

Khaisan and the 1911 Independence of Mongolia

Pyungrae LEE

Institute of Central Asian Studies,
Hankuk University of Foreign Studies

The Journal of Northeast Asian History
Volume 19 Number 1 (Winter 2022), 87-127

Copyright © 2022 by the Northeast Asian History Foundation. All Rights Reserved.
No portion of the contents may be reproduced in any form without
written permission of the Northeast Asian History Foundation.

Khaisan and the 1911 Independence of Mongolia*

Pyungrae LEE

Institute of Central Asian Studies,
Hankuk University of Foreign Studies

Introduction

Mongols proclaimed their independence from the Qing dynasty on December 1, 1911, and enthroned Jebtsundamba Khutugtu—the highest reincarnate lama in Khalkha Mongolia—as Bogd Khaan on December 28 of that same year in establishing a new independent state. The Bogd Khaan government did not confine the territory of the Mongolian state to Outer Mongolia but aimed for the unification of the entire Mongol people including those of Inner Mongolia. This had been the objective of the Mongols before the declaration of independence, and the movement for its realization had developed continually after the proclamation. This movement's symbolic figure was Khaisan from Inner Mongolia, who visited St. Petersburg to request Russian assistance just before Mongolian independence was declared.¹

^{*} This translated article is a revised and supplemented version of Pyungrae Lee, “1911년 몽골 독립과 하이산,” *대동문화연구* 75 (2011): 201-234.

¹ Khaisan's name is variously written in Chinese characters: For example, Haishan (海山), Haishan (海珊), Haisen (海森), Haisan (海三), Haiyuan (海元), and so on. Among these, the most common Chinese rendering is Haishan (海山).

Khaisan played such a decisive role in achieving independence that it is even said that “If Khaisan had not come to Khüree (present-day Ulaanbaatar), Mongolian independence could not have been achieved.”² Above all, the fact that Khaisan was included in the delegation to Russia, together with Tserenchimed and Khanddorj who were the most influential leaders of the independence movement, speaks volumes about his stature in the movement. On the one hand, Khaisan participated in the delegation to Russia to show that the aspiration for independence was the will of the entire Mongol people. On the other hand, Khaisan joined the deputation because he was one of the very persons leading the push for independence.

Khaisan’s hometown was in a region into which Han Chinese people had migrated from early on. As the Han immigration was accompanied by pasture reclamation, acute ethnic conflicts between the Han Chinese and the Mongols arose in Khaisan’s hometown. In this situation, Khaisan left his home due to the conflict with the Han Chinese, moved to Harbin, and from there went on to Khüree where he played a leading role in the Mongolian independence movement. Appointed as a high official in the Bogd Khaan government in Khüree, he strove to build a new independent state. However, his efforts for Mongolian independence and the unification of Inner and Outer Mongolia brought him into conflict with the leaders of Outer Mongolia, as well as with Russia. As a result, he suffered through political ordeals and then ultimately returned to China when Mongolian independence was revoked through the 1915 Kyakhta Trilateral Treaty.

A review of Khaisan’s life gives a vivid look both at the rise and fall of Mongolian nationalism and at almost all aspects of Mongolia’s international relations in the early 20th century, including the ethnic conflict in Inner Mongolia from the late 19th century, the 1911 declaration of independence and the ensuing national unification movement, the power struggle within the Bogd Khaan government, Mongolia’s international status determined by diplomatic negotiations between the great powers, and the fate of

² Lü Yiran ed., *Beiyang zhengfu shiqi de Menggu diqu lishi ziliao* [Historical Materials on Inner Mongol Regions during the Beiyang Government Period] (Haerbin: Heilongjiang jiaoyu chubanshe, 1999), p.213.

the Inner Mongols who emigrated to Outer Mongolia with aspirations of Mongolian independence and unification. In this regard, the explication of Khaisan's life and achievements is essential to understand the history of Mongolia and the international circumstances surrounding it at the turn of the 20th century.

For this reason, beginning from the time when Khaisan was still active, there have been many different evaluations made of him, and his name has been mentioned in almost all research on 1911 Mongolian independence. Khaisan's role in the history of the Mongolian independence movement was highlighted for the first time by the Mongolian scholar Puntsagnorov.³ His research, however, was not a full-fledged one since it just focused on the meaning of Khaisan's participation in the delegation to Russia. It was the Japanese historian Nakami Tatsuo who first gave full consideration to Khaisan's life trajectory, tracing the entire span of his life from his birth, to his involvement in the Mongolian independence and unification movements, to his eventual return to China.⁴ After that, Jamsran—a Mongolian researcher—published a monograph discussing the entire life of Khaisan. Another Mongolian scholar—Boldbaatar—also undertook full-scale research on Khaisan.⁵ In addition, Lan Meihua highlighted Khaisan and his activities in an article concerning the Inner Mongols who participated in the 1911 independence movement. Afterward, Fan Mingfang also published a comprehensive article on Khaisan.⁶ Most recently, Li Guilian and Lee Pyung-rae published articles on Khaisan's scholarship on Mongo-

³ Ts. Puntsagnorov, *Mongolyn avtonomii үеийн түүх* [A History of Mongolia's Autonomous Period] (Ulaanbaatar: Ulsyn khevel ba kheveliin üildverleilig erkhlekh gazar, 1955).

⁴ Nakami Tatsuo, "Haisan to Otai: Bogudo · Han seiken niokeru nan Mongorujin" [Khaisan and Otai: Southern Mongols in the Bogd Khaan Government], *Toyo Gakuho* 57-1 · 2 (1976).

⁵ L. Jamsran, *Mongolchuudyn sergen mandaltyn ekhen* [The Beginning of the Mongols' Renaissance] (Ulaanbaatar: Soyombo kheveliin gazar, 1992); J. Boldbaatar, *Chin zütgelt gün Khaisan* (Ulaanbaatar: Mongol ulsyn ikh surguul, 2002).

