

Unfolding Relations between Joseon and Ming during the Ming-Qing Transition

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I. Introduction

The Joseon dynasty (1392-1910) suffered devastating damage during the Imjin War (*Imjin waeran* 壬辰倭亂: 1592-1598) that rocked the Korean peninsula for seven years. Although the war was brought to an end with the death of Toyotomi Hideyoshi 豊臣秀吉 in 1598, the pains on the part of Joseon did not end soon. In the early seventeenth century, Joseon had barely begun the struggle to overcome the severe damage inflicted by the seven-year war when it was faced with another foreign crisis. The crisis had been wrought by the threat from the north as a result of the rise of the Jianzhou 建州 Jurchens under Nurhaci 努兒哈赤 (1559-1626) in Liaodong and by the military demands from the Ming which tried to use Joseon to counter the Jurchens according to the time-honored Chinese strategy of “using one barbarian to check against another” (*yiyi zhiyi* 以夷制夷). Joseon was placed at a crossroad where it was forced to make a crucial decision between the rising military power of the Jianzhou Jurchens and the existing hegemony of Ming China in East Asia.

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Before the rise to power of the Jianzhou Jurchens, Joseon officials did not take the threats from the Jurchens very seriously. For example, Sin Heum 申欽 (1566-1628) describes the Jurchen threats in the following statement:

For about 200 years since the founding of our country, we have not suffered an invasion by the Jurchen barbarians. One Jurchen rebellion in the *gyemi* year (1583) was just an inflection on the surface, and not serious enough to compare it to an infection inside the stomach. Even though the court was not unaware that Nurhaci, if arising in rebellion, would make a formidable bandit, it did not issue any order or take measures in preparation of defending against his forces.¹

Sin Heum anticipated much more serious consequences of Nurhaci's rise to power by comparing it to an infection in the stomach than that of the Nit'anggae's 泥湯介 uprising in 1583 (the sixteenth year of King Seonjo's reign) which he compared to a skin infection.

As Sin had predicted, the rise to power of Nurhaci was rapid. He established the "Later Jin" (Hou Jin 後金) in 1616, declared a rebellion against the Ming in 1618, seized the Liaodong region in 1625, and renamed his regime the "Great Qing" (Da Qing 大清) in 1636. In the meantime, the Joseon state under the Ming pressure sent troops to participate in joint attacks against the Jurchens, but suffered a crushing defeat at Sarhū in 1619. In 1623, a palace coup d'état, known as the King Injo Restoration (*King Injo banjeong* 仁祖反正), deposed King Gwanghae 光海君 (r. 1608-23) and installed King Injo 仁祖 (r. 1623-49). The King Injo regime suffered the first invasion by the Later Jin in 1627, and the second invasion by the Qing in 1636, when it surrendered and was forced to enter a suzerain-vassal relation with the Jurchens. As Sin Heum had warned, the Jianzhou Jurchens turned out to be an "infection inside the stomach," and eventually vanquished Joseon. After subjugating Joseon, the Qing armies entered into mainland China proper by way of the Shanhai Pass (Shanhaiguan 山海關),

¹ (Joseon) Sin Heum, "Biro seol" (Debate on defending against the barbarians), in *Sangchon jip* (The collection of Sim Heum's works), vol. 34.

and finally took over Beijing without a fight in 1644, thus achieving the dynastic transition from the Ming to the Qing. Ergo, since the end of the Imjin War in 1598 until the Manchu Qing's entrance into mainland China in 1644, the Joseon state had been painfully involved in the cataclysmic changes of the international order in East Asia.

This article examines this Ming-Qing transition from Joseon's perspectives. The questions to be addressed will be: What were the perceptions of the court and ruling elites towards the Ming-Qing transition? What were the impacts of the transition on the Joseon state, and its reactions? And, what made the Joseon state suffer the Jurchen / Manchu invasions twice and surrendered to them? To be more specific, the topics include: 1) the rise of the Jianzhou Jurchens in the wake of the Imjin War and the reactions on the part of Joseon; 2) the military trends of the Later Jin during the reign of King Gwanghae and the foreign policies of his regime towards the Ming and the Later Jin; 3) the consequences of the coup of the King Injo Restoration on Joseon's foreign relations; 4) the background of the 1627 (Jurchen) invasion and its course; and 5) the causes and consequences of the 1636-37 (Manchu) invasion.

II. The Rise of the Jianzhou Jurchens in the Wake of the Imjin War, and Reactions of the Joseon State

1. The Rise of the Jianzhou Jurchens under Nurhaci

By the early twelfth century, the Jurchens under the leadership of Wanyan Aguda 阿骨打 (1068-1123) began to challenge the Khitan Liao 遼 dynasty (916-1125), establishing the Jin 金 dynasty (1115-1234), and destroying the Liao in 1125. The Jin then occupied Kaifeng 開封 in 1127, and took the Song emperors Huizong 徽宗 and Qinzong 欽宗 as captives, forcing the Song 宋 to retreat to the south. In the meantime, the Korean state of Goryeo 高麗 styled itself as a vassal state to the Jin, thus shifting its alliance and loyalty away from the Liao.²

² Kim Yanggi, *Dongbangsa nonchong* (Studies on east Asian history) (Seoul National University

Defeated by the Mongols in 1234, the disunited Jurchen groups lived scattered across Manchuria and northern Hamgyeong, engaging in hunting, fishing, foraging, and agriculture. Since its inception in 1368, Ming 明 dynasty had tried to “pacify” (*zhaofu* 招撫) the Jurchen tribes by giving favors because it was well aware of their potential dangers. In the past, the Khitans had come up with the saying, “The Jurchens adding up to ten thousand, there would be no match.”³ The Ming policy towards the Jurchens had the unmistakable aim to prevent a second advent of a formidable hegemon such as Wanya Aguda. The Ming court tried to bring the native Jurchen leaders into control by bestowing on them such military titles as Commander-in-Chief, Commissioner-in-Chief, Commissioner, junior officer. Additionally, they attempted to pacified officers by presenting them the official seals and decrees. In 1404, Yongle emperor 永樂帝 established the Liaodong Military Command and the Nurgan Military Command with a network of affiliated guards and posts bring the Jurchen population under the monarch-subject relationship. That Ming system was introduced in order to preempt possible unification attempts by ambitious Jurchen chieftain, and also to serve as a check against the Mongols by following the traditional policy of using one barbarian group to control another barbarian group.⁴

While the Yongle emperor was busy pacifying the Jurchens in 1405, Möngke Temür, the chieftain of the Odoli whom the Joseon government had tried hard to persuade to yield to it, accepted the Ming title of Commissioner-in-Chief of the Jianzhou Guard, creating deep sense of anxiety among Joseon officials.⁵

Along with conferring the military titles, the Ming employed economic strategies to contain the Jurchen chiefs. In their trade with the Ming, the Jurchens traded luxury items as ginseng, furs, and pearls in exchange

Press, 1984), pp. 568-75.

³ (Ming) Mao Ruizheng, *DongYi kaolue in Qing ruguan qian shilitao xuanji (yi)* (Beijing: Renmin daxue chubanshe, 1984), p. 45.

⁴ (Ming) Chen Jian, *HuangMing tongji* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2008), vol. 4, Yongle Jiashen era.

⁵ Kawachi Yoshihiro, *Mindai Joshin shi no kenkyū* (Kyōto: Dōhōsha, 1992), pp. 41-45.

for livelihood necessities such as foodstuff, textiles, and iron implements. The Ming court allowed trade privileges only to Jurchen chiefs who possessed specially issued printed patents (勅書). Thus, the Ming tried to bring the Jurchen chiefs under their control through dominating their economic lifeline through a system of patent trade.⁶

The Ming's policy towards the Jurchens met critical moments in the later years of the Wanli reign (1572-1620). At that time, the general in control of the Ming effort to contain the Jurchens, was Li Chengliang 李成梁 (1526-1615) of Joseon origin, appointed to Assistant Commissioner of the Tieling Guard in the last years of the Jiajing reign (1521-1566) and promoted to commander in 1570, in control of the Ming forces in the Liaodong area. Li suppressed the rebellion of Wang Gao of the Jianzhou Jurchen confederation in 1575, and also that of Wang Gao's son Atai who sought for revenge on behalf of his father. In the latter campaign against Atai's Fort Gure in 1583, Giocangga (Nurhaci's grandfather) and his son Taksi (Nurhaci's father) secretly allied with Li Chengliang, but were massacred along with the fort's inhabitants at the hands of the Ming forces.

Although his father and grandfather had been killed by the Ming forces, Nurhaci's power had not yet grown enough to confront the Ming forces under Li Chengliang. Nurhaci started with thirty patents given by Li Chengliang, and continued to accumulate a great number of patents as he expanded his control over his fellow Jurchen chiefs who had held patents. Taking advantage of monopolistic patent trade, he could amass enormous wealth as a result of acquiring Ming products in exchange for such Jurchen products as furs, ginseng, and pearl. Relying on the growing military pow-

⁶ Wada Sei, "Shin no Taiso to Ri Seiryō to no Kankei" (Relations between the Emperor of Qing China and Li Chengliang), *Tōashi ronsō* (Tokyo: Seikatsusha, 1933); Kim Duhyeon, "Cheongjo jeonggweon eui seongnip gwa baljeon" (Establishment and development of the Qing dynasty), *Gangjwa Jungguksa IV* (Seoul: Jisik san'eopsa, 1989), 143-54; Wei Bide (Frederic E. Wakeman Jr.), *Hongye: Qingchao kaiguo shi* (Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 1992), pp. 22-43; Meng Shen, "Qing Taizu qibing wei fuzu baochou shi xiangkao," *Ming Qingshi lunzhujikan* (Shijie shuju, 1980); Yan Chongnian ed., *Qingchao tongshi Taizu chao* (Zijin cheng chubanshe, 2003); Takao Ishibashi, Hong Seonggu, trans., *Dae Cheong jeguk* (Great Qing empire) (Seoul: Hyumeonist, 2009); Liu Xiaoming, Yi Heun, Yi Seon'ae, and Kim Seonmin, trans., *Yeojin burak eseo Manju gukka ro* (From Jurchen villages to the Manchu state) (Seoul: Peureun yeoksa, 2013).

er based on newly acquired economic wealth, in 1583 Nurhaci launched an attack against Nikan Wailan swearing revenge for the deaths of his father and grandfather. Subsequently, in 1587, he established his seat at the Jiulao fortress in Fe Ala for further subjugation of the Jianzhou Jurchens. In the face of Nurhaci's ever expanding power the Ming court appointed him to Assistant Commander-in-chief of the Jianzhou Guard in a preemptive effort to block him from becoming the 'second Aguda 阿骨打.'⁷

Nurhaci unified the Jianzhou Jurchens in 1589. The Imjin War broke out in 1592, upon which the Ming forces stationed across the Liadong area were assembled to compose an expeditionary force to counterattack the Japanese invaders who put forth the scheme of "using [Joseon] routes to enter into the Ming." It should be noted that Li Rusong 李如松 (1549-98), the commander of the Ming forces, was the first son of Li Chengliang who had been in charge of containing the rise of the Nurhaci forces. Thus, a large number of the Ming forces in the Liadong region were diverted from their original mission in the region for the defense of Joseon. Nurhaci wasted no time taking advantage of this power vacuum created by the switch of the main thrust of the Ming forces toward Korea.⁸ In 1593 Nurhaci defeated a force of nine allied tribes led by the Yehe tribe of the Haixi Jurchens and the Korchin tribe of the Mongols at Gulu Mountain. Thereafter, Nurhaci established himself as an unrivaled hegemon in the region. From 1601 onward Nurhaci vanquished the Haixi Jurchen tribes one after another, including the Hada tribe. Placed in jeopardy, the Yehe tribe of the Haixi Jurchens turned to the Ming seeking succor. The Ming now supported their former enemy in an attempt to use the Jurchen tribe as a check against Nurhaci.

2. Joseon's Policies towards the Jianzhou Jurchens

The Confucian elites in Joseon referred to the Jurchens as *yain* 野人 (barbarian

⁷ Yan (2003), ed., *Ibid.*, pp. 18-30.

