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Seung-wook KIM
Chungbuk National University

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Historical Territory (歷史疆域) of China: Concern (隱憂) about Chinese Nationalism*¹

Seung-wook KIM
Chungbuk National University

Mainstream Discourse: “China in History”

In the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the term “歷史疆域” does not simply refer to the historically changing territory of a country. In general, since the territories of the various countries in history have also changed in various ways as time went by, it is difficult to specify the exact meaning when history and territory are combined to be used as a single word. However, in the case of China, as will be discussed later, this term specifically refers to China’s designated territory and is often used as a proper noun to present a historical basis for sovereign rights over that territory. In the same vein, Zhang Shiming (張世明) argued that the term “歷史疆域” and “歷史上

* This translated article is an revised and supplemented version of Kim Seung-wook, “중국의 역사강역 담론과 제국 전통,” *역사문화연구* 63 (August, 2017): 105-136; _____, “중국 근대 역사학에서 國家 개념의 재구성,” *역사와 담론* 89 (January, 2019): 161-197.

¹ This presentation paper is a reorganization of the following papers for the purpose of presenting at the 2nd Joint Colloquium (May 27, 2021) of the Center for Chinese Studies-Center for Diplomatic History of the Korea National Diplomatic Academy: Kim Seung-wook, “Discourse on Historical Territory and Imperial Tradition in China,” *Journal of History and Culture* 63 (2017), pp. 105-136; Kim Seung-wook, “Reorganization of State Concepts in Modern Historical Studies in China,” *History and Discourse* 89 (2019), pp. 161-197; Kim Seung-wook, “Acceptance of Nation Concepts and Science in Early Modern Chinese History: The Case of Liang Qichao (梁啟超),” *Dongbuga Yeoksa Nonchong* 67 (2020), pp. 127-160.

的疆域” should not be used interchangeably as the former is defined as “historical territory” or “historical dominion” while the latter means “historic territories” or “territories in history.” According to Zhang, the former is a proper noun that mainly refers to the legal basis of the historical rights of the national territory while the latter is a plural noun referring to the historical transition of territories of a country.² Therefore, when the term historical territory is used, what should be taken into consideration is the fact that it also reflects regional characteristics of China in recognition of the territory.

The regional characteristics are also reflected in the term “疆域” itself. In China, the term “疆域” is used interchangeably with the word territory (領土), meaning the space under the jurisdiction of sovereign states. The two words of “疆” and “域” refer to lines and areas, so to speak, boundaries and regions, respectively. Chinese scholars seem to find the conceptual distinction between “疆” and “域” useful in explicating the historical changes in the PRC’s territory. For example, Han Maoli (韓茂莉) says that before the Treaty of Nerchinsk demarcated the distinct national borders with Russia, there had been a state of “regions but no boundaries (有域無疆)” or “regions replacing boundaries (以域代疆)” in China for a long time.³ Hence, as the aforementioned two terms imply, China as a region with vague borders and China as a country with clear territorial boundaries are considered differently.

The notion of the historical territory began to be specifically recognized only after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China as the question of how to set the spatial scope of the historical narrative arose in earnest. Particularly, the cartography project of a large-scale historical map, called *The Historical Atlas of China* (中國歷史地圖集), did serve as an im-

² Zhang Shiming, *Law, Resources, and Time-Space Constructing China in 1644-1945, Tribes in Frontier* volume 2 法律, 資源與時空建構: 1644-1945年的中國 第2卷 邊疆民族. Guangzhou: Guangdong Renmin Chubanshi, 2012.

³ Han Maoli, “Territorial Changes in Past Dynasties From the Perspective of Geography 地理視角下的歷代疆域變遷,” in *Fifteen Lectures on Chinese History and Geography* 中國歷史地理十五講, Peking University Press, 2014.

portant momentum. The project began in 1954 and was published in eight volumes in 1982, almost a generation later.⁴ This project had originally begun with the aim of modifying the previously widely-used historical maps, such as *The Atlas Throughout the Ages* (歷代輿地圖) by Yang Shoujing (楊守敬) from the Qing dynasty, to suit the status of a new country. However, as the number of participating personnel and organizations was expanded and the continuous discussion lasted for a long time, it was transformed into a bigger project, not only limited to the simple revision of existing maps but producing a new historical map that reflected the historical perception of the PRC.⁵ At this time, one of the major concerns was how to

⁴ Tan Qixiang 譚其驥 ed. *The Historical Atlas of China*, Beijing: Beijing ditu chubanshe, 1982.

⁵ In the winter of 1954, the Revision Committee of Yang Shoujing's *Atlas Throughout the Ages* (重編改繪楊守敬歷代輿地圖委員會), consisted of the major members of Fan Wenlan (范文瀾) and Wu Han (吳晗), was organized and began its activities in early 1955. Its main objective was to revise Yang Shoujing's *Atlas Throughout the Ages*, which was created based on the book *Atlas of the Qing Dynasty* (大清一統輿圖) (1863). In the early days, the committee was based in the Philosophy of Social Science at Chinese Academy of Sciences (中國科學院 哲學社會科學部), and Tan Qixiang from Fudan University was assigned as the supervisor for the map compilation and the Map Publishing Company (地圖出版社) was in charge of map production. After that, the number of people and organizations was further increased. In 1957, the map compilation project was moved to Shanghai and a small group consisting of five members was organized in Fudan University. In 1959, the Research Center of History and Geography (歷史地理研究室) was established. The number of participants of the project continued to increase, reaching a maximum of 70-80 people. There were scholars such as Fu Lehuan (傅樂煥) (Minzu Univ. of China), Han Rulin (韓儒林) (School of History, Nanjing Univ.), Feng Jiasheng (馮家昇) (National Research Institute, Chinese Academy of Sciences), Wang Zhong (王忠) (Institute of Modern History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences), and Fang Guoyu (方國瑜) (Yunnan Univ.), as well as other organizations such as history and archaeology research institutes also participated. Then in the late 1950s, the school of Geodesy and Geomatics at Wuhan University (武漢測繪學院) was assigned to the supervisor in map production, which was reassigned to the National Research Institute of Surveying and Mapping Science (國家測繪總局測繪科學研究所) later in the early 1960s. The managing department maintained its existing name, and Fan Wenlan changed his title to an advisor by empowering Wu Han and Yin Da (尹達) to take responsibility for giving out specific commands. The completion of the map was originally expected in 1967 at the 1965 meeting, but it was delayed due to the Cultural Revolution and the manuscript was finally completed in 1973. Since 1974, this manuscript of temporary version for trial use has been published in total of eight volumes by the Map Publishing Company under the name of Chinese Map Publishing House (中華地圖學社). After that, under the leadership of the Chinese Academy of Social Science, scholars from the Institute of Historical Geography at Fudan University, the Institute of Ethnic Literature at Chinese Academy of Social Science, the School of History at Nanjing University, and the Minzu University of China participated in revising the temporary

associate the territory of the PRC with that of the previous dynasties especially the Qing in that historical context.

It was through an article titled ‘China in Her History and China’s Territory of the Past Dynasties (歷史上的中國和中國歷代疆域)’ published in the 1991 edition of ‘Research of Chinese Borderland History and Geography (中國邊疆史地研究)’ that Tan Qixiang, editor-in-chief of this publication, first announced his thoughts regarding the compilation of historical maps.⁶ This article, in fact, was the summary of his responses to Weng Dujian (翁獨健) at the Academic Conference About the History of Relations Between the Nations in China (中國民族關係史研究學術座談會) on May 25-31, 1981, with respect to the clarification on how he handled the matter of China’s historical territory when drafting *The Historical Atlas of China*.

Tan’s main argument in this article can be summarized through the concept of ‘China in history (歷史上的中國).’ He explained this concept through two major points: first, he argued that through thousands of years of territorial development, ‘China in history’ was finally completed in the mid-18th century under the Qing and, therefore, it should be used as the standard of China’s historical territory. Second, he pointed out that the territory described in this ‘China in history’ excluded some territory following the end of the Opium War in the 1840s and, thus, specified the standard period as ‘from the mid-18th century to the 1840s.’ This logic is referred to as the concept of the Qing as the Standard for the Establishment of the PRC in that he presented the period of the Qing as the specific standard for studying historical territory of the PRC.