⁶ Lan Meihua, "Neimenggu yu 1911 nian Menggu duli yundong" [Inner Mongolia and the Mongolian Independence Movement in 1911], *Hanxue yanjiu* 23-1 (2005); Fan Mingfang, "Haishan yu 1911 nian Waimenggu duli" [Khaisan and the Independence of Outer Mongolia in 1911], *Zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu* 15-4 (2005).

lian-Chinese lexicography and Khaisan's relationship with a Mongolian newspaper known as *Mongyul-un sonin bičig*, respectively.⁷

With these studies, Khaisan's life and achievements have been elucidated in fair detail. There are still many ambiguous aspects of his life and activities, however. Thus, scholars have put forward distinctly different assessments of his life, particularly regarding his changing careers from an anti-Chinese activist, to a fighter for Mongolian independence, to a high official in the Bogd Khaan government, and his eventual return to China. Therefore, the present author will examine Khaisan's life, as well as his role in the history of Mongolian independence, by focusing on various ambiguous aspects that have remained unanswered in previous studies. By doing so, this study will provide an accurate depiction of the historically important figure and also contribute to a clearer understanding of the Mongolian independence and unification movements in 1911. In addition, this research helps comprehend the Inner Mongols' viewpoints, as well as why they came to have various positions, on Mongolian independence.

The first section of this article discusses Khaisan's early life in his hometown, his move to Harbin, and then his activities in that city. In the second part, this study examines his visit to Khüree, his participation in the Mongolian independence movement, his activities in the Bogd Khaan government, and the political ordeals that he suffered. The last section of this research looks into the reasons why Khaisan sought a return to China after the failure of the Mongolian independence and unification movements and then attempts to evaluate his life from the perspective of the rise and fall of Mongolian nationalism.

⁷ Li Guilian, "Haishan ji qi 'Menghan hebi wufang yuanyin' yanjiu" 海山及其《蒙漢合璧五方元音》研究 [A Study on Khaisan and His Book Entitled *Mongolian-Chinese Original Sounds of the Five Regions*], *Zhangchun daxue xuebao* (2018); Lee Pyung-rae, "Haisan-gwa <Monggol Shinmun>" [Khaisan and the Mongolian Newspaper], *Monggolhak* 64 (2021).

Khaisan's Awakening of National Consciousness and Emigration to Harbin

Khaisan was born in 1857, the youngest of three brothers, in Khadlan Ulaan Gangga Village (哈達蘭烏蘭岡村) of Kharchin Jasag Chinwang Banner (喀喇沁扎薩克親王旗), Josutu League, Inner Mongolia—present-day Gangyingzi Village (岡營子村) of Tianyi Township (天義鄉) in Ningcheng County (寧城縣), Chifeng (赤峰), Inner Mongolia.⁸ His father, Bayantömör, was an influential local figure who owned a farm, along with temporary dwellings, even in the Tuquan (突泉) area in the northern part of the Greater Khinggan Range. Bayantömör brought in a private tutor to teach his son the Mongolian, Manchu, and Chinese languages, along with various knowledge of the Eastern and Western scholarships, for 14 years. Because of the regulation that “Mongols cannot take the imperial examination, and Han Chinese cannot be enfeoffed as Prince,” Khaisan married a Han Chinese woman surnamed Ma (馬) to qualify for the imperial examination. With the abolition of the imperial examination system of the Qing dynasty, however, he was unable to fulfill his aim. Although the circumstances are not clear, Khaisan was selected as a low-level official at the local office of Pingquan Prefecture (平泉州)⁹ in the Kharchin Banner and began his offi-

⁸ Regarding his activities in his hometown, this article consulted the following materials: Kalaqin youyiqi beizi Haishan ed. & trans., *Menghan hebi wufang yuanyin* [Mongolian-Chinese Original Sounds of the Five Regions] (Beijing, 1917); Bai Yukun, “Haishan,” in *Neimenggu wenshi ziliao* [Materials on Inner Mongolian Literature and History] vol. 14 (Huhehaote: Zhongguo renmin zhengxie Neimenggu zizhiqi weiyuanhui Neimenggu zizhiqi weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui, 1984); Wu Ziyun, “Haishan jianli” [A Brief History of Khaisan], in *Neimenggu wenshi ziliao* vol. 14; Deshan, *Mengguolejin Hailetuti shi shulüe* [A Brief Memoir of Hailetuti of the Mongoljin], trans. Bao Yongqing and Qingshan (Huhehaote: Neimenggu daxue chubanshe, 1997).

⁹ The Josutu League of Inner Mongolia was an area into which Han Chinese moved from early on, and Mongols and Chinese lived together. The Qing government administered the Han people from the early Yongzheng period and established an office for the settlement of lawsuits between the Mongols and Chinese. For example, the Qing court installed Bagouting (八溝廳) in the Kharchin Banner in the 7th year of Yongzheng, which was renamed Pingquan Prefecture (平泉州) in the 41st year of Qianlong. Concerning this, see Wang Guojun, *Menggu jiwen* [A Record on Mongolia], ed. and anno. Ma Xi and Xu Shiming (Huhehaote: Neimenggu renmin chubanshe,

cial career. Before long, he was promoted to a position of responsibility and became acquainted with local magnates. Later, when he was around thirty years old (in 1887), Khaisan was appointed to the post of Lieutenant-General (*Ma. meiren i janggin*) at the Princely Establishment (王府) of the Kharchin Right Banner.