⁸ Yan Chongnian, "Lun Nuerhachi," in *Yan Chongnian zixuanji* (Beijing: Jiuzhou chubanshe, 2016), pp. 39-40.

outsiders), despising them by using such colloquial pejoratives as ‘*orangk’ae*’ (barbarians) and ‘*kaedwaeji*’ (dogs and pigs). Joseon’s Confucian-inspired policy towards the Jurchens directed that as surrendered men they be treated well, and even as a defector, they would not be chosen after, thus creating neither grievances nor seeds of hostility on their part. As a Joseon general Kim Jongseo 金宗瑞 once pointed out, Joseon styled itself as a superior state vis-à-vis the Jurchens, and took pains in addressing the question of how to combine royal favors with state authority in handling them.⁹

On the one hand, Joseon treated generously the Jurchens, who had submitted to its court, by granting them official titles and return gifts, but launched punitive attacks against those Jurchens who had raided the borderlands on the other hand. For example, in 1433 when Li Manchu, one Jurchen leader in Jianzhou, undertook a raid against Luyan, the Joseon government sent an expedition army as far north as the Pozhu River to attack him. By 1437, the Four Counties (*sagun* 四郡) of the upper Yalu River region and the Six Garrisons (*yukchin* 六鎮) of the lower Tumen River region had been established to subjugate the Jurchens in the northeast. In 1467, as a response to the request from the Ming in 1467, Joseon accepted a joint campaign with the Ming against Li Manchu, resulting in the death of Li Manchu and his son. And in 1479, an expedition army led by Yun Pilsang was sent to assault the Jianzhou Jurchens.¹⁰

Nonetheless, controlling of the Jurchens became increasingly difficult and dangerous from the sixteenth century. From the late fifteenth century on, the northwestern region of the Korean peninsula suffered from natural disaster such as drought, starvation, burdens of military service, and extortion by local officials, which triggered a growing outflow of the local population migrating into Jurchen regions or other areas. As a consequence, many in the Joseon government began to worry that depopulation

⁹ (Joseon) *Sejongillok* (Veritable Records of King Sejong), vol. 75 (18th year of King Sejong, 11th lunar month, *gyeongja* day).

¹⁰ Kim Gujin, “Yeojin gwa eui gwangye” (The Relations with the Jurchens), in *Han’guksa* 22 (Seoul: Guksa pyeonchan wiweonhoe, 1995); Kim Gujin, “Joseon sidae Yeojin e daehan jeongchaek” (Joseon’s Policies towards the Jurchens), *Baeksan hakbo* 88 (2010).

in the frontier regions could cause difficulties in defending those regions. Moreover, it was noted with alarm that with the upsurge in demand for Jurchen furs at the time in Joseon, numerous cows and iron implements were being delivered to the Jurchens in exchange for luxury goods such as sable fur. The Jurchen leaders, amassing wealth through selling native products such as furs, expanded their power and wealth sufficiently to incorporate the border people of Joseon.¹¹

Following the destructive rebellion of Nit'anggae, a former Jurchen subject of Joseon, in 1583, Joseon made a difficult effort to lure and support a class of Jurchens referred to as *beonho* 藩胡 (fence Jurchens), whom Joseon regarded as playing a vital role in its northern border defense. With the outbreak of the Imjin War in 1592, the effect of the rising power of Nurhaci came to the fore with increasing urgency. On the fourteenth day of the ninth lunar month of 1592 when the Joseon court took refuge in the border city of Euiju, it was reported that Nurhaci offered to send armies to aid the Joseon-Ming endeavor to repel the Japanese invaders. The ministers of the Border Defense Command (*Bibyeonsa* 備邊司) voiced strong objections, warning that “once Nurhaci entered Joseon, it would mean the end of the state.” Then, the Joseon government decided to reject Nurhaci's offer for an alliance,¹² yet had to recognize the transformed status of the Jurchens whom they had hitherto looked down upon as ‘barbarian outsiders (*yain* 野人)’ and ‘evils (*soch'u* 小醜).’

Taking advantage of the crisis precipitated by the Japanese assault on Joseon's Hamgyeong Province, some of the Jurchen inhabitants there (referred to as *beonho* 藩胡) launched raids. With Joseon fully engaged in driving out the Japanese invaders, the government could not afford to send troops to combat the Jurchens on the other war front. Hence, the Joseon court, by bestowing gifts such as cotton cloth, tried to win over the *beonho*

¹¹ Kawachi, *Ibid.* (1992), chapter 18, 「貂皮交易の展開」; Kim Sunnam, “16 segi Joseon gwa Yain sai eui mopi gyoyeok eui jeon'gae” (Unfolding of the Fur Trade between Joseon and the Jurchens in the Sixteenth Century), *Han'guksa yeon'gu* 152 (2011).

¹² (Joseon) *Seonjo sillok* (Veritable Records of King Seonjo), vol. 30 (25th year of Seonjo, 9th lunar month, *sinmi* day).

Jurchens who could not make a courtesy visit to the capital (that is Hanseong, today's Seoul) and the court because of the war.¹³ Revolts and unrest prevailed among the Hūlun tribes, and other *beonho* Jurchens were upset by the ever intensifying pressure from Nurhaci, as the Joseon Neo-Confucian scholar Yi Ik 李穡 (1681-1763) recorded.

Since 1591, Bujantai, a chief of the Hūlun tribe, subjugated all of the *beonho* Jurchens north of the Tumen River, and undertook frequent raids upon our border towns. Some of them sought our government titles, but those requests were not granted. The [Joseon] government ordered the border commanders to intimidate them with armed forces, or to allow loose ties with them. Previously, the Not'o *beonho* Jurchens had been prohibited from crossing over into our territory for crop cultivation by a [Joseon] border commander. When he was murdered by them, the commanders Yi Suil and Yi Gwal retaliated by raiding and burning their settlements. Originally, the Not'o Jurchens had been descendants of Yi Manju, and had lived in the vicinity of the Pozhu River and Jiangjie, before they migrated to the west of Mt. Baekdu, not far from our northern border. As for the Hūlun tribe and Bujantai, they had been descended from the Udige decent group, and were closer to the deep (further north) dwelling Jurchens rather than to the Not'o tribe. In 1605, the inspector Seo Seong raised armies to punish Bujantai of the Hūlun tribe. However, his armies were ambushed and decimated to the dismay of the Joseon court. Henceforth, the Hūlun Jurchens grew in power and prestige, and attempted to annihilate the *beonho* Jurchens in Gyeongheung, who sought rescue by the Not'o tribe. In response, the Not'o cavalry of 5,000 men dashed out from Mt. Baekdu, broke through our Onseong fortress, and dealt a crushing blow to the Hūlun Jurchens at Ogaldong. From then on, Bujantai of the Hūlun fell into decline. This is a general overview of [the rebellious conditions] in the north.¹⁴

¹³ Bak Jeongmin, *Joseon sidae Yeojinin naejo yeon'gu* (Study of the Jurchens' submission to Joseon) (Seoul: Gyeongin munhwasa, 2015), pp. 208-22.

¹⁴ (Joseon) Yi Ik, "Jeongni macha," in "Gyeongsa mun" (Classics and histories), in *Seongho saseol*

It has been widely recognized that the participation of the Ming forces in the Liaodong region during the Imjin War in the Korean peninsula gave rise to the expansion of Nurhaci's power and the radical changes in the political and military situations in Manchuria.¹⁵ Yet, it should be also noted that the rise of Nurhaci had a profound impact on the border security of the Joseon state, because his emergence begot the violent revolts of those Jurchens pressured by Nurhaci—in particular, the aggressions of the Hūlun tribal chief Bujantai, as described by Yi Ik—and the eventual removal of the *beonho* Jurchens, that is, Joseon's Jurchen allies. In his attempt to muster forces from the 1593 defeat by Nurhaci, Bujantai launched raids on Joseon's settler communities and the *beonho* Jurchens in its border area. One of his raids in the third lunar month of 1605 against Donggwanjin, a garrison town located northeast of Hamgyeong, was particularly extreme, massacring Joseon officials and civilians as well as *beonho* Jurchen inhabitants in the area. Infuriated, the Joseon government dispatched 3,000 troops in retaliation, only to be routed by Bujantai's forces.¹⁶ The depth of the disaster on Joseon forces can be surmised by Yi Ik's account above that “six or seven men out of ten met death.”

Then, the *beonho* Jurchens threatened by Bujantai turned to Nurhaci *en masse*. In the process, the rivalry between Nurhaci and Bujantai escalated to a showdown between them at Menyan across the Tumen River in 1607, where Nurhaci gained final victory.¹⁷ Thereafter, almost all the *beonho* Jurchens near the borderlands of Joseon were incorporated into the Jianzhou Jurchens. With the loss of a buffer zone heretofore filled by the *beonho* Jurchens, Joseon came into direct confrontation with the Jianzhou Jurchens.

(The essays by Yi Ik), vol. 19.

¹⁵ Inaba Iwakichi, *Zōtei Manshū hattatsushi* (Tōkyō, Nihon Hyōronsha, 1934), pp. 215-16, and 519; Inaba Iwakichi, *Shintōa kensetsu to shikan* (Tōkyō: Chikura Shobō, 1939), 72-78; Yan (2016), *Ibid.*, pp. 39-34.

¹⁶ Seo Byeongguk, *Seonjo sidae Yeojik gyeoseopsa yeon'gu* (Study on relations with the Jurchens in the King Seonjo era) (Seoul: Gyomunsa, 1970), pp. 141-55.

¹⁷ Bak Jeongmin, *Ibid.* (2015), pp. 230-41.

In addition to the security issue, another vexing matter with the Jianzhou Jurchen inhabitants was the problem of their gathering ginseng at Joseon's territories. The border transgressions by Jianzhou Jurchen ginseng collectors multiplied about the time of the Imjin War. Especially during the harvest seasons of wild ginseng, a wide range of Jurchens not only covered mountain valleys, but also frequently pillaged mountain villages in search of women and livestock.¹⁸

King Seonjo 宣祖 (r. 1567-1608) was keenly concerned with the new situations along the northern border, and deliberated policy options with his ministers. Notably, in 1595 he sent Sin Chung'il to Hetu Ala to detect recent trends among the Jianzhou Jurchens in a firsthand manner. Sin Chung'il left a travelogue titled *Jianzhou gijeong dogi* 建州紀程圖記 (Record of a Trip to Jianzhou) based on what he saw and heard there. The dispatch of an envoy to a Jurchen base amid the desperate war against the Japanese attests to the depth of crisis felt by the Joseon court in the face of the rise of Nurhaci. Warning against Nurhaci's military maneuvering skills and prowess, Seonjo demanded countermeasures in anticipation of the surprise attack of his armies. In addition, he ordered the frontier officers to refrain from killing the Jurchen ginseng diggers lest local disputes between Joseon settlers and Jurchen inhabitants should erupt into major conflicts. Further, Seonjo informed the Ming court of the growing threats of the Jianzhou Jurchens to the Ming court with a view to bringing them to alert and to using the Ming military authority in curbing the Jurchen threats to Joseon.

As noted above, Joseon's control over the Jurchens near its northern border had been seriously weakened during the Imjin War, as shown in its failure to overcome the aggressions of the Hūlun tribe's Bujantai, for instance. As Nurhaci had vanquished the Hūlun tribe on the occasion of the battle at Menyan, most of the *beonho* Jurchens came under Nurhaci's dominance. Since Joseon had lost its possible allies in border defense, the sentiment of national crisis within the Joseon court further heightened, as expressed in a memorial addressed to the Wanli emperor by King Seonjo.

¹⁸ (Joseon) Ryu Mongin, "Anbyeon samsip'i chaek" (Thirty-two strategies for stabilizing the northern frontier), in *Eou jip hujip* (Sequel to the collection of Ryu Mongin's works), vol. 5.

Your subject has been granted Your Majesty's profound 'grace of restoring the [Joseon] dynasty (*jaejo ji eun* 再造之恩).' Though deeply moved by the grace, your subject is unable to find the way by which to repay your grace. Unfortunately, our country had hardly been freed from the worries [of the Japanese invaders] in the south when it was faced by another urgent alarm [from the Jurchen threat] in the north. Though we exert ourselves fending off these threats, we are afraid that we are unable to sustain ourselves because of our power being divided and weakened. Unless appealing to the parents of this world for help, it seems truly difficult to ward off the external threats.¹⁹

As indicated above, Joseon in the aftermath of the Imjin War was caught under the twin pressures of the possible renewal of Japanese hostilities in the south and the expansion of Nurhaci's power in the north. Joseon, sandwiched between the two threats, continued to rely on the Ming military power to overcome its national crisis.

III. Joseon's Policies towards the Later Jin and the Ming during the King Gwanghae Era

1. The Capture of Fushun by the Later Jin, and Debates over Joseon's Reinforcement Armies

With the passage of time, Nurhaci's military power and prestige grew with great magnitude. The growth of his power had been backed by the accumulation of economic wealth made possible by new agricultural techniques and crafts, and enormous trade profits in luxury goods such as furs and ginseng.²⁰

Following his establishment of the Later Jin in 1616 (the eighth year

¹⁹ (Joseon) "Bukno guheun geolmyeong chikyu jhu," in *Sadae mungwe* (Official communications between the Ming and Joseon), vol. 46 (34th year of Wanli, 2nd lunar month, 9th day).

²⁰ (Ming) Cheng Kaigu, *DongYi Nuerhachi kao* in *Qing ruguan qian shiliao xuanji (yi)* (Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 1984); Liu (2013), *Ibid.*, pp. 181-88.

of King Gwanghae's reign), Nurhaci announced the "Seven Great Grievances" against the Ming, and captured the garrison of Fushun in 1618. Although Nurhaci listed first the killing of his father and his grandfather by the Ming force among the seven grievances, he gave vent to his bitter inner feeling towards the Ming that had attempted to use the Yehe tribe to check against his new dynasty.²¹

While the Ming began to assemble a massive expedition army against Nurhaci, it demanded Joseon to join in its campaign against Nurhaci. When the Ming Board of War demanded reinforcements from Joseon in the intercalary fourth lunar month of 1618, its justification was again the "gratitude for restoring the dynasty" (*jaejo ji eun* 再造之恩).²² The board insisted on repaying the gratitude for saving the Joseon dynasty from destruction during the Japanese invasions by joining hands with the Ming for a strategic campaign against the Later Jin.

