

Japanese Survey of Labor Resources and Koreans Taken by Force from South Chungcheong

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1. Introduction

Since the liberation of Korea in 1945, Japan has denied that it forcibly took¹ Koreans, especially by making some women serve as Japanese military “comfort women.” Rather than feeling contrition, Japan has grown increasingly outspoken in justifying its wars of aggression. However, it is a historical fact that Koreans were forcibly taken under Japanese occupation, one which is supported by countless records and testimonies.

After going to war with China through the Mukden Incident, Japan established the National Mobilization Law on April 1, 1938, and adopted a national mobilization system in colonial Korea the following month on May 5.

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¹ The phrase “taken by force” began to be used when Bak Gyeong-sik published *Records of Forcibly Taken Koreans* (조선인강제연행의기록) in 1965. The phrase was originally used to highlight the use of force at a time when the forced mobilization of human resources was not yet recognized as a historical fact. It thereafter spawned variations including “wartime manpower mobilization” by Kim Min-young, “forced mobilization” by Kang Man-gil and Kang Chang-il, “wartime labor mobilization” by Yamada Shōji (山田昭次), Furushō Tadashi (古庄正), Higuchi Yūichi (樋口雄一), and “taken by force/forced labor” by Jeon Ki-ho and Jung Hye-kyung. This paper primarily uses “taken by force” in the sense that Japan committed a crime against humanity by using Koreans as an instrument of war.

Japan continued to expand the war front by attacking Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, to begin the Pacific War. To engage in wars of aggression, Japan sought to make up for its shortage of manpower through colonial Koreans instead of its own people. Thus began the forced mobilization of Koreans, which was an anti-human exploitation of labor resources and the ultimate means to carry out Japan's colonial policy of annihilating Koreans.

To prepare for and support Japan in forcibly taking Koreans, the Japanese Government-General of Korea investigated the distribution and amount of labor resources in colonial Korea by launching a nationwide survey. Previous studies have so far only introduced snippets of this survey. Huh Soo-youl dealt with the survey of labor resources in relation to the Japanese policy of rural restructuring in colonial Korea.² Unno Fukuzu explained that the survey was part of Japan's plan to redistribute its labor resources.³ The survey has also been mentioned by the National Archives of Korea over the process of creating annotations for labor-related Japanese documents.⁴

Recently, the forcible taking of Koreans is being more actively researched as a part of studying the regional histories of Korea. Relevant case studies have been carried out in Daejeon,⁵ Yeosu,⁶ Ganghwa,⁷

² Huh Soo-youl, "Joseonin nodongnyeok eui gangje dongwon eui siltae: Joseon naeseo eui gangje dongwon jeongchaek eui jeongae rul jungsimueuro" [The Reality of the Forced Mobilization of Korean Labor: Focusing on Forced Mobilization Policies in Korea], in *Ilje eui Hanguk sikmin tongchi* [Japan's Colonial Rule of Korea], Cha Ki-pyok, ed. (Seoul: Jeongeumsa, 1985).

³ Unno Fukuzu 海野福壽, "Chōsen no rōmu dōin" [Labor Mobilization in Korea], in *Iwanami kōza: Kindai Nihon to shokuminchi* [Iwanami Lecture: Modern Japan and Its Colonies], vol. 5 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1993).

⁴ *Ilje munseo haeje: Ijae, sagye, sanggong, gyeonggeumsok, yeolloyo, nomu pyeon* [Annotated Japanese Documents: Finance, Fiscal Budget, Commerce, Light Metals, Fuel, and Labor-Related Documents] (Jeongbu girok bojonso, 2002).

⁵ Roh Young-jong, "Daejeon jiyek eui gangje yeonhaeng hyeonhwang: Gukga girokwon sojang girokmul eul jungsimueuro" [Laborers Forcibly Taken from Daejeon: Focusing on Documents at the National Archives of Korea], *Daejeon munhwa* 14 (December 2005): 195-233.

⁶ Kim In-duck, "Ilje sidae Yeosu jiyek gangje yeonhaeng e daehan gochal" [A Study on the Compulsive Haul in Yeosu], *Yeoksawa gyeonggye* 67 (2008): 9-29.

⁷ Kim Jin-young, "Ilje mal ganghwagun e daehan illyeok dongwon eui siltae wa chueui (1938-45): Gukgagirokwon sojang 'ilje gangje yeonhaengja myeongbu' reul jungsimueuro" [The Actual

Uiseong,⁸ Wando,⁹ Jeju,¹⁰ and North Gyeongsang Province.¹¹ Such studies sought to gain an understanding of people forcibly taken from a specific region by utilizing registers of victims as well as reports issued by the Truth Commission on Forced Mobilization under Japanese Imperialism. There have also been case studies on people forcibly taken in North Jeolla Province,¹² the mobilization of soldiers in Gangwon Province,¹³ and the mobilization of students in Incheon,¹⁴ Daegu,¹⁵ and South Gyeongsang

Condition and Change of Human Manpower Mobilization in Ganghwa-Gun at the End of Japanese Imperialism: Referring to ‘Compulsory Hauled People List’ in the Custody of National Archives & Records Service] (Master’s Thesis, Kyung Hee University, 2008).

- ⁸ Kim Nan-young, “Ilje malgi Gyeongbuk Euseong-gun eui nomu dongwon hyeonhwang gwa siltae” [The Actual Status and Conditions of Forced Labor Mobilization in Uiseong-gun at the End of Japanese Colonization] (Master’s Thesis, Chungnam National University, 2011).
- ⁹ Moon Hye-ji, “Ilje malgi Wando jiyek nomu dongwon yeongu” [Research on Labor Mobilization in Wando at the End of the Japanese Colonization Period] (Master’s Thesis, Mokpo National University, 2014).
- ¹⁰ Huh Soo-youll, “Jejudo e isseoseo Joseonin gangje dongwon” [Forced Mobilization of Koreans on Jeju Island], in *Ilje malgi Jejudo eui ilbongun yeongu* [Studies on the Japanese Military on Jeju Island Near the End of Japan’s Colonial Rule of Korea], Cho Sung-young, ed. (Seoul: Bogosa, 2008); Ji Young-im, “Gusul eul tonghae bon iljeha Jejudo nae gangje dongwon eui siltae wa teukjing,” [Forced Mobilization from Jeju Island Under Japanese Colonial Rule] in *Ilje malgi Jejudo eui ilbongun yeongu* [Studies on the Japanese Military on Jeju Island Near the End of Japan’s Colonial Rule of Korea], Cho Sung-young, ed. (Seoul: Bogosa, 2008).
- ¹¹ Lee Soo-hwan and Yi Gwang-woo, “1939-1945 Gyeongbuk giyeok eui nodongnyeok gangje dongwon” [Compulsory Labor Mobilization in Gyeongbuk Area from 1939 till 1945], *Minjok munhwa nonchong* 58 (December 2014): 35-58.
- ¹² Kim Min-young, “Ilje gangeomgi gunnae nomu dongwon e daehan yeongu: Jeonbuk jiyek eui sarye” [A Case Study on the Domestic Forced Mobilization of Koreans at Jeonbuk Region in the Japanese Colonial Period], *Hanil minjok munje yeongu* 16 (2009): 51-80.
- ¹³ Kim Young-mee, “Ilje malgi (1938-45) Gangwon jiyek gunin dongwon e daehan yeongu” [Military Conscription in Gangwon Province Near the End of the Japanese Colonial Rule (1938-1945)] (Master’s Thesis, Kangwon National University, 2006).
- ¹⁴ Kim Mi-hyun, “Jeonsi chejegi Incheon jiyek haksaeung nodongnyeok dongwon” [Mobilization of Incheon Students’ Labor under National Total Motivation System of Japan’s Colonial Rule of Korea], *Incheonhak yeongu* 12 (2010): 139-82.
- ¹⁵ Kwon Young-bae, “Iljema jeonsichejeha jungdeung hakgyo eui dongwon gwa jeohang: Daegu jiyek eul jungsimeuro” [Wartime Mobilization and Resistance of Secondary School Students in the Late Japanese Imperial Rule in Korea], *Yeoksa gyoyuk nonjip* 40 (February 2008): 355-89.

Province.¹⁶

Kang Man-gil was the first to study Korean resistance against being forcibly taken.¹⁷ He analyzed the circumstances of resistance revealed through issues of Teukgo wolbo, the Monthly Bulletin of the Special Higher Police, published between April 1940 and December 1941. Other scholars joined in researching cases of such resistance, featuring studies about Koreans forced to work in Hokkaido¹⁸ or various attempts to resist or avoid being taken, including the “Bamboo Spear Revolt at Mount Daewang.” Byun Eun-jin focused on the movements of secret societies and the cases of escape to shed light on resistance against forced labor that occurred in Japan.¹⁹ Jung Hye-kyung looked into the forcible taking of Koreans in North Gyeongsang Province, organized resistance by groups such as the Study Group to Recover Korea’s Independence (Daehan dongnip hoebokdan) and the Mount Daewang Death Squad (Daewangsan gyeolsadae), and Koreans who violated the National Conscription Ordinance.²⁰ There have also been case studies conducted on various forms of resistance in-

¹⁶ Jeon Sung-hyun, “Ilje malgi Gyeongnam jiyek geullo bogukdae wa gungnae nomu dongwon: Haksaeong nodongnyeok dongwon eul jungsimeuro” [Labor Patriotism Corps and the Domestic Labor Mobilization in South Gyeongsang at the End of Japanese Imperialism], *Yeoksawa gyeonggye* 95 (June 2015): 169-206.

¹⁷ Kang Man-gil, “Chimnyak jeonjaenggi Ilbon e gangje dongwon dweun Joseon nodongja eui jeohang” [The Resistance of Korean Forced Labors Drafted by Japanese Imperialism during World War II], *Hanguksa hakbo* 2 (1997): 239-63.

¹⁸ Roh Young-jong, “Ilje malgi Joseonin eui Bukhaedo(Hokkaido) jiyek gangje yeonhaeng gwa geobu tujaeng” [Koreans Forcibly Taken to Hokkaido and Their Resistance Near the End of Japan’s Colonial Rule], *Hanguk geundaesa yeongu* 17 (June 2001): 153-88.

¹⁹ Byun Eun-jin, “Ilje chimnyak jeonjaenggi Joseonin ‘gangje dongwon’ nodongja eui jeohang gwa seonggyeok: Ilbon nae ‘doju’ wa ‘bimil gyeolsa eundong’ eul jungsimeuro” [A Study on the Resistance of Korean ‘Forced Labour’ Drafted by Japanese Imperialism, 1937-45: Focusing on ‘Escape’ and ‘Secret Organizations’], *Asea yeongu* 45 (2002): 33-65.