The local people of the time called Khaisan, Yu Zhichang (于芝昌)—the Zakhiragch Janggi (管旗章京), and Sodnom—the Director of Fiscal Bureau (度支局長)—the “three outstanding figures of the Kharchin Banner.”¹⁰ Another story has it that there were three persons called “San (三, meaning ‘three’ in Chinese)” in the Kharchin region, namely, Khaisan (Haisan 海三, another Chinese rendering of Haishan 海山), Baosan (鮑三, a maternal uncle of the Prince of the Kharchin Right Banner), and Zhangsan (張三, a sobriquet of Zhang Huatang 張華堂). These three were reportedly influential local figures in competition with one another, and due to the discord among them, Khaisan left the Kharchin Banner for Harbin.¹¹ It is not clear when and why Khaisan left his hometown. Chinese sources recorded that “Khaisan ran away abroad because he committed a crime”¹² or “he fled to Russia because he committed a crime.”¹³ A few scholars, however, have argued that Khaisan moved to Harbin after serving as a leader of the anti-Chinese movement.¹⁴ The areas around the Kharchin Banner had long witnessed conflicts between the Han Chinese and Mongols over the use of pastures. These ethnic conflicts intensified to involve armed clashes in the late 19th century when the western powers encroached on the territory and economic interests of the Qing dynasty. It was at that time, the story goes,

2006), pp.23-24.

¹⁰ Wang Guojun, *Menggu jiwén*, pp.219-220.

¹¹ Bai Yukun, “Haishan,” p.158; Wu Ziyun, “Haishan jianli,” p.162; Deshan, *Mengguolejin Hailetuti shi shulüe*, p.80.

¹² Lü Yiran ed., *Beiyang zhengfu shiqi de Menggu diqu lishi ziliao*, p.28.

¹³ Wu Xiangxiang ed., *Zhongguo xiandai shiliao congshu* [A Collection of Historical Sources on Modern Chinese History] vol. 1 (Taipei: Jingshi wenbianshe, 1962), p.669.

¹⁴ Nakami Tatsuo, “Haisan to Otai,” p.127; Jamsran, *Mongolchuudyn sergen mandaltyn ekhen*, p.145.

that Khaisan led the anti-Chinese movement.

Some other later scholars have written that Khaisan left home because of a conflict with Zhangsan. According to them, during the anti-Mongol Jindandao (金丹道) Rebellion in 1891,¹⁵ Zhangsan put pressure on Khaisan by making use of the ethnic conflict between the Chinese and Mongols. In response, Khaisan counterattacked Zhangsan by taking active roles in the Qing suppression of the Jindandao Rebellion. In the face of a military crisis, Zhangsan allied with Baosan by becoming his sworn son. In doing so, Zhangsan attempted to attack Khaisan by securing military support, through Baosan, from the Prince of the Kharchin Right Banner. Meanwhile, a minor leader of the Jindandao Rebellion was arrested but managed to escape while being transferred to Pingquan Prefecture. On this occasion, Zhangsan brought charges against Khaisan for letting the rebel flee. Realizing the seriousness of this situation, Khaisan then left home with his brothers and family in 1902.¹⁶ Another researcher argues that Baosan, in collusion with Zhangsan, met the Prince of the Kharchin Banner and accused Khaisan of punishing innocent civilians. The prince then accepted the claims by Baosan and Zhangsan and reprimanded Khaisan, discharging him from office. As a result, Khaisan grew furious and left his hometown.¹⁷

Materials about the Boxers (義和團), however, provide a little different story: Zhang Liansheng (張連升; that is, Zhangsan) was a leader of the insurgent army, a group of about 300 people, in the areas on the Liao River, while Haiyuan (海元; namely, Khaisan) served in the Qing army that

¹⁵ The Jindandao Rebellion is the revolt ignited by followers of the Jindandao—a secret religious society of Han Chinese—in 1891 in and around the Juu Uda and Josutu Leagues of eastern Inner Mongolia. This rebellion was also known as the Revolt of Red Turban Bandits (紅巾賊之變). During this rebellion, the main target of the attack was Mongols, and thus a huge number of Mongols were killed or injured. The number of Mongol casualties varies from tens of thousands up to over a hundred thousand. For details, see Borjigin Bürensain, *Kingendai niokeru Mongorujin nōkō sonraku shakai no keisei* [The Formation of Mongol Agricultural Village Society in the Modern Period] (Tokyo: Kazama shōbo, 2002).

¹⁶ Bai Yukun, “Haishan,” p.158; Deshan, *Mengguolejin Hailletuti shi shulüe*, pp.80-81.

¹⁷ Wu Ziyun, “Haishan jianli,” p.162.

suppressed the rebellion.¹⁸ According to an annotation of this record, since Zhang Liansheng continued to resist the Qing troops, Khaisan arrested and escorted Zhang to the office of Pingquan Prefecture. On the way, Zhang committed suicide, and Zhang's family made a false accusation that Khaisan had killed him. Subsequently, the prefect of Pingquan ordered Khaisan's arrest, and Khaisan left home in the winter of 1902.¹⁹

As all of this shows, the explanations for Khaisan's leaving home vary depending on the sources. The Jindandao Rebellion was an anti-Mongol incident, during which Han Chinese pillaged and killed Mongols indiscriminately. Although the branch of the Boxer Rebellion, led by Zhang Liansheng, called for expelling the Western powers from Qing China with the slogan "Support the Qing and annihilate the West (扶清滅洋)," they also clamored "Eliminate the barbarians and sweep the northern region away (除胡掃北)," thereby including the Mongols among their targets of attack. These two rebellions developed in very similar ways: first, the Han Chinese rebels attacked the Mongols, and the Qing army then suppressed the Chinese revolt; second, Khaisan took an active role in the suppression of the rebellions as a member of the Qing army.²⁰ Thus, the argument by Nakami Tatsuo and Jamsran that Khaisan participated in the anti-Chinese movement reflects an aspect of the historical truth. The remaining question concerns the time when the incident involving Khaisan and Zhang Liansheng (or Zhangsan) took place. Some scholars take it to have been the time of the Jindandao Rebellion, and others consider it that of the Boxer Rebellion. As can be seen from the records on the Boxer Rebellion that "the remnants of the Red Turban bandits (紅巾教匪) raged in the name of the Boxers,"²¹ the mistake may have arisen from the identification of the Boxers with the Red Turbans (i.e., the Jindandao believers). Given that Khaisan left home in 1902, therefore, it is reasonable to view that the incident

¹⁸ Wang Guojun, *Menggu jiwén*, pp.209-210.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.220.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.14-15, pp.209-210.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p.209.

involving Zhang Liansheng (or Zhangsan) occurred during the time of the Boxer Rebellion.