Tan’s argument was revealed in the process of refuting the related

 version from 1981. After a year of revision, the final version was officially published in 1982. For the compilation process and elevation of *The Historical Atlas of China*, see the article written by Zou Yilin 鄒逸麟, “The Beginning and End of Compilation of <*The Historical Atlas of China*> by Tan Qixiang and Its Academic Significance 譚其驥主編『中國歷史地圖集』編繪始末及其學術意義,” Hua Linfu 華林甫, ed., *Study on Geographical Literature of Qing Dynasty (清代地理志書研究)*, China Renmin daxue chubanshe, 2014.

⁶ Tan Qixiang, “China in Her History and China’s Territory of the Past Dynasties 歷史上的中國和中國歷代疆域,” *Research of Chinese Borderland History and Geography 中國邊疆史地研究* Series 1, 1991.

claims presented by Bai Shouyi (白壽彝) and others at the time. Bai Shouyi had previously suggested the principle that the current territory of the PRC should be the standard for historical narratives on the question of what would be the scope of China's territory in describing her history. Insisting on the latter, Bai proposed two options regarding the matter of choosing the standard of the historical territory of China. The first is to take the scope of the territory of Qing Dynasty and reflect its historical changes and expansions, and the second is to take the scope of the current territory of the PRC to include all ethnic groups who have resided within that territorial border.⁷ With respect to Bai's argument, Tan claimed the necessity of choosing the territory of the late Qing from the mid-18th century to 1840s, arguing that "taking Bai's suggestion would result in discarding the regions, located east of the Ussuri River and north of the Heilong River and belonging originally to China's territory, which Russia ceded back in the Aihun Treaty and the Beijing Treaty."⁸ The argument presented by Bai, as a historian of Hui ethnicity, is based on the need for national integration incorporating multi-ethnicities by the new government at the face of criticism against Han-nationalism (大漢族主義). In fact, Bai's suggestion is not particularly distinctive given that it is quite commonly used in one country's historical narrative. On the other hand, Tan's suggestion is unique in terms of the scope of 'China in history' absorbing the area, whose history is identified completely with the sovereignty of the current state, and the

⁷ Bai Shouyi, "The Settlement of the Territorial Issue From the Standpoint of Chinese History 論歷史上祖國國土問題的處理" *Guangming Daily Newspaper* 光明日報, 1951; Bai Shouyi, "Lecture on the topic of Territorial Issues in Chinese History" 中國歷史上的疆域問題" in *Questions about the Chinese Feudal Society* 關於中國封建社會的幾個問題. It was later further narrated in his publication, *General History of China*-volume 12 中國通史 12卷.

⁸ This narrative was based on the study of the history of the Russian invasion of China by Chinese academia which mainly focused on the development of Sino-Soviet border disputes in the 1960s. Yang Jianxin 楊建新, "China Firstly Occupied by Czarist Russia and the Issue of Chinese Historical Territory 沙俄最早侵占的中國領土和歷史上的中國疆域問題," in *Collection of Essays on the History of Sino-Russian Relations* 中俄關係史論文集, edited by the Department of History of Sino-Russian Relations, Institute of Modern History at Chinese Academy of Social Science 中國社會科學院近代史研究所中俄關係史研究室 and the History Department of Lanzhou University 蘭州大學歷史系, Gansu renmin chubanshe, 1979.

area, whose history is not completely consistent with the past of the current state, alike.

Tan's logic was solidified through the support of his disciples, such as Ge Jianxiong (葛劍雄). Ge was one of the towering scholars who completed the mainstream stance on the historical territory through a series of writings and has been leading discussion until today. Ge fully supports Tan's argument to elaborate further on Tan's argument as follows. In regard to the first point of Tan's argument, he claimed that the 'largest' territory of the Qing, which was naturally formed throughout its entire history, should be considered as 'China in history.' He argued that 'China in history' shouldn't be restricted either to "'China' in the minds of ancient people" from the view of modern Chinese or the limited territory of contemporary China. In respect to the second point, he stated that there are two distinct transitions in China's historical territory-before 1840 and after 1840. He said that these two periods are differentiated based on 'naturalness': the former means the unified Chinese dynasty (i.e. the Qing) was created with the surrounding native people and was a regime without any foreign influence, while the latter sees China's territory as a result of the direct impact from the invasion of great powers. In other words, he presents the contemporary territory of China as not 'natural.' In this regard, Ge confirmed Tan's argument that China in history should take the territorial scope of China 'from the mid-18th century to the 1840s.'⁹

Since Tan initially organized his research team at Fudan University when he began to produce *The Historical Atlas of China*, the academic tradition was also formed around Fudan University. Currently, the Tan-Ge academic tradition of 'the Qing Standard Theory' has been accepted as a mainstream discourse in the discussion of historical territory. This is supported in the lectures or research books related to historical territory, thus

⁹ Ge Jianxiong, *Unity and Divide-Inspiration from Chinese History* 統一與分裂 - 中國歷史的啓示, Shangwu yinshuguan, 2013, pp. 272-273. (The first edition is from Sanlian shudian, 1994); Ge Jianxiong, *China in Her History: Changes in China's Territory* 历史上的中国: 中国疆域的变迁, Shanghai Century Publication Co.,Ltd. 上海世紀出版股份有限公司, 2007; Ge Jianxiong, "Our Country" Book Series "我們的國家"系列叢書, Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2010.

confirming their solidity in academic authority.¹⁰

In fact, these ‘seemingly-sophisticated’ logics presented by the mainstream scholars sound understandable to accept the current territory of one country as the scope of that country’s historical narratives, but it is unusual to consider a specific territory of a particular period in the past as a reference point for historical narratives. Moreover, historical study at the current stage is especially cautious about recognizing one country’s territorial border as an absolute territorial scope. Instead, the consensus on the need to relativize the historical narrative of a country has also been broadened. Therefore, it is academically uncommon to suggest a historical body of a specific period from history-“China in history”-as a particular reference point. Having said that, there is a concrete reason why a number of Chinese scholars still support the concept of the Qing as the Standard for the Establishment of the PRC. As will be discussed later, they claim for a distinct context and a particular trait, both of which are applicable only to China, in defining a state.

However, even within the Chinese academia, there have been continuous yet critical discussions through which they distance themselves from this mainstream discourse. Many scholars, including Sun Zuomin (孫祚民), Yang Jianxin, Zhou Weizhou (周偉洲), Zhang Bo-quan (張博泉) and Zhang Bi-bo (張碧波) have raised different opinions from various viewpoints. They generally paid more attention to the fact that the territory has continuously changed in history and recognized that history should be narrated in different scopes according to different historical periods.

Sun Zuomin accepted Yang Sui’s argument but also sought logical modification and harmony to establish a more flexible scope of historical territory. He pointed out that foreign ethnic groups or foreign states existed beyond the border, and they were also incorporated into the Han Chinese

¹⁰ Zou Yilin 鄒逸麟, *An Overview of the History and Geography of China* 中國歷史地利概述, Shanghai: Shanghai jiaoyu chubanshe, 1993; Zhao Yong-Chun 趙永春, “From Multiple China to One China 從複數‘中國’到單數‘中國’” in *Research on Chinese Historical Territory Theory* 中國歷史疆域理論研究, Chinese Territorial Border Research Library 中國邊疆研究文庫, Harbin; Heilongjiang jiaoyu chubanshe, 2012; Han Maoli, *Fifteen Lectures on Chinese History and Geography* 中國歷史地理十五講, Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2014.

and became a part of Chinese history later.¹¹ Yang Jianxin was especially interested in the fact that historical territories have changed over time. Steadily converging on Bai's perspective, he tried to outline the formation process of China's territory that includes the frontier regions through two methods (模式): pioneering (開拓) and infiltrating (嵌入).¹²

On the other hand, Zhou Weizhou, particularly emphasizing the fact that territory changes historically, presented a critical stance against any discussion that takes a specific period as a reference point for historical narrative. Focusing on the unified multiethnic country's transition of territory according to the change of time, he insisted that China's territory in each period within her history doesn't exactly match that of current China. Then, he intimates, to take either the territory of present-day China as the standard (i.e. Yang's argument) or the territory of the Qing as the standard (i.e. Tan's argument) is to deny the fact that China's territory has continuously developed within history and that China is a unified multiethnic country formed from unifications and divisions.¹³

Moreover, in the case of Zhang Bi-bo, he pointed out that historical narratives should reflect the original context, depending on the historical reality which keeps expanding and shrinking within history, and cannot be fixedly identified. He asserted that "if the territory at that time was large, it should be recorded as including all of it. It is impossible to either drop eth-

¹¹ Sun Zuomin, "Problems with the Incorporation of Ethnic Minorities into Ancient Chinese History 中國古代史中有關祖國疆域和少數民族的問題," *Wenhui bao* 文匯報, 1961.