²⁰ Jung Hye-kyung, “Ilje malgi Gyeongbuk jiyek chulsin gangje dongwon nomujadeul eui jeohang” [A Study of Korean Protests Against Obligatory Labor Mobilization of Japanese Authorities: A Case Study of Keyonsang-Bukdo Province, 1943-44], *Hanil minjok munje yeongu* 25 (2013): 79-137.

volving student soldiers²¹ or civilian personnel in the military.²²

South Chungcheong Province is a granary where Koreans became mobilized early on. The area showed the highest ratio of potential laborers and employment seekers according to the 1940 survey of labor resources. Approximately 110,000 people from the province are listed on the register of forced laborers now held at the National Archives of Korea. This number amounts to 7.24 percent of South Chungcheong Province's entire population (1,536,587) in 1940, meaning one out of thirteen people in the province was forcibly mobilized.

Hence, this paper attempts to determine how the Japanese Government-General of Korea (hereinafter the Government-General) conducted its labor resources survey, specifically through the recruitment or mobilization methods used in South Chungcheong Province and the forms of resistance people from the area engaged in. Based on the progress made through previous studies, various collections of sources and testimonies have been studied including reports such as the Monthly Bulletin of the Special Higher Police (特高月報) and documents issued by the Government-General, such as "On the Labor Resources Survey."²³

2. Japanese Survey of Korean Labor Resources

1) Survey Procedure

To secure enough manpower to engage in wars of aggression, Japan "col-

²¹ Kim Do-hyung, "Ilje malgi Daegu 24 budae hakbyeong talchul euigeo" [A Study on the Korean Soldiers' Escape from the 24th Japanese Military Unit in Daegu], *Gunsa* 65 (2007): 203-32.

²² Yu Byung-sun, "Ilje malgi Indonesia Hanin gunsok eui hangil tujaeng" [Anti-Japanese Struggle of Korean Civilian Workers Attached to the Japanese Military in Indonesia in the Late Stages of Japanese Imperialism], *Hanguk dongnip undongsa yeongu* 44 (2013): 207-45; Rostineu, "Hangukin gunsok eui Indonesia esocoui dongnip undong" [Korean Military Labor's Independent Movement in Indonesia on the Japanese Imperialism] (Master's Thesis, Inha University, 2009).

²³ Labor-related Japanese documents held at the National Archives of Korea, originally titled Rōmu shigen chōsa kankei shorui (勞務資源調査關係書類), include records about the Government-General's labor resources survey from 1939 to 1940.

lected” resources as contributions from its colony Korea. In preparation for Japan’s plan to forcibly take Koreans, the Government-General conducted a nationwide survey of labor resources in colonial Korea. This motive in conducting the survey was made apparent in documents issued by the Government-General, which stated that “since it has become impossible to satisfy the demand without the authorities’ facilitation, the location and amount of surplus rural manpower must be constantly surveyed to contribute to the adequate allocation of labor and thereby increase war supplies and productivity.”²⁴

The Government-General surveyed the labor resources of colonial Korea and reviewed its findings in July 1939.²⁵ After two further rounds of reviews, the head of the Government-General’s Home Affairs Bureau then sent to the governor of each Korean province instructions on the labor resources survey under the title *Rōmu shigen chōsa yōkō* (勞務資源調査要綱) on March 12, 1940.²⁶ The governors were instructed to “each take their individual local circumstances into consideration to establish a minimum farmland size according to data as of the end of March 1939, to draft a ‘labor resources survey chart,’ and to submit it to the Government-General by the end of April.” The survey aimed at ascertaining the number of potential laborers and employment seekers willing to relocate or change jobs,²⁷ was to be conducted only at the township (*myeon*) level, an administrative unit smaller than a county (*gun*) or a town (*eup*).

The labor resources survey chart was composed of twelve entries that

²⁴ “Rōmu shigen chōsa yōkō” [Guidelines for the Labor Resources Survey], *Rōmu shigen chōsa ni kansuru ken* [Matters Regarding the Labor Resources Survey] (March 12, 1940).

²⁵ The papers dated July 24, 1939 and February 7, 1940 in *Rōmu shigen chōsa ni kansuru ken* indicate that guidelines based on survey results were reviewed on the two days but failed to gain final approval at the time.

²⁶ A newspaper reported at the time that “the Government-General will conduct a labor resources survey of rural areas because of the pressing need to adjust the demand and supply of labor resources and provide Japan with Korean workers.” “Rural Laborers and Capitalists to be Surveyed,” *Dong-A Ilbo* (March 15, 1940).

²⁷ Hereafter “potential laborers” refer to potential laborers capable of relocating or changing jobs and “employment seekers” refer to employment seekers willing to relocate or change jobs for employment.

required details such as the domicile, current address, and occupation²⁸ of the head of each household, the name, age, and health condition²⁹ of each household member, their relation to the household's head, availability or willingness to relocate or change jobs for employment,³⁰ farmland size (rice paddies and fields), and financial circumstances (annual income and expenditure). What is notable is that the information the chart required was not aimed at calculating surplus manpower. The Government-General initially intended to investigate the amount of surplus manpower by excluding the manpower necessary for farming and housekeeping from the total amount of available manpower. However, the Government-General changed the survey guidelines to tallying the number of people among the farming population who could relocate or change jobs for employment. As such, an arbitrarily determined minimum farmland size was used as a standard to classify any farming household with farmland smaller than the minimum size as a household with surplus manpower, thereby aiming to determine the maximum number of farmers that could be mobilized from rural Korea.³¹

Conducting a nationwide survey of labor resources required a considerable amount of funds. According to "Matters Regarding the Allocation of Expenses to Conduct the Labor Resources Survey" the head of the Government-General's Home Affairs Bureau sent to the governor of each Korean province on March 13, 1940, the Government-General planned to spend a total of 30,310 Korean Won on the survey. This budget included wages paid to surveyors amounting to 26,452 Korean Won and 20,600 Korean Won to cover the cost of surveying supplies. However, the Govern-

²⁸ Occupation was categorized as either independent farmer, independent and tenant farmer, tenant farmer, or agricultural worker.

²⁹ Health condition was categorized as strong, average, or weak.

³⁰ Men between the ages of twenty to forty-four and women between the ages of twelve and nineteen in average or above health were considered potential laborers.

³¹ Huh, "Joseonin nodongnyeok eui gangje dongwon eui siltae: Joseon naeeseo eui gangje dongwon jeongchaek eui jeongae rul jungsimeuro": 309.

ment-General only allotted a total of 22,710 Korean Won to all provinces.³²

With funding from the Government-General, each province was to appoint “persons intimately familiar with their township’s circumstances” as surveyors. With five surveyors covering each township, a total of 11,355 surveyors were hired to investigate the 2,271 townships across the Korean peninsula.³³ Each surveyor was paid two Korean Won as wages.

The surveyors were those who actually conducted the survey at each township and filled out the survey chart. Townships compiled the complet-

³² The allotted amount of 22,710 Won was only 74.9 percent of the 30,310 Won budget for the labor resources survey, or 48.2 percent of the budget the Government-General had actually secured for the project, which was 47,142 Won. The table below shows a breakdown of how much the Government-General allotted to each province.

Province	Subsidy for Surveyor’s Allowance (Korean Won)	Subsidy for Expenses on Surveying Supplies (Korean Won)	Total
Gyeonggi	2,320	760	3,080
North Chungcheong	1,040	360	1,400
South Chungcheong	1,670	560	2,230
North Jeolla	1,720	576	2,296
South Jeolla	2,440	808	3,248
North Gyeongsang	2,430	808	3,238
South Gyeongsang	2,300	760	3,060
Hwanghae	2,030	672	2,702
South Pyongan	1,380	464	1,844
North Pyongan	1,730	584	2,314
Gangwon	1,680	568	2,248
South Hamgyong	1,250	424	1,674
North Hamgyong	720	256	976
Total	22,710	7,600	30,310

³³ The table below shows how many townships and surveyors there were in each county.

Province	No. of Townships	No. of Surveyors	Province	No. of Townships	No. of Surveyors
Gyeonggi	332	1,160	Hwanghae	203	1,015
North Chungcheong	104	520	South Pyongan	138	690
South Chungcheong	167	835	North Pyongan	173	865
North Jeolla	172	860	Gangwon	168	840
South Jeolla	244	1,220	South Hamgyong	126	625
North Gyeongsang	243	1,215	North Hamgyong	72	360
South Gyeongsang	230	1,150	Total	2,271	11,355

ed charts and submitted them to the county office, which would then be transferred to the provincial office.³⁴

Table 1. Korean Households with below Minimum Farmland and Surplus Manpower (1939)

Province	Total Farmland Size as of 1936 (Unit: <i>ban</i>)	Minimum Farmland Size (Unit: <i>ban</i>)	Current No. of Households	No. of Households with Below Minimum Farmland	No. of Households with Surplus Manpower
Gyeonggi	3,932,444	21	244,605	187,259	57,346
North Chungcheong	1,611,586	18	142,162	89,533	52,629
South Chungcheong	2,492,580	14	223,372	178,041	45,331
North Jeolla	2,434,055	18	237,546	152,128	85,418
South Jeolla	4,309,902	17	401,161	239,439	161,722
North Gyeongsang	3,840,138	16	358,415	225,890	132,525
South Gyeongsang	2,776,239	30	297,742	173,514	124,228
Hwanghae	5,796,841	33	246,543	193,228	53,315
South Pyongan	4,673,995	34	179,043	141,636	37,407
North Pyongan	5,358,127	40	211,747	157,592	54,155
Gangwon	4,211,890	44	247,593	105,297	142,296
South Hamgyong	5,562,294	37	189,893	126,416	63,477
North Hamgyong	2,415,753	24	78,933	65,291	13,642
Total	49,415,844		3,058,755	2,035,264	1,023,491

³⁴ According to the survey schedule, the Government-General had to create the labor resources survey chart and distribute it to each province by March 15. Townships had to submit the completed charts to their respective province by April 10 and each province had to submit the collected charts to the Government-General by the end of April.

Each province was to analyze the labor resources survey charts collected from each county under its jurisdiction and draft various reports on the results for the Government-General such as “Report on the Labor Resources Survey,” “Report on Households with Below Minimum Farmland and Surplus Manpower,” and “Report on Employment Seekers Willing to Relocate or Change Jobs.”