Another issue concerning Khaisan's early career prior to his move to Harbin is whether the statement Khaisan gave to the Finnish scholar Gustaf John Ramstedt that he had worked at the Princely Establishment of Prince of Na (那王府)²² in Beijing and also as Li Hongzhang (李鴻章)'s secretary is true or not.²³ Concerning Khaisan's service for Prince of Na, Nakami Tatsuo considered Prince of Na as Namnansüren of the Khalkha Mongols, while Jamsran deemed the prince as Nayantu.²⁴ At any rate, since there are no relevant Mongolian sources, it is doubtful whether Khaisan really worked in Beijing. Moreover, given the situation of the time, it is even less probable that Khaisan served as a secretary for Li Hongzhang. During the Jindandao Rebellion, however, Li Hongzhang—then the Governor-General of Zhili (直隸)—sent Ye Zhichao (葉志超) to Pingquan to suppress the revolt. At that time, Khaisan reportedly participated in the suppression as a guide of the Qing army.²⁵ For this reason, Khaisan could be considered a subordinate of Li Hongzhang in a broad sense in that he helped Ye Zhichao. Thus, Khaisan's statement is not entirely unfounded.

In 1902, Khaisan reportedly hid in a temporary dwelling on his family farm in the Tuquan area with his three brothers and other family members; after a while, he moved to Harbin. Therefore, it is hard to know exactly when he left for Harbin. From the records that Khaisan lived in “a house of a certain foreigner” for four years before the declaration of independence,²⁶ and that he left for Khüree in 1907, it seems likely that Khaisan moved to Harbin in late 1902 or early 1903.²⁷ It is also not clear

²² Wu Xiangxiang ed., *Zhongguo xiandai shiliao congshu*, p.669.

²³ G. J. Ramstedt, *Ilgob charye dongbang yeohaeng* [Seven Journeys to the East], trans. Go Songmu (Seoul: Mineumsa, 1986), p.203.

²⁴ Nakami Tatsuo, “Haisan to Otai,” p.127; Jamsran, *Mongolchuudyn sergen mandaltyn ekhen*, p.146.

²⁵ Wang Guojun, *Menggu jiwen*, p.32.

²⁶ Lü Yiran ed., *Beiyang zhengfu shiqi de Menggu diqu lishi ziliao*, p.213.

²⁷ The Russian scholar E. A. Belov did not specify his sources but wrote that Khaisan moved to

what made Khaisan move to Harbin. According to research, after moving to Harbin, Khaisan met a person surnamed “Fu (傅 or 付)” — a person from Heicheng (黑城) of Kharchin Middle Banner—who then served as a translator for the Russian consulate and introduced Khaisan to the Russian consul, G. M. Semyonov. From that time, Khaisan hid in the Russian consulate for four years, learned Russian, built a deep relationship with Semyonov, and then left for Khüree in 1907 on Semyonov’s suggestion.²⁸

Japanese sources provide a different story: Khaisan and his son dwelt in the house of the Russian A. D. Khitrovo in Harbin and then left for Khüree in 1907 on Khitrovo’s suggestion.²⁹ Chinese sources also confirm this. Specifically, the Governor of Heilongjiang Province, Yu Sixing (于駟興), reported to his superior that in Harbin he discovered Khaisan hiding in the house of Khitrovo, but was not able to arrest him because of the tight security.³⁰ Furthermore, according to the testimony of Ramstedt, Khaisan was dispossessed of all his properties and subordinates by Chinese people and volunteered to become an agent for the secret police in exchange for money from Russia. There is thus a possibility that he somehow had connections with Russia already and then went to Harbin, where he built a relationship with Semyonov and advised Russian officials on their Mongolian policy.

After the opening of the Eastern Qing Railway (東清鐵道), Russia attempted to advance on Khölönbuir, the Jirim League, and other places, car-

 Harbin in 1900 or 1905. For details, see E. A. Belov, *Rossiya i Mongoliya v nachale XX veka (1911-1919)* [Russia and Mongolia at the beginning of the 20th Century (1911-1919)] (Moscow: IV RAN, 1999), p.195.

²⁸ Bai Yukun, “Haishan,” p.159; Deshan, *Mengguolejin Hailletuti shi shulüe*, p.81. A person surnamed Fu probably indicates Fuhai (阜海; also rendered as 福海 or 富海). Concerning Fuhai, see Baildagch, “Hukai to Shinmatsu~Minkoku shoki niokeru nai Mongoru töbu no seikyoku henka” [Fuhai and Political Changes in Eastern Inner Mongolia from the Late Qing Period to the Early Days of the Republic of China], trans. Borjigin Bürensain, *Shiteki* 22 (2002).

²⁹ “Gokuhi Kodama Toshimasa shi Mōko shisatsuki batsui” [Top Secret Excerpts of Mr. Kodama Toshimasa’s Inspection Report on Mongolia], in *Nihon gaikō bunsho* [Japanese Diplomatic Documents] vol. 1. 1914, p.751.

