletcher, *The Search for a New Order: Intellectuals and Fascism in Prewar Japan* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1982); J. Victor Koschmann, “Constructing Destiny: Rōyama Masamichi and Asian Regionalism in Wartime Japan,” in Sven Saaler and J. Victor Koschmann, eds., *Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders* (London: Routledge, 2006); Jung Sun Han, “Rationalizing the Orient: The “East Asia Cooperative Community” in Prewar Japan,” *Monumenta Nipponica* 60, no. 4 (Winter 2005), 481-513.

renowned political scientist and became deeply engaged in guiding the direction of Japan's Cold War order through his logic of Japan's involvement in economic development in Asia, in particular, Southeast Asia. Based on these observations, this paper aims to critically explore Rōyama's postwar writings on Asianism by focusing on the continuity between his wartime imperialist approach to China and Japan's colonies and his encounter with postwar Asia under American hegemony.

The main arguments of this article are twofold. First, Rōyama and like-minded Japanese social scientists attempted to promote Japan's position in Asia in the 1950s by actively engaging with economic development plans in developing countries, Southeast Asia in particular, at a time when the United States had not presented sophisticated plans for economic development in the Asia-Pacific region. The political scientist Sakai Tetsuya has argued that Rōyama's wartime developmentalist approach continued to influence the shaping of postwar Asian discourses in Japan, a line of thinking that exemplifies Japanese intellectuals' "subjective concern" (J. *shutai-teki kanshin*, 主体的関心) with a postwar Asian order in the Japanese context.² However, this paper will show that Rōyama's seemingly spontaneous approaches to 1950s Asia clearly reveal how much wartime colonialist and imperialist Asianist ideas continued to influence the mentality of postwar Japanese intellectuals.

In this respect, this study also pays special attention to the nature of Rōyama's developmentalist logic of a postwar Asian order, one which was widely shared by a number of Japanese social scientists in the 1950s. Since Rōyama endorsed the necessity of an American-led Cold War order characterized by the construction of an anti-communist bloc in Asia, he never challenged American militaristic hegemony in Asia, including Japan. However, Rōyama's concern was to promote Japan's postwar status in the

² Sakai Tetsuya, *Kindai Nihon no kokusai chitsujoron* [The Political Discourse of International Order in Modern Japan] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2007), 150.

international order whereas the United States did not have any vision of tangible economic development plans in 1950s East Asia and Southeast Asia since the political leaders of those countries were more concerned with colonialism and economic reconstruction after the war. Under these circumstances, Rōyama and like-minded Japanese social scientists revisited their wartime developmentalist Asian discourses that actually had served Japan's total war efforts. In that respect, their Asian discourses were not so much an alternative approach to the bipolarized Cold War international order as a highly politicized approach to rehabilitate Japan's position.

Rōyama Masamichi and the “East Asian Community” in Wartime Japan

Rōyama revealed his notion of a new Asian order in the mid-1930s, but the most concrete version of his Pan-Asianism appeared shortly after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. Together with a group of social scientists that included Shinmei Masamichi, Kada Tetsuji, and Takata Yasuma, Rōyama presented the notion of the “East Asian Community.” As is well known, this notion was proposed by wartime Japanese intellectuals to rationalize Japan's invasion of China and the construction of a Japan-led East Asian community. Developing his interest in international politics, Rōyama based his theory of the East Asian Community on the observation that the nation-state framework would no longer work since the Euro-centric international order did not have the capacity to control each country's territorial and economic ambitions.³ For this reason, advocates of the East Asian Community stressed that Japan must be the leader of Asia in order to safeguard Asia's common interests and provide security from Western imperialism.

Although Rōyama's wartime writings should be discussed in the broad

³ Koschmann, “Constructing Destiny,” 189-192.

history of Japanese intellectuals' commitment to the Japanese empire, often called *tenkō* (転向), his encounter with Pan-Asianism needs to be more carefully investigated in order to criticize the basis of his writings. Keeping their distance from spiritual and ultra-nationalistic Pan-Asianists who were advocating the Imperial Way or intrinsic Asian commonness, Rōyama and like-minded Japanese social scientists set forth the logic of development-oriented Asian regionalism. Stressing that the economic gap between Japan and the rest of Asia must be reduced, they contended that Japan would draw support from Asian subjects for its empire-building project by developing both Japan and the colonies.⁴ They also believed that developing colonial economies would be the key to creating an optimized structure for Japan's total war. For this reason, these wartime social scientists' Pan-Asian discourses were closely related to the notion of modernization and development, although they envisioned a non-Western regional community in Asia.

Rōyama's Encounter with Postwar Japan

Rōyama's wartime discourses on developmentalism lead us to raise several important questions about the continuity and discontinuity of Asian regionalist thinking in postwar Japan. As discussed earlier, Japan-led Pan-Asianism lost ground in postwar Japan as the notion of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere was stigmatized as the locus of wartime Japanese totalitarianism. While wartime ultra-nationalists, mostly advocates of spiritual and imperial-way Pan-Asianism, temporarily disappeared from the political and intellectual arenas, newly emerging liberal and progressive social scientists endeavored to erase the legacy of the fascistic era. The 33-year-old political scientist Maruyama Masao was one of them. In his

⁴ Kada Tetsuji, *Tōa kyōdōtai ron* [On The East Asian Community] (Tokyo: Nihon seinen gaikō kyōkai shuppanbu, 1939).

epoch-making 1947 essay “Political Science as Science” (*J. Kagaku to shite seijigaku*, 科学として政治学), Maruyama asserted, “[T]here has undoubtedly been a brilliant revival in other social sciences, but political science in this country, to put it bluntly, really has no tradition worth reviving. *For Japanese political science everything depends on what it happens in the future.*” [emphasis added]⁵ In this respect, Maruyama fired against those wartime social scientists who served the wartime Japanese government.

Due to his close engagement with wartime institutions and policy-making, Rōyama’s name was included among the subjects of a 1947 purge (*J. kōshoku tsuihō*, 公職追放) by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP). However, the purge of Rōyama was lifted in 1948, and he reemerged as an individual political scientist. Rōyama then became remained, actively involved in various debates over political theories and practical issues, including the question of evaluating wartime Japanese political science.⁶ In 1949, Rōyama published a monograph entitled *Nihon ni okeru kindai seijigaku no hattatsu* (日本における近代政治学の発達, *The Development of Modern Political Science in Japan*). In this book, one can easily notice that Maruyama’s 1947 essay greatly influenced Rōyama. Rōyama also basically agreed with Maruyama’s point that the Emperor system had greatly deterred the development of modern democracy in Japan and therefore critiques of Japanese fascism must begin with problematizing the Emperor system.⁷ However, while paying homage to Maruyama’s analysis, Rōyama did not endorse Maruyama’s condemnation of wartime

⁵ Maruyama Masao, trans., Arthur Tiedemann, “Politics as a Science in Japan: Retrospect and Prospects,” in Maruyama Masao, trans., Ivan Morris, *Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics* (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1969), 226.

