

Rethinking Imperialism and Constitutional Democracy in Interwar Japan and Colonial Taiwan

Ya-hsun CHAN

Department of Advanced Social and International Studies,
University of Tokyo

The Journal of Northeast Asian History
Volume 17 Number 2 (Summer 2021), 7-56

Copyright © 2021 by the Northeast Asian History Foundation. All Rights Reserved.
No portion of the contents may be reproduced in any form without
written permission of the Northeast Asian History Foundation.

Abstract

When it comes to the interwar democratic movements in Japan and its colonies, the trend of ‘Taishō Democracy’ is often regarded as an important reference. Ideas such as international coordination and self-determination prevailed while the policy of ‘constitutionalism internally and imperialism externally’ (内に立憲主義、外に帝国主義) continued, which indicates a subtle yet critical link between imperialism and constitutional democracy. My study argues that during this period social movements were not mere reflections of an abstract belief in universal values but an interplay between different conceptions of imperialism and constitutional democracy. By delineating this inner-logic, this paper rediscovers a varied and multi-layered relationship between the empire and the colonies in East Asia, as well as the tension amid intellectuals and social activists, and offers an analytical perspective on (geo-) politics and thought in modern East Asia.

Keywords

Constitutional Democracy, Imperialism, Taishō Democracy, Japanese Empire, Colonial Taiwan

Rethinking Imperialism and Constitutional Democracy in Interwar Japan and Colonial Taiwan

Ya-hsun CHAN

Department of Advanced Social and International Studies,
University of Tokyo

Introduction

Regarding the interwar democratic movements in Japan and its colonies, the trend of ‘Taishō Democracy,’ referring to democratic reform movements that took place around the end of WWI and continued into the 1920s, is often taken as one of the new chapters in modern East Asia.¹ It was a time when ideas such as international coordination and self-determination prevailed while the policy of ‘constitutionalism internally and imperialism externally’ (内に立憲主義, 外に帝国主義) continued. Literature

¹ The specific beginning and the end of ‘Taishō Democracy’ remains contested because the timeframe varies to different narratives. In the narrowest sense, ‘Taishō Democracy’ refers to the period between the Rice Riot of 1918 and the enactment of the Public Preservation Law of 1925. However, as researchers endeavor to draw a relation between the very first spontaneous mass movement in Meiji Japan, namely, the Hibiya Incendiary Incident of 1905 and the large-scale social movements after WWI, 1905 is considered the outset of ‘Taishō Democracy’ in some studies. For instances, see Mitani Taichirō, *Taishō Demokurashi Ron* [On Taishō Democracy] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2013); and Matsuo Takayoshi, *Taishō Demokurashi* [Taishō Democracy] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2001). Similarly, narratives, drawing attention to socio-political dynamics under the Public Preservation Law, tend to extend the period of ‘Taishō Democracy’ to 1931 when the Mukden Incident and its aftermath marked a clear end to the democratic institutionalization. See Narita Ryuichi, *Taishō Demokurashi* [Taishō Democracy] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2007). This paper adopts a loose time period in order to evaluate interwar democratic movements in relation to those of the late Meiji period.

regarding the development of colonial self-determination movements during the post-WWI era has provided a general picture about the juridical-political impact of the Westphalian sovereignty and Woodrow Wilson's 'Fourteen Points.' Anti-colonial nationalism, including movements in China, the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan, are considered practices that echoed the ideal of self-determination initiated by the so-called 'Wilsonian moment.'² Although Lenin's call for self-determination came forth earlier and has been acknowledged for its impact on international socialist movements as well as on decolonization in Asia and Africa, most literature suggests a closer relationship between the League of Nations and democratic movements during the early 1920s in East Asia. Studies argue that the scheme of 'constitutionalism internally and imperialism externally' held back Imperial Japan from rapid military expansion, combined with constitutional democracy, during the interwar period.³ In addition, The Taishō Democracy is praised for setting the tone for the post-WWII democratization in Japan.⁴ In some arguments, the post-WWII democracy in Japan is even forthrightly described as the 'restoration of Taishō Democracy,' or an 'Americanism' construed by Wilsonism.⁵

Despite the fact that the account of the 'Wilsonian moment' has been criticized for neutralizing the imperialist-legacy of Wilsonism in former colonies and for homogenizing colonial contexts to an abstract concept, its academic impact is of significance.⁶ Meanwhile, the Taishō Democracy accounts for a crucial part of studies on anti-colonial social movements in Taiwan, especially for analyses of the Petition Movement for the Establish-

² Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (NC: Oxford University Press, 2007), 8-11.

³ Eizawa Kōji, "Taishō Demokurashi Shisō Hatten no Shodankai" [The Stages of Development of the Thoughts of Taishō Democracy], *Shinshū Daigaku Kyōyōbu Kiyō* 4 (1970): 120-21.

⁴ Matsuo Takayoshi, *Taishō Demokurashi* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2001), vi-vii.

⁵ Miyamoto Matahisa, "'kenkyū nōto' minponshugi no tanjō," *Journal of History* 50-2 (1967): 300-01; Mitani, *Taishō Demokurashi Ron*, 18-19.

⁶ Adom Getachew, *Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination* (NJ: Princeton, University Press, 2019), 39-40; Ussama Makdisi, "Review: The Great Illusion: The Wilsonian Moment in World History," *Diplomatic History* 33-1 (2009): 136-37.

ment of a Taiwanese Parliament (臺灣議會設置請願運動, hereafter as the Petition Movement). Its unfolding impact resonated with efforts towards cultural enlightenment and varied strategies for autonomy. Inasmuch as some attempts of decolonization turned even more critical during the late 1920s, democratic movements faced serious setbacks against the enactment of the Peace Preservation Law in Japan.⁷ In current literature, within the framework of the distinction of armed resistance and cultural resistance against the Japanese colonial rule (commonly referred to as 武裝抗日 and 文化抗日 that indicate the change of the leading form of resistance during the period 1894-1915 and the period 1918-1937 separately), the Taishō Democracy is believed to have channeled the ideal of self-determination and the Neo-Kantian culturalism amongst Taiwanese intellectuals during the 1920s.⁸ Accordingly, the 1920s is often considered the initiation of political consciousness and Taiwanese national identity.⁹

One characteristic of the above-mentioned narratives alongside the tone of the Taishō Democracy is the emphasis on constitutional democracy under the scheme of ‘constitutionalism internally and imperialism externally.’ This predisposition owes its origin, first, to the expression of ‘internally’ and ‘externally’ that implies a domestic and diplomatic distinction, and second, to the terminological proximity of ‘empire’ and ‘imperialism.’ ‘Empire’ surely accounts for a crucial part of tackling democratic practices carried out under the imperial order. For example, arguments of ‘imperial democracy’ have broadened our horizons with the analysis of labors’ participating in politics that involved both empowerment and institutionaliza-

⁷ Ito Teruo, “Shō Yisui to Taiwan minshūtō: ‘zenmin undō’ to ‘kaikyū undō’” [Jiang Weishui and the Taiwanese People’s Party: “National Movement” and “Class Movement”], *Hitotsubashi Review* 83-3 (1980): 405-08.

⁸ Wakabayashi Masahiro, *Taiwan Kōnichi Undōshi Kenkyū* [A Historical Study of the Anti-Japanese Movement in Formosa] (Tokyo: Kenbunshuppan, 1983), 75, 82-84; Wu Rweiren, *The Formosan Ideology: Oriental Colonialism and the Rise of Taiwanese Nationalism, 1895-1945* (CA: University of Chicago, Department of Political Science, 2003), 204-05, 288-89; Chen Tsuilien, “Beyond Resistance and Compliance: A Study of the Home Rule Movement in Taiwan under Japanese ruled,” *Taiwanese Journal of Political Science* 18 (2013): 144-45.

⁹ Wu, *The Formosan Ideology*, 8-12.

tion.¹⁰ At the same time, the implication of imperialism in the 1920s is often equated with imperial order that is, in many instances, regarded as *a priori*. The accent on constitutional democracy which depicts reform movements within the framework of the Japanese imperial order does reflect an undercurrent, of which ‘imperialism’ existed as a hidden premise of imperial order, of ‘empire’ as a regime. The significance and limitations of the issue of imperialism withdraws. It draws strong interest only when the subject concerns Japanese militarism and fascism during the 1930s and 1940s when the legacy of constitutional democracy was believed to have been interrupted. Following Lenin’s well-known description of ‘imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism,’ analyses of imperialism then became dominant against the growing influence of Marxist-Leninism in East Asia. Subsequently, the initiation of theories of imperialism in Japan is usually referred to as the debate on Japanese democratic revolution (日本民主主義論争), and as the debate on Japanese capitalism (日本資本主義論争) that took place between 1927 and 1937, and provided structural analyses and criticisms of western imperialism and Japanese imperialism alike.¹¹ Similar accounts can also be seen in studies on ‘Taiwanese activists’ ‘left-leaning’ around 1927 that resulted in the life-right divide amongst activists and the radicalization of anti-colonial movements.¹² The expression of ‘imperialism externally’ is thus often conceived as a diplomatic stance derived from the continuing tensions with the western powers while the issue of imperialism remains irrelevant in comparison to constitutionalism.

Another characteristic is that the left, including social democratic movements, anarchism, revolutionary socialism and bolshevism, is usually

¹⁰ Andrew Gordon, “Introduction,” *Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan* (LA: University of California Press, 1992), 7.

¹¹ Inoue Kiyoshi, *Nihon Teikokushugi no Keisei* [The Formation of the Japanese Imperialism] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1974), 369-72; Fujii Shōichi, “nihon teikokushugishi no seika to mondaiten” [Achievements and Issues of the History of Japanese Imperialism], *Nihon no Teikokushugi* [The Japanese Imperialism] (Tokyo: Gakuseisha, 1975), 9-11.

¹² Qiu Shijie, *1924nián yǐ qián tái wān shè huì zhǔ yì yùn dòng de méng yá* [The Initiation of Taiwanese Socialist Movement before 1924] (Taipei: hǎi xiá xué shù chū bǎn, 2009), 110-17; Chao Hsunta, “Chiang Wei Shui’s Left-leaning Approach (1930-1931),” *Taiwan Literature Studies* 4 (2013): 142-47.

categorized as an antithesis of the Taishō Democracy. Despite the fact that a few researchers have revealed some often-neglected aspects of the Taishō Democracy in which such left ideals as feminism, minority equalities, radical liberalism, other anarchist moments, and the like were promoted, still, many scholars have assumed that the lines of the left and the Taishō Democracy barely came across each other.¹³ To a certain extent, this approach is the result of a common criticism of the Taishō Democracy as the sugar-coat of ‘bourgeois liberalism.’¹⁴ What is more, the interpretation is also connected with a tendency of decrying the left’s ‘negation of politics’ (政治の否定) between 1906 and 1922. The antagonistic view of the Taishō Democracy and the ‘negation of politics’ reflects a prolonged tension between ideology and strategy, that is a differentiation between reform and revolution, parliamentarianism and direct action, social policy and socialism, lawful gestures and radical stances, and so on. This tension contains numerous shifts and contradictions between different thoughts and actions in a particular historical context that cannot be reduced to a simple left-right distinction. There were vigorous attempts to understand the historical phenomena from diverse and varied angles. However, with the emphasis on the continuity between the Taishō Democracy and the post-WWII democratization, the left’s ‘negation of politics’ is often criticized as a strategic misjudgement and an absence in a general pursuit of democracy.¹⁵ Additionally, since the late 1990s, by redefining liberal intellectuals in the 1920s as ‘Taishō democrats,’ some studies have suggested a new picture of the liberals. Taking note of the effort of constructing ‘politics as an art’ for democracy, aimed at a ‘breakthrough’ of the existing order, they have given a positive account of the liberalist step.¹⁶ In justification of a certain consis-

¹³ In addition to Matsuo’s *Taishō Demokurashi*, Kano Masanao’s work is another outstanding exception that provides critical perspective by revealing those marginalized and understudied subject areas. For details, refer to Kano Masanao, *Taishō Demokurashi no Teiryū* [The Undercurrent of Taishō Democracy] (Tokyo: NHK Books, 1973).

¹⁴ Matsuo, *Taishō Demokurashi*, v-vi, 180-87; Mitani, *Taishō Demokurashi Ron*, 88-90.

¹⁵ Matsuo, *Taishō Demokurashi*, 180.

¹⁶ Iida Taizō, “nashonaru demokuratto to ‘shakai no hakken’” (National Democrat and the ‘Discovery of Society’), *Hihan Seishin no Kōseki: Kindai Nihon Seishinshi no Ichiryōsen* [The

tency of democracy between the interwar period and the post-war era, intentionally or unintentionally, the tension between the Japanese intellectuals and activists has been elaborated as the opposition between the ‘negation of politics’ and politics for a breakthrough, viz., an underestimation of democracy vis-à-vis persistence to democracy.