³⁰ Baildagch, “Hukai to Shinmatsu~Minkoku shoki niokeru nai Mongoru töbu no seikyoku henka,” p.44.

rying out various operations with Khitrovo being a central figure. According to the report of Yu Sixing mentioned above, Khitrovo was then supposed to reside in Harbin at least on paper, but he actually traveled across Inner Mongolia, often sojourning in the Princely Establishment of Prince Udai of the Jasagtu Banner, Jirim League.³¹ This report also stated that while hiding in Harbin after his involvement in an incident in 1905, Khaisan frequently visited the Jasagtu Banner of the Jirim League to conduct some activities.³² These situations lead us to the possibility that Khitrovo and Khaisan had a close relationship. Therefore, the assumption that Khaisan served as a Russian spy in Harbin and Inner Mongolia is not entirely groundless. In connection with this, the evaluation of Khaisan in the Russian report on the Mongol delegation to Russia in August 1911—stating that “he made efforts to turn Mongolian affairs to Russian advantage for the past five years”—seems quite indicative of Khaisan’s activities during his days in Harbin.³³

Concerning Khaisan’s stay in Harbin, one more thing to be verified is whether he worked as an editor of a Mongolian newspaper known as *Mongyul-un sonin bičig*, the first newspaper published in the Mongolian language. This newspaper was published from May 1909 to October 1919 by the Eastern Qing Railway Administration Bureau (東清鐵道管理局) with sponsorship from Russia.³⁴ For now, the only evidence of Khaisan’s in-

³¹ Khitrovo was a Russian military officer who was deeply involved in Russian policies on Mongolia in the early 20th century. Khitrovo was also involved in the publication of the Mongolian Newspaper (i.e., *Mongyul-un sonin bičig*), as well as the independence of Mongolia. To support the Mongolian independence movement, he traveled across both Inner and Outer Mongolia, encouraging Mongol princes to struggle against the Qing dynasty. Later, he participated in the Kyakhta Trilateral Conference as a Russian representative in the capacity of the Border Commissioner of Kyakhta. For details, see E. A. Belov, *Rossiya i Mongoliya v nachale XX veka (1911-1919)*, p.195; O. Batsaikhan, *Mongolyn tusgaar togtmol ba Khyatad, Oros, Mongol gurban ulsyn 1915 ony Khiagtyn geree 1911-1915* (Ulaanbaatar: Mongol ulsyn shinjlekh ukhaany akademi, Tüükhiin khüreelel, Olon ulsyn sudlalyn khüreelel, 2002), p.248.

³² Baildagch, “Hukai to Shinmatsu-Minkoku shoki niokeru nai Mongoru tōbu no seikyoku henka,” pp.40-44.

³³ Arkhiv vnesnei politiki Rossiskoi imperii [Archives of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire], F. Kitaiskii stol 143, Opis 491, d. 644, pp.162-163.

³⁴ G. Deleg, *Mongol togtmol khevelelin tüükhen temdeglel* (Ulaanbaatar: Ulsyn khevelelin khereg

volvement in the newspaper is Khaisan's testimony to Ramstedt, saying that he "published the first newspaper in Mongolian." A long time ago, Shirendev—an influential historian in Mongolia—wrote without citing any reference that Khaisan had been the editor of the Mongolian newspaper, *Mongγul-un sonin bičig*. Ever since, many historians have accepted this as a historical fact without further consideration.³⁵ Recently, scholars began to raise questions about this conventional view. On this topic, Lee Pyung-rae has conducted up-to-date research. Having closely examined Russian materials, he came to the conclusion that Khaisan had highly likely served as the editor of the *Mongγul-un sonin bičig*.³⁶

Khaisan's Visit to Khüree and Devotion to Mongolian Independence

According to Chinese sources, Khaisan went to Khüree in the 33rd year of Guangxu (1907) on the suggestion of Semyonov.³⁷ Mongolian sources also provide similar information. For example, the memoirs of Navannamjil testify that Khaisan went to Khüree together with Almas-Ochir from the same hometown.³⁸ Another source records that Almas-Ochir, after consulting with Khitrovo and others, came to Khüree in 1907.³⁹ Considering that

 erkhlekh khoroo, 1965), pp.37-63.

³⁵ B. Shirendev, *Mongol ardyn khuv'sgalyn tüükh* [A History of the Mongolian People's Revolution] (Ulaanbaatar: Ulsyn khevleliin gazar, 1969), p.30.

³⁶ Lee Pyung-rae, "Haisan-gwa <Monggol Shinmun>," p.64.

³⁷ Bai Yukun, "Haishan," p.159; Lü Yiran ed., *Beiyang zhengfu shiqi de Menggu diqu lishi ziliao*, p.279.

³⁸ Shinjlekh ukhaany akademi Tüükhiin khüreeleŋgiin gar bichmel san, F-3, D-1, Kh/N-1036 ("Güing Qayisan-u tuqai"), p.1 (undated). Although he didn't specify the year, N. Magsarjav wrote that the two men went together to Khüree. For details, see N. Magsarjav, *Mongol ulsyn shine tüükh* [A New History of Mongolia], Mongoloos kiril bichigt bulgasan O. Batsaikhan and Z. Lonjid (Ulaanbaatar: Mongol ulsyn shinjlekh ukhaany akademi, Tüükhiin khüreeleŋ, Mongol ulsyn zasgiin gazryn arkhiv, 1994), p.6.

³⁹ L. Dendeŋ, *XX zuuny Mongolyn tüükhiin ekh survalj*, Uigarjin Mongol bichgees kirill üsegt buulgaj, khevleld beltgesen O. Batsaikhan (Ulaanbaatar: Mongol ulsyn shinjlekh ukhaany akademi, Olon ulsyn sudlalyn khüreeleŋ, 2003), p.22 (henceforce, *Materials on 20th-Century*

Khaisan kept close relationships with Russian officials in Harbin, it would be reasonable to assume that Khaisan and Almas-Ochir together came to Khüree in 1907 after consultation with the Russians in Harbin.