According to Table 1 below, the number of households with surplus manpower was 1,023,491 as of 1939, corresponding to 33.5 percent or more than one third of the total number of households in Korea, which were 3,058,755 at that time. This clearly indicates that the Government-General’s intent was to maximize the number of Koreans available for its ultimate purpose of forcibly taking them.

What stands out from the breakdown of such households by province in Table 1 is the difference between provinces in terms of the minimum farmland size, ranging from as small as 14 *ban* for South Chungcheong Province to as large as 44 *ban* for South Hamgyong Province.³⁵ The difference is likely to have been caused by varying degrees of soil fertility between each area. Nevertheless, the minimum farmland size was a highly significant indicator because the number of households with below minimum farmland and surplus manpower depended on how minimum farmland sizes were defined. However, a clear explanation has not yet been discovered regarding how those sizes were determined. Yet, the ratio of arable land to the entire area of each province offers a clue to understanding the difference in minimum farmland sizes among Korean provinces. Provinces with a higher ratio of arable land and rice paddies tended to define smaller minimum farmland sizes.³⁶

³⁵ The numbers in the original source were 20 *ban* for Gyeonggi, 20 *ban* for North Chungcheong, 16 *ban* for South Chungcheong, 28 *ban* for Hwanghae, 30 *ban* for South Pyongan, 30 *ban* for North Pyongan, 30 *ban* for Gangwon, 35 *ban* for South Hamgyong, and 35 *ban* for North Hamgyong. However, the numbers have been corrected under the assumption that they appear to be miscalculations (total farmland size = minimum farmland size × number of households with below minimum farmland).

³⁶ The Proportion of Farmland to Land in Korea (as of late 1939).

The provinces with the largest number of households with surplus manpower were South Jeolla Province with 161,722 (15.8 percent of all households in the province), Gangwon Province with 142,296 (13.9 percent), North Gyeongsang Province with 132,525 (12.9 percent), South Gyeongsang Province with 124,228 (12.1 percent), and North Jeolla Province with 85,418 (8.3 percent). The majority (75.1 percent) of such households were concentrated in the provinces of Jeolla, Gyeongsang, and Gangwon. However, surplus manpower was gauged only by the size of fields and paddies and the income they generated for each household, which tended to classify a greater number of households as having surplus manpower. This classification did not take income from side jobs and cash income into consideration, leading to a higher number of households with surplus manpower despite a lower number of households with below-minimum farmland, which was an aspect of the survey the Government-General was aware of at the time.

The data directly linked to the Government-General's purpose for surveying Korean labor resources would probably have been the number of potential laborers and employment seekers. Each county was expected to calculate the minimum farmland size to be applied within its jurisdiction

Province	Proportion of Farmland to Land			Province	Proportion of Farmland to Land		
	Total	Rice Paddies	Fields		Total	Rice Paddies	Fields
Gyeonggi	30.5	16.6 (54.4%)	13.9	Hwanghae	33.4	9.0 (26.9%)	24.4
North Chungcheong	21.3	9.8 (46.0%)	11.5	South Pyongan	26.7	6.09 (22.5%)	20.7
South Chungcheong	31.0	20.8 (67.1%)	10.2	North Pyongan	14.3	3.4 (23.8%)	10.9
North Jeolla	28.5	20.4 (71.6%)	8.1	Gangwon	13.5	3.6 (26.7%)	9.9
South Jeolla	30.9	15.5 (50.2%)	15.4	South Hamgyong	13.0	2.0 (15.4%)	11.0
North Gyeongsang	20.2	10.7 (53.0%)	9.5	North Hamgyong	11.0	1.0 (9.1%)	10.0
South Gyeongsang	22.4	14.8 (66.1%)	7.6	Total	20.3	7.9 (38.9%)	12.4

* The percentages in parentheses are the proportion of rice paddies to arable land.

and then to confirm the number of potential laborers and employment seekers at households with farmland smaller than the minimum size. The survey chart was used to investigate one hundred households per township and determine the number of available laborers and employment seekers per household. Based on each township's findings, each county would then calculate an average number of potential laborers and employment seekers per township and multiply that average by the number of households with below-minimum farmland in order to produce an estimation of the total number of potential laborers and employment seekers in the county.

Table 2. Potential Laborers and Employment Seekers Willing to Relocate or Change Jobs

Province	No. of Potential Laborers					No. of Employment Seekers				
	Women	Men				Women	Men			
	12-19	20-30	31-40	41-50	Total	12-19	20-30	31-40	41-50	Total
Gyeonggi	6,017	14,744	8,661	2,829	26,234	513	2,158	829	298	3,285
North Chungcheong	39,967	89,503	44,861	14,759	149,123	3,938	23,635	7,143	1,683	32,461
South Chungcheong	17,785	66,017	19,408	4,751	90,176	2,717	31,004	8,649	1,954	41,607
North Jeolla	11,408	36,332	20,423	8,330	65,085	1,790	17,597	7,995	2,948	28,540
South Jeolla	17,631	37,763	26,092	15,258	79,113	1,544	13,376	8,060	3,501	24,937
North Gyeongsang	19,304	64,969	30,035	12,108	107,112	2,815	24,254	8,831	2,826	35,911
South Gyeongsang	44,671	71,384	40,502	21,719	133,605	3,691	23,306	9,373	3,790	36,469
Hwanghae	11,030	16,218	10,930	6,271	33,419	1,000	2,073	1,275	815	4,163
South Pyongan	33,179	50,396	32,201	14,547	97,114	721	5,001	2,505	1,069	8,575
North Pyongan	12,667	34,076	17,480	8,084	59,640	1,127	10,671	4,138	1,941	16,750
Gangwon	4,760	14,104	7,869	3,312	25,285	325	999	476	121	1,596
South Hamgyong	10,744	32,692	13,310	5,292	51,294	557	4,111	1,813	708	6,632
North Hamgyong	3,478	5,870	3,115	1,321	10,306	29	734	415	239	1,388
Total	232,641	534,068	274,887	118,581	927,536	20,767	158,919	61,502	21,893	242,316

As shown in Table 2, there were a total of 1,160,177 potential laborers (927,536 men and 232,641 women) and 263,083 employment seekers (242,316 men and 20,767 women) in Korea. Employment seekers amounted to 22.7 percent of the potential laborers. In terms of the gender ratio among employment seekers, 26.1 percent of the potential laborers were males seeking employment compared to only 8.9 percent of potential female laborers who were employment seekers. In other words, 77.3 percent, or 897,084 potential laborers did not wish to relocate or change jobs for employment, indicating that a considerable number of Koreans were destined to be taken against their will.

When limiting the scope to males, the South Chungcheong Province recorded the highest percentage of male employment seekers (41,607) among potential male laborers (90,176) at 46.1 percent. This, however, suggests that the remaining 53.9 percent of potential male laborers in the province who were not seeking employment were at the risk of being forcibly mobilized. The province to record the second highest percentage of male employment seekers (28,540) among potential male laborers (65,085) was North Jeolla at 43.9 percent. Behind the two provinces came North Gyeongsang Province at 33.5 percent (35,911 out of 107,112), South Jeolla Province at 31.5 percent (24,937 out of 79,113), North Pyeongan Province at 28.1 percent (16,750 out of 59,640), South Gyeongsang Province at 27.3 percent (36,469 out of 133,605), and North Chungcheong Province at 21.8 percent (32,461 out of 149,123).

Meanwhile, Table 2 shows that the number of potential laborers and employment seekers were concentrated in the southern provinces of Gyeongsang, Jeolla, and Chungcheong. One in four of the potential laborers in those provinces, or 242,316 out of 927,536, were willing to relocate or change jobs for employment. This coincides with findings indicating that the forcible taking of Koreans through recruitment were limited to those same southern provinces in addition to the Gyeonggi Province.

The search for potential laborers and employment seekers was categorized by age and gender. Men between the ages of twenty to fifty were divided into three groups of twenty-one to thirty-year-olds, thirty-one to forty-year-olds, and forty-one to fifty-year-olds. These age ranges would

have been applied to secure men capable of physical labor at coal mines, factories, and certain facilities. As for females, the survey only targeted those between the ages of twelve and nineteen, possibly to secure single women who could be taken away to serve as “comfort women” for the Japanese military. The number of potential female laborers aged between twelve and nineteen totaled up to 232,641, but only 20,767, or 8.9 percent of them sought employment. This suggests that women were more at risk than men of being taken by force. Near the end of Japan’s colonial rule of Korea, news about young women taken away as comfort women mainly spread between mothers with daughters. The Government-General sought to control such news by denouncing the reports as fabricated rumors, and anyone caught spreading them was sentenced to three to six months of confinement for violating the Army and the Navy’s criminal law.³⁷

Considering the number of Koreans forcibly taken according to Japan’s mobilization plan between 1940 and 1942, the Japanese demand for labor would not have been satisfied even if all potential laborers had been mobilized. The 1940 goal was to forcibly take 425,400 (355,900 men, 69,500 women), 419,600 (447,300 men, 82,300 women) in 1941, and 442,743 (403,040 men, 39,703 women) in 1942, amounting to a total of 1,287,430 (1,206,240 men, 191,503 women) for those three years.³⁸ This

³⁷ Rumors spread among Koreans that “the authorities have recently been planning to recruit seventeen or eighteen-year-old single women to send to Manchuria to cook for and comfort Japanese soldiers” or that “they will requisition twelve, sixteen, or seventeen-year-old maidens to donate blood to injured soldiers.” Roh Young-jong, “‘Gunwianbu’ gwallyeon girongmul daesi bogi” [Reviewing Records Related to the ‘Japanese Military Comfort Women’], *Girogin* 4 (2006): 89.

³⁸ Annual Goals for No. of Koreans to Take Based on the National Mobilization Plan

Year	Men	Women	Total
1940	425,400	69,500	355,900
1941	337,300	82,300	419,600
1942	403,040	39,708	442,743
Total	1,165,740	191,508	1,218,243

Anzako Yuka, “Joseon Chongdokbu Eui ‘chongdongwon Cheje’ (1937-45) Hyeongseong Jeongchaek” [Study of ‘Total Mobilization System’ (1937-45) Policy by Administration General of Chosen] (Doctoral dissertation, Korea University, 2006): 184-85.

total was 127,253 greater than the aggregate number of potential laborers at the time, which was 1,160,177. The mobilization target required 130 percent of the potential male laborers and 82.3 percent of the potential female laborers in Korea. Moreover, the target required 489.3 percent of the actual employment seekers, or 497.8 percent of male employment seekers and 120.5 percent of female employment seekers.