Since the 2000s, scholarships have come to question the above rationale of narratives that stress the continuity of ‘Taishō Democracy’ and post-WWII democratization. With a focus on the interrelation between the emergence of mass society after WWI and the social formation of the total empire during the 1930s and 1940s, some historians consider the Taishō Democracy as a synthesis of four mechanisms—imperialism, nationalism, colonialism, and modernism—that corresponded to the expansion of the Japanese empire.¹⁷ Sharing a similar interest in the formation of mass society in East Asia, a recent study argues that the Taishō Democracy played a pivotal role in establishing the social basis, or the mass society indispensable to the formation of a totalitarian state in the 1930s.¹⁸ These problematics overlap with the studies concentrating on ‘popular imperialism,’¹⁹ and resonates with the studies delineating the socialization of Japanese fascism known also as ‘grassroots fascism’²⁰ to which democratization served as a precursory role in organizing the arbitrary mass. Moreover, it suggests that the tension between the left and the liberals not be understood as a mere

 Trace of the Spirit of Critique: A Ridgeline of Modern Japanese History of Spirit] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1997), 158-59, 192-93, 218-20.

¹⁷ Narita, *Taishō Demokurashi*, iv-vi.

¹⁸ Koyasu Nobukuni, ‘*Taishō*’ wo *Yominaosu: Kōtoku, Ōsugi, Kawakami, Tsuda, soshite Watsuji, Ōkawa* [Rereading the ‘Taishō’: Kōtoku, Ōsugi, Kawakami, Tsuda, and Watsuji, Ōkawa] (Tokyo: Fujihara Shoten, 2016), 24.

¹⁹ Peter Duus, “The Rise of Imperialism,” *The Rise of Modern Japan* (MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1976), 133-35.

²⁰ The notion of “grassroots fascism” was proposed in the 1980s by Yoshimi Yoshiaki in his *Grassroots Fascism: The War Experience of the Japanese People* (草の根のファシズム—日本民衆の戦争体験, English version was published in 2015). A similar interest of depicting the formation of Japanese fascism from the bottom up can also be found in some works published in the 1990s. For example, Louise Young’s *Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* maintains critical perspectives based on cultural imperialism and social imperialism.

differentiation on politics as aforementioned but a tension involving both the stance of resisting the centralization of state power and the countertendency against it.²¹ In this regard, the tension amongst activists is no longer confined to the narrative of the Taishō Democracy and its antithesis, inseparable from the issue of strategic differentiation on politics, but open to a wider context encompassing the formation of Imperial Japan and its social conditions.

Meanwhile, the continuities and discontinuities of the interwar anti-colonial movements and post-war decolonization have prompted fruitful debates in terms of nationalism, political identity, and autonomy in Taiwanese studies. With reference to, not limited, to the Taishō Democracy, the relations between empire and colony remain contested and there are yet many aspects to be explored. As in Fanonian and Saidian manners, postcolonial mentalities are inevitably entangled with the socio-economic and political conditions emanating from the imperial legacy in which cultural or linguistic imperialism is embodied.²² This entanglement implies a transformation of the relation between empire and colony after the decline of the empire. Moreover, from the 1990s onwards, some studies have delineated the socio-political condition of Taiwan as the ‘periphery,’ ‘fissure,’ and ‘fragment’ of empires. Even, they have criticized Taiwan for attaching to empires in a higher level and placing itself in a position of ‘sub-empire.’ Likewise, the unsettled postcolonial complexity can also be located.²³ To

²¹ Koyasu, *Taishō'wo Yominaosu: Kōtoku, Ōsugi, Kawakami, Tsuda, soshite Watsuji, Ōkawa*, 98-101.

²² Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (NY: Grove Press, 2004), 55-60; Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (NY: Vintage Books, 1994), xxi-xxv, 78-80.

²³ The original terms in Chinese mentioned here are 帝國夾縫, 帝國夾縫, 帝國的碎片, and 次帝國. Detailed interpretation can be referred to Wu Jiemin, “tái wān zài dì guó zhēng bà jiá fēng zhōng dí chū lù” [A Passage-out of the Fissures of Empires], *xīn xīn wén* [The Journalist] 904 (2004). <https://sites.google.com/site/wujiehmin/home/she-hui-zheng-zhi-ping-lun/tai-wan-zai-di-guo-jia-feng-zhong-de-chu-lu> (accessed on 3rd Mar. 2020); and Wu Rweiren, “shòu kùn: zài dì guó jiá fēng zhī zhōng” [Impasse: Amongst the Fissures of Empires], *shòu kùn de sī xiǎng: tái wān chóng fān shì jiè* [The Thought of Impasse: Taiwan's Pivot to the World] (Taipei: Acropolis, 2016), 60-82; and Chen Kuanhsing, “The Imperialist Eye: The Cultural Imaginary of Sub-Empire and a Nation-State,” *Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies* 17 (1994): 149-222.

tackle the puzzle of the colonial and postcolonial situation of Taiwan more structurally, a recent study also points to ‘empire’-ism (「帝国」主義) equipped methodologically with horizontal and vertical analyses.²⁴

With respect to the above-mentioned tension amongst different intellectual and activist narratives before the fall of Imperial Japan and the recent scholarly attempts to question the ties between post-war democracy with what was argued for democracy during the interwar era, this paper traces the interrelation of constitutional democracy and imperialism. Specifically, by re-examining Meiji criticisms of imperialism that set the tone for the debate on *minponshugi* (民本主義, a paraphrase of democracy in Japanese) and demonstrating diverse stances towards ‘constitutionalism internally and imperialism externally,’ this paper will bring the issue of imperialism back to the context of the Taishō Democracy in Japan and Taiwan. It will also treat a form of antagonism amongst these intellectuals and the activists in terms of the conceptualization of constitutional democracy vis-à-vis imperialism alongside the trend of self-determination widespread throughout East Asia after WWI. By so doing, I contend that during the post-WWI era democratic movements were not mere reflections of an abstract belief in universal values but an interplay between constitutionalism and imperialism, both of which were variously conceptualized.

From the perspective of intellectual history, this paper establishes an analytical structure composed of three sections: Meiji theories of imperialism, debate on *minponshugi* of the 1910s, and democratic movements in colonial Taiwan during the 1920s. To better provide a new approach that sheds light on the entanglement of imperialism and constitutional democracy, as well as the tension amongst intellectuals and activists, the research subjects are categorized as follows: (1) Ethical imperialism and the critique of imperialism: Ukita Kazutami (浮田和民) and Kōtoku Shūsui (幸徳秋水); (2) The debate on *minponshugi*: Yoshino Sakuzō (吉野作造), Ōsugi Sakae

²⁴ Wakabayashi Masahiro, “‘Taiwan toiu raireki’ wo motomete: hōhōteki ‘teikoku’ shugi shiron,” [Towards the History of Taiwan: Essay on a Methodological ‘Empire’-ism] Ienaga Masaki ed., *Taiwan Kenkyū Nyūmon* [An Introduction to Taiwan Studies] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2020), 354-58.

(大杉榮), and Yamakawa Hitoshi (山川均); and (3) Rethinking democratic movements in colonial Taiwan: Lim Teng-lok (林呈祿), Lien Wen-ching (連溫卿), and Fan Ben-liang (范本梁). This direction leads both to big names and to the relative unknowns, including liberal constitutionalists, socialists, nationalists and anarchists who had made impacts on social movements in East Asia to different extents. To bring to a focus my discussion on the interrelation of imperialism and constitutional democracy, subjects without any immediate connections will not be covered. In this line, 1) Takekoshi Yosaburō (竹越與三郎) and Takata Sanae (高田早苗) who espoused liberal imperialism and constitutional imperialism respectively, 2) Kayahara Kazan (茅原華山) and Ōyama Ikuo (大山郁夫) involved in the debate on *minponshugi*, and 3) such influential figures as Chiang Wei-shui (蔣渭水) and Hsu Nai-chang (許乃昌) who proactively promoted Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People and/or Lenin's criticism of imperialism will not be included either. It is also through this research that the arguments of the activists like Fan, who has barely been explored due to the lack of materials, will be more richly readdressed.²⁵ Last, despite the fact that this paper stresses the development and succession of certain thoughts and actions, it does not ignore differences and transformations in a broader context, especially, the heterogeneity of the voices for 'constitutionalism internally and imperialism externally,' and the diversity within the Petition Movement. Hence, this paper will take a constructive step in initiating new research and reinvigorating the debate about the relationship between thought and (geo)politics in early 20th-century East Asia.

²⁵ One of the difficulties of conducting research of East Asian anarchists lies in the lack of evidence and materials due to brutal oppressions and the anarchist belief in anonymity alike. For more information, see Arif Dirlik's *Anarchism in the Chinese Revolution* (1991) to Hwang Dongyoun's *Anarchism in Korea: Independence, Transnationalism, and the Question of National Development 1919-1984* (2017). Depicting anarchism from a regional and trans-movement perspective is sometimes an alternative (this is also the approach of Qiu Shijie's study). This paper focuses on the continuities among discourses of imperialism, Japanese anarchism, and Taiwanese anarchist movement within existing materials.

Ethical Imperialism and the Critique of Imperialism: Ukita Kazutami and Kōtoku Shūsui

In the wake of the Meiji Restoration and the enforcement of the Meiji Constitution, Japan initiated its state-building project with western modernity as both reference and counter-reference, both of which legitimized Japan's claim for its own role in safeguarding Asian countries from the violence, posed by western powers, while validating its own ambitions for regional and global hegemony. The enforcement of the Meiji Constitution marked its legitimacy and sovereignty as the country's triumph in the First Sino-Japanese war eased its financial burdens. By waging war against China, it strengthened sovereign power over Ryukyu (now known as Okinawa) and imposed colonial rule on Taiwan. In the meantime, with a considerable amount of foreign loans, taxation and war reparations between 1895 and 1905, Japan emerged as the world's fastest-growing economy.²⁶ Herein, we can find some common factors amid theories of imperialism—military expansion, capitalism, and colonialism.

However, without severing itself from the traditional political behaviors, the Meiji Restoration turned out to be an incomplete revolution in which clanship politics continued. How to bring about a 'second Meiji Restoration,' therefore, became a heated controversy within the intellectual community.²⁷ At a time when Japan began to demonstrate its national strength through overseas expansion, most intellectuals presented supportive attitudes towards militarism.²⁸ It was generally thought that war bene-

²⁶ Robert Thomas Tierney, *Monster of the 20th Century: Kōtoku Shūsui and Japan's first Anti-Imperialist Movement* (CA: University of California Press, 2015), 31; Keiichi Harada, *Nisshin Nichiro Sensō-Sirizū Nihon Kingendaishi* [The Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War: Series Modern Japanese History] 3 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2013), 125-26.

²⁷ Matsuzawa Hiroaki, "meiji shakaishugi no shisō" [Discourses of Meiji Socialism], *The Japanese Socialism* 19 (1968): 18.

²⁸ Miyamoto Moritarō, "Ukita Kazutami ni okeru rinriteki teikokushugi no keisei 1" [The Formation of Ethical Imperialism of Ukita Kazutami 1], *The Review of Law* 112-3 (1982): 68; Alistair Swale, "Tokutomi Sohō and the problem of the national-state in an imperialist world," Dick Stegewerns ed., *Nationalism and Internationalism in Imperial Japan* (NY: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 76-80; Tierney, *Monster of the 20th Century*, 83-85; Yamamuro Shinichi, *Nichiro Sensō no Seiki-Rensa*

fitted Japan's national interests and its international visibility. Along this line, Japanese imperialism was believed to be a capacity that originated exclusively from the Japanese ethnicity in opposition to western imperialism.²⁹ Many were convinced that waging war could help to end the feudal system in some 'backward' areas, such as the Qing dynasty of China, and facilitate the flow of modernization.³⁰ As a result, modernization came to make imperialist utterances just and progressive while subscribing to a modernist reform abroad, in East Asian in particular, as well as at home.

Ukita: Ethical Imperialism and the Constitutional Morality

Criticisms against the Japanese authorities' warlike policies emerged at the turn of the 20th century when Japan's militarism caused serious casualties and financial burdens. One distinguished criticism was carried out by liberal constitutionalist Ukita Kazutami (浮田和民, 1860-1946) who denounced militarism and appealed for 'ethical imperialism' as an alternative. Ukita's main argument indicates that for the future economic growth of Japan, avoiding armed conflicts and pursuing international coordination in accordance with international laws should be imminent and inevitable.³¹ This

Shiten kara miru Nihon to Sekai [The Century of the Russo-Japanese War: Japan and the World from the Viewpoint of Connection] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2005), 82-84.

²⁹ Tierney, *Monster of the 20th Century*, 43-44; Yamamuro, *Nichiro Sensō no Seiki-Rensa Shiten kara miru Nihon to Sekai*, 82-84. In 1894, Tokutomi Sohō (1863-1957), editor-in-chief of *The Nation's Friend* (国民之友), issued 'The Expansion of Greater Japan' (大日本膨張論). In an attempt to counterbalance the western powers, he appealed for the diplomacy of imperialism and urged a large-scale military expansion to support Japan's state-building project. Takayama Chogyū (1871-1902), also had repeatedly condemned western powers for invading Asia and stressed the need for necessary counterattacks in justification of Japan's military expansion.