The purpose of their visit to Khüree is clear. They went to Khüree to pursue Mongolian independence from the Qing dynasty. Reportedly, Semyonov told Khaisan that “Outer Mongolia should become independent, but there is a shortage of capable people, so you should go there as soon as possible,”⁴⁰ and Khitrovo said Almas-Ochir that “Go to Ulaanbaatar, have an audience with the Bogd Khaan telling him to establish an autonomous government, and then come back!”⁴¹ Mongolian sources make more specific references to this aspect: According to Navannamjil, after coming to Khüree clandestinely, the two men met with religious and secular leaders, presenting the view that if Outer Mongolia commenced the great enterprise of establishing an independent state for both Inner and Outer Mongolia, Inner Mongolia would then bring it to completion. Magsarjav also states that the two met with the ruling class of Khüree and discussed how to integrate and strengthen all the Mongol peoples.

It is hard to believe that Khaisan and Almas-Ochir would have visited Khüree and discussed the issue of Mongolian independence and unification without any prior negotiation with the Outer Mongolian side. In this respect, Magsarjav makes a couple of noteworthy points: first, before the declaration of independence in 1911, leaders of both Inner and Outer Mongolia sought ways of achieving independence from the Qing dynasty and national integration through exchanges of letters and other means, and second, some Inner Mongolian leaders sent detailed information on the pasture reclamations and atrocities by Han Chinese, urging the Outer Mongolian side to be cautious about them.⁴² In particular, the news of the 1891

Mongolian History).

⁴⁰ Bai Yukun, “Haishan,” p.159.

⁴¹ *Materials on 20th-Century Mongolian History*, p.22. This material was written after the 1921 revolution to report past events to the government. For this reason, Khüree is rendered Ulaanbaatar and the Bogd Khaan government an autonomous government in this material.

⁴² Magsarjav, *Mongol ulsyn shine tүүkh*, p.6.

massacre of Mongols by Jindandao rebels was given special emphasis in a Mongol letter to the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Empire.⁴³ It thus seems likely that Khaisan's and Almas-Ochir's visit to Khüree may have taken place during this process of exchanges between Inner and Outer Mongolia. However, it is difficult to see that their visit to Khüree was caused only by the exchanges between the Mongols. Khaisan's and Almas-Ochir's visit to Khüree was probably prompted by Russian intervention.

First of all, it is noteworthy that Khitrovo, Udai (i.e., the prince of the Jasagtu Banner, Jirim League), and others consulted with I. Ia. Korostovets—the Russian ambassador in Beijing—to discuss the issue of independence of Barga, Outer Mongolia, and Inner Mongolia. According to relevant sources, Korostovets, commenting on Khitrovo's plan, stated that it would be better for them to concentrate on the independence of Outer Mongolia because of the difficulties in Inner Mongolia and Barga that resulted from the large population of Han Chinese in those regions, and called for exertions to improve their friendly relationships with Outer Mongolia.⁴⁴ From these facts, it seems fair to assume that Almas-Ochir and Khaisan visited Khüree following the advice of Korostovets. This possibility leads us to the conclusion that Almas-Ochir's and Khaisan's visit to Khüree was likely decided on in accordance with Russian policy on Mongolia. Thus, it is also possible to see that their visit to Khüree resulted from the joint enterprise of the Russian officials in Harbin, Khüree, and Beijing.

It is also noteworthy that Almas-Ochir and Khaisan visited Khüree in 1907 after the New Policies (新政) in Outer Mongolia had come into full-swing operation, and resistance against it had begun to intensify in 1906. Distinct from the cases in China Proper, the New Policies in the Mongolian region pursued “filling the frontiers by moving in Han Chinese.”⁴⁵ This

⁴³ A. Ochir and G. Pürvee eds., *Mongolyn ard түмний 1911 оны үндэсний erkх чөлөө туsgaar togmолын тölөө temchel, Barimt bichig emkhetgel 1900-1914* (Ulaanbaatar: Ulsyn khevleliin gazar, 1982), p.166 (henceforth *Materials on the Liberation Movement*).

⁴⁴ *Materials on 20th-Century Mongolian History*, p.22.

⁴⁵ Regarding the New Policies in Outer Mongolia, see Lee Pyung-rae, “20 segi chogi areu Monggol wanggong deul-ui shinjeong-e daehan insik” [Ar-Mongol Princes' Perceptions of the New

had no other aim than to prepare for a possible Russian intrusion into Mongolia. Russia had been objecting to the Chinese frontier policies on the grounds of its own security. At this point, the interests of the Russian Empire and Mongol princes coincided, and they sent Khaisan and Almas-Ochir to Khüree to realize the Russian policy on Mongolia as represented by the advice of Korostovets.

According to Magsarjav's research, Khaisan and Almas-Ochir criticized the New Policies of the Qing dynasty and discussed how to unite the entire Mongol people and strengthen them economically and militarily. They did not arrive at a conclusion, however, and then traveled to Khölönbuir and Khailar to scrutinize the circumstances of the northern frontiers of Mongolia and the adjacent regions beyond Qing control. After that, Khaisan returned to Khüree, but Almas-Ochir did not.⁴⁶ It is not clear exactly when Khaisan returned. Since Ramstedt met him in Khüree between October and December of 1909, he must have returned to Khüree prior to that.

Ever since he first came to Khüree, Khaisan was under surveillance by the Qing frontier authorities. When Khaisan came to Khüree in 1907, the Court of Colonial Affairs (理藩部) ordered Yanzhi (延祉)—the Grand Minister Superintendent (辦事大臣) in Khüree—to arrest and send Khaisan to Beijing. Yanzhi kept an eye on Khaisan but did not implement the order thoroughly, believing that Khaisan would not cause much trouble. After Yanzhi was replaced and left Khüree in the first year of Xuantong (1909), Khaisan began to reveal himself in public.⁴⁷ From this information, one thing is evident: Khaisan was under severe constraints on his activities during his first stay in Khüree. Presumably, for this reason, Khaisan disguised

Policies in the Early 20th Century], in *Kim Mungyeong gyosu jeongnyeon toeim ginyeom dong Asia sa nonchong* (1996); Lan Meihua, "China's New Administration in Mongolia," in *Mongolia in the Twentieth Century: Landlocked Cosmopolitan*, eds. Stephen Kotkin and Bruce A. Elleman (New York and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1999); Fan Mingfang, "Qingmo Waimeng xinzheng shuping" [A Review of Outer Mongolia's New Policies in the Late Qing Period], *Xiyu yanjiu* 2005-1 (2005).