¹² Yang Jianxin, "One Center, Two Ways are the Main Modes of China's Territorial Formation 一個中心, 兩種途徑是中國疆域形成的主要模式, Re-discussing the Territorial Issue in Chinese History 再論中國歷史上的疆域問題," *Lanzhou Academic Journal* Volume 1 蘭州學刊 第1期, 1986; Yang Jianxin, "Re-discussing the Word "China" and the Formation of China's Territory "中國"一詞和中國疆域形成再探討," *Research of Chinese Borderland History and Geography* volume 2 中國邊疆史地研究 第2期, 2006.

¹³ Zhou Weizhou, "China in History and Its Territorial and Ethnic Issues 歷史上的中國及其疆域, 民族問題," *Journal of Yunan Social Sciences* 雲南社會科學, 1989; Zhou Weizhou, "Some Thoughts on Constructing China's Frontier Border Studies 關於构建中國邊疆學的幾點思考," *Research of Chinese Borderland History and Geography* Volume 3 中國邊疆史地研究 第3期, 2014; Zhou Weizhou, "Re-exploration of Several Issues Concerning the Territorial Theory in Ancient China 關於中國古代疆域理論若干問題的再探索," *Research of Chinese Borderland History and Geography* volume 3 中國邊疆史地研究 第3期, 2011.

nicity, regime, and land within the territorial scope from the narrative or to not include ethnicity, regime, and land outside the territorial scope in the narrative. This is, indeed, the rule and standard that should be consistent with the study of ancient peoples and territory.”¹⁴ Zhang Bo-quan also objected to Tan Qixiang’s concept of ‘the Qing as the standard for the Establishment of the PRC’ by arguing that “How to determine the standard of Chinese historical territory is a fundamental problem in Chinese historical studies. Thus, we cannot simplify the complicated historical territory problem by artificially defining one standard.” Instead, he looked for specific analysis by limiting such problems to a certain scope of history.¹⁵

These discussions reflect the nature of Chinese nationalism centered on the Han Chinese or the central districts of China.¹⁶ However, these criticisms are meaningful in that they do not limit the scope of a historical nar-

¹⁴ Zhang Bo-quan, “On Ancient Frontier Nations and Territorial Research Issues 論古代邊疆民族與疆域研究問題,” *Jilin University Journal Social Sciences* 3rd Edition 吉林大學社會科學學報 第3期, 1999.

¹⁵ Zhang Bi-bo, “A Reanalysis of the Issue of Incorporating Nationalities and Territories-with a Special Focus on the Concept of ‘a Shared History’ 關於歷史上民族歸屬與疆域問題的再思考-兼評‘一史兩用’史觀,” *Research of Chinese Borderland History and Geography* Volume 2 中國邊疆史地研究 第2期, 2000.

¹⁶ Discussions by Sun Zuomin and Yang Jianxin are, indeed, based on the logic of Liang Qichao. Liang explicated that current China’s unified territory is, in fact, based on the process of historical national integration centered on Han Chinese. In his *Examination of the Chinese Nation in History* (歷史上中國民族之觀察) written in 1905, he insisted that China’s ‘territory (邊疆)’ has been existed as a dynamic space where the ethnic group from the central districts of China consistently interacted or merged with various ethnic groups surrounding the central districts. He also added that the Huaxia ethnicity (華夏族), created during the time of the 3rd generations of the central districts of China, had formed a geographical and cultural territory with other neighboring ethnicities-such as the Miaoman (苗蠻族), Shu (蜀族), Badi (巴氏族), Xu Hui (徐淮族), Wu-Yue (吳越族), Min (閩族), Bai Yue (百濮族), and Bai Pu (百濮族) ethnicities-and such structure had remained until the late Qing. In addition, also in his *Studies of Ethnic Groups in Chinese History* (中國歷史上民族之研究) written in 1922, it was explained that the backbone of the Chinese nation was formed by the federal competition that occurred during the 3rd generation of Ha Sang-ju, which resulted in serving the Yuan Hou (元后)-one of the tribes among the group of Hou (群后). After then, a frequent interchange between the Zhuxia people (諸夏) and Yiji (夷狄) as well as the transformation from a group of Hou to the Yuan Hou happened which resulted in the formation of the frontier border as well as the integration of the various ethnicities of China. Liang Qichao, “Examination of the Chinese Nation in History,” *Complete Writings From the Ice-Drinker’s Studio* 飲冰室全集, 41, 5-12, 1923, pp. 1-34.

rative to a specific standard but flexibly reflect the issue of how to juxtapose newly-expandable territory and history as it is. Thus, it also makes us expect that there is room for these criticisms to continue to spread. Still, it is undeniable that these arguments haven't reached a point of changing the overall atmosphere of the mainstream academia in support of the concept of 'the Qing as the Standard for the Establishment of the PRC.'

The Combined Concepts of the Qing as a Standard for the Establishment of the PRC and as a Basis for the Establishment of the PRC

When a country is established without significantly destroying the structure of the existing state, it is natural to understand that the existing state has become the foundation of the new establishment. Despite the fact that the PRC was not directly connected to the Qing because of the period of the Republic of China in between, the territory and demographic composition of the PRC can be considered as inherited from the Qing. At the beginning of the establishment of the country, there was an atmosphere in which the political leaders emphasized that the establishment of the PRC was based on the Qing.

Around the time that production of the 'Historical Atlas of China' began, Chinese leaders, including Mao Zedong, began to point out that the PRC was built on the foundation of the Qing as well as receiving the major characteristics of China from the Qing. On April 25, 1956, at the National Assembly Intelligence Committee, Mao Zedong criticized 'Han-Nationalism (大漢族主義)' and, instead, encouraged cooperation between the Han Chinese and ethnic minorities, emphasizing the fact that such cooperation played an important role in shaping the current territory of China which is 'populated' and 'spacious yet prosperous.' He said, "The population of the ethnic minorities is big but the size of the area they occupy is large. When it comes to the population, the Han Chinese have an overwhelming majority at 94%. Thus, it is not good to let Han Chinese practice Han-Nationalism and disregard the ethnic minorities. Who has a lot of land? It is ethnic minorities who occupy almost 50-60%. When China is described as 'popu-

lated' and 'spacious yet prosperous,' 'populated' refers to the Han Chinese while 'spacious yet prosperous' refers to the ethnic minorities considering the abundant underground resources in their area."¹⁷ After that, there were more statements that the Qing created the basic structure of the territory of the PRC. Zhou Enlai (周恩來) insisted that "Today's vast territory of China is inherited from the Qing. It is undeniable that the Qing has contributed to current China being 'populated' and 'spacious yet prosperous.'"¹⁸ He also especially praised the achievements of the Qing in unifying the multiethnic country, saying that "the Qing, established by the Manchu people, ruled China for nearly 300 years and played the role of unification because, before the Qing, neither of Ming, Song and Tang, nor Han could be able to unify the country as Qing did."¹⁹ In the early 1960s, Mao tried to explain the contribution of the Qing in the formation of China's territory by using a metaphor that "the advent of the Manchu people in China's history is getting a tough bride and the food we currently eat is the Qianlong's rice." In addition, in discourse with Lao She (老舍) and others, he also pointed out that Kangxi's great contribution was the establishment of the territorial foundation of China today as the territory inherited by current China.²⁰

However, despite the fact that these remarks highlighted the relationship between the newly-established PRC and the Qing at the beginning of the establishment, it was interpreted as having special significance considering the historical context until the establishment of the state. This is because the Qing, established by the Manchurian regime, has never been re-

¹⁷ Mao Zedong 毛澤東, "On the Ten Major Relationships (on April 25, 1956)," *The Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung* volume 5 毛澤東選集 第5卷. Renmin chubanshe, 1977, p. 277.