⁶ For Rōyama’s career and activities in postwar Japan, see Imamura Tsunao, *Gabanansu no tankyū: Rōyama asamichi o yomu* [Portraits of Governance: Reading Rōyama Masamichi] (Tokyo: Keisō shobō, 2009), 54-112.

⁷ Rōyama Masamichi, *Nihon ni okeru seiji ishiki no shoyōsō* [Various Aspects of Political Consciousness] (Tokyo: Keisō shobō, 1949), 46-66.

Japanese political science and suggested that a new direction for postwar Japanese political science could only be sought by thoroughly reviewing political thought in traditional and early twentieth century Japan.⁸

Why did Rōyama call for a more thorough investigation of political ideas in early twentieth century Japan, instead of accepting Maruyama's assessment? The easiest answer may be that Rōyama himself was deeply involved in producing imperial and colonial knowledge and policies during the wartime period. In a monumental study of conversion led by Tsurumi Shunsuke, one of the leading progressive intellectuals in postwar Japan, Matsuzawa Hiroaki strongly argued that Rōyama was voluntarily involved in changing the domestic political structure for the purpose of imperial war in his belief that the international political power structure at that time necessitated it.⁹ Notably, Matsuzawa based his critiques on Rōyama's understanding of international politics in the 1930s and 1940s. On a macroscopic level, Rōyama's notion of a new international order referred to imperial Japan's attempt to bipolarize the world order, that is, the Western order versus a Japan-led imperial community in Asia.

Ironically, Matsuzawa's acute analysis of Rōyama's wartime collaboration with the Japanese empire provides a clue to understanding why Rōyama's historiography of modern Japanese political science differed from that of Maruyama. Rōyama's evaluation of Japanese political scientists was structured on the observation that they had responded to "given situations." When pluralist approaches to the state prevailed in the 1920s, they problematized the dominance of the state over all other social sectors and theorized "society" as an alternative force.¹⁰ Rōyama, however, contended

⁸ Rōyama Masamichi, *Nihon ni okeru kindai seijigaku no hattatsu* [The Development of Modern Political Science in Japan] (Tokyo: Jitsugyō no nihonsha, 1949), 226-228.

⁹ Matsuzawa Hiroaki, "Minshu shakaishugi no hitobito—Rōyama Masamichi hoka" [Democratic Socialists: Rōyama Masamichi and others], in Tsurumi Shunsuke ed., *Kyōdō kenkyū—tenkō* [A Collective Study: Conversion], vol. 2 (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1960), 262.

¹⁰ Rōyama, *Nihon ni okeru kindai seijigaku no hattatsu*, 151-179.

that the advent of international society fundamentally changed the structure of domestic politics in late 1920s Japan. The First World War was, he observed, a clash of the uncontrolled interests of each nation-state. In other words, it was inevitable that each nation aimed to expand its economic and political interests beyond its national border in modern society, and this gave rise to imperialism and colonialism.¹¹

As this paper will discuss in detail how Rōyama's concept of international politics shaped his thinking about the postwar Asian regional order, it is important to link his understanding of wartime international politics to the formation of the postwar international order. As Sakai Tetsuya and J. Victor Koschmann have argued, Rōyama was primarily concerned with the question of how to restructure the Euro-centric world order, and was therefore greatly influenced by political scientists and political philosophers such as Carl Schmitt and W.Y. Elliot, who produced new interpretations of state-individual relations and regional orders.¹² After Japan's defeat, Rōyama's academic interests moved to the reshaping of a postwar international order. He first showed keen interest in American political scientists' discussions of power politics. Referring to *International Politics*, published in 1933 by Frederick Shuman, Rōyama defined power politics as a modern tendency for each country to safeguard its own interests based on military and economic power in the international order.¹³ Rōyama observed that international conflicts in the twentieth century occurred when totalitarian forces dominated national sovereignty and became uncontrolled. However, Rōyama cast a skeptical eye on each nation-state's capability to control its own national power. The advent of modern nation-states, Rōyama observed,

¹¹ Rōyama Masamichi, "Kokusai shakai ni okeru kokka shuken" [State Sovereignty in International Society], in Nakamura Akira ed., *Kindai kokkaron* [On Modern Nation States], vol. 1 (Tokyo: Kōbundō, 1950), 3-66.

¹² Koschmann, "Constructing Destiny," 187-189; Sakai, *Kindai Nihon no kokusai chitsujoron*, 131-141.

¹³ Rōyama Masamichi, "Kokusai shakai to pawa poriteikkusu" [International Society and Power Politics], *Sekai* (1950:3), in Rōyama Masamichi, *Kokusai seiji to Nihon gaikō* [International Politics and Japanese Diplomacy] (Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha, 1959), 70.

replaced the medieval order based on religious and feudal systems with economic and militaristic development and expansion. Therefore, he argued that modern nation-states would inevitably pursue worldly desires beyond the national level and thus be vulnerable to international conflicts.¹⁴

Under these circumstances, early perceptions of power politics evolved to a considerable extent and gave rise to a certain school of international politics. Scholars in this school carried the power politics-driven aspect of modern nation states a step further and established the realist theory of international politics. Hans Morgenthau was the icon of postwar realist theory in American political science. He reconfirmed that the essence of international politics is power politics, that is, each nation seeks to expand its power in the international order. Power politics, he stressed, takes different forms, depending upon the interests of each nation. According to him, the Second World War was a conflict between nations in favor of the status-quo (England and France) and nations attempting to destroy this status quo (Germany and Italy).¹⁵

Morgenthau's realist theory provided Rōyama with logical ground for Japan's involvement in the Second World War. Since Morgenthau's notion of power politics was based upon an affirmation of the egoistic nature of human beings, his political ideas from the outset intended to separate international politics from the realm of ethics and morality.¹⁶ Therefore, colonialism and imperialism were conceptualized by Morgenthau as "general" conflicts in the world of power politics. Given that both France and England, namely, the status-quo maintenance alliance, were also colonial empires, Morgenthau's realist theory, in spite of its impact on anti-Soviet policies in Cold War America, fundamentally endorsed the world order dominated by "the haves" and blocked any ethical and moralistic judgment of the violence of these

¹⁴ Rōyama, "Kokusai shakai to pawa poriteikkusu," 67-68.