⁴⁶ Magsarjav, *Mongol ulsyn shine tüükh*, p.6; "Güng Qayisan-u tuqai," p.1.

⁴⁷ Lü Yiran ed., *Beiyang zhengfu shiqi de Menggu diqu lishi ziliao*, p.279.

himself as a pilgrim or a chef for Tserenchimed in Khüree.⁴⁸

In Khüree, Khaisan was under the protection of the leaders of the Mongolian independence movement, including Khanddorj and Tserenchimed. It was Khanddorj who introduced him to Ramstedt, and in the house of Tserenchimed, he passed himself off as a chef. Some sources exaggerated the roles of Khaisan and Almas-Ochir by stating that they first proposed the independence movement when they came to Khüree. This claim, however, is not entirely unfounded because Khaisan was on friendly terms with Khanddorj and Tserenchimed in Khüree, and the 1911 Mongolian independence would not have been possible without Khaisan. From what Ramstedt said, there is a possibility that Khaisan indeed proposed Mongolian independence from the Qing and persuaded Mongol princes to that end. According to Ramstedt, Khaisan met with a total of 88 Mongol princes, among whom only 40 understood the current situations, while others were so ignorant of the state of affairs of the time and indulgent in drinking that Khaisan's visits often ended up as fruitless endeavors.⁴⁹

Whether or not 88 persons were the exact number, it seems true that Khaisan met with numerous people, given that many sources emphasize that Khaisan discussed Mongolian independence with high-ranking Lamas and princes. In view of this, Khaisan probably played a leading role as a propagator of Mongolian independence over the course of the preparation for the 1911 declaration of independence. Russian materials also confirm this. The above-mentioned report on the Mongol delegation to Russia of August 1911 evaluated Khaisan as “an important encourager to Bogd Geegen ... who saw the present time as the most opportune moment (for independence) and appealed that they should rise up at this moment.”⁵⁰ This makes understandable the words of the Russian consul V. F. Lyuba that “for many years, in Harbin, Kyakhta, Mongolia, and wherever he could go, Khaisan propagated the idea of Mongolian independence and called for the

⁴⁸ Ramstedt, *Ilgob charye dongbang yeohaeng*, p.203; “Güing Qayisan-u tuqai,” pp.2-3.

⁴⁹ Ramstedt, *Ilgob charye dongbang yeohaeng*, p.203.

⁵⁰ Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiskoi imperii [Archives of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire], F. Kitaiskii stol 143, Opis 491, d. 644, pp.162-163.

integration of the entire Mongol people.”⁵¹

In this way, Khaisan proposed and propagated the necessity of Mongolian independence and integration. Although it was not necessarily the result of his efforts, Mongol princes held a secret conference at Bogd Mountain in July 1911, made the decision to pursue independence from the Qing dynasty, and sent Khanddorj, Tserenchimed, and Khaisan to St. Petersburg to request support from Russia. This Mongol delegation left Khüree on July 29, 1911, and arrived on August 15 in St. Petersburg, where they discussed the pending issues with their Russian counterparts. Apart from this, the delegation discussed the future of Mongolia with a Buryat monk, Agvan Dorzhiev, on August 25. On the same day, Khaisan also met with the Russian Minister of Commerce and Industry. This meeting is noteworthy in view of his later activities in the economic sector of the independent government of Mongolia.⁵²

Tserenchimed and Khaisan left St. Petersburg on September 11, arrived in Moscow on the following day, and then departed for Irkutsk on around October 3. Tserenchimed subsequently left Irkutsk on October 17, heading for Khüree. Khaisan, however, stayed in Irkutsk until mid-November with the initial intention of returning to his hometown.⁵³ As the political situation in China Proper grew unstable with the outbreak of the Xinhai Revolution, he decided to go to Khüree via Kyakhta. Judging from the fact that he sent a letter to W. Kotwicz in Kyakhta on December 7, he must have arrived in Kyakhta before that.⁵⁴ Although it is uncertain exactly when Khaisan returned to Khüree, he must have arrived in Khüree before December 30, 1911, because Tserenchimed’s letter to Kotwicz—dated De-

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, d. 645, p.165.

⁵² O. Batsaikhan, *Mongolyn süülchiin ejen khaan VIII Bogd Javjandamba* (Ulaanbaatar: Mongol ulsyn shinjlekh ukhaany akademi, Olon ulsyn sudlalyn khüreeelen, 2008), p.32.

⁵³ Such itineraries can be confirmed by the letters that Tserenchimed and Khaisan sent to Kotwicz (1872-1944), a Mongolist from Poland serving as an official in the Russian Ministry of Finance. For details, see *V. Kotvichiin khuviin arkhivaas oldson Mongolyn tüükhend kholbogdokh zarim bichig*, Sudlan khevlüülsen akad. B. Shirendev, Erkhelsen akad. Sh. Natsagdorj (Ulaanbaatar: Shinjlekh ukhaany akademiin khevlel, 1972) (hereinafter *Kotwicz Collection*).