³⁰ A similar matter can be found in a common view during the Meiji period which emphasized that China was not a sovereign state (中国非国論). In accordance with the classification of *Elements of International Law*, Japan and China were both classified as 'semi-civilized.' As Japan joined the coalition force in the Boxer Rebellion alongside the so-called 'civilized' countries in 1900, some argued that this military action against China was not a war between two or more opposing sovereign nations but a 'humanitarian intervention.'

³¹ Jiang Keshi, "Rinriteki teikokushugi no keisei" [The Formation of Ethical Imperialism], *Ukita Kazutami no Shisōshiteki Kenkyū: Rinriteki Teikokushugi no Keisei* [An Intellectual History of Ukita Kazutami: the Formation of Ethical Imperialism] (Tokyo: Fujishuppan, 2003), 433-40;




Figure 1. The cover page of Ukita's *Ethical Imperialism*. Adapted from: Ukita, Kazutami (1909), *Rinriteki Teikokushugi*. Retrieved from the NDL Digital Collections. <https://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/758632> (accessed on 2020/5/13)

stance can be traced back to his interest in finding a link between social evolution and the essence of the modern nation-state. To him, a nation-state is like an organic whole. It refers to a homogeneous nation integrated under 'a common and consistent national consciousness.'³² Moreover, he argues that legal order is indispensable to shaping Japan as an integrated nation-state amid international competition. In "The Japanese imperialism" (日本の帝國主義) and "Imperialism and pedagogy" (帝國主義と教育), he states as follows:

The so-called imperialism we promote is a doctrine of pursuing the independence of a nation, and, furthermore, participating in the civilization and politics of the world. . . . The one and only imperialism that Japan should advocate is exactly the one that confronts western countries and expands the

rights of its own people on the basis of consent upon which international laws are predicated. In addition, this imperialism flourishes the independence of Asian countries in furtherance of guiding and prompting their reforms.³³

To him, imperialism is meant to be a certain capacity of guaranteeing the independence of Japan and other Asian countries, and of confronting western powers in accordance with international laws. Competition is regarded as the nature of survival while international relation is described as the 'civilization' and 'politics' of the world, a similar view to Wheaton's *Elements*

Miyamoto Moritarō, "Ukita Kazutami ni okeru rinriteki teikokushugi no keisei 2" [The formation of ethical imperialism of Ukita Kazutami 2], *The Review of Law* 112-4 (1982): 74-80.

³² Jiang, *Ukita Kazutami no Shisōshūteki Kenkyū: Rinriteki Teikokushugi no Keisei*, 406.

³³ Ukita Kazutami, *Teikokushugi to Kyōiku* [Imperialism and Pedagogy] (Tokyo: Minyūsha, 1901), 36.

of *International Law*. Against the previous understandings that imperialism is equated with military expansion, Ukita endorsed rightful competitions in terms of national independence and regional leadership. This stance was later termed as ‘ethical imperialism’ (倫理的帝國主義) through which he urged for peaceful economic expansion and co-development with other Asian countries.³⁴

Alongside the escalating tension between Japan and Russia in 1903, the legal feature of Ukita’s ethical imperialism was then elaborated as what he described as the “constitutional morality” of a nation,

We carry an obligation to survive and become the foundation of ethics. Therefore, the first principle of the moral law is simply to survive. The second principle is to compete for the sake of survival. The third principle is to compete more and more for superior survival . . . To establish a nation that is consistent with this ideal, it is crucial to maintain the order and the integration of one society . . . and to demonstrate constitutional morality.³⁵

In this paragraph, the obligation, ethics, and morality of individuals all point to the same issue, namely the survival of a nation. Besides, just as international law regulates relations between nations, he pictures an ideal nation to be established on a well-organized society under the constitution. Ethical imperialism bespeaks an ideal power relation through which conflicts between nations will be dissolved. It is here that his scheme of ‘constitutionalism internally and imperialism externally’ (内に立憲主義, 外に帝國主義) emerged. By the 1910s, Ukita’s thoughts demonstrated an apparent preference for a powerful state. In *On The New Morality of A Nation*, he refuses the idea of natural rights by elaborating the notion of *polis* in Aristotle’s *Politics* as ‘a national life’ (國家的生活), and argues that ‘man is by nature a political animal’; human nature cannot be fulfilled without a na-

³⁴ Ukita, *Teikokushugi to Kyōiku*, 68-69.

³⁵ Ukita Kazutami, *Rinriteki Teikokushugi* [Ethical Imperialism] (Kyoto: Ryūbunkan, 1909), 42-43.

tional life.³⁶

The government as well as people must absolutely obey the state. In the meantime, the government will not be allowed to step outside its jurisdiction authorized by the constitution, not even one step.³⁷

Alongside the inevitable bond between man and the nation-state, Ukita envisioned an absolute obedience to the state. In his argument, the rule of law indicates limits on government while the absoluteness of governance in one nation belongs exclusively to the state. In this regard, it is clear that the emphasis on legal order in Ukita's thought ultimately turned into an advocate for the supremacy of the state. In short, with the assumption of survival as a modern moral principle, Ukita couched a nation-state-oriented imperial reform, spanning ethical imperialism and the supremacy of the state, in terms of state sovereignty.

Kōtoku: Criticism of Imperialism, Direct Action, and *Heimin* Socialism

With an anti-militarist stance similar to Ukita's, Kōtoku Shūsui (幸徳秋水, 1871-1911) also provided a significant reference to imperialism undetached from constitutionalism. However, his arguments developed in an entirely different manner. As a journalist, his editorials reflected a rough interest in establishing a politico-economic point of view. In *Monster of the 20th Century: Imperialism* (廿世紀之怪物 帝國主義), he brings up his analysis through three separate but related factors: patriotism, militarism, and capitalism. He argues that patriotism and militarism form the basis of imperialism whereas capitalism highlights its modern features. First, Kōtoku describes patriotism as a sentiment based on the 'hatred towards other countries' rather than 'pure sympathy and compassion for one's hometown.'³⁸ He warns against the consequences of patriotism: it manipu-

³⁶ Ukita Kazutami, *Shindōtoku Ron* [A New Morality] (Tokyo: Nanbokusha, 1913), 58, 77.

³⁷ Ukita, *Shindōtoku Ron*, 31-32.

³⁸ Kōtoku Shūsui, *Teikokushugi* [Imperialism] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2013), 20.

lates a false opposition as friend/enemy distinction amongst people.³⁹ Second, he calls into question two common veins of militarism; the one for the sake of peace and the other for the sake of the wealth of a nation, and argues that militarism must benefit only the dictators and leave most people having suffered.⁴⁰ Third, he focuses on the specific role of capitalism and criticizes the interrelation between capitalism and imperialism in Meiji Japan. He cast doubts on the imperialist utterance describing imperialism itself as a natural outcome of the development of capitalism.⁴¹

They [the imperialists] suggest that exploring new markets is indispensable since people have been suffering from an abundance of capital and an excess of production . . . It is not because products are no longer needed that there is an excess of production but simply because most people are not capable of consuming. Our current system of free competition itself has caused the capitalist industrialists to monopolize the excessive profits of capital.⁴²

Kōtoku points out that the real issue lies in a malfunctioning socioeconomic system and puts further blame on the monopoly of profits and underconsumption. Adopting a stance similar to his contemporaries, both social democrats and radical liberals, he concludes that as patriotism and militarism strengthen the state of total antagonism and political dictatorship, the




Figure 2. The cover page of Kōtoku's *Imperialism*. Retrieved from the Bibliographic and Image Database of Japanese Modern Times. <https://base1.nijl.ac.jp/~kindai/image/YMNK/YMNK-00112/YMNK-00112-03.jpg> (accessed on 2020/5/13)

³⁹ Ibid., 34-41.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 51, 59-76, 82-84.

⁴¹ Ibid., 98-101.

⁴² Ibid., 102-03.

malfunctioning system of capitalism has made the situation worse.⁴³ Unlike Ukita, Kōtoku looks for a socialist system instead. In *Quintessence of Socialism*, he introduces Marxist historical materialism and the subsequent phenomena, peculiar to capitalism, and gives a fundamental depiction of a capitalist society, including the industrial reserve army, class struggle, exploitation of surplus-value, an excess of production, economic panic, and the economic cartel.⁴⁴ To prevent the potential risk, he puts forward a proposal derived from Richard T. Ely's reformism and delineates his own ideal for socialism in which to 'seize control of all means of production from the landlord-capitalists and to attribute it to a common ownership in the hands of people as well as society.'⁴⁵ By so doing, Kōtoku adjusts the well-known 'dictatorship of the proletariat,' cited from the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, to 'common ownership.'⁴⁶

Meanwhile, during this period, the term Kōtoku employed most frequently to call for people's actions was *heimin* (平民) which referred to common people in a literal sense. Briefly, it reflects four aspects of his arguments concerning political action. First, as patriotism has crystalized as an imperative in Japanese imperialism, *heimin* is defined as non-nationals (非国民), i.e., those un-patriots willing to stand against the fever of imperialism. Second, *heimin* indicates the suffering majority in contrast to the domination of the few. Third, it is translated as 'the proletariat' in the very first Japanese translation of the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* and some other social-democratic and Marxist materials. Last, this concept am-

⁴³ Ibid., 49, 96, 113-14.

⁴⁴ Kōtoku Shūsui, *Shakaishugi Shinzui* [The Quintessence of Socialism] (Tokyo: Chōhōsha, 1903), 24-28, 36-38, 43-47.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 21. His proposal, dependent theoretically on Ely's *Socialism and Social Reform*, was generally seen as an emergency measure to cope with the warlike imperialist policies. Ely was known for his proactive appeals concerning social reforms based on land reform and public ownership. Despite this outward doubt about socialism, his work was taken as a classic text by Meiji socialists. In the meantime, it is noteworthy that although Kōtoku did partially follow Ely's proposal, he subtly dodged Ely's criticisms and brought up his own ideal in opposition to government-led reform policies.

⁴⁶ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, "II. Proletarians and Communists," *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (Marxists Internet Archive, 2010), 26.

ply delivers a will to transnational solidarity in which, he stresses, the *heimin* and proletariat shared a common enemy: imperialism.⁴⁷

Between 1905 and 1906, Kōtoku's thoughts went through a critical leap in his prison life for inciting subversive thoughts 'harmful to the interests of the nation and the social order,'⁴⁸ and during his later exile to the USA. After his return in the summer of 1906, he began to urge an anarcho-syndicalist direct action of society as a whole.⁴⁹ In "The tide of the world revolutionary movement" (世界革命運動の潮流), Kōtoku criticized constitutional reforms and brought up the agenda of direct action.

What our comrades in western countries plan to adopt as means of the future revolution is not something violent. The entire working class can achieve anything with joined hands. . . . To shut down every production and transportation facility in the society is sufficient. In other words, what is to solely be done is to launch the so-called general strike.⁵⁰

To Kōtoku, the direct action for a general strike is not supposed to be reduced merely to political matters, such as universal suffrage or salary ad-

⁴⁷ Kōtoku Shūsui, *Kōtoku Shūsui Zenshū* [The Complete Collection of Kōtoku Shūsui] 6 (Tokyo: Meijibunken, 1968), 441; _____, *Kindai Nihon Shisō Taikei Kōtoku Shūsui* [Series of Modern Japanese Thought: Kōtoku Shūsui] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1975), 173, 197; Tierney, *Monster of the 20th Century*, 45-47, 116-17.

⁴⁸ Itoya Toshio, *Kōtoku Shūsui Kenkyū* [Kōtoku Shūsui Studies] (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1969), 184.

⁴⁹ Asukai Masamichi, "Meiji shakaishugi undo no kiketsu-chokusetsu kōdō ron wo megutte" [The Consequence of Meiji Socialist Movement: Regarding the Theory of Direct Action], *Thought* 524 (1968): 263-35; John Crump, *The Origin of Socialist Thought in Japan* (NY: Routledge, 2011), 19-21; Kōtoku Shūsui, *Kōtoku Shūsui Zenshū* [The Complete Collection of Kōtoku Shūsui] 7 (Tokyo: Meijibunken, 1971), 256; Komatsu Ryūji, "'keizaisoshiki no mirai' hoka— Kōtoku Shūsui to anakizumu" [The Future of Economic Organization: *Kōtoku Shūsui and Anarchism*], *Kōtoku Shūsui Zenshū* [The Complete Collection of Kōtoku Shūsui] 7 (Tokyo: Meijibunken, 1969), 426-28, 436. Despite the fact that this call for direct action did not stem from a systematic understanding of anarchism, his appeal can be traced back to three anarchist factors of 1) theoretical works regarding anarchism, such as works of Bakunin, Kropotkin, or Malatesta, 2) the anarchist role of general strike in the First Russian Revolution of 1905, and 3) syndicalist practices of the time.