¹⁵ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York: Knopf, 1948, c1960), 38-43.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 233-259.

advanced powers. Rōyama also shared similar views on diachronic changes in modern world history. He wrote:

Civilization itself is basically the concept of a social sphere that goes beyond nation or national borders. In particular, modern civilization has been transnational in its scientific and technological nature. The development of capitalism as the economic system of modern society, in association with achievements by modern civilization, necessitated *colonies* through the development of markets beyond national borders and gave rise to the international expansion of economic society.¹⁷ [emphasis added]

Rōyama argued that the configuration of power politics did not substantially change after the end of World War II. For him, the American-Soviet conflict was another chapter of the power-politics-driven international order. What actually changed was Japan's status in the international order. Rōyama's writings in 1948-1950 reflected his grave concerns about how Japan would survive in the acute Cold War international order and possibly promote its position. Not surprisingly, Rōyama centered his inquiry on how the balance of power could be explicated in East Asia. Now, referring to Arnold Toynbee,¹⁸ one of the most renowned English historians of the twentieth century, Rōyama proposed four conditions for maintaining the balance of power: (1) the participation of multiple countries would increase power balances, (2) polarization such as the American-Soviet division would destroy the conditions for power balances, (3) if the two powers maintained physical distance, a sort of balance would be imagined, and (4) a mediator could prevent a direct clash between polarized powers.¹⁹

¹⁷ Rōyama, "Kokusai shakai ni pawa poriteikkusu," 61-62.

¹⁸ Arnold Toynbee was one of the most frequently read historians in postwar Japan. While more than ten of Toynbee's books were translated into Japanese in the 1950s and the early 1960s, Rōyama was the co-translator of Toynbee's seminal work, *A Study of History*.

¹⁹ Rōyama, "Kokusai shakai ni okeru kokka shuken," 39-40.

It appears that Rōyama did not take seriously the spiritual potential of Toynbee's concept of world history. As is well known, Toynbee argued that civilization, alternative civilization in particular, emerges as one country or society encounters and responds to extreme difficulty, and he also showed keen interest in the spiritual aspect of civilization, a perspective that gained currency in 1950s Japan.²⁰ However, Toynbee's notion of the postwar world order was for Rōyama another confirmation that bipolarization would continue in international politics and, therefore, there would be strong demands for collective security in East Asia.

Unquestionably, Rōyama's first and foremost concern was to assure Japan's national security. This explains why he even showed an affinity with advocates of permanent neutrality in Japan between 1948 and 1950.²¹ A group of Japanese intellectuals and politicians, mostly liberal and progressive, proposed the notion of disarmament and neutrality in the late 1940s. If permanent neutrality was an idealistic approach to Japan's postwar security question, the realistic meaning of "peace" in Japan, as John Dower has pointedly argued, was contingent upon changing American attitudes toward Japan and Asia.²² As is well known, the United States intended to drive postwar Japan to a strong anti-communist zone in Asia in the wake of growing communist forces in Northeast Asia, which culminated in the emergence of the People's Republic of China in 1949. Rōyama, however, observed that Japan's road would not be as simple as siding with the United States in the making of the collective security system in Asia. This line of thinking came from his peculiar analysis of nationalism and communism in Asia.

Along with his writings on postwar international politics, Rōyama

²⁰ Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History* (London: Oxford University Press, 1934).

²¹ Rōyama, "Kokusai shakai ni okeru kokka shuken," 41-54.

²² John Dower, "Peace and Democracy in Two Systems: External Policy and Internal Conflict," in Andrew Gordon, ed., *Postwar Japan As History* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), 3-33.

published several articles on communism and socialism between 1948 and 1950. Not surprisingly, he showed strong disagreement with the communist notion of the state, that is, the nation-state as dominated by the interests of the bourgeoisie would disappear if the proletariat achieved their monopolization of the means of production.²³ However, Rōyama's endorsement of realist international political theory was not directly linked to his total denouncement of Marxist political theory. Rather, he paid attention to the shadow of European Marxism. In other words, he observed that the incompatibility of Marx's radical theory with advanced European countries paradoxically demonstrated its power in explaining revolution in underdeveloped countries such as early twentieth century Russia.²⁴ However, his analysis of communism around 1949 and early 1950 was not yet sophisticated enough to explain how the status of underdevelopment would be appropriated by radical leaders in these countries to forge their political power in association with nationalism. Nonetheless, Rōyama seemed to be clearly aware that a mere application of American-born political theories to Japan and Asia would not provide a resolution to the conundrum of collective security in Asia. In these yet-to-be explored Asian political spaces, he first reconfirmed his conviction that a new discourse on postwar Asian regionalism must be developed and that Japan should be actively engaged in this process. At stake was the question of what kinds of roles political scientists in Japan should play under these circumstances.

Asianist Thinking in Early Cold War Japan

As discussed above, Rōyama introduced the most up-to-date Western

²³ Rōyama Masamichi, "Marukusushugi seijigaku hihan" [Critiques of Marxist Political Science], in Rōyama Masamichi, *Minshu skakaishugi e no michi* [The Way for Democratic Socialism] (Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha, 1960), 77-84.

²⁴ Rōyama Masamichi, "Kyōsantō sengen hihan" [Critiques of the Communist Manifesto], in Rōyama, *Minshu skakaishugi e no michi*, 21.

political theories to Japanese academia and showed an in-depth understanding of the complexity of international politics. He was also aware that these Western political theories had clear limits in explaining the political situations of non-Western countries in the postwar context. The gap between Western political theories and Japanese politics was conceptualized by Rōyama in two major areas. From the perspective of macroscopic democratic development, the Japanese road to Western democracy came to an impasse as Japan was dominated by ultra-nationalists during the wartime period.

Second, Rōyama observed that Japan was undergoing a confusion of value systems. While the American occupational forces attempted to promote American democratic routes to Japan, various social and political theories had already arrived in Japan and were having an influence. For instance, the concept of “democracy,” Rōyama wrote, was theorized by both conservatives and progressives as “people’s democracy” and “western democracy,” respectively.²⁵ Here, people’s democracy referred to political ideologies presented by the Soviet Union and Mao Zedong. However, Rōyama was skeptical about these “alternative” democratic systems. He accused them of being a democracy without the legitimacy of elections, that is, the communist party determines its own power and responsibility without election.²⁶ He found that the coexistence of such antipodal democratic ideas was due to the problem of the “Japanese people who do not have the capability to make autonomous judgments based on their own experience and knowledge of democracy.”²⁷ In this way, Rōyama and like-minded Japanese social scientists in the 1950s did not accept the American value system as such and sought autonomous political development. However, this

²⁵ Rōyama Masamichi, “Kyōsanshugisha no minshushugikan— <Futatsu no minshushugi> no hihan” [Communists’ Perceptions of Democracy: Critiques of the Development of Democracy], in Rōyama, *Minshu skakaishugi e no michi*, 58-72.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 66-68.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 59.

does not mean that they problematized, as some progressive Japanese intellectuals did, America's highly polarized and militarized approach to Asian security.