In 1610, the second year of King Gwanghae's reign, the Liaodong Military Command of the Ming maintained, "During the Imjin debacle the Ming saved Joseon by mobilizing its people [practically] into the fire ground," referring to the Imjin War as "a war to rescue Joseon" (*dongyuan yiyi* 東援一役).²³ On the other hand, a majority of ministers from the Border Defense Command urged the sending of troops for the sake of the Ming whom they referred to as "parent country" and "savior" [of Joseon]. They insisted on repaying the moral debt owed to the Ming that had "restored the dynasty (i.e., Joseon) as parent country." Many ministers of the Joseon court in fact agreed with that view. For example, Kim Sangheon (1570-1652) recalled, "Thanks to the Wanli emperor's (r. 1573-1619) imperial grace, our country recovered from its loss and our people regained

²¹ Iwai Shigeki, "Kanjin to Chugoku ni totte no Shin-cho, Manju" [The Qing Empire and the Manchus with Regard to the Chinese and China], in *Shin-cho to wa Nani ka* [What is the Qing Empire?], ed. by Okada Hidehiro (Tōkyō: Fujiwarashoten, 2009), p. 95.

²² (Joseon) *King Gwanghae ilgi* (Daily Records of King Gwanghae), vol. 127 (10th year of King Gwanghae, intercalary 4th lunar month, *eulhae* day).

²³ (Joseon) *King Gwanghae ilgi* (Daily Records of King Gwanghae), vol. 25 (2nd year of King Gwanghae, 2nd lunar month, *gyeongsul* day).

their lost lives.” And he also asserted that the Imjin War had transformed Joseon’s relationship with the Ming from that of lord and vassal or that of *hua* 華 (civilized center) and *yi* 夷 (barbarian periphery) to that of father and son, thus making one single family.²⁴ While the moralists empathized with Joseon’s indebtedness to the Ming, the proponents of *realpolitik* paid attention to the Joseon’s difficult conditions when the Ming as “parent” and “savior” pressed on Joseon a recompense for its imperial magnanimity.

The question of accepting the Ming request for sending troops threw the Joseon court into uproar. King Gwanghae was in a cautious position to avoid the Ming request, while the Border Defense Command was in favor of sending troops.²⁵ In the fourth intercalary lunar month of 1618, King Gwanghae asked his ministers to put forth their respective opinions, as described by a historian official in the *King Gwanghae ilgi* (Daily Record of King Gwanghae’s Reign).

In an effort to decline the [Ming] demand for reinforcements, King Kwanghae ordered many times that the Board Defense Council send notes to the [Ming] commands in Liaodong and Guangning, yet the council would not follow the order. Then, the king ordered to extend the deliberations to include all the officials ranked at the second rank and

²⁴ (Joseon) Kim Sangheon, “Sajedok jusa jeungdong seo,” in *Cheongeum jip* (Collection of Kim Sangheon’s Works), vol. 9.

²⁵ Han Myeonggi, “King Gwanghae dae cui Daebuk seryeok gwa jeongguk cui donghyang” (The Great Northerner faction and court politics during the King Gwanghae era), *Han’guksaron* 20 (1988), pp. 326-37; Han Myeonggi, *Imjin waeran gwa Han Jung gwangye* (The Imjin War and Korea-China relations) (Seoul: Yeoksa bipyeongsa, 1999), pp. 244-50. Gye Seungbeom has provided a good summary of the debate between King Gwanghae and the Border Defense Command over the sending of troops. “King Gwanghae dae cui daeoe jeongchack gwa geu nonjang eui seonggyeok” (Foreign policies during the King Gwanghae era, and the characteristics of the policy debate), *Han’guk Bulgyosa yeon’gu* 4 (2013). Yet, his remarks that “all the court officials including censors were united in supporting the foreign policies of the Border Defense Command, which represented the collective opinion of all officials,” or that “only King Gwanghae struggled to voice a different opinion, refusing to accept the collective opinion” (*Ibid.*, p. 35) do not conform to the historical facts, because many court officials such as Bak Seungjong, Bak Jaheung, Bak Jeonggil, Yun Hwi, Yi Sibal, Yi Wigyeong, Im Tae, Jeong Jun, Jo Chanhan, and Hwang Jungyun supported the King Gwanghae line, going beyond their factional affiliations.

higher who also presented the same opinion. Even the arch villain (Yi Icheom of the Great Northerner faction) could not dare to go against the great cause [of repaying the Ming]. Nonetheless, Yun Hwi became the first to voice opposition to sending troops, and was followed by Hwang Jung'yun, Jo Chanhan, Yi Wigyeong, and Im Tae, all of whom, comprehending the intent of the king, presented their open proposal phrased in deceitful and absurd words. In the end, in the campaign in 1619, the king instructed the two commanders (Gang Hongnip and Kim Eungseo) to communicate secretly with the Jurchens and surrender to them [in anticipation of the Ming defeat]. Internally, he ordered to place the mother of prince (Queen Dowager Inmok) into custody, and externally he refused to follow the order from the emperor, thus being in breach of the three human bonds (*samgang* 三綱).²⁶

Even though the Westerner's (*Seoin* 西人) bias is transparent, this account conveys important facts; most of all, King Gwanghae's efforts to avoid sending Joseon troops and to persuade the Ming commanders and commissioners stationed in the Liaodong and Guangning regions. Though the ministers of the highest Border Defense Command—including Yi Icheom (1560-1623) whom the Westerner historian condemned as the “principal culprit” of the King Gwanghae's regime—advocated the sending of the troops, a substantial number of high officials, such as Yun Hwi, Hwang Jung'yun, Cho Chanhan, Yi Wigyeong and Im Tae, supported the King Gwanghae's position.

When the Liaodong governor Li Weifan sent a letter urging preparation for sending the troops, King Gwanghae ordered to send a return letter that warned against “any rash move of troops without full preparation.”²⁷ In addition, he pointed to the fact that the Joseon troops in such a weak and poorly trained state would not be of much aid to the Ming expedition. King

²⁶ (Joseon) *King Gwanghae ilgi*, vol. 127 (10th year of King Gwanghae, intercalary 4th lunar month, *gapsin* day).

²⁷ (Joseon) *King Gwanghae ilgi*, vol. 127 (10th year of King Gwanghae, intercalary 4th lunar month, *gyeyu* day).

Gwanghae's compromise in case he had to send the troops was to bring them only to the point of the Joseon's border towns such as Euiju without crossing into Liadong, and to build defense against the Jurchens.²⁸ He also took issue with the fact that the capacity of the person, supposed to request the military troops and supply them, was merely the Liadong governor instead of the minister of the Board of War or the emperor himself.²⁹

Reiterating the King Gwanghae's ideas, in the fifth lunar month of 1618 a letter was sent to the Ming court that underlined the difficult conditions facing Joseon, such as the "lack of forces to defend Joseon beset by enemies on all sides, the poorly trained Joseon soldiers who were farmers at the same time, and the ever lingering threat from the Japanese." Notably, the letter marked the everlasting fear about a possible Japanese invasion.

On the other hand, a majority of the Border Defense Command ministers insisted on sending the troops to fulfill Joseon's obligation as a vassal state to come to the aid of the Ming now deemed as "parent" and "savior." They urged repaying the gratitude owed to the Ming that "as a parent country that restored the Joseon dynasty."³⁰ Remarkably, Yi Icheom, as head of the Great Northerners faction and the real power of the King Gwanghae's regime, brought the court's attention to the possible punitive measures by the Ming in case Joseon would not accept its demand.³¹ Jang Myeon argued that "the great cause [of aiding the Ming] should be upheld even if it leads to the death of the country." For Jang, "it was more miserable to lose the confidence of the Ming than to allow the Jurchen cavalry to overrun the country."³² Many high officials turned a blind eye to the retaliatory attack

²⁸ (Joseon) *King Gwanghae ilgi*, vol. 127 (10th year of King Gwanghae, intercalary 4th lunar month, *eulmyo* day); (Joseon) *King Gwanghae ilgi*, *gweon* 129 (10th year of King Gwanghae, 6th lunar month, *byeongja* day).

²⁹ (Joseon) *King Gwanghae ilgi*, vol. 127 (10th year of King Gwanghae, intercalary 4th lunar month, *gveongjin* and *imo* days).

³⁰ (Joseon) *King Gwanghae ilgi*, vol. 127 (10th year of King Gwanghae, intercalary 4th lunar month, *imo* day).

³¹ (Joseon) *King Gwanghae ilgi*, vol. 128 (10th year of King Gwanghae, 5th lunar month, *imjin* day).

³² (Joseon) Jang Myeon, "Bu Chechalsa wang gwanseo si jingye cha," *Nakseo jip* (Collection of Jang Myeon's Works), vol. 2 .

from the Jurchens when Joseon would remain neutral. Instead, they believed it more important to maintain the country's loyal relations with the Ming by fulfilling its duty as a vassal state.

2. Joseon's Foreign Policy after the Defeat at the Sarhū Battle

King Gwanghae's reluctance to sending the troops had multiple reasons. There had been a possibility that he came to have an anti-Ming sentiment because of the Ming court's objection to his accession to the throne. He feared a strong possibility of a retaliatory attack from Nurhaci as well as a domestic rebellion against him in case the Joseon troops' participated in the Ming campaign against the Jurchens. In addition, King Gwanghae worried that due to the heavy cost of the war preparation his ambition to build palaces would be thwarted.³³

Faced by strong opposition from the ministers of the Border Defense Command, King Gwanghae sought for a breakthrough by rallying support from the proponents of caution, such as Bak Jaheung, Bak Jeonggil, Yun Hwi, Yi Wigyeong, and Im Yeon, who sided with him during the debate over the sending of troops, as well as Bak Seungjong and Hwang Jung'yun who sympathized with him in adapting new relations with the Later Jin after the Sarhū battle.

Yun Hwi proposed that the Joseon government should inform the Ming court of its inability to mobilize its armies because of the manpower shortage and the financial strain, and that in the event of mobilizing armies they should not cross the border. Bak Jaheung warned that since the Joseon troops were not trained for open field battle, their defeat would only damage the imperial authority, and he counseled similar to Yun Hwi that the Joseon troops should form a rear defensive position at the country's border. Im Yeon argued that in case the Ming was under attack and thus put into jeopardy, that might well mandate the sending of Joseon troops, but it was not necessary for Joseon to join in the Ming's punitive campaign against

³³ Han (1999), *Ibid.*, pp. 250-55.

the Jurchens.³⁴ Yi Wigyeong was of a similar opinion with Bak Jaheung in that the Joseon troops should remain as a defensive barrier along its border in anticipation of the possible resurgence of Japanese hostility. Bak Jeonggil proposed that the Ming emperor should be notified of Joseon's difficulties and the Ming generals in Liaodong should be advised against rash actions in their military operations against the Jurchens.³⁵

Yun Hwi, Im Yeon, and Hwang Jung'yun all were doubtful that the Ming forces could ever defeat Nurhaci. Therefore, they agreed to King Gwanghae's strategy of providing a defensive barrier at the border. In the fifth lunar month of 1618, he appointed Im Yeon to the emissary to be sent to the Ming court.³⁶ Subsequently, he dispatched Bak Jeonggil, Yun Hwi, and others to Beijing in endeavors of informing the emperor of the difficult situations in Joseon and avoiding any dispatch of troops to the Ming.

However, no such diplomatic effort materialized because of the Ming military commissioner Yang Hao's interference. Yang, stationed in Liaoyang, checked the Joseon envoys on their way to Beijing and inspected their state letters and communications. He charged the Joseon envoys for trying "to communicate insubordinate letters, forgetting the Ming rescue mission during the Japanese invasions."³⁷ In the end, a congratulatory delegation led by Yun Hwi returned with an imperial order that demanded the Joseon king to send the troops and to follow Yang Hao's command. All of the diplomatic efforts by King Gwanghae came to naught.³⁸

King Gwanghae acquiesced to sending 13,000 Joseon troops to Liaodong, yet he did his best to minimize the damage to be suffered by the Jo-

³⁴ For the opinions of Yun Hwi, Bak Jaheung, and Im Yeon, see (Joseon) *King Gwanghae ilgi*, vol. 128 (10th year of King Gwanghae, 5th lunar month, *imjin* day).

³⁵ For the opinions of Yi Wigyeong and Bak Jeonggil, see (Joseon) *King Gwanghae ilgi*, vol. 128 (10th year of King Gwanghae, 5th lunar month, *gichuk* day).

³⁶ (Joseon) *King Gwanghae ilgi*, vol. 128 (10th year of King Gwanghae, 5th lunar month, *gichuk* day).

³⁷ (Joseon) *King Gwanghae ilgi*, vol. 134 (10th year of King Gwanghae, 11th lunar month, *gyeongin* day).