¹⁸ Bai Jing-yuan 白靜源, Ma Qi-cheng 馬啓成, and Li Zhuqing 李竹青, "Summary of the Concluding Remarks at the Symposium on the Establishment of the Zhuang Autonomous Region held by the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (on March 25, 1957) 在政協全國委員會召開的關於建立壯族自治區問題座談會上的總結發言紀要," in *Compilation of Zhou Enlai's Commentary on Ethnic Issues and Ethnic Policies* 周恩來同志對民族問題與民族政策論述選編. Minzu University of China Department Office 中央民族學院科研處, 1981, p. 59.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* p. 97.

²⁰ Feng Erkang 馮爾康, "Studies of History and Politics 清史研究與政治," *Shixue yuekan* Volume 3 史學月刊 第3期, 2005; Shu Yi 舒乙, "Chairman Mao talks about Kangxi to Lao She 毛主席對老舍談康熙," *Digest of Science and Technology* volume 3 科技文萃 第3期, 2002.

stored after its collapse during the Anti-Manchurian revolution (排滿革命) and, thus, it was natural at the time not to think that this newly built state based on socialist ideology was connected with the already collapsed feudal dynasty.

Such remarks presented by the leaders were also generally accepted by the Chinese academia and led to discussions highlighting the relationship between these two countries. For example, Dai Yi (戴逸), in his *Concise History of the Qing* (簡明清史) Volume 2 written in 1984, cited Zhou Enlai's claim in discussing the policy for frontier ethnic groups during the Qing. His writings had a great influence on spreading the claim that the Qing formed the basic framework of the PRC.

China's second-generation party and state leaders have also stressed the national spirit and distinctive features of China. At the same time, the Chinese academia emphasized that the Qing laid the foundation for the PRC, highlighting the historical fame of the Qing. They also quoted Mao Zedong's phrases 'populated and 'spacious yet prosperous' in order to support his argument that China's fundamental national spirit basically came from the Qing.²¹

However, these two countries, the Qing and the PRC, were quite distinctive, especially in terms of the principles and characteristics that constituted their territories. First of all, in terms of the structural composition of territory, the Qing existed in the form of an "empire" in which various systems (institutions) coexisted separately whereas the PRC was basically a country aiming for the unified-national system of "nation-state." In addition, the centrality of the Qing was primarily placed on Manchu (滿人) while the main habitat area for Han Chinese was limited to 'China.'²²

²¹ Dai Yi, *Concise History of the Qing* volume 2, Renmin chubanshe, 1984.

²² Mark Mancall, in his analysis of the tribute system of the Qing Empire, pointed out that Qing Empire had coexisted in the form of a heterogeneous state: the northwestern crescent region included the inland Asian world consisting of Manchuria and the Feudatory Regions(藩部), the southern crescent region was governed by both the traditional Chinese order of mainland China and the tributes which were divided into non-China and China, respectively. Mark Mancall, *The Ch'ing Tribute System: An Interpretive Essay*, John King Fairbank ed. *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relation*, Harvard University Press, 1968, pp. 63-89.

On the other hand, the centrality of ‘China’ has been restored in the PRC. The nation-state of China has begun in the form of ethnicism among Han Chinese since the Xinhai Revolution and the territorial area of current China was finally established through the process of restoration of ‘China’ by the Han Chinese.²³ There was no doubt that the centrality of maintaining the current ‘unified multiethnic’ China was based on ‘China’ and Han Chinese. From this point of view, even if the PRC is considered to have followed the Qing in respect of the territorial border as well as the demographic composition, there was already a big difference in terms of the genuine meaning that this implies. Thus, it would be unreasonable to say that the Qing was the standard for the establishment of the PRC, rather than to say that the Qing was the basis for the establishment of the PRC.

In the meantime, the discourse on historical territory presented by Tan Qixiang and Ge Jianxiong has developed the “notion that the Qing is the basis for the establishment of the PRC” into the “notion that the Qing is the standard for the establishment of the PRC,” solidifying the connection between the Qing and the PRC in historical context. By suggesting that these two countries share the so-called “China in history” as a constitutional principle, they played a role in paving the way for explicating an integration of the Qing and the PRC instead of relying on mere general explanation. In other words, they responded to the demands of political power and scholars in the early days of the establishment of the country, many of whom sought the logical grounds for national integration including Han Chinese and ethnic minorities via historical discussions.

²³ In this regard, it is questioned whether the present China, which has restored the “China,” has the right and qualifications to govern the “non-China” area under the Qing Dynasty. Lee Seong-Gyu, Kim Gwang-Eok and Yang Il-Mo, eds., *Why is it still ‘China’?* The Pluralities and Universality of Chinese Civilization, *Acanet*, 2014, pp. 448-449.

The Historical Basis of the Integration of Nation and State

There have been many studies treating how the old state systems during imperial China were linked to a new state system in China's transitional process to a nation-state. Wang Hui (汪暉), presenting the summary of the transition process, pointed out that the territory of the traditional empire underwent a series of transformations and overlapping stages in the process of building a nation-state. Specifically, he summarized the flow of the transition process as follows: (1) the Theory of the nation-state by the Han Chinese, which consisted of only half of the revolutionary faction before the Xinhai Revolution happened, which was at the end of the Qing; (2) Discussion of the Theory of Unity and Salvation (合群救國論) and Great Nationalism (大民族主義) argued by Kang Youwei or Liang Qichao based on the rationale of historical phenomena of international competition and multi-ethnicity; (3) "Nationalism that determines the scope of an ethnicity based on the national borders of the Qing Empire" or "Logic of Pluralistic Unitary Nation" suggested by Sun Wen, etc.²⁴

Meanwhile, people pay attention to the fact that the nation-state of China inherited the imperial characteristics of the Qing. There has been a continuous discussion in academia highlighting this point. For example, Cho Byong-Han explicated that the traditions of the Chinese empire turned into the ideological inspiration or origin of the formation of 'the Great Chinese Nation (大中華民族)' in the process of the formation of nationalism in China.²⁵ Yu Yong-Tae explained that Great Nationalism—including Han, Manchu, Hui, Zhuang, and Miao ethnic minorities—, first formulated by Liang Qichao, was later expanded into the Theory of Zhonghua Minzu. Moreover, with faithful support especially from Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek during the Anti-Japanese War, it was continuously transmitted to

²⁴ Wang Hui, "Questions on the Liberation of the Objects and Modernity-A Few Reflections on [The Rise of Modern Chinese Thoughts]," in *Asia is the World*. Geul Hangari, 2010.

²⁵ Cho Byong-Han "The Formation of Nationalism and the Tradition of Chinese Empire in Modern China," *The Journal of Northeast Asian History*, 23.

the era of the PRC.²⁶ He also argued that in this process, the “internalized imperialism” has also come to constitute an important characteristic of modern Chinese nationalism.²⁷ Meanwhile, Jeon In-gap referred to this as an “imperial nation-state” by pointing out that the structure, ideology, and governance strategy of the Chinese Empire were implied within the system of the Chinese nation-state through the process of dismantling and reconstruction.²⁸ In sum, these scholars are commonly pointing out the phenomenon of connection or overlap between the two systems formed in the process of transitioning from the imperial state system to the nation-state system.