⁵⁰ Kōtoku, *Kindai Nihon Shisō Taikei Kōtoku Shūsui*, 101.

justments, but should be developed as revolutionary acts.⁵¹ To achieve this purpose, he believes, revolution could not be carried out overnight ‘because it takes a large amount of time to arouse consciousness and to strengthen solidarity.’⁵² Eventually, in 1909, Kōtoku put forward the slogan of ‘towards the people’ and called for action to build greater solidarity across different walks of life and social distinctions.⁵³ Arguably, the idea of *heimin* is related to common people in terms of social solidarity conjoined tightly with the practice of general strike. With a firm stance of anti-imperialist socialism against the state, Kōtoku’s direct action displays his strategic concern for political action in which a certain tension between the state and the society is never resolved.⁵⁴ In this regard, his appeal for direct action can be seen as recognition of the autonomy from within one society, or a *heimin* socialism. It brought to light a revolutionary step towards the empowerment of the people, i.e., the initiative of people’s own sovereignty.

The Debate on *Minponshugi*: Yoshino Sakuzō, Ōsugi Sakae, and Yamakawa Hitoshi

In the wake of the High Treason Incident of 1910,⁵⁵ Kōtoku’s attempt to stimulate sociopolitical changes outside of the existing legal order was

⁵¹ Kōtoku, *Kōtoku Shūsui Zenshū* 6, 434-35.

⁵² Kōtoku, *Kindai Nihon Shisō Taikai Kōtoku Shūsui*, 300.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 301-02.

⁵⁴ Kōtoku, *Shakaishugi Shinzui*, 129-30. It is noteworthy that Kōtoku did not make a clear refusal to the Emperor system during the early 1900s. Some arguments even showed that he believed a socialist system and the Emperor system were compatible with each other. This stance was in large part influenced by his mentor Nakae Chōmin who was known for his interpretation of *res publica* as a political form of joint governance between the Emperor and its royal subjects, namely people in Japan. Kōtoku’s tolerance on the Emperor system is believed to have changed after 1905 when some expressions against the system could be found in his works and correspondences. Until his execution in 1911, however, no solid arguments regarding the system had been made. Accordingly, it is difficult to judge whether his refusal to the notion of state functioned as a counterforce against the ‘national polity’ (国体) of Japan.

⁵⁵ In the incident, Kōtoku was accused of being responsible for a conspiracy to assassinate the Emperor, convicted of the crime of treason, and executed. Until the 1960s, when the ‘incident’ was proved to be a political plot, he was often misunderstood as an extremist who favored political terrorism.

forcibly interrupted. The socialist movements underwent the so-called ‘age of winter’ with constant police harassment and the government’s high-handed policies. During the 1910s and 1920s, to rely on lawfulness and patriotic gestures became more or less the camouflage for their remaining activities against the suppression.⁵⁶ By launching legal activities authorized by the constitution, such as tax reforms and the extension of suffrage, the reformist intellectuals witnessed a peak referred later to as ‘Taishō Democracy.’ On the premise of ‘imperialism externally and constitutionalism internally,’ *minponshugi* advocated by Yoshino Sakuzo (吉野作造, 1878-1933) is believed to have best represented these circumstances.⁵⁷ Meanwhile, Ōsugi Sakae (大杉栄, 1885-1923) and Yamakawa Hitoshi (山川均, 1880-1958), both of whom were Kōtoku’s fellows and successors of direct action, seemed rather detached from and intolerant to Yoshino’s legalist posture. Thus, the debate on *minponshugi* can be regarded as a prelude to the tension amid social movements during the post-WWI era.

1. Disputes over the Notion of State

Inspired by Ukita’s constitutional politics, Yoshino’s interests in constitutionalism can be traced back to his theory of state. To him, there exists an indivisible bond between individuals and the state.⁵⁸ In “On the ideas of the ‘authority of the state’ and ‘sovereignty’” (「国家威力」と「主権」との觀念に就て), Yoshino employs Hegel’s *Staatsgewalt* to delineate the difference between authority and sovereignty. He stresses that ‘sovereignty lies in the state’ is a false proposition; the real issue is ‘the authority of the state which lies in the state.’⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Matsuo, *Taishō Demokurashi*, 89, 114, 162, 169, 305.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 157-58.

⁵⁸ Yoshino did not initially distinguish between ideas of state, nation, nation-state and government, therefore the connotation of his wording of ‘国家’ appears to be ambiguous. As regards the notion of *Staatsgewalt*, I adopt both ‘state’ and ‘nation’ accordingly in the following paragraph.

⁵⁹ Yoshino Sakuzō, *Yoshino Sakuzō Senshū Seiji to Kokka* [Selected Works of Yoshino Sakuzō: Politics and the State] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995), 93.

From my point of view, ‘sovereignty’ indicates the legal force that demands the national actions of individuals. Therefore, it refers to coercion that aims entirely at the national actions of individuals and requires their obedience (blindness in an extreme sense) to the outer criterion. . . . What I designate as the ‘authority of the state’ indeed has a direct connection to something that not only regulates but also takes a lead in allowing for the individual act on his/her own will, i.e., the supreme inner criterion of the national actions of individuals.⁶⁰

By distinguishing between the outer-legal and inner-spiritual criteria, Yoshino introduces the distinction between sovereignty and the authority of the state. To him, the former refers to the power of subjugation and domination while the latter relates to an individual’s spontaneous obedience. Herein, it is noteworthy that sovereignty is perceived as a sovereign power, a regime, or a form of government. Authority appears indivisible to the state and bespeaks a ‘vitality of guiding the sovereignty’ in the modern era.⁶¹ To maintain this vitality, therefore, requires consistency between people and the state, which sets the tone for his political theory. Alongside this, Yoshino describes democracy as a result of an extreme discrepancy between sovereignty and the authority of the state. People have but to demand authority by launching revolution since ‘sovereignty violates the authority of state.’⁶² To avoid this situation, he urges for reconciliation under an ideal type of constitutional governance that balances the tension between statism (国家主義) and individualism (個人主義).⁶³

⁶⁰ Yoshino, *Yoshino Sakuzō Senshū Seiji to Kokka*, 92.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 95.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 96.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 124. There are some similar albeit different terms in Japanese regarding the notion of 国家 that refers to nation, state, or nation-state in different context, including 国粹主義, 国家主義, and 国家中心主義. In English, they are often translated as ‘nationalism’ which can lead to some misunderstandings. In the following paragraphs, I focus on the issue of “state” in light of governance and legal constitution by employing a relatively unpopular word “statism” to translate the term 国家主義. Accordingly, 国家中心主義 can be translated as “state-centrism.” This discernment will help highlight the significance of “state” in Yoshino’s works and distinguish his

Sharing a similar view on constitutionalism with Ukita, Yoshino regarded the constitutional governance as essential to the political reforms in both the domestic and diplomatic aspects. He warns against the danger of statism and denounces individualism for its ignorance of such crucial issues as norms of a nation (国家的規範) and the morality of sacrifice.⁶⁴ In Yoshino's theory, statism drags down the nation while individualism harms Japan's national interests in industrial development and international competitions.⁶⁵ His interest in constitutionalism stems from a pursuit of power balance regulated by the constitution.⁶⁶ His focus is primarily upon how to harmonize contradictions and avoiding political vacuums, caused by the revolutionary epoch of the day, less than how to understand sovereignty in association with social formation that includes emperor, people, and the state.

Unlike Yoshino's interest in the state theory and constitutionalism, Ōsugi and Yamakawa, as the most influential representatives of the anarcho-syndicalism, were enthusiastic about the potential of transnational direct actions. Let alone Ōsugi's remarkable self-positioning as an anarchist, a diversity of interests can be found in his thoughts on whom Kōtoku's criticism of imperialism and *heimin* socialism made some impact. During the Russo-Japanese war, Ōsugi had addressed the tension between nationalism and internationalism with a doubtful eye on patriotism channeled by the passion towards nation-state.⁶⁷

In comparison with Yoshino's interest in the theory of state, Ōsugi's apparent indifference to state can be traced back to his arguments regarding the inherent political and social orders expressed as the 'facts of conquest'

 efforts from other nationalist attempts, such as 国粹主義, regarding the supremacy of the Japanese ethnicity in relation to the Meiji nationalism.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 126-27.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 129.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 132.

⁶⁷ Ōsugi Sakae, *Ōsugi Sakae Zenshū* [The Complete Collection of Ōsugi Sakae] 1 (Tokyo: Paru Shuppan, 2015), 2-6.

(征服の事実).⁶⁸ In his rationale, following the collapse of the feudal system, the rise of the constitutional state reveals the will to individual freedom in association with the birth of a modern state. However, the long-continued domination stays unchanged as the previous privileged remained and the newborn privileged came to power. Against this situation, Ōsugi doubts if the appeal for the state as the ‘highest form of community’ could fit the best interests of people.⁶⁹ The ‘facts of conquest’—the violence of the conqueror and the willing acknowledgment of the conquered—, as a prologue to Ōsugi’s serial arguments regarding the theory of the nature of slavery (奴隸根性), the extension of life (生の拡充) and the creation of life (生の創造), demonstrates the basis of his anarchism. He argues that social institutions have developed hand in hand with domination which originates from the ‘facts of conquest’ including the army, factories, the parliament and the state, and so forth.⁷⁰ And, it is modern society that has been broadly divided into capitalists as the conqueror and laborers as the conquered.⁷¹ Marxism, according to Ōsugi, provides a significant referential point in which to fathom the causes of the modern facts of conquest via historical materialism, capitals, and theories of production.⁷² However, the way people should resist against the prolonged history of conquest without falling back appears to be the most critical issue of the time. To achieve this goal, the creation of life—a leap or reverse as compared with the orderly progression of revolutionary stages—is indispensable. Then, an entirely differ-

⁶⁸ Ōsugi Sakae, *Ōsugi Sakae Zenshū* [The Complete Collection of Ōsugi Sakae] 2 (Tokyo: Paru Shuppan, 2014), 102-08. The ‘facts of conquest’ refers to 征服の事実 in Japanese. Literally, 事実 indicates the reality, facts, or truths in different context. Here I choose “facts” to highlight the aspect of norms and values in one society, more in tune with Ōsugi’s counterargument against the establishment of Imperial Japan, just as “social facts” in sociology refers to a certain value system or social structure.

⁶⁹ Ōsugi Sakae, *Ōsugi Sakae Zenshū* [The Complete Collection of Ōsugi Sakae] 3 (Tokyo: Paru Shuppan, 2014), 150-54.

⁷⁰ Ōsugi Sakae, *Ōsugi Sakae Hyōronshū* [Collection of Commentaries by Ōsugi Sakae] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1996), 34, 40, 50-53.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 55-56.

⁷² Ōsugi, *Ōsugi Sakae Zenshū* [The Complete Collection of Ōsugi Sakae] 3, 173-78.

ent projection of revolution from the traditional Marxist theory emerged.⁷³

A similar vigilance can be found in the early works of Yamakawa, in which he focuses specifically on the interrelation among the nation-state, capitalism, and imperialism. This orientation can be interpreted as a further argument of Kōtoku's criticism of imperialism which gave a general sketch of the relationship among the three elements. Yamakawa's most influential argument was launched around WWI. To him, the Great War disclosed exactly the imperialist nature of capitalism, where the emergence of the nation-state played an essential role.⁷⁴ In "Anatomy of the capital system" (資本主義のからくり), adopting a common Marxist point of view, Yamakawa captures the nation-state as a co-product of capitalism and construes the development of capitalism during the 1910s in both a liberalist pattern and an imperialist pattern.⁷⁵ Moreover, by introducing the notion of the superstructure, he calls attention to the issue a ruling class and democratization.

The modern nation-state can turn into a cause for militarism only when the nation has, to some extent, been democratized, and the lust for dynastic power has been consistent with the class that became dominant as a result of certain democratization.⁷⁶

To him, in the modern era, the interests between the previous and current ruling classes have integrated alongside the development of the nation-state and democracy. Since inequalities, originating fundamentally from economic life, are left unsolved, no end to militarism is guaranteed. In

⁷³ Ōsugi, *Ōsugi Sakae Zenshū* 1, 314-16. Ōsugi's interest in the possibility of carrying out a revolution without the expected stages of development of one society can be traced back to his studies of anarchism, anarchist biology, and geography. By probing into these related works, he gained insights from the theory of "mutation" and that of "deviation," which eventually supported his endeavors to tell evolution from revolution.

⁷⁴ Yamakawa Hitoshi, *Yamakawa Hitoshi Zenshū* [The Complete Collection of Yamakawa Hitoshi] 1 (Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 2003), 388.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 440.

⁷⁶ Yamakawa Hitoshi, *Yamakawa Hitoshi Zenshū* [The Complete Collection of Yamakawa Hitoshi] 2 (Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 1966), 98.

short, Ōsugi and Yamakawa probe into the existing power relation by calling the state and the nation-state into question, respectively, while Yoshino upholds the constitutional authority of the state. Ōsugi and Yamakawa present more interest in revealing the untold tension behind the façade of constitutionalism whereas Yoshino seeks after a stable constitutional order in lieu of revolutionary upheaval.