The above numbers demonstrate that Japan's labor mobilization plan could have never been fully executed without resorting to coercive methods. The Government-General's mobilization demands continued to rise between 1940 and 1942, exceeding the maximum number of potential laborers since 1942 to be nearly five times more than the number of employment seekers at the time.

2) Survey of South Chungcheong Province

South Chungcheong Province had 107,961 potential laborers (90,176 men, 17,785 women) and 31,257 employment seekers (41,607 men, 2,717 women), more than any other area in Korea. The ratio of employment seekers among potential laborers was 41.4 percent, or 46.1 percent when limiting the scope to males. The province surveyed labor resources in the 167 townships under its jurisdiction and reported the results to the Government-General's Home Affairs Bureau on May 17, 1940.³⁹ A total of 835 surveyors were employed to investigate 16,700 households, which accounted for 7.8 percent of all the households in the province.

According to Table 3, there were 85,929 households with below-minimum farmland and 128,759 households with surplus manpower in the South Chungcheong Province as of March 31, 1940. Compared to survey results from 1939, the province had 8,684 (3.9 percent) fewer farming households, 92,112 (51.7 percent) fewer households with below-minimum farmland, but 83,428 (184 percent) more households with surplus manpower in 1940. Among all farming households in the province, 60 percent

³⁹ "Rōmu shigen chōsa kankei shorui," *Rōmu shigen chōsa ni kansuru ken*, September 24, 1940.

Table 3. Households with below Minimum Farmland and Surplus Manpower in South Chungcheong (1940)

County	No. of Farming Households	No. of Surveyed Households	No. of Households with Below Minimum Farmland	No. of Households with Surplus Manpower
Daedeok	13,026	1,100 (8.4%)	5,979	7,047 (54.1%)
Gongju	18,152	1,100 (6.1%)	5,199	12,993 (71.6%)
Nonsan	16,693	1,300 (7.8%)	5,680	11,012 (66.0%)
Dangjin	15,000	1,000 (6.7%)	5,528	9,472 (63.1%)
Boryeon	11,136	1,000 (9.0%)	4,465	7,715 (69.3%)
Buyeo	19,045	1,600 (8.4%)	6,968	12,077 (63.4%)
Seosan	26,179	2,000 (7.6%)	16,344	9,835 (37.6%)
Seocheon	12,180	1,200 (9.9%)	5,750	9,053 (74.3%)
Asan	14,153	1,200 (8.5%)	5,098	9,055 (64.0%)
Yeongi	8,826	600 (6.8%)	1,963	6,863 (77.8%)
Yesan	16,606	1,200 (7.2%)	8,724	7,882 (47.4%)
Cheonan	14,151	1,300 (9.2%)	5,179	8,971 (63.4%)
Cheongyang	14,739	1,000 (6.8%)	2,010	9,126 (61.9%)
Hongseong	14,739	1,100 (7.5%)	7,042	7,697 (52.2%)
Total	214,688	16,700 (7.8%)	85,929	128,759 (60.0%)

of them turned out to be households with surplus manpower. These results seem to reflect how well the province conformed to the Government-General's survey guidelines. They also hint that coercive methods including recruitment would eventually be used to procure labor resources from the province.

The county with the highest number of households with surplus manpower in the province was Yeongi County with 6,863 households, which amounted to 77.8 percent of all households in the county. Other counties with a high percentage of households with surplus manpower included Seocheon County with 9,053 (74.3 percent), Gongju County with 12,993 (71.6 percent), Boryeong County with 7,715 (69.3 percent), and Hongseong County with 7,697 (52.2 percent). The counties with the lowest percentage of households with surplus manpower were Seosan County with

Table 4. Potential Laborers and Employment Seekers Willing to Relocate or Change Jobs in South Chungcheong

County	Population in 1940 ⁴⁰	No. of Employment Seekers	No. of Potential Laborers					
			Total	Women	Men			
					12-19	Subtotal	20-30	31-40
Daedeok	76,039	1,021	4,044 (5.3%)	1,078	2,966	2,382	465	119
Gongju	124,536	8,238	16,799 (13.5%)	2,046	14,753	11,515	2,720	518
Geumsan	73,740	1,951	5,221 (7.1%)	736	4,485	2,688	1,164	633
Nonsan	134,716	2,983	5,429 (4.0%)	1,574	3,855	3,095	694	66
Dangjin	94,365	3,190	8,135 (8.6%)	1,477	6,658	4,745	1,582	331
Boryeong	86,470	1,109	4,281 (4.9%)	940	3,341	2,608	571	162
Buyeo	122,390	6,786	12,402 (10.1%)	1,521	10,881	6,775	3,140	966
Seosan	160,022	1,847	9,362 (5.9%)	747	8,615	5,331	2,616	668
Seocheon	102,509	3,294	8,627 (8.4%)	2,190	6,437	5,061	1,123	253
Asan	93,221	3,666	6,066 (6.5%)	1,294	4,772	3,740	851	181
Yeongi	65,944	2,257	6,271 (9.5%)	1,084	5,187	4,200	775	212
Yesan	114,679	2,065	6,919 (6.0%)	867	6,052	4,209	1,371	472
Cheonan	112,646	3,193	8,325 (7.4%)	2,009	6,316	4,773	1,364	179
Cheongyang	77,648	2,199	4,728 (6.1%)	666	4,062	3,003	812	247
Hongseong	97,692	2,477	6,973 (7.1%)	692	6,281	4,580	1,324	377
Total	1,536,587	46,276	113,182 (7.4%)	18,521	94,661	68,705 (72.6%)	20,572 (21.7%)	5,384 (5.7%)

9,835 (37.6 percent) and Yesan County with 7,882 (47.4 percent).

On August 28, 1940, the number of potential laborers and employment seekers in South Chungcheong Province was reported to the Government-General. Table 4 offers a breakdown of those numbers by age, county, and gender.

As can be seen in Table 4, there were 113,182 potential laborers (94,661 men and 18,521 women) and 46,276 employment seekers (43,456 men and 2,820 women) across fifteen counties in South Chungcheong Province. The number of potential laborers accounted for 7.37 percent of the province's population, which were 1,536,587 as of 1940.⁴¹ That percentage would rise to approximately 14.7 percent by considering only half of the province's entire population, which was 768,294, in order to exclude the aged, children, and women older than twenty. With the province seeking to report the largest possible number of potential laborers to the Government-General, the results suggested that one out of seven male adults or single women could be mobilized by force in the future.

Among the total of 94,661 potential male laborers in the South Chungcheong Province, the largest pool of them was 14,753 in Gongju County (16.4 percent) while Daedeok County had the smallest pool with 2,966 potential male laborers. The number of potential male laborers varied by age group, 68,705 or 72.6 percent were between twenty to thirty years old, 20,572 or 21.7 percent were between thirty-one to forty years old, and 5,384 or 5.7 percent were forty-one years old or older. This gives reason to speculate that Japan primarily targeted males in their twenties to forcibly take away.

The total of 46,276 employment seekers accounted for about 40.9 percent of the potential laborers in the province. Among potential male la-

⁴⁰ Chōsen Sōtokufu, *Chōsen Sōtokufu Tōkei Nenpō* [Statistical Yearbook of the Japanese Government-General of Korea] (1939-42).

⁴¹ A total of 111,316 people from South Chungcheong province are listed on the register of forcibly taken Koreans kept at the National Archives of Korea. This number accounts for 7.24 percent of the province's population of 1,536,586 in 1940, meaning that one out of thirteen people were forcibly taken to Japan.

borers, 45.9 percent were employment seekers, while the equivalent ratio for females was 15.2 percent. Moreover, the total number of employment seekers amounted to a mere 2.8 percent of the province's entire population in 1940. These numbers and percentages therefore demonstrate that recruitment in the province would never have been successful for Japan without resorting to coercive and deceptive methods.

3. Cases of Recruitment in South Chungcheong

Rural communities in Korea were forced to serve two purposes under Japanese colonial rule. One was to produce food and the other was to provide labor resources for Japan's wars of aggression, which thereby led to forced mobilization. Koreans were forcibly taken in various ways including recruitment, placement through government channels, conscription, or the organization of patriotic labor corps called *Geullo bogukdae* (勤勞報國隊), but all of them involved coercion. In the case of recruitment, recruiters from Japanese companies were dispatched to areas designated by the Government-General to directly procure laborers. Two years were given to recruit from the seven designated provinces of North and South Chungcheong, North and South Gyeongsang, North and South Jeolla, and Gyeonggi.

The Essentials to Recruiting Korean Workers reveals Japan's coercive recruitment process.⁴² Japanese companies seeking to recruit Koreans were required to submit five copies of an "Application to Employ Korean Workers" to local government offices in Japan through an employment agency. The government offices would review the application, attach an "application approved" label if deemed reasonable, and transfer the application to the Japanese Ministry of Health and Welfare. Through consultation with the Japanese Home Ministry, the Japanese Ministry of Health and Welfare would make a labor mobilization plan and communicate it to the

⁴² Hayashi Eidai and Katō Hiroshi, eds., *Senji gaikokujin kyōsei renkō kankei shiryōshū 3: Chōsenjin 2* [Collection of Historical Documents Related to Forcibly Taken Foreigners 3: Koreans 2], vol. 2 (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 1991): 1074-78.

Government-General in Korea. At the same time, the Ministry of Health and Welfare issued an “Import Permission Order” to each prefectural government office in Japan responsible for notifying individual companies on whether their application had been approved or not.

Japanese companies that gained approval from the Ministry of Health and Welfare would then be allowed to submit an “Application for Approval of Labor Recruitment” to the Government-General in Korea. The Government-General would review and compare the applications to the details in the “Import Permission Order” transmitted from the Japanese Ministry of Health and Welfare before finally assigning a recruitment area (province) and issuing a license to each company’s recruiter. Once a company was assigned with a recruitment area, it could formally submit an “Application for Permission to Recruit” to the corresponding Korean province. The provincial government would attach to the company’s application its conclusion on whether permission should be granted and how many workers the company would be permitted to recruit and present the documents for the Government-General’s final approval. After obtaining final approval, the province would officially grant permission for the company to recruit and assign a specific county for recruitment based on the requested number of workers. Before initiating recruitment, a recruiter was required to hand in to the local chief constable a notification⁴³ attached with a copy of the company’s “Application to Recruit and Employ Korean Workers” and a recruitment notice.