However, what should be further considered here is that in the process of transitioning from an imperial state to a nation-state system the pattern and method of composing the territory and population and the trend reflecting such composition were not consistently maintained over time. This trend indeed wasn't geared to promoting the establishment of a new country based on the maintenance of Qing's territory and demographic composition from the beginning. In specific, the leaders in the early days of formation couldn't find convergence in terms of dealing with the relationship between Han Chinese and ethnic minorities, or the ‘China’ and ‘non-China’ features.

As discussed above, the differentiation of the two elements of ‘China’ and ‘non-China’ was strongly promoted among the Han Chinese revolutionaries in late Qing. The alliance's revolutionary doctrine, which led to the Xinhai Revolution, was “Expel Barbarians, Restore China (驅除韃虜, 恢復中華),” and the Han Chinese’ “ethnicism” against the Manchus during the Xinhai Revolution as well as the “revanchism” against the Qing, who

²⁶ Yu Yong-Taem, “The Theory of Zhonghua Minzu and Northeast Geopolitics: Theoretical Grounds for the Northeast Project,” *Journal of Asian Historical Studies* 93, 2005.

²⁷ Yu Yong-Tae, “The National-Imperialism and the Logic of Unitary Nation in Modern China,” *The Journal of Northeast Asian History* 23, 2009.

²⁸ Jeon In-gap, “From the Empire to the Imperial Nation-State (1) -The Structure and Ideology of the Empire,” *The Journal of Chinese Studies* 中國學報 65, 2012; Jeon In-gap, “From the Empire to the Imperial Nation-State (2)-The Empire's Governing Strategy and Modern Reconstruction,” *The Journal of Chinese Studies* 66, 2012.

destroyed the Ming, were prevalent at the moment as pointed out earlier.²⁹ The Manchu-Han ethnic contradiction raised by the revolutionaries was indeed somewhat exaggerated, considering the fact that the Manchu-Han integration was already in progress at the time. In sum, it is undeniable that the trend of establishing a novel state system through the separation of some pluralistic elements, embraced by the imperial system mainly via the separation of ‘China’ and ‘non-China,’ began to emerge.

Since then, the problem of separation and integration of the “China” and “non-China” elements within the Qing has always been a problem in addressing the development of nationalism centered on Han Chinese. The reason why Liang Qichao, in his writing “The Theories of Johann Bluntschli, Master of Political Science (政治學大家伯倫知理之學說)” in 1903, supported Greater Nationalism (大民族主義) over Lesser Nationalism (小民族主義) by questioning the revolutionary’s claim of “State Building is Only Possible When the Manchus Are Expelled (排滿方能建國)” could provide a resolution to such problem. The Great Nationalism he insisted upon was not only the nationalism of the Han Chinese, but also a nationalism that unified the various ethnicities incorporating all of central China (本部) as well as other feudatory regions (藩部).³⁰ This assertion was finally realized as a state-building strategy of “Five Races Under One Union (五族共和)” in the process of transitioning to a republican state after the Xinhai Revolution.³¹ However, the anti-Manchu spirit and Han Chinese-centrism still existed, and even Liang Qichao himself clearly recognized that there was a limitation to the integration led by the Han Chinese’ assimilative power.³² In other words, for Han Chinese, there existed the possibility of

²⁹ This is clearly revealed in the course of the debate between Liang Qichao and Sun Yat-sen in the late Qing Dynasty. Hiroaki Yokoyama 横山宏章, *The Republic of China-Domination by the Wise and Good Governance* 中華民國-賢人支配と善政主義, Chuokoron-Shinsha, Inc. 中央公論社, 1997.

³⁰ Liang Qichao, “The Theories of Bluntschli, Master of Political Science 政治學大家伯倫知理之學說,” *The Complete Works of In-Bing-Shih* 飲冰室合集 volume 13, 1903, pp. 75-76.

³¹ Feng Jianyong 馮建勇, *A Study on the Xinhai Revolution and the Political Changes in the Frontiers of Modern China* 辛亥革命與近代中國邊疆政治變遷研究, Harbin: Heilongjiang jiaoyu chubanshe, 2012, pp. 277-294.

³² Kim Seung-Wook, 2020, pp. 146-147.

forming a country that both included and excluded the “non-China” elements.

The convergence over this problem couldn't be made even in the process of the Communist Party establishing the PRC. In fact, the Chinese Communist Party didn't originally plan to establish a “Grand Unification (大一統)” system by integrating the minor ethnic groups-Tibet, Mongolia, and Xinjiang- into the “Chinese Nation (中華民族).” Instead, the declaration promulgated at the 2nd Congress of the Communist Party of China in July 1922 included a plan to establish a “Federal Republic of China” under the principle of a “free federal system” by letting Mongolia, Tibet, and Huigang exercise autonomy.³³ The General Outline of the Constitution of the Soviet Republic of China, enacted in Ruijin (瑞金) in November 1931 when Mao Zedong took control of the party, also stipulated that it recognizes the full national autonomy of all minorities-Mongolia, the Hui people, Tibet, the Miao people, the Li people, and Goryeo people-and their right to decide for themselves whether to join or to leave the Chinese Soviet Republic.³⁴ However, Mao Zedong, in his article titled “The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party” written in 1939, agreed with the proposal of Sun Yat-sen on the meaning of “the Chinese People”: which included all ethnic minorities such as Mongolia, the Hui people, Tibet, and Uyghurs centered on Han Chinese.³⁵ Hence, before the establishment of the PRC, it can be said that both the Communist Party and Mao Zedong didn't have consistent stances in terms of policy towards the ‘ethnic minorities.’ However, in the process of the united front with the border

³³ The Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party 中共中央書記處, “Declaration of the Second National Congress of the Communist Party of China (1922.07) 中國共產黨第二次全國代表大會宣言 (1922年7月),” in *Before the 6th Party Congress*, Party Historical Materials 六大以前黨的歷史材料, Renmin chubanshe, 1980, pp. 2-11.

³⁴ Central Archives 中央檔案館, “Outline of the Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic 中國蘇維埃共和國憲法大綱 (Passed by the First National Congress of the Chinese Soviet on November 7th, 1931 1931年11月7日中華蘇維埃第一次全國代表大會通過),” in *The Selected File of Central Committee of Communist Party of China* 7th Edition 中共中央文件選集 第7冊(1931), Central Party School Press 中共中央黨校出版社, 1983, pp. 464-468.

³⁵ Mao Zedong, “The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party 中國革命和中國共產黨,” in *Collected writings of Mao Zedong* 毛澤東集, Sososha 蒼蒼社, pp. 93-131.

ethnic groups being promoted during the Anti-Japanese War and the national civil war, there was a consensus to incorporate those ethnic minorities into “the Chinese people” by way of giving them “autonomy”.

In the “Joint Platform” at the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference held in September just before the establishment of the PRC on October 1, 1949, the basic stance on “ethnic policy” was officially decided. Here, each ethnic group in China was united into one “national” by saying, “We practice unity and mutual cooperation to oppose imperialism and the merit of the people within each ethnic group, antagonize between ethnic groups, and prohibit acts of pressuring and dividing national unity.” In this change, each ethnic group was allowed to have “regional autonomy” in its residential area, while the independence and separation from China were not allowed.³⁶ This was more clearly stipulated in the “Constitution of the People’s Republic of China” promulgated in September 1954. They were incorporated into China under the name of “equal ethnic families” or “unified multiethnic countries.” In this process, the inconsistent stance between the two choices over how to establish the relationship between the two elements of “China” and “non-China” within the Qing eventually was settled on the premise of integration within a single state system.

What made each ethnic group maintain a certain cooperative front before establishing the country was the mobilization structure that tied them together under the same goal in reaction to the revolution or anti-Japanese war. However, even in the midst of this movement, there has been little in-depth discussion about the method or possibility of integrating them as a nation that constitutes the nation-state and equals the state. Even if the Chinese Communist Party advocated the principle of a “great family” since its foundation and appealed for a universe of a “grand unification,” these heterogeneous ethnic elements could not be identified as Chinese

³⁶ Central Chinese Communist Party Literature Research Office 中共中央文獻研究室編, “Common Program of The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (1st Plenary Session of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference on September 29th, 1949) (中國人民政治協商會議共同綱領 1949年9月29日政治協商會議第1屆全體會議通過),” in *Selected Important Documents Since the Founding of New China* Volume 1 建國以來重要文獻選編 第1冊, Central Party Literature Press 中央文獻出版社, 1992, pp. 1-13.