2. The Debate on *Minponshugi*

The development of *minponshugi* is generally acknowledged as a progress of democracy through which the tension between the Emperor's sovereign power and people's political rights was eased.⁷⁷ In the debate on *minponshugi*,⁷⁸ Yoshino reveals a belief that monarchy and democracy will become compatible with each other once an ideal constitutionalism is established.⁷⁹ Contrarily, Ōsugi and Yamakawa cast doubts on the consequences of the ignorance of people's sovereignty and warns that democracy would move backward.⁸⁰

In the wake of WWI, the concept of democracy was rather unpopular and facing challenges in Japan. Yoshino's appeal for *minponshugi* was prepared against the conventional idea that democracy violates the Emperor's sovereign power and that the public opinion merely reflects the stupidity of the crowd.⁸¹ Meanwhile, Yoshino exerted himself balancing sovereignty

⁷⁷ Ishida Takeshi, "'Shakai' no ishikika to shakaiseisaku gakkai" [The Sense of 'Society' and the Association for Social Policy], *Nihon no Shakai Kagaku* [Social Sciences in Japan] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1984), 91-92.

⁷⁸ Among a series of debates on *minponshugi* between 1912 and 1920, Yoshino's conceptualization is believed to have generated people's greatest enthusiasm in both Japan and its colonies. Instead of going through every debate at the time, this paper punctuates a discursive context between Yoshino and his opponents, Ōsugi and Yamakawa.

⁷⁹ Yoshino Sakuzō, "Kensei no hongi wo toite sono yūshū no bi wo sumasu no michi wo ronzu" [On the Essence of Constitutionalism and the Path towards Its Ultimate Fulfillment], *Taishō Demokurashi Ronsōshi* [The History of Debates of Taishō Democracy] 1 (Tokyo: Shinsensha, 1971), 258-59.

⁸⁰ Ōsugi, *Ōsugi Sakae Zenshū* 4, 208-11; Yamakawa, *Yamakawa Hitoshi Zenshū* 1, 453-55, 463.

⁸¹ Ōta Masao, "Kaisetsu" [Commentary], *Taishō Demokurashi Ronsōshi* [The History of Debates of Taishō Democracy] 1 (Tokyo: Shinsensha, 1971), 536-37.

and state authority on the one hand and statism and individualism on the other. Accordingly, from the perspective of constitutionalism, he stressed that the constitution determines the fundamental rules of state governance but it does not necessarily have to be defined by the doctrine of ‘the sovereignty lies with the people.’⁸² In his most-quoted article “On the essence of constitutionalism and the path towards its ultimate fulfillment” (憲政の本義を説いて其有終の美を濟すの途を論ず), Yoshino asserts as follows.

When it comes to new (western) knowledge regarding politics, laws, and so forth, the term [democracy] has been applied to at least two different senses. On one hand, it is applied as ‘the sovereignty of the state lies de jure with the people,’ while on the other, as ‘the fundamental aim of the sovereign activities of the state lies politically with the people.’⁸³

First, in his argument, the state is believed to be indispensable to democracy. Second, by distinguishing between the sphere of law and that of politics, as well as the sovereignty of the state and the sovereign activities of the state, Yoshino differentiates democracy in two senses, *de jure* and *de facto* by which means the well-known distinction between democracy and *minponshugi* is made. At this juncture, democracy refers to issues regarding the whereabouts of the sovereignty (主権の所在) and *minponshugi* refers to the aim of the sovereign activities (主権活動の目的). Without necessarily elaborating democracy alone, he recapitulates the urgency of establishing a




Figure 3. Yoshino’s article published in *Chuō Kōron*. Reprinted from Yoshino, Sakuzō (1916), “Kensei no hongii wo toite” in *Chuō Kōron* 31(3) (Tokyo: Chuō Kōron Sha): 326.

⁸² Yoshino, *Taishō Demokurashi Ronsōshi* 1, 249.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 259.

constitutional *minponshugi* that connects the Meiji Constitution and democracy together and puts people at the forefront of the sovereign activities. This combination made him confide in the inviolability of the imperial system in juxtaposition with the latest (western) trend of democracy.

To be certain, Yoshino's *minponshugi* helped bring into prominence an amalgam of Imperial Japan and constitutionalism in which monarchy and democracy could be smoothly subsumed.⁸⁴ However, this stance immediately elicited a controversy, including criticism from Ōsugi and Yamakawa, in the intellectual community. In "The blind leading the blind: Dr. Yoshino's theory of the descent of democracy" (盲の手引する盲—吉野博士の民主主義墮落論), Ōsugi praises Yoshino's effort in bringing up the issues regarding sovereignty but severely criticizes the way he mixes democracy with *minponshugi*.⁸⁵ What Yoshino has described as reconciliation/balance is indeed a compromise preventing him from facing the reality that as the 'formidable institution of necessary evils,' as well as the 'highest form of community,' the state prevails (in every sector of the society).⁸⁶ According to Ōsugi, that is how Yoshino states that *minponshugi* reaffirms statism on the battlefield of constitutionalism without confronting it.

As the absolute principle of politics, democracy has turned into one of the principles of convenience that corrects the malpractice of statism—the opposite of democracy—as a result of its development. Eventually, democracy has even lost the name and been renamed as *minponshugi*.⁸⁷

Ōsugi entertained grave doubts concerning the possibility of reconciliation/balance between statism and democracy as the two ends of politics to be reconciled without distortion and takes Yoshino's *minponshugi* as the vivid example of that distortion. In the process, Ōsugi thinks, democracy was put in jeopardy and turned futile. That being so, in Ōsugi's opinion, the theory

⁸⁴ Ibid., 261.

⁸⁵ Ōsugi, *Ōsugi Sakae Zenshū* 4, 207.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 210-11.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 208.

of reconciliation might lead to a conspiracy between *minponshugi* and statism in which the former enhances the latter. Contrarily, during the early 1910s, Ōsugi was devoted to anarchism under the banner of new socialism and a revolutionary tactic called the ‘rebel of life’ (生の反逆).⁸⁸ He paid attention to a scheme predicated upon communal economy and union-based politics with a view to deterring the class distinctions and activating the idea of mutual aid.⁸⁹

Yamakawa shares a similar attitude against *minponshugi* and a syndicalist point of view with Ōsugi. He agrees with Yoshino’s observation that capitalist imperialism is seeking the monopoly of the global market while liberalism is incorporating into statism.⁹⁰ However, he disagrees with Yoshino’s differentiation of sovereignty.⁹¹ To him, *minponshugi* can be briefly summarized as *democracy* without democracy and as the absence of people’s demands. The constitution, conceptualized by Yoshino, is nothing but a simple fact of history and an *a priori* of politics so any reduction of democracy to *minponshugi* could serve to accentuate statism and aristocracy.⁹²

What is more, questioning a close linkage between *minponshugi* and statism, Yamakawa underlines *minponshugi* as the art of oligarchic rule interchangeable with a democracy without democratic characteristics.⁹³ More importantly, he worries about a reversal in which the anti-statist conviction of *minponshugi* might end up going the other way around to support statism and even fashion a new form of imperialism.⁹⁴ Against this scenario, Yamakawa calls for a ‘return to democracy.’⁹⁵

The spirit of pure democracy pursues direct politics of and by all mem-

⁸⁸ Ōsugi, *Ōsugi Sakae Zenshū* 2, 131.

⁸⁹ Ōsugi, *Ōsugi Sakae Zenshū* 3, 150.

⁹⁰ Yamakawa, *Yamakawa Hitoshi Zenshū* 1, 463.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 452.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 453-56.

⁹³ Yamakawa, *Yamakawa Hitoshi Zenshū* 2, 87, 93.

⁹⁴ Yamakawa, *Yamakawa Hitoshi Zenshū* 1, 463.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 460-61.

bers of the society. Also, politics should not speak up for democratic politics that lubricates the relation between the dominant and the dominated with the oil of democracy but for common affairs that involve no part of domination.⁹⁶

With a strong implication of syndicalism, Yamakawa features a society through which all members are involved without exclusion. In other words, instead of excluding particular subjects from the political sphere, he calls for an embracement of all in common affairs. In counter to *minponshugi* as a democracy without democratic characteristics, Yamakawa gave priority to a politics of inclusion as democracy in its purest form.

3. Democracy in What State?

Just as the perspective of Ukita and Kōtoku has revealed, different conceptions of the idea of imperialism occasioned various interpretations regarding state sovereignty and people's sovereignty in the 1900s. The debate on *minponshugi* showed a similar dynamism. Despite the fact that Yoshino had no intention of linking his constitutionalism to the term 'imperialism,' his theory did reflect a similar interest with Ukita's ethical imperialism. By providing a scheme of constitutional *minponshugi* that regulated the 'sovereign activities of the state,' he elaborated on Ukita's thesis about a reliable legal order in tune with constitutionalism. Similarly, Ōsugi and Yamakawa carried on Kōtoku's criticism of imperialism and developed their interpretations regarding the intimacy between the existing power relations and *minponshugi*.

However, it does not mean that the debate on *minponshugi* was a mere repetition of previous theories of imperialism. Instead of focusing on legal order in terms of imperialism, Yoshino delves more into the relationship between individuals and the state with respect to democratic thoughts. In addition, unlike Ukita's apparent mistrust in people's right of autonomy

⁹⁶ Ibid., 460.

and interest in state supremacy, supposed regulation under the constitution, Yoshino's attitude is relatively flexible.⁹⁷ To him, the authority of the state can only be disclosed with a harmonious relationship between the state and the people; yet, public opinions need guidance just as people need to be enlightened.⁹⁸ Contrarily, from the perspectives of Ōsugi and Yamakawa, an entirely different enthusiasm can be seen.⁹⁹ In Ōsugi's rationale, as the consequence of the 'facts of conquest,' society has witnessed the history of conquest having potential for the revolutionary anarchism and proving itself a 'boundless movement of evolution.'¹⁰⁰ In Yamakawa's call for a pure democracy, society is regarded as a sphere opposed to politics. This well-known anti-political stance lasted until 1922 when he announced a turn from 'the negation of politics and the confrontation of politics.'¹⁰¹ That is how Yamakawa's emphasis on society as a pivotal factor for anti-political activism comes in step with his theoretical offensive against the conspiracy between statism and *minponshugi*.

Besides, their attempt to advance people's solidarity from without the existing order reminds us of Kōtoku's *heimin* socialism amid the split between syndicalism and parliamentarianism. Against the backdrop of the 1907 Hibiya Incendiary Incident,¹⁰² how to maintain the scheme of social-

⁹⁷ During the 1910s, Ukita used to describe the masses as those who are 'mentally low-graded and lack common-sense' and therefore can be easily manipulated. To him, the mass is non-autonomous, and to an extent precarious to Japan's constitutionalism. For details about this topic, see Ikimatsu Keizō, *Taishōki no Shisō to Bunka* [The Thought and Culture of the Taishō Period] (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1971), 35.

⁹⁸ Yoshino, *Yoshino Sakuzō Senshū Seiji to Kokka*, 30-31.

⁹⁹ This chapter focuses on the situation before the 1920s so changes after the debate on *minponshugi* will not be discussed. However, it is worth mentioning that although during the 1910s Ōsugi and Yamakawa shared a similar syndicalist stance, disputes over which strategy best fitted the interest of the labor movements soon occurred alongside the escalation of labor disputes in Japan. Their debate took place between 1920 and 1922 (known as the anarchist-Bolshevik debate) in which Ōsugi represented the anarchist stance while Yamakawa represented the Bolshevik one.

¹⁰⁰ Ōsugi, *Ōsugi Sakae Zenshū* 1, 315-16.

¹⁰¹ Yamakawa Hitoshi, "Seiji no hitei to seiji no taikō" [The Negation of Politics and the Confrontation of Politics], Ōkubo Kazushi ed., *Ana-boru Ronsō* [The Anarchist-Bolshevik Debate] (Tokyo: Dōjidaisha, 2005), 72-73.

¹⁰² The incident was a patriotic riot in 1905 in the Hibiya area of Tokyo. The riot was ignited mainly

ism vis-à-vis imperialism remained contested in the 1910s. By the late 1910s, with a similar concern over imperialism, Ōsugi focused more on domination in affiliation with his hypothesis of ‘facts of conquest’ while Yamakawa showed a particular interest in articulating the nature of capitalism. While their dissent against the state appears as a common theme in their criticisms of *minponshugi*, however, the thematic spectrum of anti-statism is fairly wide. Taking the later anarchist-Bolshevik debate as a reference, Ōsugi and Yamakawa disagreed with each other in various aspects including differentiations on politics, the proletariat dictatorship, and forms of unions.¹⁰³ In search of the boundless movement of evolution, Ōsugi’s new socialism anticipated a permanent revolution without any direct hard-handed intervention of central government. Yamakawa’s social life, sitting in tandem with a pure democracy, leaned more toward the Marxist-Leninism. Taken altogether, it can be said that Kōtoku’s socialist idea was reinscribed simultaneously in the anarchist discourse of Ōsugi and the Bolshevik discourse of Yamakawa.