While the lack of democratic experience pertains to the historical side of political "backwardness" in Japan, the absence of sovereignty, Rōyama thought, would leave the Japanese unable to take Asian affairs as part of their own concerns. In this respect, the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 had a profound impact on Rōyama's writings on international politics in the 1950s. First of all, the Korean War was an international war that reconfirmed that boundaries of security should not be confined to the single nation-state framework. Therefore, Rōyama observed in September 1950, just three months after the outbreak of the Korean War, that the upcoming peace treaty talks between the United States and Japan would be closely related to the Korean War.²⁸ However, Rōyama was not simply concerned about the physical security of Japan that would be politically independent. Here, Rōyama artfully linked the Korean War to the power and responsibility of Japan in the changing postwar Asian order.

He first asserted that North Korea's invasion of South Korea should not be justified in any way since South Korea was legitimized by the United Nations.²⁹ For this reason, Rōyama concluded that the Japanese must make clear moral judgments about the Korean War. Rōyama's emphasis on an ethical standpoint on the Korean War discloses his political intention very well. As Oku Takenori has argued, leftist and even liberal intellectuals were hesitant to make value judgments on the interventionist policies of the Soviet Union and Mao's China in 1950s and 1960s Japan.³⁰ There were only a few

²⁸ Rōyama Masamichi, "Reisen no shosan to shite no Nihon no heiwa joyaku" [The Japanese Peace Treaty as the Outcome of the Cold War], *Fujin kōron* (1950:9), in Rōyama, *Kokusai seiji to Nihon gaikō*, 194.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 206.

³⁰ Oku Takenori, *Nondan no jeonhusa* [The Postwar History of the Japanese Journalistic World], trans. Song Seok Won (Seoul: Sohwa, 2007), 118-121.

intellectuals who were critical of China's and the Soviet Union's support of Kim Il Sung's North Korea. In this way, Rōyama utilized the Korean War to detach the Japanese from an "illusionary" narrative of communism as bearing peace and liberation. Referring to Ruth Benedict's *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, in which she wrote that "the Japanese concept of morality is situational," Rōyama urged the Japanese to make a "universal" ethical judgment on the Korean War, which indicated that Rōyama fully endorsed the advent of the San Francisco System in 1951.³¹

Just as Rōyama, a realist political scientist, considered it urgent for Japan to join the San Francisco System, similar logic was found among like-minded Japanese social scientists. For instance, Kada Tetsuji, one of the core advocates of the East Asian Community during the wartime period, criticized the idealist aspect of postwar Japanese political science. He particularly problematized the writings of Nanbara Shigeru, a renowned political scientist who had served as the president of the University of Tokyo between 1945 and 1951.³² Kada insisted that Nanbara's notion of non-armament and non-nuclear oriented peace was a highly romanticized approach to security that lacked a realist sensibility.³³ Notably, a number of liberal and progressive intellectuals were still adhering to the ideal of Japan as the icon of non-armament and anti-war policies in the mid-1950s. Kada was also skeptical about the "permanent neutrality" group since it would eventually entrust Japan's militaristic and diplomatic sovereignty to the hands of foreign powers, the United States in particular.³⁴ For him, it was urgent for the Japanese to be armed with a new perspective that would "drive issues in Japan-favored directions" in the international order.

Once Japan's joining of the America-led collective security system was

³¹ Rōyama, "Reisen no shosan to shite no Nihon no heiwa joyaku," 207-208.

³² In September 1947, Tokyo Imperial University was renamed as University of Tokyo.

³³ Kada Tetsuji, *Sengō jūnen: Nihonjin no seikatsu to iken ni kansuru essei* [Ten Years after the War: Essays on the Life and Perceptions of the Japanese] (Tokyo: Raifūsha, 1955), 180-181.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 189.

justified from a realist perspective, what kind of new role for Japan did these social scientists present? Rōyama was not satisfied with Japan's simply playing a potential anti-communist "buffering" role as designated by the United States. As discussed above, he induced from the Korean War his own logical grounds for the necessity of Japan's autonomous role in the making of a postwar Asian order. Here, he made the point that Japan should bear responsibility for the outbreak of the Korean War. However, this seemingly retrospective standpoint is by no means related to Rōyama's recognition of the "ethical" responsibility for Japanese colonialism, which is strikingly different from his accusation of the Soviet Union and China as unethical. Instead, he argued that Japan's failure during the Asia Pacific War resulted in the expansion of communist powers in northeast Asia. He also added that America's misjudgment of the Soviet menace and the rise of Mao's China in the mid-1940s created conditions for the inevitable crisis of world peace.³⁵

In 1953, Rōyama published an article with the interesting title, "Japan in the World." Given that most Japanese intellectuals were still preoccupied with domestic political issues with the advent of the San Francisco System in 1951, Rōyama once again brought an "internationalist" perspective with a view to having an impact on Japan's yet-to-be determined road under the American security system. In this article, he quickly captured the new wave of thinking that ideological and political conflicts in the Asian region would be predominantly influenced by economic development in the name of reconstruction.³⁶ In other words, massive anti-colonial political forces in the late 1940s were transformed into forces for economic modernization. Rōyama was of course aware that the term "development" did not exclusively belong to the "free world." It was he who actually articulated a Japanese version of development during the wartime period. As will be discussed in detail below, the relationship between growing nationalist forces

³⁵ Ibid., 205.

³⁶ Rōyama Masamichi, "Sekai ni okeru Nihon" [Japan in the World], in Rōyama, *Gendaishi kōza* [Lectures on Modern History] in *Kokusai seiji to Nihon gaikō*.

in Asia and economic development was one of the primary concerns in Rōyama's writing in the early 1950s.

While the United Nations took the initiative in injecting economic development into the Third World, Rōyama found it useful for Japan to be involved in Asian affairs as well. Here, he summoned the Meiji period as a "success story" that showed newly liberated Asian countries a way to turn foreign impacts into domestic power. Referring to the 1949 book by British diplomat and historian of premodern Japan George B. Sansom, *The Western World and Japan*, Rōyama argued that Meiji Japan's experience would provide useful lessons for these Asian countries.³⁷ It is of course impossible to find any speculations from Rōyama that it was during the Meiji era that Japan laid the foundation for its becoming an imperial power. Neglecting Japan's colonial encounter with its Asian neighbors in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Rōyama extracted the exterior of economic development from Meiji Japan and intended to apply it to newly decolonized Asian states.

Asian Nationalism and the Question of Ideology

Rōyama was aware that America's collective security system in Asia succeeded in enticing only Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, leaving most South Asian and Southeast Asian countries as "weak points." At stake was the question of the incompatibility of American foreign policies with these areas. In fact, the United States did not present any detailed blueprint for economic and political changes in India and Southeast Asia. Notably, it was in the late 1950s and early 1960s that a direct foreign investment-oriented economic development plan was first proposed by American policymakers. In that respect, Rōyama understood early on the gravity of the problem of Asian nationalism and its impact on Japan's status in the international order.