“nationals” in a single country. Considering the Han Chinese-centered ethnic structure and nationalism that led the process of establishing the PRC, the realistic basis for the concept of a nation that encompassed “China” and “non-China” in response to the establishment of a new country has not been solidified. As a result, when “China” and “non-China” in the Qing were eventually integrated as one nation-state, they faced the task of finding a logical basis to bind them together.

The task of finding the logical basis was, therefore, one of the critical reasons why the leaders proposed the concept of the Qing as the basis for the establishment of the PRC, in which process other scholars later came to promote the logic of ‘China in history’ along with the concept of the Qing as the standard for the establishment of the PRC. The “50s of the 18th century to the 40s of the 19th century,” according to mainstream scholars such as Tan Qixiang and Ge Jianxiong, were considered as a period of configuring the “complete territory of the Chinese Empire,” which encompassed all of Mongolia, Uighur, and Tibet and initiated Qing’s conquest of Zunghar Khanate. In other words, they regard the historical experience of these periods as a moment of integration in which ‘China’ and ‘non-China’ elements were merged into a single country.

National Traditions of Country China

In the discussion of China’s historical territory discussed above, it recognizes that the current Chinese state historically shares its history with that of the Qing. This recognition reflects the effort to see the Chinese state on a continuum from the national traditions of the preceding period. Moreover, it also reflects an understanding of the history of the Chinese state as differentiated from the perspective of the typical Western model of a nation-state. Ge Jianxiong explains that “China in history” is a concept as well as a historical entity that has its own Chinese innate context which cannot solely be described by the typical concepts like “empire” or “nation-state.” According to him, “China in history” can be interpreted both in “states in history” and “the other states” and hence China has continuously

maintained an existence and an operation of its own.³⁷

Recent scholars have pointed out that China exists as a concept with multiple meanings in various dimensions such as geography, culture, and population in addition to the state level. They argue that China in terms of “China as a state” has existed in a distinctive context differentiated from the typical ‘state’ in Western terms³⁸ while contending a particular way in explaining “China as a region,” discrete historically from “China as a state,” where the geographical, cultural, and population aspects of China are divided.³⁹ According to this explanation, the state as a concrete polity does not exist independently but constitutes a multilayered entity with other meanings (see the table below). In this vein, the newly formed “China as a state” like the PRC was given the task of maintaining and restoring the logical structure of “China as a region” in the sense that it supports the establishment of the state system of the “China as a state.”

China as a state	China as a region
A state China	Geographical China Demographical China Cultural China
China	Chinese-ness

³⁷ His explanation that the territory of the Qing era was created during “the Sang Ye Empire (桑葉帝國)” centered on “the Sixteen Interior Region Provinces (內地16省)” mainly through the process of “the replacement of chieftaincy with officials (改土歸流)”-in other words, by absorbing the ‘non-China’ regions into the already-existed territory based on Han Chinese-centered inertia-is indeed considered somewhat outdated nowadays, especially since the publication of “Concise History of the Qing” in the 80s. However, about China-in this context, he also doesn’t fully explain how the gap between the Qing and the countries before Qing is differentiated. Li Xiao-Jie 李曉杰 and Ge Jianxiong, eds., *Traditional Chinese Edition 疆域與政區*. Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 2011, pp. 202-226.

³⁸ Yu Xingwu 于省吾 and Wang Yuanhua, eds., *Explain the China 釋中國*, Shanghai Literature & Art Publishing House 上海文藝出版社, 1988, pp. 1515-1523.

³⁹ Lee Seong-gyu pointed out that the concept of ‘China’ was not a simple concept of a country but became complicated by combining it with unique cultural and ethnic attributes: thus, there are “China as a state (China ①),” “China as a geographic concept (China ②),” “China as a cultural concept (China ③),” and “China as a concept of ethnicity (China ④).” Lee Seong-gyu, Kim Gwang-Eok and Yang Il-Mo, eds., *Why is it still ‘China’?* pp. 435-449.

In light of this, “China in history” can be seen as a concept that focuses on “China as a region” rather than “China as a state” in the discussion of China’s historical territory. In other words, “China in history” is interchangeable with “China as a region” which in fact defines the current “China as a state” in an authentic way as China as it is.

The discussion of the historical territory is closely intertwined with other discussions that explain China from the perspective of “China as a state,” such as in relation to the concepts like ‘Tianxia (all under heaven 天下)’ or ‘Home (家).’ Also, for this reason, there is the potential for this discussion to be widely accepted and spread across Chinese academia in the future. For example, Ge Zhao Guang (葛兆光) develops the logic by arguing that a finite “state” and an infinite (with no boundary) “empire” indeed coexist. In his “Dwelling Here in China (宅茲中國),” he opposes using the narrative style derived from European history considering it to be a common yet only measures for universal history. He argues that China does have a clear innate context, neither as a typical empire nor as a nation-state. Regarding the question of how to define China, he raised the question of “Was China an ‘empire’ with undefined boundaries as an ever-changing ‘ethnic yet cultural community’ or a ‘nation-state’ with defined boundaries based on a clear sense of unity and consistent tradition?” He replied that “China indeed established a coexistent history, intertwined between the infinite empire and the finite state-empire and nation-state- respectively.” He finally concluded that under such a coexistent structure, China’s territory has steadily developed as a historical entity, distinctive from an “imaginary community” like the West.⁴⁰ The his-

⁴⁰ Ge Zhaoguang explicated that “China did not move from the empire to a nation-state. Instead, there existed a finite ‘state’ within the consciousness of an unbounded ‘empire,’ and unbounded ‘empire’ existed within a consciousness of a finite ‘state.’ Thus in the case of China, the nation-state has still remained in the consciousness of the traditional central empire despite the fact that the modern nation-state had emerged by breaking away from the traditional central empire. As a consequence, the modern nation-state and the traditional central empire have created a coexistent history.” Ge Zhaoguang 葛兆光, *Live Here, In This Country China 宅茲中國:重建有關“中國”的歷史* 歷史, edited by Lee Won-Seok, Geul Hangari, 2012, pp. 13-43; Ge Zhaoguang, Liu Fengyun 劉鳳雲 and Liu Wenpeng 劉文鵬, eds., “Reconstructing the Historical Discourse on “China”-Saving History From the Nation-state, or Understanding the Nation-state in History?重建關於“中國”的歷

torical entity to which he refers here is the association between China with defined boundaries and that with undefined boundaries. The entity also overlaps in meaning with “China in history” in the discussion of historical territory. In this sense, the discourse on the historical territory develops in conjunction with special attention to the national traditions of the state of China.

At this juncture, we can expect that the discussion of mainstream discourse on historical territory will broaden its scope of convergence within Chinese academia in the future. Xu Jilin (許紀霖), in his book titled ‘China in the World (家國天下),’ explains that China has been a continuum of family-state-world (家-國-天下) for a long time. In particular, the state was indeed the most “ambiguous” categorical concept, while the family or world was recognized as relatively more specific concepts.⁴¹ It is hard to say that he falls into the same category as the scholars of critical liberal intellectuals; or, that he is not directly involved in such discussion. Interestingly, on the other hand, he also pays attention to the aspect of “China as a region” couched in the concepts of family or world.

An Inseparable Nexus between Sovereignty and History?

The concept of sovereignty became a mainstream concept in political discourse in the process of establishing political order centered on the modern territorial state in the West. To borrow an expression, it was the state’s na-

史歷述 -從民族國家中拯救歷史, 還是在歷史中理解民族國家?” *In The National Identity of the Qing Dynasty-Research and Controversy of “New History of Qing Dynasty”* 清朝的國家認同-“新清史”研究與爭鳴, Beijing: China Renmin University Press 中国人民大学出版社, 2010, pp. 245-266.