The recruitment of Korean workers was fraught with coercion and deception. The Japanese government, the Japanese Government-General of Korea, colonial officials, the police, and Japanese companies cooperated closely with each other to coax, trick, and threaten Koreans into being taken away to Japan. From eight o’clock in the morning of May 23, 1940, the

⁴³ The notification included details such as 1) the recruiter’s name and address, 2) recruitment office location, 3) recruitment period, 4) recruitment volume, 5) time, place, and date of assembly for employment seekers (Shokugyō shōkai-sho shikōkisoku) [Employment Agency Enforcement Regulation], Japanese Government-General of Korea’s Order no. 7, Article no. 47 (January 20, 1940).

Government-General held meetings for the next three days with the director of each Korean province's social affairs department. The main topic of those meetings was about securing the supply of labor. Discussions took place on subjects related to recruitment permits, worker selection, basic training, and registers of farming households and potential laborers.⁴⁴ This demonstrates that the Government-General and provincial government officials were deeply involved in mobilizing Koreans from the recruitment stage. The Government-General allotted a recruitment quota for each province, county, and township so that the respective government offices as well as police stations and substations could employ all sorts of methods to fill their quota. Meanwhile, corporate recruiters bribed and entertained officials at the Government-General and relevant counties or townships as well as policemen so as to elicit their support in recruiting Korean workers.

The recruited Korean workers were transported on foot, by truck, train, or ship, which usually took from three to fifteen days. They were told to assemble at their township office where a staff member would lead them to a county office and hand them over to a corporate recruiter. Each county would then move groups of workers to train stations in Daejeon, Hongseong, Cheonan, Nonsan, or Iri (modern day Iksan) from which they were transported by train to Busan or Yeosu and then to Shimonoseki, Japan or the South Sea Islands by cross-channel liners. Won Cheon-sang was practically kidnapped in 1942 to a mine in Oita near Fukuoka Prefecture with no clue as to where he was being sent or what sort of work he was expected to do. The excerpt below from his testimony reveals the circumstances under which he was forcibly taken.

That's when. Just as I was wondering whether something had happened in our neighborhood, someone came and told me he needed to ask me something. So, I went. When I got there, he didn't ask me anything and just left me there. When evening came, he brought a couple of other people and told us we had to go, and we went straight to Dangjin County...

⁴⁴ "Possible Solutions for Securing Manpower, Mass Recruitment to be Discussed at Today's Director of Social Affairs Meeting," *Dong-A Ilbo* (May 24, 1940).

We spent the night there, had breakfast the next morning, and around lunch time, we were told to come out. We were put on a truck that just started driving toward somewhere.⁴⁵

The description above features a case in which a Korean man was tricked and forcibly taken by someone, most likely a recruiter. Without any explanation, the man was put on a truck and driven to a coal mine. In 1940, a policeman from the Goseong Police Station arrested a man walking along a road in Sacheon County of South Gyeongsang Province and took the man away on a truck.⁴⁶ Some people were taken away in the middle of the night or early in the morning. Some were working in a field when they were taken away on a truck and shipped to Japanese coal mines in Hokkaido or Kyushu.⁴⁷ The case below of Kim Su-eui, who was taken away in 1943 to the Itazuke Air Base in Fukuoka Prefecture, shows that the word recruitment was synonymous to being taken by force. Recruiting methods resembled those of a “man hunt” from the beginning.

I had come back from work and was eating supper at home when “recruiters” came in and said, “Let’s go to the township office!” “Oh, recruitment!” was what instantly crossed my mind, so I answered, “I’m in the middle of a meal.” They pulled my arm saying, “You can eat at the township office.” Mother wailed and pleaded that I was an only child, but the recruiters angrily told her “not to bother them” and dragged me away.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ Won Cheon-sang (1919 nyeon chungnam dangjingun chulsaeng) eui jeungeon [Testimony by Han Yeon-wu (Born in 1919 in Seosan County, South Chungcheong)] from Truth Commission on Forced Mobilization under the Japanese Imperialism, *Ttokttakseon Tago Odaga Bada Gwisin Dweol Ppeon Haenne* [I Almost Became a Sea Ghost on a Steamboat] (Seoul: Prime Minister’s Secretariat, 2006): 171-72.

⁴⁶ Kim Woon-tai, *Ilbon jegukjueui eui Hanguk tongchi* [Japanese Imperialism’s Rule of Korea] (Seoul: Pakyoungsa, 1986): 534-35.

⁴⁷ Park Gyeong-sik, *Nihon teikokushugi no Chōsen shihai* [Japanese Imperialism’s Rule of Korea], vol. 2 (Aoki Shoten, 1973): 70.

⁴⁸ Kim Chan-jeong, *Shogen Chōsenjin kyōsei renkō* [Testimonies of Forcibly Taken Koreans] (Tokyo: Shin jinbutsu oraisha, 1975): 20.

The Sumitomo Konomai Gold Mine and the Hokkaido Coal Mine Steamship Company are Japanese companies that can be clearly confirmed through records for forcibly taking Koreans from South Chungcheong Province. Between October 7, 1939 and September 22, 1942, twelve transports of 1,688 Koreans were made from South Chungcheong to the Sumitomo Konomai Gold Mine,⁴⁹ while six transports of at least 1,811 Koreans were made to the Hokkaido Coal Mine Steamship Company between July 1941 and March 1942.

The Hokkaido Coal Mine Steamship Company had been struggling from a lack of manpower in 1939, which is why it quickly proceeded to apply for recruitment in Korea in July that year. However, through a work-force manager meeting the Coal Mining Association hosted in Sapporo, an agreement was reached on September 1, 1939 under which the Hokkaido Prefectural Government would gather all applications in the prefecture and deliver them to the Government-General in Korea by mid-September. The Hokkaido Coal Mine Steamship Company was thus able to obtain official permission from the Government-General on September 19, 1939 and contracted out its recruitment of Koreans. The first transport began on October 3 and shipped 400 Koreans on the freighter Tokachi-maru from October 5 to 9. Until November 7, approximately 2,500 Koreans were taken by force to the company's multiple mines. The company later switched to the direct recruitment of Koreans and took around 2,100 Koreans from the two Jeolla provinces as well as South Gyeongsang Province.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ The register of forcibly taken Koreans kept at the National Archives of Korea contains 2,096 laborers from South Chungcheong Province who were taken to the Konomai Gold Mine. Roh Young-jong, "Chungnam jiyek sahoe, gyeongje sutalsang" [Social, Economic Pillaging in South Chungcheong], in *Chungcheong namdoji* [Records of South Chungcheong Province], vol. 9 (South Chungcheong Province, 2008).

⁵⁰ Hokkaido Mining Co., Ltd. sent personnel staff to Seoul to confer with government offices and hired two Korean employees to handle recruitment affairs, but later chose to contract out its recruitment operations due to the following reasons: 1) short recruitment period compared to large recruitment volume, 2) shortage of corporate recruiters, 3) pressure of transporting large groups of workers to meet their shipment deadline by October 1939, 4) unstable circumstances in Korea due to a disaster, and 5) unpredictable timing of brokerage through government agencies. Eidai and Katō, *Senji gaikokujin kyōsei renkō kankei shiryōshū 3: Chōsenjin 2* (1084).

Based in Hokkaido, the Hokkaido Coal Mine Steamship Company was a representative firm in coal mine development with a capital of ten billion Japanese Yen. The firm was originally established on November 18, 1889 as the Hokkaido Coal Mine Railway Company. The company re-named itself in October 1906 after acquiring mines such as Horonai, Sorachi, and Yubari and developing several others including the Shinhoronai Mine.⁵¹ The Hokkaido Coal Mine Steamship Company recruited all across Korea between August 2, 1939 and June 5, 1942 and took over the course of twenty-five transports 83.4 percent, or 10,425 out of its quota of 12,500 laborers. Among the Koreans the company took, approximately 14.5 percent, or more than 1,811 were from the South Chungcheong Province. Table 5 provides details on six rounds of recruitment the company carried out in South Chungcheong Province.

Between July 1941 and March 1942, the Government-General assigned a quota six times to the Hokkaido Coal Mine Steamship Company for recruitment in South Chungcheong Province and the company later obtained formal permission to recruit from the province's governor as well. The company's quota was 2,150 in total and at least 1,811 Koreans were taken away from South Chungcheong, which was a slightly higher percentage compared to the average of 83.4 percent for all of Korea. The table shows that 453 Koreans were taken from Seosan County through three rounds of recruitment, more than any other county in the province and 100.7 percent of the quota the company was assigned for the county. The next highest number of Koreans taken through two rounds of recruitment were Buyeo (237, 118.5 percent), Yesan (221, 88.4 percent), and Hongseong (197, 93.8 percent). Only thirty-eight Koreans were taken from Secheon County, less than any other county in the province and equivalent to a mere 38 percent of the company's quota in the county.

There were two instances in which more Koreans were taken than the assigned quota for a single round of recruitment in a county. The Hokkaido

⁵¹ Sapporo Trade and Industry Bureau's Coal Department, *Hokkaidō no sekitan sangyō* [Hokkaido Coal Industry] (1954).

Table 5. Forced Mobilization through Recruitment in South Chungcheong (Hokkaido Coal Mine Steamship Company)⁵²

	Application Date	Approval Date	Date of Assignment to Province by the Government-General	Date of Provincial Governor's Permission	Start Date of Recruitment	Date of Arrival	Quota	No. of Koreans Taken	No. of Korean Workers by County
Total	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,150	1,811+ α (84.2%)	
Round 1	1941.3.15.	1941.5.22.	1941.7.6.	1941.7.28.	1941.7.28.	1941.8.27.	200	197 (98.5%)	Seosan 197 (200)
Round 2	1941.6.17.	1941.8.9.	1941.9.27.	1941.10.20.	1941.11.10.	1941.12.12.	100	100 (100%)	Geumsan 100 (100)
Round 3	1941.6.17.	1941.8.9.	1941.11.4.	1941.12.12.	1942.1.20.	1941.2.28.	700 ⁵³	693 (99%)	Seosan 150 (150) Buyeo 137 (100) Hongseong 137 (150) Yesan 122 (150) Nonsan 147 (150)
Round 4			1941.11.19.	1941.12.12.	-	-	300	α	
Round 5			1941.1.20.	1942.1.21.	1942.1.24.	1942.3.24.	300	224 (74.7%)	Yeongi 95 (100) Seochon 38 (100) Buyeo 100 (100)
Round 6	1941.7.15.	1941.9.29.	1941.3.5.	1942.3.6.	1942.4.15.	1942.6.5.	550	597 (119.4%)	Cheonan 100 (100) Asan 98 (100) Dangjin 134 (150) Yesan 99 (100) Seosan 106 (100) Hongseong 60 (68)

Coal Mine Steamship Company was assigned a quota of 100 for its third recruitment in Buyeo County but took 137 people and took 106 people from Seosan County, more than the assigned quota of 100 for the company's sixth recruitment in the county. However, in Seocheon County, the company ended up taking only 38 people instead of its assigned quota of 100. The company nearly filled its quota in most counties of South Chungcheong Province, but the way it exceeded its quota in several counties indicates how coercive and deceptive its recruitment must have been under the Japanese government and Government-General's support. Since July 1939, the Hokkaido Coal Mine Steamship Company eagerly took part in the application process to acquire Korean workers. Owning ships and trains to transport such workers is likely to have served as an advantage to the company in gaining permission.⁵⁴

Meanwhile, the Konomai Gold Mine located in Monbetsu, Hokkaido was acquired by Sumitomo Mining Co., Ltd.⁵⁵ in 1917 and operated until

⁵² Moriya Yoshihiko, "Dai niiji sekai taisen ni okeru Chōsenjin kyōsei renkō no tōkei-teki kenkyū" [Statistical Researches on Korean Forced Transfer during World War II], *Dōto daigaku kiyō* 13 (December 1994): 76–77.