³⁸ (Joseon) *King Gwanghae ilgi*, vol. 132 (10th year of King Gwanghae, 10th lunar month, *gapsin* day).

seon soldiers. The appointment of Gang Hongnip, then Vice Minister of the Ministry of Punishment, to commander-in-chief of the expeditionary army was of his own accord. In Gang Hongnip's experience as a translator of Chinese envoys in the court and his colloquial Chinese ability, King Gwanghae saw the merit of forthright communication with Chinese generals. He gave Gang an instruction that he should not be swayed easily by the Ming leadership and avoid losing battle.³⁹

The Joseon troops were assigned to serve under the command of the regional commander Liu Ting after crossing the Yalu River into Liaodong. Yet they suffered a crushing defeat at Sarhū in the third lunar month of 1619. Gang Hongnip surrendered together with his remaining forces. A theory that "King Gwanghae gave a secret instruction for Gang Hongnip to surrender to the Later Jin army" had already been presented,⁴⁰ yet it appears to be untrue. Shortly after the Sarhū defeat in the fifth lunar month of 1619, the Border Defense Command reported the deaths of 8,000 to 9,000 Joseon troops,⁴¹ almost seventy percent of the entire army. Such a large death toll could not occur, if the Joseon troops were scheduled to surrender.

Nevertheless, the theory that King Gwanghae and his collaborators conspired with Gang Hongnip to reveal military plans [to the enemy] with the consequence of damaging the Ming expedition had gained currency.⁴² Yet, many scholars since the Ming scholar official Xu Guangqi have judged that the defeat of the Ming expedition army at the hands of the Later Jin army was a foregone conclusion. They concluded that the Ming army was inferior in all factors of war, such as the number and the readiness of the troops, military equipment such as firearms and military supplies including grain supplies, the leadership of the commanders, and the

³⁹ (Joseon) *King Gwanghae ilgi*, vol. 137 (11th year of King Gwanghae, 11th lunar month, *jeongsa* day).

⁴⁰ Kōzō Tagawa, *Mo Bunryū to Chosen to no Kankei ni tsuite* (Regarding Mao Wenlong and His Relations with Joseon), in *Seikyu Sessō* (Joseon Treatises) 3 (1932), pp. 6-15.

⁴¹ (Joseon) *King Gwanghae ilgi*, vol. 140 (11th year of King Gwanghae, 5th lunar month, *giyu* day).

⁴² Han (1999), *Ibid.*, p. 309.

morale of the soldiers.⁴³ In particular, the commander Liu Ting harshly pressured the Joseon troops to charge forward in spite of the bad weather and the scarce provisions.⁴⁴ The theory of the conspiracy between King Gwanghae and Gang Hongnip had been a constructed memory to justify the coup d'état that removed King Gwanghae and installed King Injo.

After the defeat at Sarhū, the Ming court showed a conflicting attitude toward Joseon. On the one hand, it extolled Joseon's sacrifice for the sake of the Ming, while it was suspicious of the Joseon army's surrender, and demanded further reinforcements from Joseon. At the time of Guangning's fall at the hands of the Later Jin troops in 1622, Ming generals desperately sought for refuge in and aid from Joseon.⁴⁵

King Gwanghae tried to dispel the Ming suspicion on the one hand, and also tried to evade the Ming demand for reinforcements on the other. He ordered the construction of a shrine dedicated to Kim Eungha who died heroically at the Sarhū battle, and the publication of Kim's memoir entitled *Chungryeol nok* 忠烈錄 (Record of Loyalty) and to distribute the memoir in the Liaodong area. That was a tactical gesture to dispel the Ming suspicion by informing the Ming court that the Joseon government commemorated countrywide a war hero who had died for a Ming cause. When the Ming general Liang Zhiyuan arrived to press for reinforcements, he was given a bribe to discourage his demands. Moreover, citing the possibility of the Later Jin's invasion against Joseon, the Joseon court asked for the deployment of the Ming armies at Kuandian and Zhenjiang along the Jurchen invasion route. Underlining Nurhaci's imminent retaliatory attack was also a stratagem to preempt the Ming demand for the Joseon reinforcements.⁴⁶

King Gwanghae's policy toward the Later Jin can be summarized in three points. First, he kept an eye on the recent trends of the Later Jin and

⁴³ (Ming) Xu Guangqi, *Xu Guangqi ji* (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1984), vol. 3; Huang Rehyu, "1619 nian de Liaodong zhanyi," *Mingshi yanjiu luncong* (Jiangxi guji chubanshe, 1991), vol. 5; Yan (2003), *Ibid.*, pp. 347-58.

⁴⁴ (Joseon) Yi Minhwan, "Chaekjung ilnok," *Ja'am jip* (Collection of Yi Min Hwan's Works), vol. 5.

⁴⁵ Han (1999), *Ibid.*, pp. 265-72.

⁴⁶ Han (1999), *Ibid.*, pp. 273-79.

gathered related information in a firsthand manner whenever possible, while he took precautions not to expose Joseon's situations to them. Second, he avoided confrontation with the Later Jin, and instead pursued a 'loose reign (*jimi* 羈縻)' policy of loose engagement. Third, in anticipation of their invasion, he also built up military preparedness. While trying to import muskets and swords from Japan, he ordered the domestic manufacture of muskets and cannons. Not only military equipment, he was also concerned with strengthening manpower by recruiting and training soldiers and officers. In sum, King Gwanghae tried to maintain a *status quo* with the Later Jin by employing a policy of *jimi* while at the same time taking self-strengthening measures to fend off their possible invasion.⁴⁷

King Gwanghae was consistent in that line of policy. After the defeat in the Sarhū battle, he harkened back to the diplomacy of Goryeo toward the Jin state in the past. He predicted that the Ming could not stay the aggression of the Later Jin which had grown as strong as its predecessor under Aguda in the early twelfth century. For him, the best policy for Joseon for now was "to follow the Goryeo strategy of preserving the dynasty by accommodating with [the Jurchens] externally to avoid their invasion, and in the meantime building strength domestically."⁴⁸ Accordingly, envoys were exchanged between the two states, and Gang Hongnip's letters were related by Joseon envoys to the court which had eagerly looked forward to the recent information about the Later Jin.

A substantial number of high officials supported King Gwanghae's conciliatory policy toward the Later Jin. For example, Hwang Jung'yun went so far as to say that "Joseon should cut off its tributary relations with the Ming and enter into friendly relations with the Later Jin," and that "the territory outside the Shanhaiguan Pass no longer belonged to the Middle Kingdom."⁴⁹ Hwang also left an explicit record that King Gwanghae ad-

⁴⁷ (Joseon) *King Gwanghae ilgi*, vol. 147 (11th year of King Gwanghae, 12th lunar month, *sinmi* day).

⁴⁸ (Joseon) *King Gwanghae ilgi*, vol. 166 (13th year of King Gwanghae, 6th lunar month, *byeongja* day).

⁴⁹ (Joseon) *King Injo sillok* (Veritable Records of King Injo), vol. 1 (1st year of King Injo, 4th lunar

opted a conciliatory policy toward the Later Jin despite strong opposition to the peace talks from the Border Defense Command, citing an ancient episode of Taiwang (the posthumous title of Duke Gu of the Zhou dynasty) making concessions to a barbarian of the Xunyu tribe.⁵⁰ Bak Seungjong, Chief State Councilor in the last years of King Gwanghae's reign, also argued for maintaining the *status quo* through accommodation with the Later Jin.⁵¹

With the blockade of the Liaodong route that connected Joseon to the Ming, King Gwanghae became all the more pronounced in advocating his line of *realpolitik* in order to protect the security of the state by avoiding being drawn into the Ming-Jurchen confrontation. He gave voice to his views as follows: "Envoys should be exchanged even in a time of war." "Military strategies do not exclude an act of fraud." And "Lofty talks do not always help the security of the country."⁵²

Meanwhile, domestic conditions within Joseon became increasingly critical. First of all, the heavy war expenses, pivotal to expedition campaign, imposed extraordinary burdens on the ordinary people. With the hardship of the people's livelihood and the worsening fiscal status, the lavish palace construction project initiated by King Gwanghae came under vehement criticism, which he ignored, thus further impairing his reputation. Moreover, after the Sarhū battle he reinstated proponents of caution such as Yi Jeonggwi, Yi Kwi, and Choe Myeonggil, who had been ousted by their opponent Yi Icheom. King Gwanghae's action to bring about a countervailing force against Yi Icheom created tension between him and the most powerful man in ruling Great Northerner faction. With King Gwanghae's declining reputation and the schism with the ruling group at court,

month, *imsin* day).

⁵⁰ (Joseon) Hwang Jungyun, "Sang daein" (Great Men), in *Dongmyeong seonsaeng munjip* (Collection of Hwang Jungyun's Works), vol. 5.

⁵¹ (Joseon) *King Gwanghae ilgi*, vol. 172 (13th year of Kwanghaegun, 12th lunar month, *gyeongin* day).

⁵² *Joseon yeongjeop dogam docheong euigwe* (Illustrated Records by the Superintendent of Welcoming Ceremonies), (Ming) Tianqi 1st year.

the stage was set for the political upheaval that eventually removed him from the throne.⁵³

IV. The King Injo Restoration and the Outbreak of the 1627 Jurchen Invasion

1. The King Injo Restoration and Joseon's Relations with the Ming and the Later Jin

The King Gwanghae regime collapsed due to a coup d'état referred to as the King Injo Restoration (*King Injo banjeong* 仁祖反正) in the third lunar month of 1623. The leaders of the coup claimed that the fundamental principle of the new King Injo regime was the rectification of the "King Gwanghae regime's accommodation with the Later Jin" barbarians at the expense of the Ming.⁵⁴

The Ming court initially recognized King Injo's seizure of power as a usurpation.⁵⁵ Some Ming officials sent their men disguised as merchants to the Joseon capital to spy on the changed situations there. Still, many Ming officials leaned toward how to relate the event of a 'usurpation' in the Joseon court to the Ming agenda of war against the Jurchens. For example, the vice minister of the Ming Board of War Bi Ziyang, charged with military provisions, proposed that "the bestowal of investiture for the new King Injo be followed later by Joseon's military victory against the Later Jin first." On the other hand, the coup leaders in the Joseon court appealed to Ming officials for the fastest investiture that would prompt Joseon's fight against the Later Jin.⁵⁶

⁵³ Han (1999), *Ibid.*, pp. 286-301.

⁵⁴ (Joseon) *King Injo sillok*, vol. 34 (15th year of King Injo, 1st lunar month, *gyehae* day).

⁵⁵ (Ming) *Xizong shilu* (Veritable records of Emperor Xizong), *Liangchao congxin lu* (fourth month of Tianqi third year, *wuzi* day).

⁵⁶ Han (1999), *Ibid.*, pp. 338-48; Han Myeonggi, "Han Jung gwangye eui gwanjeom eseo bon King Injo banjeong eui yeoksajeok euimi: Myeong eui Joseon e daehan 'euijejeok jibaeryeok' gwa gwallyeon hayeo" (Historical significance of the King Injo Restoration seen from the viewpoint of Joseon-China relations: The Ming China's 'apparent' control over Joseon), *Nammyeong hak* 16 (2011).

In the debate over ratifying King Injo as the new king of Joseon, the role of Mao Wenlong 毛文龍 (1576-1629) was crucial. Immediately after the coup, he reported to the Ming court that “King Gwanghae had been disloyal to the Ming whereas King Injo showed loyalty by executing the traitors.”⁵⁷ Then, the minister of the Board of War Zhao Yan argued for the investiture of the new king of Joseon in view of Mao Wenlong’s heavy reliance on Joseon for military resources.⁵⁸

It took almost two years for the Ming court to confer the investiture of King Injo. This was because the Ming court was divided between the moral justification to rectify a ‘usurpation’ in the vassal state and the strategic need to keep the Later Jin in check by using its forces. The factional politics in the Ming court between the moralist Donglin faction and the opposing Yan faction also were involved in this issue. Wei Dazhong from the Donglin faction insisted that King Injo, in violation of the monarch-subject relationship, should not be granted investiture.⁵⁹ Yet, since 1623 when Wei Zhongxian of the Yan faction assumed real power at the Ming court,⁶⁰ they were in favor of conferring the investiture upon King Injo and in support of Mao Wenlong who maintained good terms with them.⁶¹

In the first lunar month of 1625, the Tianqi emperor notified Mao Wenlong of King Injo’s investiture and ordered him to defeat the Later Jin by combined forces with Joseon.⁶² By enhancing Mao’s position as the primary contributor to King Injo’s investiture, the Ming court sought to use Mao as leverage in controlling the new regime in Joseon. In short, the King Injo regime was obliged to be at the disposal of Mao Wenlong.

⁵⁷ (Ming) *Ming Xizong shilu*, vol. 37 (eighth month of Tianqi third year, *Dingchou* day).

⁵⁸ (Ming) *Ming Xizong shilu* (liangben), vol. 42 (fifth month of Tianqi fourth year, *renxu* day).

⁵⁹ (Joseon) Hong Ikhan, *Hwapo jocheon hanghaerok* (Record of Hong Ikhan’s Voyage to Visit the Ming Court), vol. 1 (4th year of Tianqi, 11th lunar month, 20th day).