⁴¹ Xu Jilin 許紀霖, *China in the World-Current Chinese People, the National Family* 家國天下-現代中國的個人, 國家與世界認同, Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2017. Recently, Xu Jilin has suggested the concept of the “New Idea of Tianxia (新天下主義),” arguing that China should build an inclusive order for other peoples based on the Confucius civilization of the Han Chinese mainly through multidimensional and multi-layered self-awareness. Xu Jilin, *New Idea of Tianxia* 新天下主義, edited by Qing Liu 劉擘, Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2015.

ture of territoriality turned into a theory.⁴² It was originally initiated from the belief that there should be an absolute political authority within a single domestic community. In the modern era, it was accepted as the recognition that such authority is the basis for recognition of the independent status of a state in the competitive world order. In modern nationalism, sovereignty acquires the status of almost inviolability in consideration of the ideal of peaceful international relations, apart from the reality of international politics, among individual sovereign states.⁴³

The belief here that sovereignty works as the basis for the authority of each separate state is predicated upon the assumption that it originates from the collective identity of the people (nation) of the nation-state, or the people (nation) equivalent to the state itself. In this respect, the perception of each country's sovereignty depends on what nationalism the nation-state has as its own basis.⁴⁴

Historical Types of European Nationalism

Types	I	II	III
Foundation Principle	Civic	Civic	Ethnic
	Liberal	Liberal	Authoritarian
	Individualistic	Collectivist	Collectivist
Examples in the early days	United Kingdom	France	Russia
Typical examples	United Kingdom, United States	France	Germany

Source: Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*. Harvard University Press, 1993, pp. 3–11. Reorganized by referring to the contents.

⁴² Anthony Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985, p. 88.

⁴³ Park Sang-Seop, *State. Sovereignty*, Korean Conceptual History Series 2, Sowha 小花, 2017, pp. 187-225.

⁴⁴ There is disagreement over whether state sovereignty belongs to national sovereignty (i.e., the whole community of the people as in state level) or to popular national sovereignty (i.e., each individual).

As can be seen from the table above, there were various types of nationalism that constituted a nation-state even among countries in Europe. According to an analysis by Liah Greenfeld, the history of European nationalism can be largely divided into three types. Britain aimed for individualism-liberalism based on civic principles. On the other hand, France aimed for collectivism-liberalism based on civic principles. Russia and Germany developed nationalism with authoritarian-collective tendencies by emphasizing ethnic principles.⁴⁵ This shows that the issue of how to define nation-state is not limited to a single model but inclusive of numerous variations, thereby indicating a divergent evolution of each country.

Chinese nationalism can also be seen as possessing its own regional features. In general, it has mostly been based on a community, composed of its nation, to put a unit of the state before that of an individual people. The theory of state organism by Johann Bluntschli had the greatest influence on Chinese nationalism.⁴⁶ Bluntschli upheld that the sovereignty of the state lies in the state (= the people) itself as an organism.⁴⁷ Liang Qichao played a decisive role in accepting Bluntschli's doctrine in China. Actually, he originally took the position that "a state is the product of a contract" following Rousseau's position⁴⁸ but he immediately turned to Bluntschli's theory of state organisms.⁴⁹ Then, Liang's contention made a

⁴⁵ Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*. Harvard University Press, 1993, pp. 3-11.

⁴⁶ Jung Hye-Jung, "Acceptance and Transformation of the Bluntschli' State Thought in Modern Korea, China, and Japan: Focusing on Hiroyuki Kato, Liang Qichao, and Najin·Kim Sangyeon", *The Journal of Asiatic Studies* 亞細亞研究 63-3, 2020.

⁴⁷ Oh Hyang-Mi, "Johann Caspar Bluntschli's Theory of Sovereignty", *Korean Journal of International Relations* 國際政治論叢 54-3, 2014.

⁴⁸ Liang Qichao, "Rousseau's Case 盧梭學案," *Qing Yi Bao* 清議報 volume 98-100, 1901, pp. 11-12; Liang Qichao, "The new citizen of China 中國之新民," and "Master of Social Contract Rousseau 民約論巨子盧梭之學說," *The Regenerate People Magazine* 新民叢報 volume 11-12, 1901-1902. Regarding this shift, Hazama Naoki (狹間直樹) argues that Liang Qichao indeed stood in both two axes, like the two axes of an ellipse, that he took the nationalism (國權主義) from the point of the "state," while taking populism (民權主義) from the point of "people (新民)." Hazama Naoki 狹間直樹, "New People 新民說," Joint Research on Liang Qichao-Western Modern Thought Acceptance and Meiji Japan 共同研究梁啓超-西洋近代思想受容と明治日本, Misuzu Shobo みすず書房, 1999, pp. 92-93.

⁴⁹ Liang Qichao, "The Theories of Bluntschli, Master of Political Science 政治學大家伯倫知理之學

profound impact on the formation of concepts like state and ethnicity not only in China but also in Korea and Japan.⁵⁰

The transformation of modern China into a nation-state was a process of redefining itself as a sovereign state.⁵¹ The change was also the process of restructuring a civilized empire-the Tianxia (all under heaven) including pluralism- into a homogeneous polity.⁵² If not limited to the scope of a nation-state, the concept of state sovereignty itself can be found in the Nerchinsk Treaty between the Qing and Russia from the 17th century.⁵³ However, as pointed out earlier, the foundation for the community consist-

說,” *The Regenerate People Magazine* 新民叢報 38:39, 1903, p. 4.

⁵⁰ Among Bluntschli's books, *Allgemeines Staatsrecht* (1868) was translated as *General Theories of State Law* (國法汎論) by Katō Hiroyuki (加藤弘之) between 1876 and 1879. In addition, the *Deutsche Staatslehre für Gebildete* (1974, Nördlingen), which could be an abbreviated version, was translated as *On the Nation-state* (國家論), Tokyo: Shunyōdō 春陽堂, 1889 by Hirata Tōsuke (平田東助) and Hiratsuka Daishiro (平塚定二郎), as well as *Nation Studies* (國家學), Tokyo: Zenrinyakushokan 善隣譯書館, 1899 by Azuma Heiji (吾妻兵治). Liang Qichao began to translate and publish Bluntschli's *Theory of the State* in the 11th “Qing Yi Bao” from April 10, 1899. In 1902, Guangzhi Book Company (廣智書局) compiled the books of Bluntschli as translated by Liang Qichao and published it under the title of *Standard Codes of the Study of State* (國家學綱領). Also, on May 25, 1903, the 32nd edition of *Xinmin Congbao* published an introduction of Bluntschli under the pseudonym of Liren (力人), and, on October 4th, 1903, the 38th and 39th *Xinmin Congbao* introduced the theory as a whole by publishing an article titled “The Theories of Bluntschli, Master of Political Science 政治學大家伯倫知理之學說” including the head of Bluntschli. In Korea, in 1907, An Jonghwa (安鍾和) translated and introduced “Standard Codes of the Study of State 國家學綱領” from the Guangzhi Book Company (廣智書局) under the same title. (Bluntschli Johann Caspar (伯倫知理), *Standard Codes of the Study of State* 國家學綱領, edited by An Jonghwa, Guangxue Bookstore 廣學書舖, 1907). Bak Geun-gab, *Bluntschli's Study of the State that Came Over To Korea*. Concept and Communication 20, 2017.

⁵¹ Maria Adele Carrai, *Sovereignty in China: A Genealogy of a Concept since 1840*, Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law, Cambridge University Press, 2019.

⁵² From the early stage, Fairbank analyzed the process of transformation from a culture-based empire into a modern nation-state through research on the tribute system and the Chinese-centered regional order. J.K. Fairbank and Teng Ssu-yu, *On the Ch'ing Tributary System*. Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 6 No.2 (1941), pp. 135-246; J.K. Fairbank, ed., *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1968. Levenson also distinguished between the Tianxia as a system of value and the state as a system of power. Joseph R. Levenson, *Confucian China and Its Modern Fate*, vol.3, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965, p. 98.