Rethinking Democratic Movements in Colonial Taiwan: Lim Teng-lok, Lien Wen-ching, and Fan Ben-liang

Following the end of WWI, the convention of the Paris Peace Conference, the international settlement for peace, and advocates for self-determination engendered a reshuffling of global politics. No military supremacy seemed to fit the tendency of international relations. Many intellectuals, including those in Imperial Japan and colonial Taiwan, were convinced that international relations were heading into a new phase of humanity and justice. When such valuable concepts as international coordination and autonomy

because the Katsura cabinet failed to reach a satisfactory deal with Russia after the Russo-Japanese War. The situation provoked rage amongst people in Japan. Many gathered for a protest in Tokyo and finally became violent after their confrontation with the police. The authorities had to declare martial law to suppress the riot. The state of siege lasted for more than two months and ended up with over 500 casualties.

¹⁰³ Ōkubo Kazushi ed., *Ana-Boru Ronsō* [The Anarchist-Bolshevik Debate] (Tokyo: Dōjidaisha, 2005), 76, 85, 143, 188.

triggered upheavals in the colonies of former western powers, East Asia also attested to various social movements. Reform movements gathered under the banner of *minponshugi* in Japan while the tension amid different social sectors generated a greater dynamism of ‘reconstruction.’¹⁰⁴ In the wake of the March First Movement in colonial Korea and the May 4th Movement in mainland China, intelligentsia of colonial Taiwan also quested for the well-being of Taiwanese people in various aspects. Next, I would like to explore nationalist, socialist, and anarchist voices from colonial Taiwan and shed light on their correlation with the discourses on imperialism and *minponshugi* in Japan.

1. Lim: Special Legislation as a Constitutional Exception

As regards social movements in Taiwan during the 1920s, the Petition Movement for the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament (臺灣議會設置請願運動, hereafter as the Petition Movement) is known to be the most widespread and influential one. It is praised for motivating Taiwanese nationalism in political and cultural spheres and for broaching the issue of how to reduce the inequalities under colonial rule. The movement was supported by the Taiwan Cultural Association (臺灣文化協會, hereafter as the Association), in collaboration with such magazines as *Tai Oan Chheng Lian* (臺灣青年) and *Taiwan Minpao* (臺灣民報). As a leading representative, Lim Teng-lok (林呈祿, 1886-1968) and his fellows devoted themselves to promoting colonial autonomy by way of the rule of law and constitutionalism. In “The awakening of Taiwanese youth in the new era” (新時代に処する台湾青年の覚醒), Lim defines the post-WWI era as a time of new culture, geared towards reforms of the world and human emancipation, and avows that the principle of the survival of the fittest has turned obsolete.

A united front of action in solidarity regardless of gender, class, race

¹⁰⁴Kano Masanao, “kaisetsu” [commentary], *Kindai Nihon Shisō Taikei 34 Taishō Shisō Shū II* 近 [Series Modern Japanese Thought 34 Collection of Taishō Thoughts 2] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1977), 420-21.




Figure 4. The first issue of *Tai Oan Chheng Lian*. Reprinted from *Tai Oan Chheng Lian* 1(1) (Tokyo: Taiwan Seinen Zasshisha).

and so forth, he believes, for economic equality, anti-bureaucracy, *minponshugi*,¹⁰⁵ or national self-determination appears to be the impending task that fulfills ‘the sacred mission of civilization’ based on humanity, justice, liberty, and equality.¹⁰⁶ During the Paris Peace Conference, Lim argues that as a member of the League of Nations Japan is no longer an island, isolated in the old times, so needs to expand its gaze globally afar in the new era.¹⁰⁷ As the only nation with some colonies in Asia, Japan is obligated to the cultural development of Taiwan and the perpetual peace of East Asia.¹⁰⁸ With an enthusiasm for cultural development, Lim regards a thorough rule of law, i.e., constitutionalism, as the key factor and underscores the necessity of enlightenments for Taiwanese people.¹⁰⁹

Nay, as a part of the world, to enlighten Taiwan as such culturally inevitably shines a spirit of commitment and dedication for the society and the nation as well as the world. Therefore, we the youth believe, the cultural movement of ours violates no policy of the government; contrarily, it is exactly through our efforts that a decisive success in the history of imperial rule can be achieved.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁵Yoshino Sakuzō, “Shukushi” [Congratulatory Address], *Tai Oan Chheng Lian* 1 (July 16, 1920): 9-10. Although Yoshino did send his greetings and encouragement to *Tai Oan Chheng Lian* for the release of the first issue, he did not hesitate to address his concern about the potential issue of exclusiveness in the cultural, enlightenment in specific, movement of Taiwan.

¹⁰⁶Lim Teng-lok, “Shin jidai ni shosuru taiwan seinen no kakusei” [The awakening of Taiwanese youth in the new era], *Tai Oan Chheng Lian* 1 (July 16, 1920): 30-31.

¹⁰⁷*Ibid.*, 32.

¹⁰⁸*Ibid.*, 33.

¹⁰⁹*Ibid.*, 36-37.

¹¹⁰*Ibid.*, 39.

In his appeal, enlightenment refers to the culture-led practices that contribute to the civilization at home and in the world. This step informs us of how Lim strategized for a higher, more objective in a sense, standpoint from which to include both the colonizer and the colonized and to overlook colonial and international orders together.¹¹¹ A similar effort can be found in *The Movement of the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament* (台湾議会の設置運動). Here, he argues that the dictatorship of the colonial authorities contradicts the constitutionalism.¹¹²

Moreover, the constitutional politics that has developed in civilized countries is eventually becoming the common truth of the world. What is to be done at this point is to authorize the right to political participation, to put politics, based on the self-conscious public opinion, into practice, and to seek the well-being of the nation.¹¹³

As the common ground of civilization, he thinks, constitutional politics has swept across the world and has prompted movements such as the Universal Suffrage Movement in Japan.¹¹⁴ Given the fundamental ethnic differences between Taiwanese and Japanese and the lessons from the doomed European colonial policy of assimilation, he thinks, the appeal for special legis-

¹¹¹Ibid., 38.

¹¹²Taiwan Gikai Kisei Dōmeikai, *Taiwan Gikai no Secchi Undō* [The movement for the establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament] (Tokyo: Taiwan Gikai Kisei Dōmeikai, 1929), 3-8. *The Movement of the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament* is a pamphlet published by the association 'Gikai Kisei Dōmeikai' (台湾議會期成同盟会) where Lim served as the editor and the publisher. Despite the fact that the actual contributor(s) remain contested, studies have cited testimony from Tagawa Daikichirō's memoir of Lim as the person who drafted the *Prospectus* for the Petition Movement. See Chi, Hsufeng, *Taishōki Taiwanjin no 'nihon ryugaku' kenkyū* [Study of Taiwanese Residents' "Studying Abroad in Japan" in the Taishō Period] (Tokyo: Ryūkei Shosha, 2012), 209-210. The *Prospectus* has been collected in the pamphlet as an appendix. As the paragraph quoted in this paper fits the argument in the *Prospectus*, the following argument adopts it as Lim's stance. Due to the limit of space, this paper does not cover other representatives. However, what is required is further analyses which pinpoint the diversity in the Petition Movement and distinguish Lim from other participants at that time.

¹¹³Taiwan Gikai Kisei Dōmeikai, *Taiwan Gikai no Secchi Undō*, 8.

¹¹⁴Ibid.

lation for a Taiwanese parliament amounts to the enthusiastic aspiration, proposed globally at that time, for constitutionalism. It benefits Taiwanese people and ‘the spirit of the constitutionalism of the empire’ on top of Japan’s colonial rule over Taiwan.¹¹⁵ In addition to this direct reference to Yoshino’s *minponshugi*, it is noteworthy that the focal point of his constitutionalism rests on the right to political participation in harmony with the rule of law by the Japanese empire.¹¹⁶ He argues for a greater degree of autonomy, foreign to either the assimilation policy (同化政策) or the so-called inland extension (內地延長), while acknowledging the empire’s further expansion as a premise for the current and future international relations.¹¹⁷ He thus concludes that ‘[the application of constitutional politics to Taiwan] will geographically benefit the southward advance of the empire and historically achieve the mission of promoting the fraternity between the Chinese and the Japanese. . . .’¹¹⁸ On this ground, instead of advocating Taiwanese residents’ participation in the Imperial Parliament, Lim urges for a Taiwanese Parliament for the sake of civilization and imperial spirit of constitutionalism as well as a ground plan for future southward expansion of Imperial Japan.

2. Lien: A Pro-Socialist Critique of Imperialism

This acknowledgment of the expansion of the Japanese empire could be a strategy for the colonial constitutional reforms. Meanwhile, doubts concerning the nature, reasoning, and strategies of the Petition Movement increased after the Incident of Violation of the Public Order Police Law¹¹⁹ of 1923

¹¹⁵Ibid., 12.

¹¹⁶Ibid., 10. The right to political participation here refers to self-determination on representative politics, legislation and budgets, and so forth.

¹¹⁷Ibid., 9.

¹¹⁸Ibid. 8-9.

¹¹⁹The incident refers to the first systematic oppression conducted by the Japanese authorities in accordance with *The Public Order Police Law* in 1923, in which most opinion leaders in the Petition Movement were arrested, fined or confined.

which caused a serious setback and lit the fuse of a further split within the Association. The most intense criticisms came from pro-socialist activists who denounced the lawful Petition Movement for ignoring the political reality where social suffering and class contradictions worsened as the Japanese capitalist imperialism advanced. In his manuscript on the history of the political movement in colonial Taiwan, Lien Wen-ching (連溫卿, 1894-1957) noticed that the movement developed under the condition of the legitimacy of the special legislation, such as the Law 63 (六三法)¹²⁰ and the sovereign power of the Japanese empire.¹²¹ Despite the fact that the Petition Movement went strongly against the special rule authorized by the Governor-General of Taiwan, the very structure that embraces colonial Taiwan in the legal system, stipulated by special legislation, could not but contain the tone of colonialism. To Lien, the appeal for special legislation for the Taiwanese parliament was therefore not an extension of constitutionalism but that of the imperial order intent on ‘particularizing’ the colony.¹²²

Lien defines Lim’s autonomy as an attempt to secure the independence of internal affairs, namely, the decision-making process without interference.¹²³ The Petition Movement has evoked a general national consciousness against Japanese imperialism; however, it did not represent the interest of people in Taiwan on the grounds that the imperial structure remains untouched.¹²⁴ Lien, therefore, describes nationalism raised by the Association as follows.

In short, nationalists in the Cultural Association regard the old culture of the feudal system as the opposite of the new culture of capitalism

¹²⁰The Law 63 is a special legislation that authorized the special rule of the Governor-General of Taiwan during the late 19th century and the early 20th century.

¹²¹Lien Wen-ching, “ri jù shí qī zhī zhèng zhì yùn dòng” [Political Movements under the Japanese Rule], Yan-hsian Chang and Jia-yin Weng ed., *tái wān zhèng zhì yùn dòng shǐ* [The History of Taiwanese Political Movement] (Taipei tái wān zhèng zhì yùn dòng shǐ: dào xiāng chū bǎn shè, 1988), 44.

¹²²*Ibid.*, 83-84.

¹²³*Ibid.*, 86.

¹²⁴*Ibid.*, 87.

and yet employ the fraternity between Japan and China in respect of the export of capital and the mobilization of local capital.¹²⁵

According to Lien, the fraternity between Japan and China was commonly used to justify the establishment of a Taiwanese parliament while dodging the issue of the interrelation between capitalism and imperialism. From the aspect of the flow of capital, impelled by the development of capitalism, during the 1920s, Lien had devoted to the study group for social problems and Marxism. It was also in the same period that he was introduced to Yamakawa and, presumably, had a chance to deepen the mutual understanding of the socialist solidarity between Japan and Taiwan.¹²⁶ From 1923 onwards, Lien had an inclination to generate a class struggle, less than a nationalist reform, to bring an upheaval to the capitalist structure in colonial Taiwan. Although the Marxist (-Leninist) critique of imperialism began to gain more and more attention in East Asia at that time, it is noteworthy that the vigilance towards constitutionalism and imperialism in colonial Taiwan echoed an often-forgotten context of the interwar debates on *minponshugi* and imperialism in Imperial Japan.

3. Fan: Rebellious Anarchism

A similar anti-imperialist account can be found in the Taiwanese anarchist movement. In “Manifesto of the New Taiwan Anarchist Society” (新台湾安社宣言, hereafter as *Manifesto*) published in *La Nova Formoso* (新台湾), Fan Ben-liang (范本梁, 1897-1945) describes the suffering in Taiwan as part of a universal plight caused by imperialism.¹²⁷ Although it is generally believed that Ōsugi sparked Fan’s interest in anarchism during his undergraduate years in Tokyo, the *Manifesto* is indeed constructed in a Kōtoku-

¹²⁵ Ibid., 59.

¹²⁶ Qiu, *1924nián yī qián tái wān shè huì zhǔ yì yùn dòng de méng yá*, 103-07.

¹²⁷ Taiwan Sōtokufu Keimukyoku, “museifushugi undō” [The Anarchist Movement], *Taiwan Sōtokufu Keisatsu Enkakushi* [The Historical Record of the Police of the Office of the Governor-General of Taiwan] 2 (Taipei: Taiwan Sōtokufu Keimukyoku, 1939), 878.