⁶⁰ Xie Guozheng, “Donglin tangyi ji Tianqi jian zhi tanghuo,” in *MingQing zhi ji Tangshe yundong kao* (Shanghai: Shanghai shiji chubanshituan, 2005), pp. 46-47; Yan Chongnian, *Mingwang Qingxing liushi nian* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2006), pp. 95-98.

⁶¹ (Ming) Bo Qizong, *Dongjiang shimo*.

⁶² (Ming) *Ming Xizong shilu*, vol. 55 (first month of Tianqi fifth year, *Dingchou* day).

What, then, were the attitudes of the new King Injo regime towards the Ming and the Later Jin that conditioned its policies towards them? Since an important justification for the coup to remove King Gwanghae had been his disloyalty to the Ming, it was inevitable for the regime to proclaim pro-Ming and anti-Jin policies. In the fourth lunar month of 1623, King Injo pronounced “caring about the people” (*hyulmin* 恤民) and “punishing the bandits (i.e., the Jurchens)” (*tojeok* 討賊) as the foremost tasks of his regime.⁶³ Yet, an expedition to “punish the Jurchen bandits” was out of the question given the devastated military and economic conditions in which King Injo and his supporters found themselves. Yi Sibal (1569-1626) asserted that it was mandatory to rescue the people from the dire conditions and to give relief to them, not to mention military affairs.⁶⁴

As a matter of fact, King Injo gave consent to the counsel of the royal secretary Han Yeojik that the circumstances at the time mandated waiting for the stabilization of the people’s living conditions while keeping friendly relations with the Later Jin. Han denounced the call for breaking ties with the Later Jin as a rash act of inviting invasion, maintained an appeasement attitude towards the Later Jin against any conflict with them, and demanded Mao Wenlong be discouraged from undertaking a rash raid on the Later Jin.⁶⁵

Within the Joseon court at that time, a sort of consensus seems to have been reached in which the *status quo* should be contained along with a policy of appeasement toward the Jurchens; even, the Border Defense Command was not in opposition to such a policy that had been initiated earlier, in fact, by King Gwanghae.⁶⁶ Although King Injo and his supporters in the coup proclaimed ‘anti-Jurchen’ as a key policy, they had no desire to place their regime in danger by risking war with the Jurchens. While

⁶³ (Joseon) *King Injo sillok*, vol. 1 (1st year of King Injo, 4th lunar month, *kapsin* day).

⁶⁴ (Joseon) Yi Sibal, “Deungdae hu non seonjang Yeonbyeong cha,” in *Byeog’o yugo* (Works Left by Yi Sibal), vol. 4.

⁶⁵ (Joseon) Yi Weonik, “Yeongsang si ingyeon ju sa,” in *Ori seonsaeng byeoljip* (Addendum to Collection of Yi Weonik’s Works), vol. 1.

⁶⁶ (Joseon) *King Injo sillok*, vol. 1 (1st day of King Injo, 3rd day, *jeongsa* day).

underscoring their ‘pro-Ming’ stance, they sought for a *status quo* with the Late Jin.⁶⁷ Their cautious action remained basically unchanged until the first invasion of the Jurchens in 1627.

The position of the King Injo administration further worsened because of the rebellion, led by Yi Gwal 李适 (1587-1624), one of the discontented participants in the 1623 coup against King Gwanghae. Yi Gwal managed to muster 10,000 men, defeated government forces, and captured the capital without precedent, thus forcing King Injo to flee to Gongju for refuge. Though the rebellion was put down in less than two months, it entailed profound damage both to government finance and the people’s livelihoods because during the course of the rebellion and its suppression a large number of casualties were produced on each side. The rebellion seriously weakened the defense capabilities of Joseon especially in the northern provinces.⁶⁸

Experiencing a near collapse of the regime due to the rebellion within just one year from its start, King Injo and his ministers committed the main armies to the protection of the regime. In order to protect the capital and the court, the Royal Division was increased in number, and the Anti-Jurchen Division was newly organized. The private troops commanded by the merit subjects of the coup were also reinforced in number, and engaged in searching out the new regime’s domestic political enemies with a vengeance. Since the main forces of the Joseon government were diverted from northern border defense to regime support, the slogan to “punish the

⁶⁷ Han (1999), *Ibid.*, pp. 361-66. Gye Seungbeom argues that the foreign policy of the King Injo court after the success of the coup was readjusted to adopt that of the Border Defense Command in the King Gwanghae era. He criticizes this author’s argument that “the foreign policy line of the Joseon state remained basically unchanged even after the coup” as oversimplifying, and adds that “Han Myeonggi’s argument does not indicate the principal force in charge of the King Injo government’s foreign policy” (Gye (2013), *Ibid.*, p. 32). Yet, I would like to draw attention to my statement that the Westerner faction’s policy towards the Later Jin can be understood as “designed to maintain the status quo,” and as basically identical with “King Gwanghae’s strategy to keep loose ties” (*kimi* 羈縻) with the Later Jin (Han (1999), *Ibid.*, p. 363). There remains the need for future study to examine more closely the operations of the Border Defense Command in its personnel and policies during the King Gwanghae and King Injo eras.

⁶⁸ Han Myeonggi, “Yi Gwal eui nan i King Injodae choban daenaeye jeongchaek e michin yeopa” (Impact of Yi Gwal’s Rebellion on the Foreign and Domestic Policies of the Early King Injo Era), *Jeonbuk sahak* 48 (2016).

Jurchen bandits” sounded hollow.⁶⁹

Mao Wenlong’s influence became more deeply felt by the Joseon court in the aftermath of Yi Gwal’s rebellion. Yi Gwal had commended Prince Heung’an, an uncle of King Injo, at the start of the rebellion when King Injo had not yet received investiture from the Ming. In case the Ming court had approved Prince Heung’an, the King Injo regime would have been bound to collapse. The Joseon court’s stake in Mao was raised greatly, and it came to rely on him further. In fact, what the King Injo court feared most was a situation in which the rebels would ally themselves with Mao Wenlong and pose a serious threat from the northern frontier.⁷⁰

In the second lunar month of 1624, Mao Wenlong kept up the pressure on the Joseon court to provide military supplies, claiming that he took it upon himself to suppress Yi Gwal’s rebellion.⁷¹ The King Injo court could not but accept Mao’s demand. The expenses spent to support Mao’s army had increased progressively to the extent that by 1627 the amount of grain supplies sent to them was reportedly equivalent to one third of the annual expenditures of the government. Moreover, the violence and extortion committed by Mao’s soldiers and the Liaodong people against the Korean residents in the northern region were so extreme that they were condemned as another group of the Red Turban bandits.⁷²

The task of catering to the Mao army culminated in the erection of a eulogy monument in the seventh lunar month of 1624. Composed by Kim Ryu, one of the top merit subjects in the 1623 coup, the monument’s text was fraught with praise that was exactly contrary to reality. Despite Mao and his troops’ blatant oppression and extortion, he was extolled as a “disinterested protector of the Joseon state and people from the Jurchen aggression.”⁷³

⁶⁹ Han (2016), *Ibid.*

⁷⁰ (Joseon) Kim Gijong, *Seojeongnok* (Record of Travel to the West).

⁷¹ (Joseon) *Bibyeonsa deungnok* (Records of the Border Defense Command), vol. 3 (2nd year of King Injo, 2nd lunar month, 24th and 25th day).

⁷² Han (1999), *Ibid.*, pp. 374-84.

⁷³ (Joseon) Kim Ryu, *Bukjeo jip* (Collection of Kim Ryu’s Works), vol. 8.

In the sixth lunar month of 1625, the Ming envoy entered the capital to confer investiture on King Injo. In order to welcome the Ming mission that brought a happy ending to the political turmoil infest with the coup and the rebellion, the King Injo court spent profusely. Some 200,000 *ryang* worth of silver was spent to entertain Ming envoys and their retinues—an amount capable of purchasing 200,000 *seok* or approximately 200,000 bushels of rice.⁷⁴ In short, Yi Gwal’s rebellion forced the King Injo regime not only to spend a large amount of military expenditures, but also to bear the extraordinary burden of the ‘cost of the pro-Ming relationship,’ resulting in a worsening financial status and a worsening of the people’s livelihood. Ultimately, the regime’s professed commitments to “state security” and the “punishment of the Jurchen bandits” were seriously compromised.

Yi Gwal’s rebellion also had a negative effect on Joseon’s relations with the Later Jin. To begin with, there were renegade officers of the rebel camp who defected to the Later Jin and tried to drive a wedge between the two states. For example, Han Yun, the son of the rebel leader Han Myeongryeon, submitted to Nurhaci, and tried to inspire him to attack Joseon by providing recent information about the Joseon court.⁷⁵ Furthermore, though the King Injo court was obliged to support Mao Wenlong and to allow him to recruit local soldiers, that action constituted a serious challenge to the Later Jin, thus detracting from its policy of avoiding hostility with the Jurchens. The supportive measures for Mao Wenlong were deemed necessary for the security of the precarious regime in the aftermath of the rebellion. However, such measures did create military tension with the Later Jin.

2. Outbreak of the 1627 Jurchen Invasion and Its Results

What were the reasons for Joseon suffering the invasion by the Later Jin, even though it struggled for the *status quo* by conducting a policy of ap-

⁷⁴ (Joseon) *Seungjeongweon ilgi* (Daily Record of the Royal Secretariat), vol. 6 (3rd year of King Injo, 6th lunar month, 13th day); (Joseon) *King Injo sillok*, vol. 1 (1st year of King Injo, 1st lunar month, *gapsin* day).

⁷⁵ (Qing) *Manwen laodang*, sixth day of first month of Tianming era.

peasement towards the Jurchens? To begin with, there were pressing reasons derived from the domestic conditions of the Later Jin. Though acceding to the position of khan in 1626, Hongtaiji's hold over power was still not firm. While his power was checked by his three elder brothers, Daisan, Amin, and Manggultai, he needed to consolidate his leadership with successful campaigns. The economy was in crisis, too. Due to the severe famine around this time, the price of rice soared, and an increasing number of people died of starvation, too. Thus invading Joseon in search of grain supplies was an attractive option.⁷⁶ In launching an attack on Joseon, Hongtaiji made it clear that he aimed to chastise Joseon for supporting Mao Wenlong and to make Joseon side with the Later Jin against the Ming. Hongtaiji was determined to terminate Mao Wenlong's resistance, blaming him for attracting the rebellious defectors from the Later Jin.⁷⁷

Since the last years of King Gwanghae, Mao Wenlong's troops and his Chinese followers from Liaodong established their bases around the Yalu River region, and increasingly became a nuisance to the Later Jin. The difficulties with them became worse, as the King Injo regime was obliged to treat Mao Wenlong well in the aftermath of Yi Gwal's rebellion. Mao's soldiers and Chinese followers were allowed to use the fields in Joseon's northwest frontier, and their acts of violence and extortion towards local residents of Joseon were largely condoned. They provoked the Jurchens by bluffing a joint campaign with Joseon against them, thus serving as a kind of 'trigger' of the Later Jin invasion against Joseon.⁷⁸

The Joseon troops, wrecked by Yi Gwal's rebellion, had no time for recovery, and thus could not hold their ground against the Jurchen invasion in 1627. Their vulnerability was witnessed by Gang Honip who recalled that "the undermanned Joseon unit at the Neunghan mountain fortress

⁷⁶ Kim Jongweon, "Jeongmyo horan si eui Hu Geum kun eui chungbyeong donggi" (Motivations of the Later Jin Armies in the 1627 Invasion), *Dongyangsa yeon'gu* 12 (1978); No Gisik, "Manju eui gulgi wa Dongasia jilseo eui byeondong" (Rise of the Manchus and Changes in the East Asian World Order), *Jungguksa yeon'gu* 16 (2001).

⁷⁷ (Qing) *Qing Taizong shilu*, vol. 2 (First month of first year of Tiancong era, *bingzi* day).

⁷⁸ Han Myeonggi, *Jeongmyo, byeongja horan gwa dong asia* (The 1627 Jurchen and the 1636 Manchu invasions) (Seoul: Pureun yeoksa (2009), pp. 46-53).

quickly collapsed when they saw the overwhelming Later Jin armies.”⁷⁹

Driven by the Later Jin forces out of his stronghold at Cheolsan in the northern Pyeong’an province, Mao Wenlong escaped to an island in the estuary of the Yalu River. King Injo took refuge on Gwanghwa Island. The Later Jin forces led by Amin did not sweep across the country, but came down only to Hwanghae Province, north of the capital, and offered peace terms, because the Jurchen commanders feared that a prolonged campaign against Joseon might invite a counterattack from the Ming governor Yuan Chonghuan, who was stationing in Ningyuan in Liaodong. Eventually, an “elder and younger brother” alliance with tribute missions to be sent three times each year was agreed upon between Joseon and the Later Jin.⁸⁰

What were the effects of the 1627 Jurchen invasion on Joseon, which had barely recovered from Yi Gwal’s rebellion of 1624? The King Injo regime had to commit all military capabilities to the defense of Gangwha Island in order to protect the king there. The regime had to halt a number of reform measures, such as imposing identification tags, compiling military registers, and levying military tax on *yangban* nobles, in fear of going against the peoples’ sentiment. Moreover, King Injo had to issue an edict of apology for so many killings in the aftermath of the coup of 1623, the forceful implementation of the identification tag law, and the worsened living conditions.⁸¹

The King Injo court brought back some key officials from the ousted King Gwanghae government, such as Yun Hwi, Yi Minhwan, Bak Nanyeong, Yi Ilweon, and Mun Heuseong. Some coup leaders such as Kim Ryu and Yi Gwi played a leading role in reinstating those officials who had supported Gwaehaegun’s cautious foreign policies, arguing that protecting the people by seeking peace with the Jurchens was undertaken as an expediency without losing the sense of fealty towards the Ming.⁸²

⁷⁹ (Joseon) Sin Daldo, “Gangdo illok,” in *Man’o seonsaeng jip* (Collection of Sin Daldo’s works), vol. 7 (*jeongmyo* year, 2nd lunar month, 10th day).