³⁷ Ibid., 8-10.

Rōyama admitted that the notion of western style nationalism never occurred to these countries. Referring to Hans Kohn, the author of the pioneering work *The Idea of Nationalism*, he observed that modern nationalism concurrently emerged in areas where the foundations of democracy and industrialization were firmly laid.³⁸ The lack of industrialization and democracy, he continued, was often attributed to Western imperialism, and for this reason Asian nationalist forces tended to be anti-Western and anti-imperial.³⁹ Interestingly, he never insisted that nationalist forces in Asia should be controlled. Instead, he called for them to develop in a “healthy” way.⁴⁰

It appeared that Rōyama endorsed Asian nationalism as a *fait accompli* in its fight against colonialism and imperialism, while the United States was still showing its antipathy to nationalist movements in Southeast Asia and supporting European colonial powers in the early 1950s.⁴¹ However, nationalism for Rōyama was not so much a liberating ideology as a sort of political invariable one needed to take seriously in mapping out a regional order. Here, it is important to note that he never denounced nationalism as he envisioned an Asian regional community during the wartime period. If nationalism was a historical reality in early twentieth century Asia, Rōyama’s wartime concept of nationalism was always premised upon its coexistence with a grand Asian identity. His theory of the East Asian Community was his answer to the question of how each national community should serve the greater interest of a Japan-led East Asian empire. His writings on Asian nationalism in the early 1950s reflected his continuing observation of the relations between nationalism and regionalism. In sum, his realistic approach

³⁸ Rōyama Masamichi, “Futatsu no sekai to Ajia” [Two Worlds and Asia], in Rōyama, *Kokusai seiji to Nihon gaikō*, 147.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 144.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 148.

⁴¹ Robert McMahon, *The Limits of Empire: The United States and Southeast Asia since World War II* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 43-68.

to nationalism traceable to the 1930s enabled him to regard postwar Asian nationalism as a “given” condition, while intellectuals and policymakers in the United States were not prepared to respond to these massive political movements in Asia.

How, then, did Rōyama link growing nationalist forces in Asia to the Japanese experience? Here, Rōyama once again attempted to show his reflective standpoint on Japan’s war. He argued that democratic and industrial development in early twentieth century Japan faced serious challenges as religious and chauvinistic nationalists dominated the political power structure. Its outcome, he acknowledged, was colonization of Japan’s Asian neighbors and challenge to the Euro-centric world order.⁴² This seemingly retrospective interpretation of wartime ultra-nationalism in Japan was an intended attempt for Rōyama to critically engage with Asian nationalist movements in the 1950s. Just as wartime Japanese nationalism was overwhelmed by irrational and religious forces, he asserted that similar tendencies were occurring in China and Southeast Asia. Once nationalist forces were manipulated by indoctrinated groups, Rōyama stressed, this process would give rise to distortions in the power structure and nationalism would often become violent and xenophobic.⁴³ He warned that the final destination of such distorted nationalism would be communism since communist ideology claims to be anti-foreign and anti-imperial.⁴⁴ For this reason, the problem of nationalism in Asia was irrevocably related to Japan’s security. This line of thinking in Rōyama’s writings tells us why he paid special attention to Chinese nationalism led by Mao Zedong.

Rōyama did not hesitate to label Mao’s New Democracy (Ch. *xin min zhu zhu yi*, 新民主主義) a “varietal form of Marxism.”⁴⁵ He observed that

⁴² Rōyama Masamichi, “Ajia nashonarizumu to Nihon” [Asian Nationalism and Japan], in Rōyama, *Kokusai seiji to Nihon gaikō*, 160.

⁴³ Ibid., 166.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 170.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 167.

China's concentrated power structure led by the Chinese Communist Party would emphasize the specialized mission of the Chinese people based on exalted patriotic sentiments and a growing demand for strong national sovereignty, which would take place along with the promotion of racial consciousness and xenophobia.⁴⁶ Rōyama's critiques of Mao's China seemed to target pro-Chinese intellectuals within Japan. As Oguma Eiji has pointed out, Japanese communists and liberals tended to sympathize with anti-American and anti-Western nationalist movements in their opposition to the American-led San Francisco Treaty.⁴⁷ Rōyama felt an urgency to shape a new Asian regional discourse before it was absorbed by anti-American or anti-Western rhetoric.

While being critical of Japanese advocates of radical socialism, Rōyama and like-minded intellectuals did not believe that a Western-style or an American-style democracy could be easily transplanted into Japan and the newly liberated Asian countries. They believed that a mediating political ideology should constitute an integral part of new Asian regional discourses. It was under these circumstances that a group of Japanese social scientists, including Rōyama, showed keen interest in democratic socialism (*J. Minshu shakaishugi*, 民主社会主義) in the 1950s. In 1951, the Federation for Democratic Socialism (*J. Minshu shakaishugi renmei*, 民主社会主義連盟) was organized in Japan. Interestingly, many of the participating intellectuals had never been involved in socialist organizations or movements. In that respect, the democratic socialism espoused by Japanese advocates was ideologically different from social democracy, often called a revisionist and constitutionalist notion of socialism. In addition, several participants in the democratic socialist movement were specialists in non-Japanese fields. Moreover, the doctrine manifested by the Federation for Democratic

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Oguma Eiji, "The Postwar Intellectuals' View of Asia," in Sven Saaler and J. Victor Koschmann eds., *Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders* (London: Routledge, 2006), 204-205.

Socialism clearly shows that this organization looked beyond domestic affairs to consider Japan's role in the international arena. Rōyama wrote,

In order to lay the foundation for democracy in our country, we should not base it upon capitalists' disorderly *laissez-faire* activities. If protecting people's lives is not achieved and a basic structure for the national economy is not established, development of people's individuality cannot be anticipated and class violence ideologies such as communism cannot be controlled. ... Precisely for this reason, the foundation of a *socialism-oriented public controlled and planned economy* is urgent in our country. [emphasis added]

In addition, what is urgent for Japan's present and future is its international path.... Democratic nationalism is based on international solidarity and strengthens pacifist organizations within the United Nations. It also prepares for threats against peace and contributes to the realization of democracy in the international order. At the same time, *it is an extremely important mission to overcome Asia's backwardness and pave the way for Asia's independence and self-reliance*. We believe that we must take the internationalist perspective by allying with democratic groups in Asia, instead of taking an isolationist notion such as Asia as the third power.⁴⁸ [emphasis added]