Ōsugian manner. With the main focus on imperialism, it outlines the colonial condition as a consequence of imperialism entwined with a prolonged history of violence, conquest, and dominance. In *Manifesto*, Fan adopts Kōtoku's arguments in *Imperialism* and Ōsugi's theory of the 'facts of conquest,' the second of which discloses conflicts between gender, class, race, nation, and so forth in the modern era.¹²⁸ By referring imperialism to the capitalist monopoly, patriotism, militarism and political dictatorship, he defines Japan's rule on Taiwan and Chosŏn (the Korean Peninsula) as 'an annexation and forcible occupation by means of the aggressive imperialism and the international capitalism, or the monster of the 20th century.'¹²⁹ Regarding the upheavals and political reform movements in Asia, Fan doubts that the movements for national self-determination, independence, suffrage, and democratically elected parliament are unlikely to solve that structural and global problem thoroughly.

All of these movements of the so-called violence begets violence, nothing more than fishing in troubled waters, or an incitement of the ambitious, who makes use of a certain complex of mass revolution to gain interest from the monopoly of the petite bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie, while sacrificing the wealth and endeavors of the poor people.¹³⁰

Describing the existing social movements as violence, engineered under the deception of the ambitious—the imperialist in the context of his argument—, Fan hints at a link between imperialism and the above-mentioned nationalist movements. Claiming the well-being, liberty, and equality for

¹²⁸Ibid., 879 In the *Manifesto*, one can find some paragraphs consistent to Kōtoku's *Monster of the 20th Century: Imperialism*, in denouncing the ambition of the dictators, the system of free competition, and the ideal of a cosmopolitan brotherhood. However, the appeal for socialism in Kōtoku's *Imperialism* is replaced by 'scientific anarchism' in *Manifesto*, reflexive of the opposition between the anarchist and the Bolsheviks in the 1920s. Ōsugi's interests in colonialism and the formation of the relation between the conqueror and the conquered, instilled in his anarchist phraseology, are also subtly merged into Fan's criticism of imperialism as well.

¹²⁹Ibid., 880.

¹³⁰Ibid.

all human beings appears to be naïve without a thorough disruption of the inherent system of dominance. From this point of view, almost every ‘progressive’ camp, including the Petition Movement and the Bolshevik regime, turns conservative and backward.¹³¹ Contrarily, Fan praises the violence of rebellious anarchism (暴動のアナーキズム),¹³² which aims at a future of cosmopolitanism without a dominant state, warlord, capitalist, etc. This discourse of ‘violence’ indicates a crucial momentum in the anarchist theory of revolution, thereby distinguishing revolutionary violence from the reproduction of violence or making a distinction between the replication of the imperialist structure and an escape from the structure.

Considering the fact that most of the East Asian anarchist activities stayed anonymous and underground by dint of the brutal repression against them in the 1920s, whether Ōsugi’s theory of the ‘rebel of life’ had a major bearing on Fan’s rebellious anarchism remained inconclusive. Still, with his direct adoption of Kōtoku’s arguments, a common vigilance towards the reproduction of imperialism, embedded within various forms of democratic reformism, can be located. This suggests that from the Petition Movement to the pro-socialist arguments, and onwards to the anarchist criticisms in the 1920s, activists’ disagreements to a great extent derived from different conceptions of the nature of the imperial order, i.e., imperialism.

¹³¹Ibid., 881.

¹³²Regarding the translation ‘rebellious anarchism,’ the original term ‘暴動のアナキズム’ is used to describe the relation between violence and revolution, political terrorism and anarchism. Although this topic is out of the scope of this paper, it is worth mentioning that some materials reveal Fan’s passion about the potential of bringing about anarchist revolution by political assassinations. However, in Fan’s terminology, anarchism indeed contains both connotations of violence and science. In this regard, even if ‘riot’ and ‘violent’ are closer to the word ‘暴動’ in a literal sense, ‘rebellious’ anarchism not only gives greater prominence to the aspects of disruption and creation together, but also fits better the context of direct action in East Asian anarchism. As for the joint campaign under the anarchist banner of direct action between Japan and Taiwan, see Itsumi Kichizō, “Taiwan dokuritsu undō ni chiratta mumeiki” [The Unknown Ghosts Dissipated in the Movement for the Independence of Taiwan], *The Eye of the Modern* 12: 4 (1971): 200-09.

4. The Perspective of Imperialism and *Minponshugi*

Against the backdrop of the post-WWI tension between the League of Nations and the Communist International, the antagonism amid Taiwanese activists can be seen as a reflection of different political ideologies for a world order. Nevertheless, by calling into question the local context of ‘constitutionalism internally and imperialism externally,’ it is worth remembering that the interrelation of constitutional democracy and imperialism had a tremendous impact on these political thoughts of the time. The problematics reveals great tensions between different stances towards the Japanese imperial(-ist) practices as opposed to western powers. It involves the issues of 1) the domestic order within the Japanese empire, 2) the colonial order between the empire and its colonies, 3) the regional order amid Asian countries, and 4) the global order in international competitions.

Under these circumstances, according to Lim, two common factors of autonomy, supported by the Japanese constitutionalism, and national self-determination, brought out alongside the transformation of the imperial order, are not just theoretical doctrines for certain abstract universal values to make their society better. The two agendas should be put into practice in the process of petition movement, along the growth of political consciousness, and in the course of the rule of law. Accordingly, appeals for the right to political participation or for the rule of law appeared more in relation to a greater picture of global order in lieu of imperialism than a local context foregrounding the colonial nature of modern Taiwan. Contrarily, in Lien’s rationale, criticisms against the limited autonomy swirls around the interplay between capitalism and imperialism, indicative of the politico-economic reality of repression which Taiwan had experienced under the colonial rule. He thus presented an interest in breaking free from the conundrum, posited by the overriding competence of Japan for regional hegemony, rather than integrating Taiwan into the hierarchy of global order. Last, sharing a similar interest in grasping the Japanese imperial order as an amalgam of capitalism and imperialism, still, Fan’s disallowance of any form of dominance that causes human suffering paved the way for a radical anarchist revolution in which to stand for revolutionary violence

and even goes beyond the Bolshevik political economy on how to build a post-capitalist world.

Conclusion

This paper describes two different conceptualizations towards the Japanese colonial rule; one regards it as a part of the imperial order and the other considers it as a set of practices of imperialism. Empire and imperialism are two different, *albeit* interrelated, concepts embedded in the discourses of the interwar Taiwanese social movement. By reviewing the Meiji theory of imperialism and the debate on *minponshugi*, I maintain that the utterances of the Petition Movement focused on autonomy in terms of constitutionalism influenced in large part by the legacy of Ukita and Yoshino. Among them, the appeal for the application of constitutionalism to Taiwan came in step with the issue of how to respond to the theme of ‘particularizing’ the colony. While advocating special legislation within the boundary of the Meiji Constitution, the pro-constitutionalist supporters realized that the notion of self-determination might be an exceptional matter in colonial Taiwan. Second, it is certain that constitutional politics in colonial Taiwan proved to be useful in promoting the southward advance of the Japanese empire. It thus revealed a colonial adaptation of the ‘constitutionalism internally and imperialism externally’ that echoed Ukita’s theory of ethical imperialism. Third, as the search for autonomy, instead of sovereignty, set the tone for the movement, the idea of constitutional politics could be more closely tied to the application of rule of law rather than the sovereignty of the Taiwanese people. This direction, therefore, also lacked for the issue of sovereignty, or the same problem as Yoshino had apropos of his *minponshugi* in which the whereabouts of sovereignty was considered insignificant to democracy.

On the other hand, as Kōtoku’s appeal for direct actions had generated attention amid activists in Japan and its colonies, his anti-imperialist idea, inspired by Ōsugi and Yamakawa, was well received in colonial Taiwan. In the wake of the October Revolution in Russia, the Leninist definition of imperialism as ‘the highest stage of capitalism,’ also became dominant and, in

a sense, orthodox. And, as criticism against the legal approach of the petition movement increased, how to perceive the interplay of capitalism and imperialism started revisiting the local context of the anti-colonial attempts. First, the stance of rejecting the constitutional ground of imperialism, echoed also in the Japanese anti-imperialist tradition, had emerged in the arguments made by Lien and Fan. The antagonism between the economic and legal approaches of social movements in colonial Taiwan shared a similar vision that Ōsugi and Yamakawa had in the sense that these colonial intellectuals also refused parliamentarianism and *minponshugi*. Second, criticisms of the Japanese colonialism in colonial Taiwan had an anarchist root and a communist international root in common but the issue did not generate much attention amid the Japanese socialists during the early 1920s. As in the case of Fan, eager to interweave social revolution with anti-colonialism in the anarchist manner, a more careful look at the anarchist legacy should be taken from the viewpoint of the colonies, especially anarchist activism agitated by the colonial intellectuals, in reexamining the issue of imperialism in modern East Asia at that time.

Last, without lumping the various lines of social movement during the 1920s together in Taishō Democracy, we need to delineate the multilayered and multifaceted traits of these movements in terms of popular imperialism, imperial democracy and constitutional imperialism, and the like.¹³³ The discursive diversity implies that the transformation of the Japanese imperial order was intertwined with the development of constitutionalism and democracy. In this vein, the banner of ‘constitutionalism internally and imperialism externally’ can be reinterpreted as two principles compatible and interpenetrated with, rarely disconnects from, each other. During the first quarter of the 20th century in Japan, then, imperialism was in itself constitutionalism, and *vice versa*. It is at this juncture that Taishō Democracy, praised conventionally for holding back Japanese overseas expansion, can

¹³³Duus, *The Rise of Modern Japan*, 133-35; Gordon, *Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan*, 7; Horio Teruhisa, “Taisei saitōgō no kokoromi to ‘Teikoku’ ideologi no keisei” [The Attempt of the Reintegration of the System and the Formation of the Ideology of ‘Empire’], *Nihon no Shakaishugi* [The Japanese Socialism] 19 (1968): 141.

be further elaborated as a mechanism capable of neutralizing imperialism and constitutionalism.

Handling both the Japanese intellectuals' debates on imperialism and democracy and the Taiwanese intellectuals' efforts to transform or deconstruct the imperial(-ist) order, this paper reveals multiple intersection between constitutional democracy and imperialism during the interwar period when such crucial questions as national identity, political consciousness, and social reforms were vitally raised in colonial Taiwan. In the process, it brings the issue of imperialism back to the study of the colonial history and democratic movements of Taiwan and charts varied relationships between the colonial empires and their colonies in East Asia as well as the tension amid intellectuals and social activists in both realms. This new perspective will help rediscover and rethink the ongoing dialogue between (geo-)politics and thought in modern East Asian history.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

- Kōtoku Shūsui. *Shakaishugi Shinzui* 社会主義神髓 [The Quintessence of Socialism]. Tokyo: Chōhōsha, 1903.
- _____. *Kōtoku Shūsui Zenshū* 幸徳秋水全集 [The Complete Collection of Kōtoku Shūsui] 6. Tokyo: Meijibunken, 1968.
- _____. *Kōtoku Shūsui Zenshū* 幸徳秋水全集 [The Complete Collection of Kōtoku Shūsui] 7. Tokyo: Meijibunken, 1971.
- _____. *Kindai Nihon Shisō Taikai Kōtoku Shūsui* 近代日本思想大系幸徳秋水 [Series of Modern Japanese Thought: Kōtoku Shūsui]. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1975.
- _____. *Teikokushugi* 帝国主義 [Imperialism]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2013.
- Lien Wen-ching. “Rì jù shí qī zhī zhèng zhì yùn dòng” 日據時期之政治運動 [Political Movements under the Japanese Rule]. In *Tái wān zhèng zhì yùn dòng shǐ* 臺灣政治運動史 [The History of Taiwanese Political Movement], Chang Yan-hsian and Weng Jia-yin, ed. 37-212. Taipei: Dào xiāng chū bǎn shè, 1988.
- Lim Teng-lok. “Shin jidai ni shosuru taiwan seinen no kakusei” 新時代に処する台湾青年の覚醒 [The Awakening of Taiwanese Youth in the New Era]. *Tai Oan Chheng Lian* 1 (July 16, 1920): 29-40, 1920.
- Ōsugi Sakae. *Ōsugi Sakae Hyōronshū* 大杉栄評論集 [Collection of Commentaries by Ōsugi Sakae]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1996.
- _____. *Ōsugi Sakae Zenshū* 大杉栄全集 [The Complete Collection of Ōsugi Sakae] 2. Tokyo: Paru Shuppan, 2014.
- _____. *Ōsugi Sakae Zenshū* 大杉栄全集 [The Complete Collection of Ōsugi Sakae] 3. Tokyo: Paru Shuppan, 2014.
- _____. *Ōsugi Sakae Zenshū* 大杉栄全集 [The Complete Collection of Ōsugi Sakae] 4. Tokyo: Paru Shuppan, 2014.
- _____. *Ōsugi Sakae Zenshū* 大杉栄全集 [The Complete Collection of Ōsugi Sakae] 1. Tokyo: Paru Shuppan, 2015.
- Taiwan Gikai Kisei Dōmeikai 台湾議會期成同盟会, ed. *Taiwan Gikai no Secchi Undō* 台湾議会の設置運動 [The Movement for the Establishment of a Taiwanese