⁸⁰ Han (2009), *Ibid.*, pp. 53-57.

⁸¹ (Joseon) Jang Yu, “Paldo seonyu gyoseo,” in *Yugok jip* (Collection of Jang Yu’s Works), vol. 2.

⁸² Kim Yongheum, *Joseon hugi jeongchisa yeon’gu* (Study on Political History in Late Joseon)

The peace accord with the Later Jin provoked fierce opposition from both within and without the court. For example, the censor Yun Hwang (1571-1639) denounced the peace agreement as an “act of capitulation” to the Jurchens, and urged the king to decapitate the Jurchen envoys and the Joseon officials who solicited peace with them.⁸³ King Injo and the coup leaders were placed in a deeply embarrassing situation. King Injo was extremely offended by Yun Hwang’s wording, such as “act of capitulation.” Yet he could not punish Yun severely because it was a great compromise to the justification for the coup to enter into a peace agreement with the Jurchen ‘barbarians’ and to swear submission to them before heaven (*gocheon maengse* 告天盟誓).

What were the reactions of the Ming to the 1627 invasion? Yuan Chonghuan, the Ming general in charge of the northeast forces, dispatched envoys to Shenyang, the capital of the Later Jin, to criticize the invasion to Joseon, and demanded prompt withdrawal of the troops.⁸⁴ Furthermore, he sent forces close to the Sancha River in order to apply military pressure on the rear of the Later Jin forces, but he could not forestall the invasion. Mao Wenlong condemned Joseon’s peace accord with the Jurchens as a betrayal to the Ming’s grace.⁸⁵ The Ming Board of War also suspected Joseon of secret communications with the Jurchens, and feared their conquest of the country.⁸⁶ Thus, the King Injo government was beset not only with the domestic accusations but also with doubtful suspicions from Mao Wenlong and the Ming court, as well.

What economic benefits did the Later Jin acquire through the victorious 1627 invasion? To begin with, it gained an annual tribute payment of 10,500 *pil* worth of cotton cloth as well as the promise of opening markets in the border region.⁸⁷ Thereafter, through the border markets Joseon

(Seoul: Hyeon (2006), pp. 202-4).

⁸³ (Joseon) *King Injo sillok*, vol. 15 (5th year of King Injo, 2nd lunar month, *imja* day).

⁸⁴ (Qing) *Qing Taizong shilu*, vol. 2 (Third month of first year of Tiancong era, *renshen* day).

⁸⁵ (Joseon) Sin Daldo, “Gado bongsa si gyeonmun gye,” in *Man’o seonsaeng jip* (Collection of Sin Daldo’s Works), vol. 5 (4th lunar month, 27th day).

⁸⁶ *Liangchao congxin lu*, vol. 33 (Third month of seventh year of Tiancong era).

⁸⁷ (Joseon) *King Injo sillok*, vol. 15 (5th year of King Injo, 5th lunar month, *imja* and *gyeonsin* day).

served as a supplier of not only daily necessities such as grains, fruits, and medicinal materials, but also of rare goods such as Chinese silk, Japanese pepper and timber, and books. Those various goods, acquired through trade with Joseon, were used in turn for trade with the Mongols or for presentation as gifts to them. In short, since the Later Jin succeeded in pressing Joseon into the economic role of a supplier of much needed goods, it could tide over an economic crisis and bring stability to the regime.⁸⁸

Much strategic and political gain, too, could be enjoyed by the Later Jin. The invasion assured the Later Jin that there would be no need to worry about a Joseon attack to its rear in a future confrontation with the Ming. In fact, in the fifth lunar month of 1627 Hongtaiji lost no time in attacking the Ming Jinzhou fortress shortly after the return of the Later Jin army from the Joseon expedition. And Hongtaiji was eager to inform other countries that the Later Jin had subjugated Joseon, as he did to the Ming general Ji Yong.⁸⁹ Furthermore, with the successful campaign against Joseon, Hongtaiji became more confident, and wanted to place his state on a par with the Ming. Thus, in the state letter entrusted to the king's brother Prince Weonchang who was returning to Joseon, he asserted that "since the Ming claims to be the only kingdom of the Son of Heaven, and looks down on the Later Jin, we will launch a pacification attack on the Ming after offering an oath to heaven."⁹⁰ Because the King Injo court agreed to the 1627 peace accord with the Later Jin on the premise that Joseon would continue to maintain a vassal relationship only with the Ming, Hongtaiji's claim to equality between the Later Jin and the Ming increasingly rendered such a premise irrelevant.

⁸⁸ Han (2009), *Ibid.*, pp. 76-82.

⁸⁹ (Qing) *Qing Taizong shilu*, vol. 3 (Fifth month of first year of Tiancong era, *dingchou* day).

⁹⁰ (Qing) *Qing Taizong shilu*, vol. 3 (Fifth month of first year of Tiancong era, *gengwu* day).

V. The 1636 Manchu Invasion and the Transformation of Joseon-Qing Relations

1. Breakdown of the 1627 Peace Accord

Although Joseon and the Later Jin had entered into an alliance of “elder and younger brother,” the relationship between the two states had not stabilized. To begin with, “younger brother” Joseon and “elder brother” Later Jin had differing perspectives on the 1627 peace accord. Joseon perceived the peace accord with the “animal-like barbarians” as an “expedient measure to tide over the national disaster,”⁹¹ whereas the Later Jin saw it as a favor sparing Joseon from certain destruction.⁹²

Moreover, Mao Wenlong who took refuge on Gado 椴島 (or Pido 皮島) Island at the mouth of the Yalu River, continued to undertake acts of hostility toward the Later Jin, thus creating thorny issues between the two states. In 1628, for example, Mao had his men launch ambushes in the northwest border region and launch raids on the Later Jin envoys traveling back and forth to the Joseon court. Then, the Later Jin charged that Joseon secretly allied itself with Mao, and undertook raids against them in violation of the peace accord. In retaliation, the Later Jin launched a surprise attack on Seonsa port and killed Mao’s men there.⁹³ Joseon found itself ‘sandwiched’ between Mao Wenlong and the Later Jin.

Joseon could not break its relations with the Ming general Mao Wenlong, insofar as it wanted to maintain the vassal relationship with the Ming. The Later Jin pressed for his surrender, threatening that the fate of the Ming was sealed.⁹⁴ In the end, it was by the hands of the Ming commander Yuan Chonghuan that Mao Wenlong was executed in 1629. Still, the Ming camp at Gado Island remained a source of nuisance to both Joseon and the

⁹¹ (Joseon) *King Injo sillok*, vol. 15 (5th year of King Injo, 2nd lunar month, *sinchuk* day).

⁹² (Qing) *Qing Taizong shilu*, vol. 8 (First month of fifth year of Tiancong era, *gengzi* day).

⁹³ (Joseon) *King Injo sillok*, vol. 19 (6th year of King Injo, 8th lunar month, *gapjin* day); (Joseon) *Seungjeongweon ilgi*, vol. 20 (7th year of King Injo, 2nd lunar month, 2nd day).

⁹⁴ (Ming) Tan Qian, “Mao Wenlong,” in *Zaolin zazu* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2006), p. 597.

Later Jin, because the Ming officers who came after Mao essentially repeated his practice of freebooting, marauding, and interfering.⁹⁵

Furthermore, the Later Jin exerted pressure on Joseon to increase the frequency of the border markets and the size of the annual tribute payments. In reaction, many Joseon officials were strongly opposed to transferring supplies such as imported Chinese silk to the Jurchens.⁹⁶ And the Later Jin demanded placing their envoys to the Joseon court on a par with the Ming counterparts. The King Injo court was in deep distress under such heavy economic and political demands from the Later Jin.

However, a more fundamental reason for the breakdown of the 1627 peace accord lies in a drastic shift in the power balance between the Ming and the Later Jin that would not allow for an ambiguous attitude by Joseon towards the Later Jin. After the success of the 1627 campaign against Joseon, the Later Jin turned its attention to the Ming. Beset by the increasing Jurchen threats, the Ming sought more aid from Joseon while the Later Jin requested also assistance from Joseon or at least its neutrality. Joseon found itself in a very difficult situation in which it was obliged to decide on only one side to the exclusion of the other.

In 1629, Hongtaiji decided to launch his first attack on China through Xifengkou, which was outside the Great Wall, and his banner armies reached the very walls of Beijing. Although eventually repulsed by the Ming general Yuan Chonghwan, the Later Jin armies succeeded in capturing major cities inside the Great Wall, such as Zhuhua, Yongping, and Luanzhou. Later, Amin's armies drove the region near the capital into a panic by massacring civilian residents, and looted livestock and goods completely. Outraged by the debacle, the Chongzhen emperor ordered the execution of Yuan Chonghuan on the alleged charge of "secret communications" with

⁹⁵ A study on Mao Wenlong argues that his death weakened the rear threat to the Later Jin, and triggered the rebellion of Kong Youde and Geng Zhongming, thus providing an important cause for the demise of the Ming ((Qing) Zhao Lian, "Mao Wenlong zhi sha," in *Xiaoting zalu* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1997), p. 363).

⁹⁶ (Joseon) Kim Sangheon, "Cheong mul i Jungguk mulhwa yeono cha," in *Cheong'eum jip* (Collection of Kim Sangheon's Works), vol. 17.

the Later Jin commanders, thus expediting the dynasty's self-destruction.⁹⁷

Faced with the disappointing news that the imperial capital had been besieged by the Jurchen barbarians, anti-Jurchen feeling deepened further among Joseon officials. However, a cautious line of action was in operation too. For example, in the second lunar month of 1630, when the Ming officer Chen Jicheng and his men from Gado Island attacked a Later Jin envoy to Joseon, the magistrate of the Euiju border town Yi Siyeong provided cover for him to escape the Ming attackers.⁹⁸ As a result, the Joseon court received suspicion from both sides—the Ming officers at Gado and the Jurchen leaders at Shenyang as well.⁹⁹

Another crisis occurred in the first lunar month of 1633, when Hong-taiji again pressed for boats and sailors from Joseon, following his previous demand in the fifth lunar month of 1629. Although the Jurchen armies prevailed in field battles against the Ming forces, the Jurchen commanders eagerly wanted boats and sailors in order to defeat the Ming forces at Gado Island and to transport manpower and supplies to the ever expanding war fronts. The Joseon court turned down both requests with a vehemence that may have risked a breakdown of the 1627 peace accord.¹⁰⁰ Two months later, two Ming renegade generals Kong Youde and Geng Zhongming, who rose in rebellion at Dengzhou, defected to the Later Jin with their boats and sailors. The Ming asked Joseon to participate in a joint attack on the rebels, while the Later Jin asked Joseon for grain supplies needed to support the armies of Kong and Geng. Caught between the two extreme choices, Joseon decided to side with the Ming. The Joseon government mobilized naval forces to persecute the Kong-Geng armies around the Yalu River region, and eventually engaged in skirmishes with the Jurchen forces who came to rescue the Kong-Geng armies.¹⁰¹ To the Later Jin commanders, Jo-

⁹⁷ For the attack on the imperial capital, see Yan Chongnian, "Qiandao yuanxi Yanjing zhi yi," in *Qingchao tongshi – Taizongchao* (2003), pp. 103-42.

⁹⁸ (Joseon) *King Injo sillok*, vol. 22 (8th year of King Injo, 3rd lunar month, *gyeongja* day, and 4th lunar month, *gabin* day).

⁹⁹ Han (2009), *Ibid.*, pp. 117-22.

¹⁰⁰ (Qing) *Qing Taizong shilu*, vol. 9 (Fifth month of fifth year of Tiancong era, *xinchou* day).

¹⁰¹ Han (2009), *Ibid.*, pp. 472-81.

seon's inability to break its tie with the Ming became all the more evident.