Although the non-socialist democratic socialist group in 1950s Japan disclosed a sort of messianic vision of the future of Japan and Southeast Asia, the understanding of democratic socialism was different among its members. For instance, Itagaki Yoichi, an architect of Japan's mobilization policy in Southeast Asia during the wartime period, also joined the Federation for Democratic Socialism. Never having been engaged with

⁴⁸ Rōyama Masamichi, "Minshu shakaishugi no gutaiteki shinro" [A Detailed Route for Democratic Socialism], originally published in *Shakaishugi kyōkasho* [Textbooks on Socialism] (1957) in *Rōyama, Minshu shakai shugi e no michi*, 327.

socialist thought, Itagaki found democratic socialism as a way of creating a government-owned planned economy.⁴⁹ He was convinced that a set of state-centered top-down economic development plans must be mapped out to modernize these places in Southeast Asia where the basis for democracy and industrialization was weak. In fact, Itagaki's concept of the state was heavily influenced by Tokyo Imperial University economics professor Kawai Eijirō, who introduced the thinking of English philosopher Thomas Hill Green in the 1920s and 1930s.⁵⁰ As is well known, Green's idealist philosophy was characterized by the state's responsibility to proactively take care of social problems, inequality, and poverty.⁵¹ Itagaki found such an interventionist role by the state compatible with the needs of Southeast Asia in the 1950s and intended to expand Japan's role in Asia.

Rōyama articulated his concept of democratic socialism in a much clearer tone. He paid attention to how the Geneva Conference of 1954 was ineffective in resolving the Korean conflicts. In spite of the spirit of peaceful coexistence in the aftermath of the Korean War, Rōyama stressed, the end of the Cold War system could not be anticipated.⁵² Under these circumstances, the Soviet system was gradually penetrating the mindset of nationalist leaders in Asia and Africa. Rōyama theorized that the popularity of the Soviet system was closely related to these nationalist leaders' ambition to directly convert their "underdeveloped economy" into an industrialized one

⁴⁹ About Itagaki's relationships with the democratic socialism group, see *Karashima Masato, Teikoku Nihon no Ajia kenkyū sōryōkusen taisei, keizai riarizumu, minshu shakaishugi* [Asian Studies in Imperial Japan: Total War System, Economic Realism, and Democratic Socialism] (Tokyo: Akashi shoten, 2015), 129-135.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 131. Kawai's monograph on Thomas Hill Green's social philosophy was first published in 1930. Kawai Eijirō, *Tōmasu Hiru Gurin no shisō taikai* [An Outline of Thomas Hill Green's Thought] (Tokyo: Nihon hyōronsha, 1930).

⁵¹ Maria Dimova-Cookson and William J. Mander, *T. H. Green: Ethics, Metaphysics, and Political Philosophy* (London: Oxford University Press, 2006).

⁵² Rōyama Masamichi, "Minshushugi to ideorogi no tairitsu" [Conflicts between Democracy and Ideology], *Sekai* (1956) in *Rōyama, Minshu shakai shugi e no michi*, 120.

like that of the Soviet Union.⁵³ He continued to share his highly realistic observation that the American system characterized by a “paradise for private firms” and equality between labor and capital would not be exported to these “underdeveloped” countries. For this reason, he observed that a socialist plan and management by the state had received lasting attention from nationalist leaders to deal with their economic problems.⁵⁴

In order to prevent Asian nationalist forces from allying with communist ideology, Rōyama found it important to propose an Asia-optimized ideological direction first for Japan and eventually for decolonized Asian countries. Rōyama’s affinity for democratic socialism stemmed from such geopolitical thinking, and he was envisioning a “social state” where social, economic, and political conflicts are managed by the state’s intervention. Rōyama, Itagaki, and other “democratic socialists” found that the logic of an interventionist state needed to be applied to some economic sectors immediately within Japan. Agricultural reforms carried out by the American Occupation forces right after the war, they insisted, only emancipated Japanese peasants from feudalistic peasant-landlord relations. Since most of them were still small-sized and family-oriented land owners, development in productivity and an increase in income would hardly be expected.⁵⁵ To break through this impasse, Rōyama suggested, the state should consider converting individual Japanese farms into cooperative unions and implementing a national-level social security system. In doing so, Rōyama argued that a “democratic will” would spring forth from Japanese peasants.⁵⁶

Apparently, Rōyama’s logic of socialism mainly pertained to its validity as a preventive measure rather than its radical potential. By enacting some of the “socialistic” reform policies in democratic states, he believed

⁵³ Ibid., 131.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 132.

⁵⁵ Rōyama, “Minshu shakaishugi no gutaiteki shinro,” 333-334.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 340-341.

that the problem of unevenness and inequality within a single state might be temporarily resolved. Interestingly enough, this line of thinking bears a striking resemblance to his wartime notion of an East Asia cooperative community. During the wartime period, Rōyama and advocates of the East Asian Community shared the concern that optimizing Japanese society for total war should begin by managing symptoms of socio-economic inconsistencies, economic conflicts in particular. They urged that the economic gap between the industrialized metropole and urban areas be reduced to create a sense of national unity essential for total mobilization. Expanding this logic to Asia, they attempted to propose a “rationalizing” solution to the economic gap between empire and colony. It was for this reason that Rōyama strongly called for Imperial Japan to be involved in colonial economic development. He believed that a Japan-led economic development plan would be the key to directing anti-colonial nationalist forces in the colony to the making of a cooperative Asian community.

Here, one might wonder how Rōyama himself evaluated wartime imperial discourses produced by Japanese intellectuals. As discussed earlier, he admitted that ultra-nationalists distorted and destroyed democratic and industrial foundations that had been gradually accumulating in Japan until the 1920s. Obviously, Rōyama and the East Asian Community group came into acute conflict with ultranationalist groups as they competed to produce an idealized theory of an Asian empire. Being critical of “irrational” visions such as the Imperial Way (*kōdō*, 皇道), they argued that imperial Japan must present realistic and development-oriented regional discourses to embrace colonial subjects. This indicates that Rōyama’s evaluation of Japanese wartime ideology only focused on the failure of the ultranationalists’ approach to domestic and international challenges, instead of admitting the colonial nature of his own theory during the wartime period.

Asian Regional Developmentalism and Japan

While a group of Japanese social scientists were grappling with the question of restructuring Japanese society and at the same time engaging with Asia, significant political changes occurred in Southeast Asia. In 1954, the Ho Chi Minh-led Vietnamese nationalist forces finally defeated the French colonial army. The rise of nationalist powers in Southeast Asia propelled the United States to redraft its Southeast Asian policy. Facing the growing influence of Mao's China in Southeast Asia and third world nationalist leaders' affinity for the Soviet system, the United States felt an urgent need to deter the proliferation of communist ideology in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.⁵⁷ Moreover, the Bandung Conference of 1955 reconfirmed that a free market economy and democracy, the two wheels of the Pax Americana system, would not attract third world leaders who, although in different contexts, harbored anti-colonial and anti-western sentiments.