- Parliament]. Tokyo: Taiwan Gikai Kisei Dōmeikai, 1929.
- Taiwan Sōtokufu Keimukyoku 台湾総督府警務局, ed. “Museifushugi undo” 無政府主義運動 [The Anarchist Movement]. *Taiwan Sōtokufu Keisatsu Enkakushi* 台湾総督府警察沿革誌 [The Historical Record of the Police of the Office of the Governor-General of Taiwan] 2. Taipei: Taiwan Sōtokufu Keimukyoku, 875-97, 1939.
- Ukita Kazutami. *Teikokushugi to Kyōiku* 帝國主義と教育 [Imperialism and Pedagogy]. Tokyo: Minyūsha, 1901.
- _____. *Kokumin Kyōikuron* 国民教育論 [On National Pedagogy]. Tokyo: Minyūsha, 1903.
- _____. *Rinriteki Teikokushugi* 倫理的帝國主義 [Ethical Imperialism]. Kyoto: Ryūbunkan, 1909.
- _____. “Kokka ni kansuru shindōtoku” 国家に関する新道徳 [A New Morality Regarding the Nation]. In *Shindōtoku Ron* 新道徳論 [A New Morality]. Tokyo: Nanbokusha, 23-112, 1913.
- Yamakawa Hitoshi. *Yamakawa Hitoshi Zenshū* 山川均全集 [The Complete Collection of Yamakawa Hitoshi] 2. Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 1966.
- _____. *Yamakawa Hitoshi Zenshū* 山川均全集 [The Complete Collection of Yamakawa Hitoshi] 1. Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 2003.
- _____. “Seiji no hitei to seiji no taikō” 政治の否定と政治の対抗 [The Negation of Politics and the Confrontation of Politics]. In *Ana-boru Ronsō* アナ・ボル論争 [The Anarchist-Bolshevik Debate], Ōkubo Kazushi, ed. 72-73. Tokyo: Dōjidaisha, 2005.
- Yoshino Sakuzō. ‘Shukushi’ 祝詞 [Congratulatory Address]. *Tai Oan Chheng Lian* 1 (July 16, 1920): 9-10, 1920.
- _____. “Kensei no hongī wo toite sono yūshū no bi wo sumasu no michi wo ronzu” 憲政の本義を説いて其有終の美を済すの途を論ず [On the Essence of Constitutionalism and the Path towards Its Ultimate Fulfillment]. In *Taishō Demokurashi Ronsōshi* 大正デモクラシー論争史 [The History of Debates of Taishō Democracy] 1, Ōta Masao, ed. Tokyo: Shinsensha, 1971.
- _____. *Yoshino Sakuzō Senshū Seiji to Kokka* 吉野作造選集政治と国家 [Selected Works of Yoshino Sakuzō: Politics and the State]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995.

Secondary Sources

- Asukai Masamichi. “Meiji shakaishugi undo no kiketsu–chokusetsu kōdō ron wo megutte” 明治社会主義運動の歸結—直接行動論をめぐって [The consequence of Meiji Socialist Movement: Regarding the Theory of Direct Action]. *Shisō* 思想 [Thought] 524: 263-82, 1968.
- Chao Hsunta. “Chiang Wei Shui’s Left-leaning Approach (1930-1931).” *Taiwan Literature Studies* 4: 129-65, 2013.
- Chen Tsuilien. “Beyond Resistance and Compliance: A Study of the Home Rule Movement in Taiwan under Japanese Ruled.” *Taiwanese Journal of Political Science* 18: 141-70, 2013.
- Crump, John. *The Anarchist Movement in Japan 1906-1996*. UK: The Anarchist Federation, 1996.
- _____. *The Origin of Socialist Thought in Japan*. NY: Routledge, 2011.
- Duus, Peter. *The Rise of Modern Japan*. MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1976.
- Eizawa Kōji. “Taishō Demokurashi Shisō Hatten no Shodankai” 大正デモクラシー思想発展の諸段階 [The Stages of Development of the Thoughts of Taishō Democracy]. *Shinshū Daigaku Kyōyōbu Kiyō* 信州大学紀要 4: 89-125, 1976.
- Fanon, Frantz. *The Wretched of the Earth*. NY: Grove Press, 2004.
- Fujii Shōichi. “Nihon teikokushugishi no seika to mondaiten” 日本帝国主義史の成果と問題点 [Achievements and Issues of the history of Japanese Imperialism]. In *Nihon no Teikokushugi* 日本の帝国主義 [The Japanese Imperialism], 9-43. Tokyo: Gakuseisha, 1974.
- Getachew, Adom. *Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination*. NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019.
- Gordon, Andrew. *Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan*. LA: University of California Press, 1992.
- Keiichi Harada. *Nisshin Nichiro Sensō–Siriizu Nihon Kingendaishi* 日清日露戦争—シリーズ日本近現代史 [The Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War: Series Modern Japanese History]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2013.
- Horio Teruhisa. “Taisei saitōgō no kokoromi to ‘Teikoku’ ideologi no keisei” 体制再統合の試みと「帝国」イデオロギーの形成 [The Attempt of the Reintegration of the System and the Formation of the Ideology of ‘Empire’]. *Nihon no*

- Shakaishugi* 日本の社会主義 [The Japanese Socialism] 19: 139-90, 1968.
- Iida Taizō. “Nashonaru demokuratto to ‘shakai no hakken’” ナショナルデモクラットと「社会の発見」(National Democrat and the ‘Discovery of Society’). In *Hihan Seishin no Kōseki: Kindai Nihon Seishinshi no Ichiryōsen* 批判精神の航跡: 近代日本精神史の一稜線 [The Trace of the Spirit of Critique: A Ridgeline of Modern Japanese History of Spirit], 155-221. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1997.
- Ikimatsu Keizō. *Taishōki no Shisō to Bunka* 大正期の思想と文化 [The Thought and Culture of the Taishō Period]. Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1971.
- Inoue Kiyosh. *Nihon Teikokushugi no Keisei* 日本帝国主義の形成 [The Formation of the Japanese Imperialism]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1974.
- Ishida Takeshi. “‘Shakai’ no ishikika to shakaiseisaku gakkai” 「社会」の意識化と社会政策学会 [The Sense of ‘Society’ and the Association for Social Policy]. In *Nihon no Shakai Kagaku* 日本の社会科学 [Social Sciences in Japan], 45-71. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1984.
- Ito Teruo. “Shō Yisui to Taiwan minshūtō: ‘zenmin undō’ to ‘kaikyū undō’” 蒋渭水と台湾民衆党—「全民運動」と「階級運動」 [Jiang Weishui and the Taiwanese People's Party: “national movement” and “class movement”]. *The Hitotsubashi Review* 83.3: 396-413, 1980.
- Itoya Toshio. *Kōtoku Shūsui Kenkyū* 幸徳秋水研究 [Kōtoku Shūsui Studies]. Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1969.
- _____. *Shakaishugi Undo Shi* 社会主義運動史 [The History of Socialist Movement]. Tokyo: Hōseidaigaku Shuppankyoku, 1979.
- Jiang Keshi. “Rinriteki teikokushugi no keisei” 倫理的帝国主義の形成 [The Formation of Ethical Imperialism]. In *Ukita Kazutami no Shisōshiteki Kenkyū: Rinriteki Teikokushugi no Keisei* 浮田和民の思想史的研究: 倫理的帝国主義の形成 [An Intellectual History of Ukita Kazutami: the Formation of Ethical Imperialism], 422-65. Tokyo: Fujishuppan, 2003.
- Kano Masanao. “Kaisetsu” 解説 [commentary]. In *Kindai Nihon Shisō Taikei 34 Taishō Shisō Shū II* 近代日本思想大系34大正思想集2 [Series Modern Japanese Thought 34 Collection of Taishō Thoughts 2], 419-64. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1977.
- Komatsu Ryūji. “‘Keizaisoshiki no mirai’ hoka—Kōtoku Shūsui to anakizumu” 「経済組織の未来」ほか—幸徳秋水とアナーキズム [The Future of Economic

- Organization: *Kōtoku Shūsui and Anarchism*]. In *Kōtoku Shūsui Zenshū* 幸徳秋水全集 [The Complete Collection of Kōtoku Shūsui] 7, 419-38. Tokyo: Meiji-bunkan, 1969.
- Koyasu Nobukuni. *'Taishō' wo Yominaosu: Kōtoku, Ōsugi, Kawakami, Tsuda, soshite Watsuji, Ōkawa* 「大正」を読み直す: 幸徳・大杉・河上・津田、そして和辻・大川 [Rereading the 'Taishō': Kōtoku, Ōsugi, Kawakami, Tsuda, and Watsuji, Ōkawa]. Tokyo: Fujihara Shoten, 2016.
- Makdisi, Ussama. "Review: The Great Illusion: The Wilsonian Moment in World History." *Diplomatic History* 33.1: 133-37, 2009.
- Manela, Erez. *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism*. NC: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Marx, Karl and Engels, Frederick. "II. Proletarians and Communists." In *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, 22-27. Marxists Internet Archive, 2010.
- Matsuo Takayoshi. *Taishō Demokurashi* 大正デモクラシー [Taishō Democracy]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2001.
- Matsuzawa Hiroaki. "Meiji shakaishugi no shisō" 明治社会主義の思想 [Discourses of Meiji Socialism]. In *Nihon no Shakaishugi* 日本の社会主義 [The Japanese Socialism] 19: 5-62, 1968.
- Mitani Taichirō. *Taishō Demokurashi Ron* 大正デモクラシー論 [On Taishō Democracy]. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2013.
- Miyamoto Matahisa. "'Kenkyū nōto' minponshugi no tanjō" <研究ノート> 民本主義の誕生 [<Note> Birth of Democracy]. *Journal of History* 50.2: 283-301, 1967.
- Miyamoto Moritarō. "Ukita Kazutami ni okeru rinriteki teikokushugi no keisei 1" 浮田和民における倫理的帝国主義の形成 (一) [The Formation of Ethical Imperialism of Ukita Kazutani 1]. *Hōgaku Ronsō* 法学論叢 [The Review of Law] 112.3: 42-71, 1982.
- _____. "Ukita Kazutami ni okeru rinriteki teikokushugi no keisei 2" 浮田和民における倫理的帝国主義の形成 (二) [The Formation of Ethical Imperialism of Ukita Kazutani 2]. *Hōgaku Ronsō* 法学論叢 [The Review of Law] 112.4 (1982): 73-101, 1982.
- Narita Ryūichi. *Taishō Demokurashi* 大正デモクラシー [Taishō Democracy]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2007.
- Ōkubo Kazushi, ed. 大窪一志編. *Ana-Boru Ronsō* アナ・ボル論争 [The Anarchist-

- Bolshevik Debate]. Tokyo: Dōjidaisha, 2005.
- Ōta Masao. “Kaisetsu” 解説 [Commentary]. In *Taishō Demokurashi Ronsōshi* 大正デモクラシー論争史 [The History of Debates of Taishō Democracy] 1, 528-40. Tokyo: Shinsensha, 1971.
- Qiu Shijie. *1924nián yǐ qián tái wān shè huì zhǔ yì yùn dòng de méng yá* 1924年以前台灣社會主義運動的萌芽 [The Initiation of Taiwanese Socialist Movement before 1924]. Taipei: hǎi xiá xué shù chū bǎn, 2009.
- Said, Edward. *Culture and Imperialism*. NY: Vintage Books, 1994.
- Swale, Alistair. “Tokutomi Sohō and the problem of the national-state in an imperialist world.” In *Nationalism and Internationalism in Imperial Japan*, Dick Stegewerns, ed. NY: Routledge Curzon, 68-88, 2003.
- Tierney, Robert Thomas. *Monster of the 20th Century: Kōtoku Shūsui and Japan’s first anti-imperialist movement*. CA: University of California Press, 2015.
- Yamamuro Shinichi. *Nichiro Sensō no Seiki–Rensa Shiten kara miru Nihon to Sekai* 日露戦争の世紀—連鎖視点から見る日本と世界 [The Century of the Russo-Japanese War: Japan and the World from the Viewpoint of Connection]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2005.
- Wakabayashi Masahiro. *Taiwan Kōnichī Undōshi Kenkyū* 台湾抗日運動史研究 [A Historical Study of the Anti-Japanese Movement in Formosa]. Tokyo: Kenbunshuppan, 1983.
- _____. “‘Taiwan toiu raireki’ wo motomete: hōhōteki ‘teikoku’ shugi shiron” 「台湾という来歴」を求めて—方法的「帝国」主義試論 [Towards the history of Taiwan: Essay on a Methodological ‘Empire’-ism]. In *Taiwan Kenkyū Nyūmon* 台湾研究入門 [An Introduction to Taiwan Studies], Ienaga Masaki, ed. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 343-65, 2020.
- Wu Rweiren. “*The Formosan Ideology: Oriental Colonialism and the Rise of Taiwanese Nationalism, 1895-1945*.” PhD diss. University of Chicago, 2003.