The boats and seamen earned the Later Jin an added mobility. From then on, the Later Jin forces could circumvent Gado Island and the Shanhaiguan pass, and attack interior lands of the Ming. Ganghwa Island in Joseon, where King Injo took refuge during the 1627 invasion, also became vulnerable. Pessimism about the 1627 peace accord and anti-Joseon sentiment can be detected among the Later Jin commanders as well. For example, one Jurchen general in the fourth lunar month of 1633 asserted that "we should learn from the past mistake of losing a heaven-endowed chance to conquer Joseon and enter into a peace agreement."¹⁰²

With his military power reinforced by the boats and seamen, Hongtaiji decided on the grand strategy of conquering the Ming by securing its flanks (i.e., the Mongols and Joseon) first in a conference with *beiles* (banner lords) in the sixth lunar month of 1633.¹⁰³ A majority opinion was that the 1627 peace accord might be kept effective as a means to secure grain supplies and trade, depending on how the situation surrounding Joseon unfolded. Given Joseon's renewed hostility towards the Later Jin as manifested in its joint operation with the Ming to stop the rebel armies, led by Kong Youde and Geng Zhongming, from submitting to the Jurchens, the 1627 peace accord became immensely precarious.¹⁰⁴

2. The 1636 Manchu Invasion and Joseon's Foreign Relations

In 1634, Hongtaiji subjugated the Chahar 察哈爾 Mongols, and captured the Yuan empire's seal then in the possession of their leader Ligdan Khan 林丹汗. The capture of Ligdan's imperial seal allowed Hongtaiji to style himself as successor to the Mongol emperors who had ruled Inner Asia and

¹⁰² Luo Zhenyu, ed., "Ning wan wo qingshou fu Kongtan bianfa zou," in Tiancong chaochen gong zouyi (Eighth day of fourth month of seventh year of Tiancong era) in *Qing ruguan qian shiliao xuanji (er)* (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 1989), pp. 55-56.

¹⁰³ (Qing) Qing Taizong shilu, vol. 14 (Sixth month of seventh year of Tiancong era, *wuyin* day).

¹⁰⁴ Han (2009), *Ibid.*, pp. 135-40.

mainland China together.¹⁰⁵

Immediately upon obtaining the Yuan imperial seal, the Later Jin officials began to prepare for the transfer of the ‘Mandate of Heaven’ (*tianming* 天命) to Hongtaiji. On the fourth day of the second lunar month of 1636, the multi-ethnic Manchu, Mongol, and Chinese officials prompted Hongtaiji to ascend to the imperial throne. He refused several times according to the Chinese ritual convention, but ordered that emissaries be sent to Joseon to discuss the matter with the Later Jin’s “younger brother.” In order to gain the Joseon court’s endorsement of his plan to adopt the imperial title, Hongtaiji dispatched a Manchu delegation including seventy seven Mongol officers led by Inggūldai 龍骨大 and Mafuta 馬夫大, who arrived at the Joseon border town of Euiju on the sixteenth day of the second lunar month of the same year.¹⁰⁶

The arrival of the Qing delegation threw the Joseon court and literati circles into an uproar. Hong Ikhan 洪翼漢 (1586-1637) made an impassioned statement that “I had only known the Great Ming Son of Heaven, yet this unacceptable state of affairs (i.e., Hongtaiji’s assumption of the emperorship) had been already anticipated when Joseon officials had acquiesced to the terms of peace with the Jurchen barbarians,” and proposed that the Qing envoys be decapitated. The court debate was dominated by a majority of bellicose anti-Manchu officials who argued for cancellation of the 1627 peace agreement while some cautious officials such as Choe Myeonggil, Yi Gyeongseok, and Jo Ik urged restraint, arguing for maintaining the peace agreement.¹⁰⁷

In the end, King Injo promulgated a decree to the effect that Joseon would break off the peace accord with the Later Jin, and that all the subjects of the eight provinces should prepare for war. The decree reads in

¹⁰⁵ Sugiyama Masaaki, *Mongoru Teikoku to Nagai Sonogo* (The Mongol Empire and the Long Thereafter) (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2008), pp. 298-302.

¹⁰⁶ Nakamura Hidetaka. “Hidetaka. no Chosen Seibatsu ni Kansuru Komonjo” (Historical Documents Relating to the Emperor of Qing China’s Invasion of Joseon), in Nakamura Hidetaka, *Nissen Kankeishi no Kenkyu* (Studies in Japan-Joseon Relations) (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan, 1969).

¹⁰⁷ Han (2009), *Ibid*, pp. 140-50.

part: “The 1627 peace accord was an expedient measure under unavoidable circumstances to allow loose engagement (*gimi* 羈縻) [with the Jurchens];” “Now, since we cannot bear to hear of the usurpation of the imperial title [by Hongtaiji], we rejected the state letter [from him] without weighing our country’s strength and fate;” “The subjects of all of the eight provinces should arise in anger according to the court’s righteous action to fight the enemy even to the death;” “Loyal literati are encouraged to present war strategies, while brave men are expected to volunteer to fight so as to repay the state’s grace.”¹⁰⁸ One copy of the decree was sent to the governor of Pyeong’an Province via a messenger on the seventh day of the third lunar month of 1636. Unfortunately, the messenger was arrested by the Inggüldai’s men, and the decree fell into the hands of the Manchus,¹⁰⁹ who came to confirm the written evidence of the Joseon court’s denial of the 1627 peace agreement.

Recently, a new interpretation regarding the decree in point has been presented; the decree did not intend to negate the diplomatic tie with the Later Jin or to denounce the Later Jin as an enemy of Joseon. Thus, the new interpretation has challenged the conventional theory of this author and others who have defined the decree as “severing the diplomatic tie” (*jeolhwa* 絶和) with the Later Jin.¹¹⁰ O Suchang correctly points out that the *Veritable Records of King Injo*’s (*King Injo sillok* 仁祖實錄) description of the intercepted decree in point as calling for “the severing of the diplomatic tie and preparing for defense” (*jeolhwa bieo* 絶和備禦; See footnote 110) has provided the source for the conventional view of it. Yet, he argues that the *King Injo sillok*’s historical description represented not the contem-

¹⁰⁸ (Joseon) *King Injo sillok*, vol. 32 (14th year of King Injo, 3rd lunar month, *byeong’o* day).

¹⁰⁹ (Joseon) *King Injo sillok*, vol. 32 (14th year of King Injo, 3rd lunar month, *inja* day).

¹¹⁰ O Suchang, “Byeongja horan e daehan gieok cui waegok gwa geu hyeonjaejeok euimi” 「병자호란에 대한 기억의 왜곡과 그 현재적 의미」 (Distorted memories of the 1636 Manchu invasion, and their present meanings), *Yeoksa wa hyeonsil* 104 (2017). O Suchang argues that the King Injo decree in point merely meant to justify his refusal to receive the diplomatic communications from the Qing, and to call for preparing for a possible invasion, but the Qing leaders read more meaning into it to seek out a *casus belli*. In particular, he interprets the phrase, “*seosa donggu* 誓死同仇” as meaning to “confront the enemy all together” rather than following the conventional meaning to “swear death to avenge the enemy.”

porary but rather the post—the 1636-37 invasion view of cemented antipathy towards the Manchus. Still, it can be argued that the historian of the *King Injo sillok* who defined the decree as such might well have actually represented contemporary majority opinion at the Joseon court. Moreover, to the suspicious minds of the Manchu leaders, the decree was certainly read as an act of hostility towards them.

With regard to the meaning of the phrase “*seosa donggu* 誓死同仇 (to swear death to avenge the enemy),” O Suchang offers a toned-down translation meaning “*gongdong bujeok* 公同赴敵 (to confront the enemy altogether).” O Suchang thus argues that King Injo’s intention when he used this phrase was to call for the unity of all the people in an anticipated war with the Manchus rather than to urge actual revenge upon them. Still, it is doubtful that the Manchu leaders took pains to find any subtle meaning of the word “*gu*” 仇 other than “sworn enemy.”

The decree contains the word “*ro* 虜 (barbarian)” to refer to the Manchus with hatred and disdain. Even though the Joseon court had used decent terms such as *gwisa* 貴使, *gwigae* 貴价, and *gwicha* 貴差 (all meaning honorable envoy) to refer to the Jurchen and Manchu envoys in its state letters since the 1627 peace accord,¹¹¹ it had been extremely provoking to the Manchus that the Joseon court had used such pejoratives as “*ro* 虜 (barbarian)” and “*jeok* 賊 (bandit)” to refer to them in its documents.¹¹² Those wordings such as “*ro* 虜” and “*jeok* 賊” may be taken as unmistakable evidence of the Joseon court’s hostility and disdain towards the Manchus.

The breakdown of the 1627 peace agreement had been already anticipated, when the Joseon armies engaged in battle against the Later Jin forces, which protected the renegade Ming generals Kong Youde and Geng Zhongming in 1633. Around that time, one Later Jin general denigrated the peace agreement as a colossal mistake, lamenting that “in 1627, a heaven-

¹¹¹ The terms of address, such as *gwiguk* 貴國, *gwisa* 貴使, *gwigae* 貴价, and *gwicha* 貴差 can be found in *Chaoxian guo laishu boce* which contains state letters from Joseon.

¹¹² (Joseon) *Seungjeongweon ilgi*, vol. 55 (15th year of King Injo, 1st lunar month, 17th day). Hongtaiji defined the meaning of *jeok* 賊 as “those who stole in hiding,” and mocked the Joseon leaders who did not assault what they called *nojeok* 奴賊 (barbarian bandits).

given opportunity to conquer Joseon had been lost.”¹¹³ Later, alarmed by the extremely hostile atmosphere of the Joseon court, the Qing delegation, led by Inggūldai to discuss Hongtaiji’s adoption of the title of emperor and to extend his condolences for the death of Queen Inyeol of Joseon, departed hurriedly without meeting the king. When reaching Pyeongyang on his flight to the north, Inggūldai refused to stay in an official mansion, but rather chose to a mountain fortress for safety.¹¹⁴ When he captured the decree fraught with hostile and bold language such as *charo* 此虜 (these barbarians), *seosa donggu* 誓死同仇 (To swear death for avenging the enemy), and *jaweon jongjeong* 自願從征 (To volunteer to join the expedition), it was natural for the Manchu commanders to read the decree as that of “severing diplomatic ties” with their state. In short, it is reasonable to see the decree of King Injo as that of “severing diplomatic ties” with the Qing, reflecting the opinion of bellicose ministers against it.

In the third lunar month of 1636, Hongtaiji ascended to the imperial throne. Joseon envoys who happened to attend the ceremony—Na Deokheon and Yi Gwak—refused to prostrate themselves as a sign of defiance. In the fourth lunar month of the same year, Hongtaiji sent a letter blaming Joseon for betraying the alliance. He listed a number of grievances and complaints harbored by the Jurchens/ Manchus since the era of Nurhaci, and made an issue of the Joseon court’s obstinate loyalty only to the Ming emperor. He asserted that any ruler of superior virtue was eligible for the position of Son of Heaven, and that the Ming founded by “Zhu Yuanzhang 朱元璋, a Buddhist monk [sic] of the Huangjuesi temple lost its mandate to rule the world.” He charged that Joseon [rather than the Qing] had first created a source of conflict as “King Injo had listened only to the voices of Confucian scholars, civilian officials, and literati,”¹¹⁵ referring to the anti-Manchu censors and ministers in the Joseon court.

¹¹³ See footnote 103.

¹¹⁴ (Joseon) *King Injo sillok*, vol. 32 (14th year of King Injo, 3rd lunar month, *inja* day).

¹¹⁵ Jinhan ze Chaoxian guowang beimeng shu” (Fifteenth day of fourth month of tenth year of Tiancong era), in *Qing ruguan qian yu Chaoxian wanglai guoshu huibian 1619-1643*, eds. by Zhang Cunwu and Ye Quanhong (Taipei: Guoshi guan, 2000).

On the ninth day of the twelfth lunar month of 1636, the Qing forces led personally by Hongtaiji invaded Joseon for the second time. The failure to reconnoiter correctly the enemy situation at the beginning of the invasion resulted in an inordinate delay in communicating news of the invasion to the capital—belatedly after the Qing forces had crossed the Yalu River. In particular, because the supreme field commander Kim Jajeom had fled from his post, the cavalry vanguard of the Qing forces entered the Joseon capital of Hanseong only five days after they had crossed the Yalu River. Blocked off from their route of escape to Ganghwa Island, King Injo and his ministers were forced to take refuge at Namhan Mountain Fortress south of the capital on the fourteenth day. The undermanned mountain fortress was poorly provided with grain supplies and winter clothes. Besieged by the Qing forces, the Joseon court in the mountain fortress survived the “cold and hungry” winter for forty seven days before it surrendered to them.¹¹⁶

In a surrender ceremony at Samjeondo witnessed by the Manchu, Mongol, and Chinese officials lined up, King Injo presented himself before Hongtaiji, and knelt down three times, each time bowing his head three times (*sambae gugodu*; Ch. *sanbai jiukoutou* 三拜九叩頭) before the Qing emperor. The ceremony symbolized the complete isolation of the Ming, as the last loyal vassal state that had persistently opposed the Qing finally accepted Qing overlordship. On his way back to Shenyang, Hongtaiji brought the crown prince Sohyeon (1612-1645) of Joseon as a hostage and as many as 100,000 captives from Joseon. Consequently, Joseon society would undergo serious difficulties and discord regarding how to address the problems of repatriating a large number of hostages and captives.¹¹⁷

In the aftermath of the 1636 invasion, the Qing did its utmost to ensure Joseon’s compliance with its role as a vassal state. It argued that the

¹¹⁶ As for the aggressive advance of the Qing armies in the early stage of the war, see (Joseon) Na Mangap, “Geupbo ihu illok,” in *Byeongja rok* (Record on the Year of 1636) .