Rōyama was aware of the subtlety of third-world alliance movements in the mid-1950s. While acknowledging the significance of revealing the imperialistic nature of white supremacy, he sent a highly realistic response to the Bandung Conference. Labeling as “abstract” the peace principles presented by China's Zhou Enlai, Rōyama warned that such a highly motivated spirit of anti-colonialism and nationalism would not last without substantial economic development in these areas.⁵⁸ Rōyama's analysis of the making of blocs in the third world ended with a strong suggestion that the United States develop forward-looking attitudes and not simply repeat its “ideology” driven anti-communist military strategies. He, at least as of 1957, seemed to be optimistic about more expanded economic aid by the United States in South Asia and Southeast Asia and attempted to draw a new rule for

⁵⁷ Hiroyuki Hoshiro, “Co-Prosperity Sphere Again? United States Foreign Policy and Japan's “First” Regionalism in the 1950s,” *Pacific Affairs* 82, no. 3 (Fall 2009), 389.

⁵⁸ Rōyama Masamichi, “Kokusai seiji ni okeru Ajia Afurika shokoku” [Asian and African Countries in International Politics], *Sōgō* (May, 1957), in Rōyama, *Kokusai seiji to Nihon gaikō*, 130-131.

Japan's new role under America's new economic policies.

However, the United States was still overwhelmingly focused on militaristic approaches to these regions. To be sure, witnessing the threat posed by nationalist movements in the third world, a group of intellectuals and bureaucrats in Washington called for more direct economic aid-oriented policies to attract nationalist leaders in these areas. The report by W.W. Rostow and Max Millikan issued in 1957 represented a new wave of thinking within the United States.⁵⁹ The report urged the United States government to implement more direct and sophisticated economic development plans in the third world and also to contrive a new strategy to create partnership with nationalist leaders in developing countries. Not surprisingly, Asia was one of the key strategic areas for American Cold War policy in the Rostow and Millikan report. However, the United States was less interested in creating a cooperative Asian bloc and still preferred "individual" prescriptions for political changes in each Asian country. In the meantime, the Japanese government accelerated its blueprint to extend its influence in Southeast Asia by providing economic aid. To this end, inducing America's support was utterly essential. In 1957, the Japanese Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, a former class A war criminal, visited Washington and presented his new "Asia plan," which was characterized by developing Asian economies through foreign aid.

However, Kishi's aim to promote Japan's status in Asia through American dollars was clearly rejected by President Dwight D. Eisenhower.⁶⁰ It is conceivable that America suspected Japan of intending to reemerge as a regional power, although the main reason for Washington's negative response was unrelated to its recognition of Japan's responsibility for its colonial past in Southeast Asia. However, the rejection of Japan's Asian plan

⁵⁹ W.W. Rostow and Max Millikan, *A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper & Bros, 1957).

⁶⁰ Sayuri Shimizu, *Creating People of Plenty: The United States and Japan's Economic Alternatives, 1950-1960* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2001), 174-201.

was not replaced by tangible American economic policies, and this resulted, as Sayuri Shimizu has convincingly argued, in the wide opening of South Asia and Southeast Asia for Japan's self-motivated economic expansion.⁶¹ Under these circumstances, Japanese social scientists actively appropriated this "opportunity" with more emboldened voices.

In June 1959, a group of Japanese social scientists published a provocative work entitled *Ajia keizai hatten no kiso riron* (アジア経済発展の基礎理論, *Basic Theories of Asian Economic Development*). This text of more than 850 pages was published by the Nihon Ekafe Kyōkai (Japanese Association for the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East), and it is not an exaggeration to say that it was the epitome of the social scientific scholarship that illuminated the emergence of developmentalist Asian discourses in Japan in the late 1950s. Rōyama supervised the entire publication process and wrote a foreword and an individual article for this book. In the foreword, he once again confirmed that Japan's "particular" experience in the early twentieth century would be universally meaningful for most Southeast Asian countries.⁶² How, then, did Rōyama and the other authors of this book articulate Japan's role in Asia in the late 1950s?

First, it is important to note that this book placed exceptional emphasis on the term subjectivity (J. *shutaisei*, 主体性). The meaning of being "subjective" in the Asian context was well illuminated in Rōyama's own article, "*Ajia keizai hattatsu no kokusai seijigakuteki igi*" (J. アジア経済開発の国際政治学的意義, "The Meaning of Asian Economic Development from the Perspective of International Politics"). Here, Rōyama insisted that neither the Cold War bipolar system led by the United States and the Soviet Union nor the neutralist alliance characterized by the 1955 Bandung Conference would provide an optimized route for Asia's security and economic

⁶¹ Ibid., 199.

⁶² Nihon Ekafe Kyōkai, ed., *Ajia keizai hatten no kiso riron* [Basic Theories of Asian Economic Development] (Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha, 1959), 7-8.

development.⁶³ According to him, both the Soviet Union and the United States had prioritized their ideological goals, the spread of people's democracy, and non-proliferation of communism, respectively, through political intervention, and this had been an obstacle to the political development of Asian nationalism.⁶⁴ He was equally critical of the neutralist trend by Third World countries such as Egypt and India. Given that Arab nationalist movements became increasingly politicized over their oil resources, Rōyama was skeptical about the possibility of a true "neutralist" alliance in Asia as well.

It is not surprising that Rōyama and like-minded Japanese social scientists responded tepidly to the neutralist movements that culminated in 1955 at the Bandung Conference. Although Japan sent its own delegates to Bandung, there was no reason for the developing countries to recognize Japan's presence in the Third World, given that Japan had been one of the major colonial powers in the early twentieth century.⁶⁵ However, these social scientists at least believed that their version of a postwar Asian regional unit would gain momentum by penetrating the "weak-point" of an ideology driven third-world bloc notion, that is, most countries were desperately searching for a path to rapid economic development and they would eventually establish economic relations with "advanced" countries to receive financial and technological aid. By carrying this idea a step further and having collective and cooperative economic relations in these individually less developed countries, these social scientists intended to rationalize Japan's joining and actually leading these late-comers.

⁶³ Rōyama Masamichi, "Ajia keizai kaihatsu no kokusai seijigakuteki igi" [The Meaning of Asian Economic Development from the Perspective of International Politics], in Nihon Ekafe Kyōkai, ed., *Ajia keizai hatten no kiso riron*, 674-676.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 674.

⁶⁵ About Japan and the Bandung Conference, see Kristine Dennehy, "Overcoming Colonialism at Bandung, 1955," in *Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders*, 213-225; Kweku Ampiah, "Japan at the Bandung Conference: The Cat Goes to the Mice's Convention," *Japan Forum* 7, no. 1 (1995), 15-24.