⁵³ The original table marked this number as 400, but it has been corrected to 700 in this paper based on the sum of quotas assigned to the counties where the third round of recruitment took place.

⁵⁴ After initiating its application process in July 1939, the Hokkaido Coal Mine Steamship Company dispatched all its labor management staff members to Seoul to confer with government officials in Korea. The company actively recruited Korean workers through the two Koreans it hired to handle recruitment tasks and succeeded in taking 84.2 percent of its quota by taking advantage of the ships and trains it owned through Yubari Railway Company and Kyoritsu Steamship Company. Eidai and Katō, *Senji gaikokujin kyōsei renkō kankei shiryōshū* 3: *Chōsenjin* 2, 1078–85; Chōsenjin kyōsei renkō shinsō chōsadan, *Chōsenjin kyōsei renkō kyōsei rōdō no kiroku: Hokkaidō, Chishima, Karafuto Hen* [Records of Forced Labor: Volume on Hokkaidō, Chishima, Karafuto] (Tokyo: Gendaishi Shuppankai, 1974): 136–37.

⁵⁵ Established in 1919, Sumitomo was headquartered in Osaka and operated mines in Hokkaido including Konomai Gold Mine, Akabira (赤平) Coal Mine, Uetashinai (上歌志内) Coal Mine, Utashinai (歌志内) Coal Mine, Shinutashinai (新歌志内) Coal Mine, Kokufu (國富) Mine, Naie (奈井江) Coal Mine, Inaushi (伊奈牛) Mine, Karamatsu (唐松) Coal Mine, Ponbetsu (奔別) Coal Mine, and Yasoshi (八十士) Mine. Truth Commission on Forced Mobilization under Japanese Imperialism, *Gangje Dongwon Myeongbu Haejejip* [Annotated Register of Forced Laborers], vol. 1 (Seoul: Prime Minister's Secretariat, 2009): 123–24.

the mine's closure in 1973.⁵⁶

Between October 1939 and September 1942, the gold mine took a total of 1,744 Koreans from South Chungcheong Province through twelve rounds of recruitment. Table 6 below features details on the twelve rounds of recruitment the gold mine carried out in South Chungcheong Province.

Table 6. Forced Mobilization through Recruitment in South Chungcheong (Sumitomo Konomai Gold Mine)⁵⁷

County	Round no.	Arrival Date	Quota	Number of People Taken	No. of People Taken by Towns and Townships
Total		-	1,668	1,668	
Cheonan	Sub total	-	201	202	Cheonan 23, Pungse 12, Hwanseong 25, Gwangdeok 5, Mokcheon 29, Seongnam 23, Sushin 4, Galjeon 14, Seonghwan 19, Buk 21, Uembong 1, Seonggeo 9, Ipjang 9, Jiksan 7, Goesan 1
	1	1939. 10.7.	102	102	Cheonan 7, Pungse 12, Hwanseong 23, Gwangdeok 5, Mokcheon 8, Seongnam 4, Sushin 4, Galjeon 14, Seonghwan 19, Buk 6
	22	1942. 8.29.	99	100	Cheonan 16, Hwanseong 2, Mokcheon 21, Seongnam 19, North 15, Uembong 1, Seonggeo 9, Ipjang 9, Jiksan 7, Goesan 1
Asan	Sub total	-	200	200	Onyang 27, Songak 6, Tangjeong 15, Yeomchi 22, Uembong 19, Yeongin 10, Inju 14, Seonjang 27, Dogo 20, Sinchang 24, Dobang 2, Dunpo 14
	1	1939. 10.7.	100	100	Onyang 16, Songak 3, Tangjeong 7, Yeomchi 14, Uembong 5, Yeongin 5, Inju 3, Seonjang 16, Dogo 11, Sinchang 13, Dobang 2, Dunpo 5
	20	1942. 8.15.	100	100	Onyang 11, Songak 3, Tangjeong 8, Yeomchi 8, Uembong 14, Yeongin 5, Inju 11, Seonjang 11, Dogo 9, Sinchang 11, Dunpo 9

⁵⁶ Eidai Hayashi and Moriya Yoshihiko, eds., *Senji gaikokujin kyōsei renkō kankei shiryōshū 3: Chōsenjin 2* [Collection of Historical Documents Related to Forcibly Taken Foreigners 3: Koreans 2], vol. 3 (Tokyo: Akashi shoten, 1991): 1261-62.

⁵⁷ Moriya Yoshihiko, "Kinzoku kōzan to Chōsen-Kankokujin kyōsei renkō" [Forced Transfer and Labor from Korean Peninsula in the Metal Mines during World War II: In the Case of Konomai Gold Mine of Sumitomo Company], *Dōto daigaku kiyō* 9 (December 1990): 19-20.

Dangjin	Sub total	-	197	197	Dangjin 31, Sunseong 24, Godae 10, Seokmun 9, Myeoncheon 20, Hapdeok 37, Bongcheon 18, Sinpyeong 13, Songak 22, Songsan 22, Songdeok 1
	1	1939.10.7.	100	100	Dangjin 16, Sunseong 15, Godae 3, Seokmun 4, Myeoncheon 10, Hapdeok 24, Bongcheon 9, Sinpyeong 6, Songak 8, Songsan 4, Songdeok 1
	21	1942.8.23.	97	97	Dangjin 15, Sunseong 9, Godae 7, Seokmun 5, Myeoncheon 10, Hapdeok 13, Bongcheon 9, Sinpyeong 7, Songak 14, Songsan 8
Yeongi	Sub total	-	236	236	Dong 55, Jochiwon 23, Seo 38, Jeoneui 52, Jeondong 26, Nam 36, Geumnam 50
	2	1940.1.6.	50	50	Dong 23, Jochiwon 4, Seo 9, Jeoneui 7
	6	1940.12.8.	97	97	Dong 21, Jochiwon 6, Seo 11, Jeoneui 17, Jeondong 3, Nam 10, Geumnam 29
	7	1941.1.16.	15	15	Dong 3, Jochiwon 1, Jeoneui 4, Jeondong 7
	10	1941.12.21.	74	74	Dong 2, Jochiwon 3, Seo 12, Jeoneui 16, Jeondong 8, Nam 12, Geumnam 21
Gongju	Sub total	-	226	226	Tancheon 33, Gyeryeong 23, Banpo 20, Janggi 28, Euidang 15, Jeongan 13, Useong 21, Sagok 12, Sinha 14, Sinsang 5, Gongju 16, Mokdong 26
	3	1940.3.27.	125	125	Tancheon 12, Gyeryeong 17, Banpo 14, Janggi 13, Euidang 14, Jeongan 7, Useong 11, Sagok 9, Sinha 3, Sinsang 5, Gongju 10, Mokdong 10
	6	1940.12.8.	26	26	Tancheon 20, Gongju 6
	7	1941.1.16.	75	75	Tancheon (1), Gyeryeong 6, Banpo 6, Janggi 15, Euidang 1, Jeongan 6, Useong 10, Sagok 3, Sinha 11, Mokdong 6
Buyeo	9	1941.9.8.	148	148	Buyeo 7, Gyuam 4, Eunsan 7, Woesan 29, Chochon 15, Seokseong 12, Guryong 3, Oksan 4, Nam 17, Chungbuk 5, Yangam 10, Yanghwa 7, Imcheon 10, Sedo 8, Hongsan 10
Daedeok	Sub total	-	120	120	Jinjam 22, Giseong 37, Yuseong 10, Sannae 6, Jeonbong 2, Dong 12, Tandong 7, Buk 8, Gujeuk 13, Yucheon 3
	2	1940.1.6.	50	50	Jinjam 20, Giseong 30

	10	1941. 12.21.	70	70	Jinjam 2, Giseong 7, Yuseong 10, Sannaec 6, Jeonbong 2, Dong 12, Tandong 7, Buk 8, Gujeuk 13, Yucheon 3
Nonsan	9	1941. 9.8.	114	114	Nonsan 8, Yangchon 10, Noseong 12, Gujagok 5, Beolgok 8, Sangwol 13, Bujeok 5, Seongdong 13, Ganggyeong 6, Yeonsan 12, Gasegok 9, Duma 13
Yesan	10	1941. 12.21.	97	97	Yesan 4, Daesul 9, Sinyang 8, Gwangsi 6, Daheung 3, Eungbong 5, Sapgyo 11, Godeok 13, Sinam 9, Oga 16, Deoksan 11, Beomsan 2
Seocheon	Sub total	-	128	128	Jongcheon 8, Seo 13, Biin 20, Hansan 23, Masan 6, Maseo 9, Seocheon 5, Gisan 1, Sicho 8, Munsan 17, Janghang 7, Hwayang 8, Dong 3
	9	1941. 9.8.	33	33	Jongcheon 6, Seo 3, Biin 9, Hansan 5, Masan 2, Maseo 1, Seocheon 1, Hwayang 6
	19	1942. 8.7.	50	50	Hansan 15, Masan 3, Maseo 8, Gisan 1, Sicho 8, Munsan 15
	23	1942. 9.22.	45	45	Jongcheon 2, Seo 10, Biin 11, Hansan 3, Masan 1, Seocheon 4, Munsan 2, Janghang 7, Hwayang 2, Dong 3

As indicated in Table 6, the Sumitomo Konomai Gold Mine's first round of recruitment occurred in the counties of Cheonan, Asan, and Dangjin. The second round took place in the counties of Yeongi and Daedeok, the third round in Gongju, the sixth and seventh round in Yeongi and Gongju, the ninth round in Buyeo, Nonsan, and Seocheon, the tenth round in Yeongi, Daedeok, and Yesan, the nineteenth round in Seocheon, the twentieth round in Asan, the twenty-first round in Dangjin, the twenty-second round in Cheonan, and the twenty-third round in Seocheon. The table shows that the gold mine took 1,668 Koreans from South Chungcheong Province between October 7, 1939 and September 22, 1942. Four rounds of recruitment occurred in Yeongi County to take 236 people, which was the greatest number of Koreans the gold mine took from a single county in South Chungcheong Province. Yesan County was where the gold mine took the least number of people, which was 97 people through a single round of recruitment.