⁵³ This is also the main argument for the claim of “China in history” within the discourse of historical territory.

ing of the nation as a unit of the state was rather weak in view of establishing national sovereignty along with the juxtaposition of the state and the people. Despite the fact that it had systematic associations among the three elements constituting the empire, still, the Qing had many heterogeneous characteristics among them, which deterred the formation of a single national organism.⁵⁴

In China, even from pre-modern times, there existed the concept of “ethnic group (族類),” which allowed for the recognition of a common ethnicity beyond the contrast with other ethnicities.⁵⁵ In addition, there was a possibility that it could be seen as an original form of national (ethnicity) perception parallel to modern sovereign states. In fact, Chinese intellectuals regarded the concept of the nation (ethnicity) as a single entity in accepting the theory of the national organism by Johann Blunckhili. However, it is hard to say that the concept of the nation was developed mainly by the Han Chinese under the structure of Hwa-Yi Theory (華夷論). The “great nationalism” claimed by Liang Qichao, integral to the national organism, indeed referred both to Central China in terms of geography and Han Chinese in terms of ethnicity. The nationalism, promoted in this fashion, therefore, tended to have authoritarian characteristics centered on Han Chinese as well as collectivist characteristics. It finally resulted in placing the non-Han

⁵⁴ Koo Bum-jin, *Qing Dynasty, The Chimera Empire*, Minumsa Publishing Group, 2012.

⁵⁵ The word “ethnic group (族類)” was originally defined as a group of people of the same kind as the word “Identifying Things by Ethnicity (Zhouyi-Dongren-xiang) (族類辨物 (『周易·同人·象』))” implies. As time goes by, its scope of meaning became broadened to be referred to the blood relatives consisting of descendants of the same surname. Therefore, in the “Shi Yi’s Aspirations Saying That Those Who Are Not of Our Ethnicity Will Have Different Hearts (Zuo Zhuan·Chengong·4 Years) (史佚之志有之曰, 非我族類, 其心必異 (『左傳·成公·4年』)),” it was mainly limited to the meaning of the blood clans but it could be able to add the context connected with the meaning of the ethnicity-meaning of ethnicity used after the modern times-as the contrast to other ethnicities got highlighted from the Hwa-Yi world view. Jiang-Tong (江統), in *Theories International Migration (徙戎論)*, also remarked that “Those who are not of our ethnicity must have different hearts, and the attitudes of Rong and Di are not the same as those of China. (The Book of Jin, Volume 56, Jiang Tong Tradition)(非我族類, 其心必異, 戎狄志態, 不與華同 (『晉書·卷56·江統傳』)).” In spite the fact that the concept of “ethnic group” has a different implied meaning from the concept of “nation” used since the modern times, it is also considered as having a similar context with the currently used “nation” today.

Chinese (or non-China) elements in the margins or on a sub-level of the category of state. Even after the establishment of the PRC, it consequently led to Han-nationalism (大漢族主義) of which Bai Shouyi and others were wary. It seems that this became a contributing factor that weakened the unity of the Chinese (ethnic) people as the basis for national sovereignty.

Such vulnerabilities did not have the opportunity to be revised or shifted in other directions before the establishment of the PRC. As in the case of the state sovereignty in Western countries which grew within a competitive international system, the process of Chinese nationalism has also been stimulated by a very intense sense of external crisis. Resistance as a nation (ethnicity) preceded integration as a nation (ethnicity). In the midst of this, even after the establishment of the “new” China, it was difficult to see that the various ‘ethnicities,’ entwined with the Han Chinese nationalism, formed sufficiently a single collective identity as the people (ethnics) for the basis of national sovereignty. The reason why Tan Qixiang presented the concept of “China in history” as a basis for explaining the connection between the PRC and the Qing while compiling *The Historical Atlas of China* has an immediate bearing on this matter. In short, it was a response to the task of national (ethnic) integration that was belatedly addressed after the establishment of the PRC.

If then, the discussion of China’s historical territory is fundamentally interrelated to the internal problems of Chinese nationalism. It contains the dark side (隱憂) of Chinese nationalism, or the hidden concerns. Dealing with internal matters that do not want to be displayed to neighboring countries, it should be treated very carefully.

At this moment, we need to be wary of this problem on the ground that this discussion itself may cause tensions and clashes with neighboring peoples and countries considering that its logic links national sovereignty with history. The territory of the state does change from time to time as a result of conducting mutual relations with neighboring countries and ethnic groups, including wars, aggressions and treaties.⁵⁶ What could be com-

⁵⁶ Since modern times, international law can be said to have served as a post-approval of effective

monly assumed here is the scope of territory in which national sovereignty is determined along with the emergence of the state in modern times. If one country sets its national territory based on what existed in the past before its establishment, this turns out to be a key factor that agitates the existing stable geopolitical structure. However, as already pointed out, the concept of historical territory in China is not simply a general noun that refers to the historically changing Chinese territory but a proper noun referring to “the basis of the historical right of the legal territory.”⁵⁷ Just as Tan Qixiang criticized Yang Sui’s claim, arguing that “isn’t it not recognizing the regions, located east of the Ussuri River and north of the Heilong River, belonging originally to China’s territory, which Russia ceded back in the Aihun Treaty and the Beijing Treaty?,” “China in history” is presented on the premise of the restoration of territories lost before the establishment of the PRC. There are also some scholars who go even further to expand the scope of the lost territories. For example, Zou Yilin (鄒逸麟) claimed that “it is rare in world history for a country to lose 200 kilometers² of territory,” referring to the fact that the complete territory of the Chinese Empire experienced a number of invasions in the northeast, northwest, north, southwest, and sea areas by imperialism from the time of the Opium War before the establishment of the PRC.⁵⁸ However, it is undeniable that such a historical discussion cannot serve as a direct basis for changing the current national territorial boundaries in terms of international law. Still, even if it is limited to the historical dimension, the discussion should be cautious about the danger of becoming a topic of national sovereignty, which may

rule by the state. A colonial occupation that happened in the 19th century was mostly legalized by the principles of international law, a classic example of which was the so-called ‘terra nullius’ principle. In this case, the unoccupied land does not refer to the land without inhabitants, but land for which indigenous people do not have the right of sovereignty. It started with the concept proposed by German jurist Ferdinand von Martix at the 188th Congress of the Institute of International Law held in Lausanne, Switzerland in 188, and was later used as a basis for imperialism’s colonial occupation under the name of international law. Andrew Fitzmaurice, “The Genealogy of Terra Nullius,” *Australian Historical Studies* 38 (129) 2007, pp. 1-15.

⁵⁷ Zhang Shiming, pp. 756-757.

⁵⁸ Zou Yilin, *An Overview of the History and Geography of China* 中國歷史地利概述, Shanghai: Shanghai jiaoyu chubanshe, 2007, pp. 148-163.

become a trigger provoking tension and conflict with its neighboring countries.

The unconvincing argument for the inseparable nexus between sovereignty and history does not exist merely in Chinese academia. The perception of sovereignty over China's historical territory, as reflected in the concept of "China in history," is not far from the concept of "historical sovereignty," which is often discussed in general academia. Recently, there is a trend in academia and society that has emphasized historical succession based on historical sovereignty, as differentiated from national sovereignty. However, history and sovereignty are inevitably interlinked to each other. It is not appropriate to thrust state sovereignty back into the distant past.⁵⁹ If attempting to change the territorial scope along which state sovereignty is implemented, it will have to be accompanied by a changeable to rearrange even the history of its neighboring countries or by diplomatic tension. Nevertheless, the discussions that awkwardly associate history and sovereignty among East Asian countries have vigorously continued. This phenomenon itself, therefore, shows that each country, as sovereign state, still has weak foundations on which to form peaceful international relations with its neighboring countries. In this respect, in evaluating and responding to China's discourse on historical territory, I contend, it is necessary to ensure that the collective identity of the (ethnic) peoples from which national sovereignty originates goes beyond "nationalism" and shares more universal values.

⁵⁹ Lim Ji-Hyun, *The Dilemma of Goguryeo History: Between 'National Sovereignty' and 'Historical Sovereignty'*. Research Institute of Comparative History and Culture. *The Border of Modernity, the Change of History-Standing on the Frontier and Looking at History*. Humanist, 2004, pp. 19-34.

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