In order to pave the way for Japan's "rejoining" Asia, the efficacy of Japan-Southeast Asian economic cooperation had to be emphasized. To address this issue, Rōyama revisited his notion of international politics in Asia. Although the concept of collective security is essential in Cold War Asia, economic cooperation for development, Rōyama stressed, must take place among Asian countries, and not be predominantly led by Cold War superpowers.⁶⁶ However, it is misleading to assume that Rōyama and other social scientists simply denounced the central position of the United States in the Asian Cold War order. They never challenged America's strategic initiative to create an anti-communist bloc. Nor did they call for Japan to consider building an autonomous military power, as least in the late 1950s and the early 1960s. They were aware that any Asian regionalist discourses that recalled Japan's imperial past would not be accepted by most Asian countries. While endorsing America's primary role as a superpower in Northeast Asia, they intended to utilize Japan's growing economic power to construct a Japan-favored economic order in Asia. This explains why their "blueprint" for an Asian economic order excluded South Korea and Taiwan, Japan's two former major colonies and now under the direct militaristic and economic sway of the United States.

While Japan was a primary partner in America's Cold War policy in Asia, this did not discourage these social scientists from being critical of economic plans in Asia led by the United States. Rōyama, for instance, did not hide his skepticism about both the ECAFE and the Colombo Plan. He asserted that these plans were basically the outcome of Western countries' strategic interests in Asia, the United States, in particular, and did not consider the creation of self-reliant cooperative relations among Asian countries.⁶⁷ Such critiques seem to be premised upon his observation that these economic plans would automatically bring Western capital and

⁶⁶ Rōyama, "Ajia keizai kaihatsu no kokusai seijigakuteki igi," 682.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 678.

technology to underdeveloped countries and eventually aimed to implant a Western-style free market economy into non-Western areas. Contrary to the expectations of “free world” leaders, a number of nationalist leaders in Asia and Africa showed keen interest in non-Western routes. For instance, India’s second 5-year economic development plan between 1955 and 1960 was explicitly influenced by the Soviet model. Most developing countries had already adopted government-led multi-year economic plans in the late 1950s, and these plans were usually characterized by an intensive government-led campaign to construct basic infrastructure for economic development and rapidly increase productivity.

Interestingly, the era of state-led developmental plans was not conceived of as “foreign” by these Japanese social scientists. Rather, the idea of state-led development in Asia in the 1950s had much in common with Japan’s notion of a controlled economy during the wartime period. Imperial Japan intended to control all human and material resources for its war effort, and total mobilization necessitated a strong control tower within the government and actual developmental goals based on a rapid increase in productivity. In that respect, the boom in economic plans in Asia in the 1950s was not so much an anxious reaction to the spread of the Soviet model, but rather provided favorable conditions for these Japanese social scientists who were once deeply involved in the construction of a controlled economy during the wartime period.

For instance, Hara Kakuten, one of the contributors to *Ajia keizai hatten no kiso riron* and a former member of the Research Bureau in the Manchurian Railway, a think-tank during the wartime period, clearly understood the nature of state-driven developmental plans in Asia. He asserted that these economic plans were contingent upon the flow of foreign capital, since no government in Asia was capable of securing the necessary capital for its public development projects.⁶⁸ In other words, he observed that

⁶⁸ Hara Kakuten, “Keizai kaihatsu keikaku no hikaku keitaironteki kosatsu” [A Comparative

these developing countries were by no means economically independent. Hara's analysis was logically linked to the necessity of Japan's intervention in Asian economic development plans through providing capital. Hara was one of the main think-tank experts for Kishi Nobusuke's Asia plan in the late 1950s. As Kobayashi Hideo has succinctly pointed out, Kishi aimed to promote Japan's position in Asia by providing direct foreign capital to developing countries, and much of his thinking came from his experience as an architect of a "self-sufficient" Asian economic community in wartime Manchuria.⁶⁹

Conclusion

Pan-Asianist thinking and practice in early twentieth century East Asia was inseparable from Asian subjects' encounter with the West as colonizing powers. This seemingly messianic vision of a self-sufficient East Asian community reached its apex as Japan appropriated it as the rationalizing logic of its empire building during the wartime period. This indicates that Japanese wartime Pan-Asian ideologues, although different in their theoretical orientations, hardly problematized Japan's colonial violence against its Asian neighbors. Rōyama Masamichi was one of the most "evolved" Pan-Asianist social scientists during the wartime period. Instead of referring to intrinsic and biological commonalities among Asians, he, together with like-minded social scientists, grappled with the question of transforming the Chinese and colonial subjects into voluntary supporters of a Japan-led Pan-Asian empire. To this end, he paid special attention to the status of the underdeveloped economies in China and Japan's colonies and called for Japan to be actively involved in economic development as an

Morphological Analysis of Economic Development Plans], in Nihon Ekafē Kyōkai, ed., *Ajia keizai hatten no kiso riron*, 614-615.

⁶⁹ Kobayashi Hideo, *Manshū to Jimintō* [Manchuria and the Liberal Democratic Party] (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 2005).

integral step toward a self-sufficient regional economy.

Rōyama's postwar perceptions of Asia did not show any substantial changes from his wartime writings. Admitting that the key player in reshaping an Asian order should be the United States, he still believed that the Japanese experience of wartime Pan-Asian empire building, although it failed, could provide a practical path for these newly decolonized countries in South Asia and Southeast Asia. Revisiting the idea of a state-centered planned economy for Japan's war efforts, Rōyama and a group of postwar Japanese social scientists attempted to revitalize their wartime thought, thereby rationalizing Japan's leading role in a postwar Asian order under American hegemony. Rōyama's writings and his influence in both academia and the political world first and foremost indicates that Pan-Asianist thinking, nominally stigmatized after Japan's defeat in the Second World War, never disappeared but rather shaped an important aspect of the Japanese vision of the international order during the early Cold War period.

More importantly, Rōyama's developmentalist approach to postwar Asia poses a much broader question in critically evaluating Japanese wartime ideologies. Beginning in the 1960s, the United States eventually employed the notion of state-centered planned economic development in the Third World, Southeast Asia in particular. The American realization of the necessity to deeply engage in rebuilding the economies of newly decolonized countries was part of its grand strategy to create an anti-communist buffer zone by transforming political leaders in Southeast Asia into potential supporters of American foreign policy in Asia. It is misleading to think that American policymakers simply borrowed Japan's wartime notion of economic development in Asia, led by Rōyama and advocates of the East Asian Community. However, an economic development-oriented approach to Cold War Asia by the United States certainly created political space and economic space for Japan's involvement in reshaping the Asian order. At stake is the question of revealing the link between colonial developmentalist Pan-Asian discourses in wartime Japan and America-led regional economic reconstruction and development projects in postwar Asia.

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