In the case of the tenth round of recruitment, the gold mine's recruiter

Takano Jūgorō (高野重五郎)⁵⁸ submitted to South Chungcheong Province an “Application for Permission to Recruit Koreans.” On November 7, 1941, the province’s governor granted the gold mine permission through Provincial Ordinance no. 257. During a span of two months, the gold mine was permitted to recruit 100 Koreans each from Daedeok County and Yeongi County as well as 150 Koreans from Yesan County, meaning a quota of 350 persons in total through the gold mine’s tenth round of recruitment. According to the application for this tenth round, Koreans were to be divided into twelve groups. One supervisor would be assigned to every fifty Koreans on a ship or to every thirty Koreans on a train. The plan was to transport the Korean workers by train to Busan and hire a ship to transport them from Busan to Hakodate or Otaru in Japan. They would then take a train to Monbetsu Station where a van would pick them up to be delivered to a mine.⁵⁹

The gold mine’s recruiter spent 6,023.31 Korean Won to forcibly take 98 Koreans from Yesan County of South Chungcheong Province from November to December in 1941. 1,228.76 Won and 380.8 Won were respectively spent on bribing or entertaining county and township officials. Officials such as the county governor, the head of each township, the county’s director of home affairs, the social affairs staff of the county and its townships, the chief constable, and the head of each police patrol unit were presented with bribes such as teaware, canned food, shirts, or snacks. They were entertained a total of 46 times through dinners or parties. Apart from bribery and entertainment, 886.47 Won was spent on recruiting expenses, 1,078 Won on payment to the Association for Korean Labor Affairs (*Joseon nomu hyeophoe*), and 2,450 Won on travel and transportation expenses. As a result, it cost the gold mine 61.46 Won for every worker pro-

⁵⁸ Takano Jūgorō set up a temporary office to recruit Koreans at Hanaya Hotel located at 52, 1-jeongmok, Bon-jeong in Daejeon. Once a farmer after graduating from Simsang Elementary School, he became employed by Konomai Gold Mine in 1932 and began working as the mine’s foreman in 1937.

⁵⁹ “Documents Related to Labor Mobilization on the Korean Peninsula,” in Eidai and Moriya, *Senji gaikokujin kyōsei renkō kankei shiryōshū* 3: *Chōsenjin* 2: 1289-1305.

cured from Korea.⁶⁰ Hence, from the Japanese Government-General of Korea to low-ranking administrative officials in rural Korea, the Sumitomo Konomai Gold Mine made full use of its connections and persistently used coercive and deceptive methods to take full advantage of its quota and procure 1,668 Koreans from South Chungcheong Province through twelve rounds of recruitment.

4. Resistance by Workers from South Chungcheong

1) Evasion

Japan's forced mobilization was met with resistance by Koreans in South Chungcheong Province. Although it was rare to collectively resist recruitment, many Koreans did try to resist individually through various means of evasion. They attempted evasion during recruitment or in the process of

⁶⁰ The details of expenditures for the Konomai Gold Mine's recruitment are as below. Moriya Yoshihiko, "Chōsenjin kyōsei renkō ni okeru boshū-kanassen chōyōhōshiki no ikkansei" [A Study on the Consistency of the Systems for Recruiting, Official Mediation, and Conscription of the Koreans during the World War II], *Dōto daigaku kiyo* 14 (December 1995): 13-102.

Date	Detail	Amount (Won)	Date	Detail	Amount (Won)
11.1	Clothes & hat storage at Nonsan Station (21 days)	15.75	12.10	Abstract family register, expedition fee	19.90
11.6	Waxed paper for worker register	8.40	12.10	Abstract family register, expedition fee, daily wage	250.00
11.9	150 copies of the recruitment notice	37.00	12.11	Worker accommodation, meals	319.03
11.12	Tools to post notice	3.16	12.11	3 recruiter train tickets (Yesan-Cheonan)	3.90
11.23	Travel expenses & daily wage (7 days)	20.00	12.11	Train tickets (Cheonan-Daejeon)	3.90
12.8	Background check form (Yesan Police Station)	15.00	12.11	Daily wage & expenses for returning home	45.00
12.9	Automobile lease (20 days)	18.90	12.12	Medical expenses for injured workers	4.90
12.10	Photos of recruited workers	65.00	12.12	Other	27.23
12.10	Physical examination & vaccination	30.00	Total		886.47

being transported, and even after arriving at their final destination they continued to seek opportunities to escape.

Residents of South Chungcheong Province foremost kept the whereabouts of their family members or relatives ambiguous to one another to lower the possibility of being taken away. People who particularly sought to evade recruitment went into hiding in nearby mountains such as Mount Chilgap, Mount Daedun, or Mount Gyeryong or on a remote island if they lived in coastal areas. Meanwhile, people often attempted to escape while being transported, whether it be from their lodgings, a train station, restroom, or even from a truck or a train in motion. Attempts to escape continued even after reaching their final destination. However, workers caught attempting to escape were beaten, sometimes to the point of death, or placed under heavy labor and surveillance.

Koreans caught trying to escape from Hokkaido were sent to labor camps called *takobeya* where they suffered under harsh working and living conditions. Below is an excerpt from a testimony by Yun Seung-yeol, who was taken on February 27, 1942 from Hongseong County of South Chungcheong Province to the Hokkaido Coal Mine Railway Company's Sorachi Mine where he witnessed a fellow Korean worker, an unidentified person whose last name was Yun, become subjected to heavy labor at a *takobeya* for trying to escape.

Once rock dust gets into the bodies of workers there, it's stuck and can't be flushed out. That's why people who stay there often get sick. You know those places called "*takobeya*." Runaways are sent there to do that stuff, that hard work. There's no hours or anything like that there. You have to carry a huge load through thick rock dust all day so you can't recognize anyone when they get out. Rock dust. That's what they made Koreans do... Runaways were sent there. To a *takobeya*. There was someone taken to Hanyang with me, his name was Yun. It would've been better if he stayed put where he was, but he got caught running away. So, he was sent away there to do that shit. All those white rocks. My god, it's no place to be. We got three shifts but it's a double shift there. Double shift. It means you go to work in the evening and again in

the morning. Double shift. So, you work more.⁶¹

Life at a *takobeya* indeed meant a significantly heavier workload. Most sites usually operated under a three-shift system, but workers sent to a *takobeya* had to bear a double shift. In other words, the price for trying to run away was to be confined at a *takobeya* and forced to work day and night. Despite such harsh circumstances, Koreans still sought ways to escape. Also, a severe beating awaited those caught trying to escape. While working at a coal mine in Nagasaki Prefecture, Han Yeon-woo from Seosan County of South Chungcheong Province testified about the beating of a fellow Korean who attempted to run away.

Lots of people died. From a mine collapse or a beating... Yes. Even after all those threats to kill anyone who runs away... People still ran away? Yes, they still did. That's why they would get dragged away and beaten. He was one of them. I saw it. Beaten to show what would happen to anyone who tries to run away. We were told not to run away or else we'd get killed.⁶²

Japanese supervisors or foremen sought to prevent Korean workers from escaping by making an example out of anyone caught trying to run away. Testimonies such as the one below indicate that Koreans were threatened by witnessing the capture and beating of their compatriots that ended in death in many cases.

⁶¹ Yoon Byeong-ryeol (1925 nyeon Chungnam Hongseonggun chulsaeng) eui jeungeon [Testimony by Yoon Byeong-ryeol (Born in 1925 in Hongseong County, South Chungcheong)] in Truth Commission on Forced Mobilization under the Japanese Imperialism, *Ahobmeori neomeo bukhaedoro* [Beyond Ahobmeori To Hokkaido] (Seoul: Prime Minister's Secretariat, 2009): 85-86.

⁶² Han Yeon-wu (1919 nyeon Chungnam Seosangun chulsaeng) eui jeungeon [Testimony by Han Yeon-wu (Born in 1919 in Seosan County, South Chungcheong)] in Truth Commission on Forced Mobilization under the Japanese Imperialism, *Ttokttakseon tago odaga bada gwisin dweol ppeon haenne* [I Almost Became a Sea Ghost on a Steamboat]: 80-84.

Seven or eight foremen surrounded him, cursed at him, and struck his ribs and shins with clubs. He rubbed his hands together, begging for mercy. The foremen said, “Runaways deserve to die.” They eagerly stripped him of his clothes, placed a club between his shins, and made him sit. They sat on his shoulders to press him down. ... One foreman used another club to strike a heavy blow on his shoulders that knocked him down, leaving him like a limp, trembling frog. Another foreman joined in by kicking him, while yet another pounced on him. He was soaked with blood by the time he completely lost consciousness. It was routine for the foremen to prepare a bucket of water to splash on beaten runaways, throw a sack over them, and chat over a smoke. When the sound of his breathing grew faint, he was carried away on a stretcher to the dispensary, but he never came back.⁶³

The above describes the death of a Korean from Chungcheong Province in June 1942 after being beaten by Japanese foremen for trying to escape forced labor at a railroad construction site in Biratori, Hokkaido. Although many met the same fate of being bludgeoned to death for attempting to flee, the beatings failed to stop Korean workers from continuing to take the risk.

Japan began to investigate what was causing Koreans to escape as the number of runaways kept rising to reach 429 by November 1939.⁶⁴ At the same time, it had officials such as chief constables give speeches about the “valor of industrial warriors” in order to brainwash Koreans into believing that “Japan and Korea are one” on their way to and even after they arrived in Japan.

- 1) Those who use recruitment as a means to sail over to Japan
- 2) Those who receive instructions to escape from acquaintances or oth-

⁶³ Kwon Byong-tak, *Kerama yeoldo: Ilje mal jingyonggi* [Kerama Islands: Accounts of Conscripted Labor Around the End of Japanese Colonial Rule] (Yeungnam University Press, 1982): 50-51.