¹¹⁷ Han Myeonggi, “Byeongja horan sigi Joseonin poro munje e daehan jaeron” (Rethinking of the Problem of Joseon War Prisoners during the 1636-37 Manchu Invasion), *Yeoksa bipyeong* 85 (2008).

Qing bestowed the “grace of reviving the dynasty” (*zaizao zhi en* 再造之恩) on Joseon by allowing King Injo to continue his kingship.¹¹⁸ From time to time, the Qing court applied pressure on the Joseon court by circulating such rumors as that King Injo might be summoned to the imperial court, or that King Injo might be replaced by other candidates. As time passed, the king’s relationship with the crown prince detained at Shenyang became estranged because they found themselves in an awkward rivalry in gaining recognition from the Qing court. The Qing court did not loosen its tight grip on the Joseon officials either. Many officials accused of an anti-Qing stance were taken to Shenyang to be interrogated, tortured, and even put to death. The sons of high ministers were also taken to Shenyang as hostages to ensure their accommodation with the Qing demands.¹¹⁹

After the state surrender to the Qing in 1637, King Injo strove to preserve his regime by a realistic acceptance of the Qing hegemony. He accused anti-Jurchen and Manchu officials of “placing the country in jeopardy,” and ousted those belligerent officials who insisted on “taking revenge to wipe out shame” (*boksu seolchi* 復讐雪恥) in favor of moderate officials such as Choe Myeonggil. Choe also strove to preserve the dynasty by taking a cautious approach not to antagonize the Qing, yet he was dismissed when he was found to have been involved with the incident of the secret communications with Ming ships in 1642. King Injo persisted in keeping those ministers who complied with his pragmatic line of policy towards the Qing by his side. Typical examples were Kim Ryu and Kim Jajeom, who continued to remain in key posts in the government, though their official careers had been seriously flawed because of grave errors made in the military operations during the 1636-37 invasion.

King Injo’s pragmatic stance towards the Qing met with fierce criticism from a majority of moralist officials in the court. Some even asked such incisive questions as “Was this the purpose of the coup?” calling the justification for the King Injo regime into question.¹²⁰ King Injo, however,

¹¹⁸ (Qing) *Qing Taizong shilu*, vol. 33 (First month of second year of Chongde era, *wuzhen* day).

¹¹⁹ Han (2009), *Ibid.*, pp. 172-84.

¹²⁰ (Joseon) *King Injo sillok*, vol. 44 (21st year of King Injo, 9th lunar month, *jeongsa* day).

was persistent in his pragmatism to such a degree that one dynastic historian recorded that “King Injo hated those officials who were ashamed of serving the Qing.”¹²¹ It appears that King Injo saw a chance for his own course of action in his pragmatic stance towards the Qing apart from the coup leaders who had installed him on the throne.

From the Qing perspective, what were the benefits gained from the successful 1636-37 invasion? First of all, the Qing commanders could set out their long-anticipated attack on the Ming without worrying about a Joseon attack to their rear. Moreover, the Qing commanders could extract much-needed boats and firearms from Joseon, and use them in their attacks on Gado Island and Jinzhou. In light of the Qing’s empire building, the subjugation of Joseon was an epochal event. By defeating Joseon, which had persistently remained as a loyal ally of the Ming, Hongtaiji and his commanders’ confidence in conquering the Ming was greatly enhanced. Hongtaiji boasted of himself to the Ming general Zu Dashou that he had converted Joseon into the “most trusted subject (*gugong zhi chen* 股肱之臣)” to the great dismay of the Ming general.¹²² By taming Joseon from the most die-hard opponent against the Jurchens to the “most trusted subject,” the Qing took a large step in its enterprise to build an empire that extended beyond the Mongolian and Manchurian plains.¹²³

On the other hand, even after Joseon’s submission to the Qing in 1637, the Ming tried to use Joseon’s aid in countering the Qing aggression. For example, when the Songshan area was besieged by the Qing forces, the Ming Board of War dispatched Wang Wuwei who tried to extract military aid from Joseon in countering the Qing forces. Wang sent the Buddhist monk Dubu to Joseon to gain firsthand knowledge on recent matters. He examined the mind of the Joseon people still leaning towards the Ming rather than the Qing in a “ratio of six to four.” Dubu observed that the Joseon people’s fear of the Qing came from its military prowess and threats

¹²¹(Joseon) *King Injo sillok*, vol. 46 (23rd year of King Injo, intercalary 6th lunar month, *sinsa* day).

¹²² (Qing) *Qing Taizong shilu*, vol. 37 (Seventh month of second year of Chongde era, *wuzhen* day).

¹²³ Han (2009), *Ibid.*, pp. 214-34.

as well as its holding of the king's son and subjects as hostages. And he reported that Joseon harbored "rebellious feelings inside though appearing submissive" (*yangshun yinni* 陽順陰逆) to the Qing.¹²⁴

Remarkably, in the wake of the 1636-37 invasion there appeared signs of change in Joseon's attitude towards Japan. Since the Imjin War, Japan had been perceived as the "sworn enemy for good." Yet after the 1636-37 Qing invasion, such intense antipathy towards the Japanese eased relatively, and instead was directed toward the Manchus. With such shifting perceptions of Japan there emerged a discourse of "using Japan to counter the Qing" (*iwae je Cheong* 以倭制清) prominently put forth by Cho Gyeong and Song Siyeol,¹²⁵ who advocated for a placatory approach towards Japan in the shift from enemy to ally.

VI. Conclusion

The end of the Imjin War (1592-98) did not mark the end of an external threat to Joseon because the rise of the Jianzhou Jurchens under Nurhaci posed a growing threat to the country's northern front. The move of the Ming forces commanded by Li Rusong (the first son of Li Chengliang) from Liaodong to Joseon in order to expel the Japanese invaders stimulated the expansion of the Jianzhou Jurchens power. Moreover, Joseon, preoccupied with the war against the Japanese, could not prevent its Jurchen allies near the Tumen River region from being incorporated under the Nurhaci's control. Joseon had no other alternative but to rely on Ming power to counter the rising threat from the Jianzhou Jurchens.

During the reign of King Gwanghae, the Joseon court was caught between the Ming demand for military reinforcements in its campaign against the Jurchens and the threat of retaliation from the Later Jin in case

¹²⁴ Zhongguo guojia bowuguan, ed., *Zhongguo guojia bowuguan guanzang wenwu yanjiu congshu - MingQing dangan juan* (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2006), p. 157.

¹²⁵ (Joseon) Jo Gyeong, "Sa sagan so" in *Yongju yugo* (Works Left by Jo Gyeong), vol. 6; (Joseon) Han Weonjin, "Uam Seonsaeng seo dongp'a si bal," in *Namdang seonsaeng jip* (Collection of Han Weonjin's Works), vol. 31; Han (2009), *Ibid.*, pp. 352-57.

Joseon accepted the Ming demand. King Gwanghae's cautious policy of maintaining the *status quo* with the Later Jin came into conflict with the moralist officials who argued for military assistance to the Ming to repay the great debt of gratitude owed to the Ming during the Japanese invasions. When the Korean expedition, sent under the pressure from the Ming and the anti-Jurchen Joseon officials to join the Ming forces, suffered a crushing defeat in 1619, a hawkish opinion was voiced over the court. Supported by more cautious ministers such as Yun Hwi, Hwang Jungyun, and Bak Seungjong, he managed to reject the Ming's demand for further reinforcements and continued the policy of loose relations with the Later Jin. The prudent foreign policies to avoid national disasters notwithstanding, he faced a fatal political crisis created by the people's grievances against his costly palace construction project as well as by the defection of some of his close aids.

The 1623 coup that deposed King Gwanghae and installed King Injo resulted in a renewal of room for the Ming court to intervene in the affairs of the Joseon court. The Ming court initially defined the coup as an act of 'usurpation,' yet granted investiture for King Injo in a strategic calculation to use Joseon in confronting the Jurchens. The anti-Jurchen King Injo court was willing to support the Ming attempts to subjugate the Jurchens, citing "punishment of the [Jurchen] bandits" as the regime's legitimate agenda. Yet, the Yi Gwal rebellion of 1624 seriously weakened the regime's ability to protect itself, let alone its goal of "punishing the [Jurchen] bandits." The vulnerable King Injo regime had to provide added support to the Ming general Mao Wenlong in order to demonstrate its pro-Ming stance further, and consequently had to bear heavy burdens entailed by the pro-Ming activities.

Joseon's harboring of Mao Wenlong within its territory served as a trigger for the Later Jin invasion in 1627. The King Injo court took refuge at Ganghwa Island, still it accepted the terms of peace with the Later Jin. King Injo and his supporting ministers wanted to see the 1627 peace accord as "an expedient means to tide over the national crisis," but their opponent regarded it as a serious compromise to the regime's anti-Jurchen stance for which its coup had been justified.

The “elder brother and younger brother” alliance with the Later Jin placed Joseon in an ambiguous position in its relations with the neighboring powers. As a “subordinate to the Ming while at the same time a “younger brother” to the Later Jin, the Joseon state was “sandwiched” and oppressed between the two opposing powers. Mao Wenlong accused Joseon of forgetting a debt of gratitude to the Ming while the Later Jin suspected Joseon of covering Mao.

The breakdown of the precarious 1627 peace agreement started with the two incidents that greatly escalated the Jurchen threats to the Ming and alarmed Joseon to come to its aid—the Later Jin siege against the imperial capital in 1629, and the submission of the Ming generals Kong Youde and Geng Zhongming to the Later Jin in 1633. Faced with these mounting threats to the Ming dynasty, anti-Jurchen sentiment and the sense of indebtedness to the Ming were refreshed and strengthened among the Joseon officials. When the Joseon armies responded to the Ming call for a joint attack on Kong and Geng and fought against the Jurchen forces who provided cover for them, the Jurchen leaders confirmed where the hearts of Joseonns lay. By the time Hongtaiji took actions to assume the emperorship in 1635, the breakdown of the two states’ diplomatic relationship had become irreversible. When the Qing delegation led by Inggūldai arrived to discuss the matter of Hongtaiji’s adoption of the title of emperor with the Joseon court, anti-Manchu officials of Joseon demanded that the Qing envoy be decapitated, and that the 1627 peace accord be abrogated. “Pretending to the title of emperor by the barbarians” was out of the question to them. On the other hand, more cautious officials proposed that the conciliatory policy based on the peace agreement be maintained. Following the anti-Manchu officials’ hard line, King Injo proclaimed the decree that announced the end of diplomatic ties with the Qing and called for all provinces to prepare for war. Unfortunately, however, one copy of the decree fell into the hands of the Inggūldai delegation.

Assured of the unchanging anti-Manchu stance of the Joseon court, Hongtaiji led an army 100,000 strong to subjugate Joseon. The Joseon troops were overwhelmed by the Qing forces, and King Injo and his ministers took refuge at the Namhan mountain fortress to resist to the end. How-

ever, they were forced to surrender and accept the Qing overlordship. Until the Qing entered Beijing in 1644, it had imposed strict surveillance and heavy tribute payments upon Joseon. King Injo and cautious ministers tried not to antagonize the Qing by accommodating its demands. Still, in the eyes of anti-Manchu officials and literati, King Injo's 'pro-Qing' activities were seen to subvert the moral justification of his regime.

The successful 1636-37 campaign against Joseon brought many advantages to the Qing. To begin with, Joseon's close tributary ties with the Ming were severed, leaving the Ming stripped of its staunchest ally. The Qing acquired the sources for military supplies and manpower from Joseon, which it could mobilize in its attack against the Ming. Moreover, converting Joseon, steadfastly loyal to the Ming, into a vassal state of the Qing vastly enhanced Hongtaiji's prestige required in his enterprise to transform his regional power, based on Manchuria and Mongolia, into an imperial power in East Asia. The Ming dynasty made a last-ditch attempt to seek military aid from Joseon, but to no avail. As for Joseon, its hostility towards the Manchus never ceased, while its perception of Japan began to show a subtle sign of change as some officials proposed a "discourse of using Japan to counter the Qing."

In the early seventeenth century, which witnessed great political upheaval in East Asia involving the dynastic transition from the Ming to the Qing and the ruling house change in Japan, Joseon lacked power and leverage of its own to exert influence on such great change, and thus remained an object of contention and rivalry between neighboring powers. The 1636-37 Manchu invasion almost ended the Joseon dynasty, yet the dynasty survived on the condition of stopping its long hostility towards the Jurchens and Manchus. By the mid-seventeenth century, Joseon had settled into stable diplomatic relations with the Qing and Tokugawa Japan, yet its deep-rooted anti-Jurchen/Manchu sentiment cast a long shadow while giving rise to more reserved and placatory feelings toward Japan condemned once as a sworn enemy since its invasion of Joseon from 1592 to 1598.

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