⁶⁴ Police Agency Security Office under the Japanese Home Ministry, “November, December Bulletin of the Special Higher Police,” *Teukgo wolbo* 23 (1939): 166.

ers in Japan

- 3) Those who are kidnapped on their way to a place of employment by someone offering to broker a job less dangerous than working at a mine or a coal mine
- 4) Those who fear working at a mine or a coal mine
- 5) Those averse to being overworked at a mine or a coal mine
- 6) Those who believe the actual terms of labor are different from those advertised during recruitment

Japan identified the above six cases as potential reasons that were causing recruited Koreans to run away. However, such identification was no more than conjecture on the part of Japan. Koreans were forced to support Japan's wars of aggression, but they were aware that Japan and Korea being one was a fabricated idea. The voluntary participation of Koreans had been impossible from the outset. In 1940, the number of mobilized Korean workers dropped 56.7 percent from 54,944 to 31,177, among which 20,430 had run away. The continuously rising number of runaways thus served as one of the main reasons Japanese companies switched to a more coercive, organized method of procuring labor through government offices that took on the role of brokers.⁶⁵

2) Collective Action

Apart from running away, Koreans taken from South Chungcheong Province also constantly attempted to resist working in Japan by going on strikes, slowing down, or taking direct, collective action. They acted together to demand the improvement of poor wages, meals, contract lengths, and working conditions. Against punishments that Japanese supervisors or foremen privately inflicted, Korean workers resorted to the direct use of force from time to time.

⁶⁵ Kang, "Chimnyak jeonjaenggi Ilbon e gangje dongwon dweun Joseon nodongja eui jeohang": 244.

The difference between Korea and Japan's funeral practices gave reason to engage in collective action as well. On March 15, 1940, a strike occurred to demand the repatriation of a Korean worker who died by accident at Nippon Mining's Toyoha Mine.⁶⁶ On November 17, 1940, Koreans protested against the funeral arrangements for a worker who died from a cave-in at the Mitsubishi Mining Company's Teine Mine. The denial of requests to repatriate the body, postpone the funeral until family members arrived, provide interment, and suspend all mining operations until after the funeral were met with a unified, rebellious response involving abusive language by all 292 Korean workers on site.⁶⁷ When the Hokkaido Coal Mine Steamship Company decided to cut back on meal portions, Korean workers at the company's Yubari Mine declared on April 3, 1941 that they were unable to work on empty stomachs. They went on a strike by refusing to enter the pit until the company accepted their demand for the provision of meal replacements.⁶⁸ On June 25, 1941, around eight hundred Koreans working at the Oyubari Mine assaulted police officers and threw stones at them in protest.⁶⁹

One hundred thirteen Korean workers were ostracizing their pit boss over meal issues. When the matter became public on June 15, a police officer came to persuade the Koreans to change their mind. However, nearly 200 Koreans surrounded the officer, yelling as they stripped him of his hat and clothes to beat him. That prompted the Yubari Police Station to issue an emergency dispatch to the scene where thirty-four Korean workers were arrested to pacify the situation. At the sight of their colleagues being taken away, the remaining Koreans chased the

⁶⁶ Police Agency Security Office under the Japanese Home Ministry, "April Bulletin of the Special Higher Police," *Teukgo wolbo* 24 (1940): 180.

⁶⁷ Police Agency Security Office under the Japanese Home Ministry, "November, December Bulletin of the Special Higher Police," *Teukgo wolbo* 23 (1939): 188.

⁶⁸ Police Agency Security Office under the Japanese Home Ministry, "April Bulletin of the Special Higher Police," *Teukgo wolbo* 27 (1941): 86.

⁶⁹ Police Agency Security Office under the Japanese Home Ministry, "June Bulletin of the Special Higher Police," *Teukgo wolbo* 27 (1941): 75-76.

police up to the bus station, creating further commotion as they assaulted and threw stones at officers. The Koreans also threatened to “attack the police station if their arrested colleagues failed to be released by the 27th.” By that time, Koreans from other pits joined in so that approximately 800 of them seemed rebellious enough to attempt an attack on the police station.

This incident was settled with the repatriation of ten among the arrested thirty-four Koreans for obstructing justice. Meanwhile, on October 15, 1940, fifty Koreans went on strike at Mitsubishi’s Obira Mine in Oita Prefecture because of wages that differed from what was advertised during recruitment. When Koreans witnessed their representative being beaten by Japanese pit bosses at the office, they swarmed to the office and threw stones to break its windows in protest.⁷⁰ This incident, however, was not the first in which Koreans from South Chungcheong collectively protested against the beating of compatriots by Japanese supervisors or foremen, which sometimes escalated to the Koreans using force. On October 27, 1939, a Korean worker discovered a Japanese supervisor beating a Korean colleague inside a pit at the Konomai Gold Mine and rushed to the office to complain.⁷¹ Similar incidents occurred at the Toi Gold Mine in Shizuoka Prefecture as well as the Higashimizome Mining Co., Ltd. in Yamaguchi Prefecture.

On October 11, 1941, around one hundred Koreans from South Chungcheong who witnessed their compatriot being beaten by a Japanese pit boss barged into the office in protest to injure three oppressive Japanese pit bosses and shatter fifty sheets of window glass.⁷²

⁷⁰ Police Agency Security Office under the Japanese Home Ministry, “November Bulletin of the Special Higher Police,” *Teukgo wolbo* 26 (1940): 86.

⁷¹ Police Agency Security Office under the Japanese Home Ministry, “November, December Bulletin of the Special Higher Police.” *Teukgo wolbo* 23 (1939): 188.

⁷² Police Agency Security Office under the Japanese Home Ministry, “October Bulletin of the Special Higher Police,” *Teukgo wolbo* 28 (1941): 111.

Among the 176 Koreans involved in the above incident at the Toi Gold Mine, eleven were arrested for leading the riot and eight of them were repatriated for being convicted of assault. The excerpt below describes how Koreans from South Chungcheong acted in unison at the Higashimizome Mine upon witnessing the beating of several compatriots.

On April 14, 1942, fifty-four Koreans from South Chungcheong including Yun Hui-mok witnessed a Japanese pit boss beating their colleague Kang Bong-jun and three other Korean workers for feigning illness to avoid work. The witnesses rushed over to the office to warn the manager that they will never forgive the pit boss's assault upon a fellow migrant.⁷³

The testimony below by Ji Ok-dong from Cheonan County of South Chungcheong Province describes yet another instance of collective resistance that occurred at the Asajino Airfield in Hokkaido, Japan.

As he was eating, a colleague of ours said “Darn, the work is hard and this is what we get for meals. There’s practically nothing except for these four pieces.” That’s when the “sewayaku,” the supervisor got up as he said, “What? You damn bastard!” and started kicking him in the middle of a meal. The kicking made his lunch box fly away and blood started to stream. The others there shouted, “This bastard is killing a man. Let’s beat him to death!” They began to stomp on the supervisor until he was half dead. But word got out so that the military police came over, fully armed with guns and helmets and all that. There must have been about fifty of them. They came in a truck and stood on guard as they investigated. Instead of being put to work, we were sent to the barracks that day. But because the military police came, the four workers who took the lead (in beating the supervisor) got killed. They were shot

⁷³ Police Agency Security Office under the Japanese Home Ministry, “April Bulletin of the Special Higher Police,” *Teukgo wolbo* 30 (1942): 157.

to death.⁷⁴

As shown through the testimonies above, Japanese supervisors privately abused Korean workers without any particular reason. And some of those Koreans collectively reacted to such abuse with violence toward Japanese supervisors. Yet, most people from South Chungcheong chose to run away. Those caught trying were beaten, sometimes to the point of death. Such consequences still did not stop Koreans from continuing their attempts to escape. Aware that the Japanese idea of Japan and Korea being one was pure fiction, they also acted in unison to carry out strikes and slowdowns, and voiced their demands regarding meals, wages, contract lengths, or working hours.

5. Conclusion

As Japan aggressively broadened its influence over China and recalibrated its colonial operations to facilitate war in the late 1930s, it started to mobilize Koreans as a means to launch wars of aggression. Japan's labor mobilization plan involved several different methods, one of which was recruitment. Mobilizing labor required beforehand a nationwide survey of Korean labor resources. For the survey, minimum farmland sizes were defined to detect the number of households with surplus manpower and also determine the number of potential laborers and employment seekers willing to relocate or change jobs.

The survey results revealed that there were 1,160,177 potential laborers and 263,083 employment seekers in Korea. The ratio of employment seekers among potential laborers was 22.7 percent, a number maximized to demonstrate that a high percentage of Koreans were compliant toward the Japanese government's colonial policies and justified such policies. At the same time, the ratio hinted at how coercive and deceptive Japan's mobili-

⁷⁴ Ji Ok-dong (1926 nyeon Chungnam Cheonwongun chulsaeng) eui jeungeon [Testimony by Ji Ok-dong (Born in 1926 in Cheonwon County, South Chungcheong)] in Truth Commission on Forced Mobilization under the Japanese Imperialism, *Ahobmeori neomeo bukhaedoro*: 368.

zation of Koreans would become. As of March 31, 1940, South Chungcheong Province had 113,182 potential laborers and 46,276 employment seekers. The number of potential laborers amounted to 7.37 percent of the province's entire population at the time, which were 1,536,587. These numbers meant that one out of every thirteen people in the province could be mobilized.

The coercion and deception in Japan's recruitment methods indicate that many Koreans were taken away by force. Recruitment quotas were determined through a strictly hierarchical administrative system in both Japan and colonial Korea and involved bribery and entertainment provided by Japanese corporate recruiters to ensure administrative cooperation from authorities of all ranks. The Hokkaido Coal Mine Steamship Company and the Sumitomo Konomai Gold Mine are notable among the Japanese companies that can be identified through records for carrying out recruitment in South Chungcheong. Between the two companies alone, more than 3,555 Koreans were taken from the province to Japan through eighteen rounds of recruitment between 1939 and 1942.

People from South Chungcheong Province tried to either evade or directly resist forced labor. They constantly attempted to run away from points of assembly, while being transported to Japan, and even after being placed to work. They also took collective action against violence or harsh working conditions by going on strike or slowing down their work pace. Koreans were aware of the fictionality in the idea that Japan and Korea were one and therefore continued to exhibit various forms of resistance. This made recruitment an increasingly ineffective method of mobilization for Japanese companies so that they were later compelled to pursue more coercive methods such as conscription or using government agencies as brokers.

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