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p.81.

cember 30, 1911—indicates that Khaisan had already been working in the Ministry of the Interior.⁵⁵

The members of the delegation returned individually to evade surveillance by the Qing dynasty. The remaining question is why Khaisan did not come straight back to Khüree but stayed in Irkutsk and Kyakhta for about two months. During his stay in Irkutsk, Khaisan maintained contact with Khüree and St. Petersburg to keep track of the overall situation and to negotiate on arms aid and other matters with Russian officials. In a letter to Kotwicz, Khaisan stated that although he had tried several times to go to his hometown in Inner Mongolia, circumstances at that time had not allowed it. Peculiarly, in his letter to Kotwicz dated November 16, 1911, Khaisan asked Kotwicz, in writing letters to him from then on, to send them to Nikolai Nikolaevich Gombojav in Beijing, under the name of “Mongol Batu.”⁵⁶ Thus, it seems that he intended to go to his hometown and conduct activities for Mongolian independence while maintaining contact with Beijing to keep track of circumstances there. With the outbreak of the Xinhai Revolution, however, he had to modify this original plan. According to his letter to Kotwicz dated February 2, 1912,⁵⁷ Khaisan returned to Khüree because of the strong request from Tserenchimed.

Glory and Frustration in the Bogd Khaan Government

After the Mongol delegation to Russia returned to Khüree, princes of Outer Mongolia set up a provisional government on November 30, 1911, and declared on December 1 both internally and externally that Mongolia threw off Qing rule and became an independent state.⁵⁸ Then, on December 29, they enthroned Jebtsundamba Khutugtu as Bogd Khaan, announced the es-

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.127-129.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.32-33.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p.116.

⁵⁸ *Materials on the Liberation Movement*, p.110.

tablishment of the cabinet of five ministries, and granted honors and rewards to those who had contributed to Mongolian independence. Among the delegation to Russia, Khanddorj was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs and Tserenchimed Minister of Internal Affairs, while Khaisan was mentioned in the third place of honor. Khaisan was granted the noble title of Bulwark Duke (輔國公) and appointed Deputy Minister (*des tūshmel*) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.⁵⁹ The reason why Khaisan, then appointed merely Deputy Minister, was named in the third place of honor may have been the important role he had played in the independence process.

Presumably, it was Tserenchimed's recommendation that made Khaisan appointed Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Navannamjil, who worked together with Khaisan and witnessed firsthand the situation of the time, recollected as follows: "Duke Khaisan was a man of outstanding political insight with proficiency in the Manchu, Chinese, and Mongolian languages, and knew very well the international situation as well as the state of internal affairs of the late Qing dynasty. Therefore, in pursuing Mongolian independence and seeking support from the Russian Emperor, he served as a core supporter of Da Lama Tserenchimed, contributed to the construction of the new state, and became Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs."⁶⁰ As mentioned above, Khaisan once hid in the house of Tserenchimed in disguise of his chef and later accompanied Tserenchimed when the Mongol delegation returned from Russia. As will be discussed below, it was also Tserenchimed who actively helped Khaisan when he got in trouble politically.

In this regard, Navannamjil testified, "because [Khaisan] was not on good terms with Prince Khanddorj and other ministers, he resorted to the protection of Da Lama [Tserenchimed], merely providing Da Lama with a variety of advice. Hence, he did not have any actual power to conduct [affairs] in his charge."⁶¹ This testimony clarifies that Khaisan performed his

⁵⁹ *Materials on 20th-Century Mongolian History*, pp.124-125.

⁶⁰ G. Navaannamjil, *Övgön bicheechiin ügüüel* [A Writing of an Old Scribe] (Ulaanbaatar: Ulsyn khevleliin gazar, 1956), pp.188-189.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p.189.

official duties under Tserenchimed's protection. Khaisan showed excellent abilities not only as a high official but in various other areas as well. A Mongolian document gave an evaluation of him as follows: "He is a person like a pillar of our country, being loyal, fluent in many languages, shrewd, faithful to the grace of the lord, and devoted to official duties."⁶² Navannamjil also appraised Khaisan, "whenever I talked to Duke Khaisan about public affairs and daily matters, he was reticent and mild-mannered. Given that he always put forward [his own] opinion on every issue to make things right, however, I thought him a genuine scholar."⁶³

Numerous foreigners who met Khaisan in Khüree also thought highly of Khaisan's ability. T. A. Rustad—a resident employee in Beijing of British American Tobacco—who met Khaisan frequently on his business trip to Khüree said, "he is a genuine patriot and never concerned with himself ... Duke Khaisan is the only one who does something in the new Mongolian government. Others in the government only drink and watch how things go, throwing every affair upon him."⁶⁴ Ramstedt also wrote in an unpublished letter that Khaisan "was truly at the heart of all matters and the most unyielding enemy of China."⁶⁵ Korostovets, who was usually critical of Khaisan, also evaluated him positively in terms of his capability and devotion.⁶⁶

Khaisan was active in the economic sector, including trade, as well. As mentioned above, on August 25, 1911, he had a meeting with the Russian Minister of Commerce and Industry. This meeting was made possible at the request of the Mongolian side. In the spring of 1912, Khaisan—together with Tserenchimed, Khanddorj, Duke Tüshee, and a Russian named

⁶² Mongol ulsyn ündesnii arkhiv, FA-47, D-1, Kh/N-7, nug-1, kh-262.

⁶³ "Güing Qayisan-u tuqai," p.5.

⁶⁴ *The Correspondence of G. E. Morrison 2 (1912-1920)*, ed. Lo Hui-Min (Cambridge University Press, 1978), p.52.

⁶⁵ G. J. Pentti Aalto, "Ramstedt and the Mongolian Independence Movement," *Studia Mongolica* Tom. 1(9) Fasc. 1-17 (1973): p.128.

⁶⁶ Korostovets, *Mōko kinseishi* [A History of Modern Mongolia], trans. Takayama Yōkichi (Tokyo: Morikita shoten, 1943), p.364.

F. Moskvitin—established the Russo-Mongolian Consignment Warehouse Company to stimulate commercial transactions between Mongolia and Russia. Khaisan participated in this joint company as an investor along with three Ministers of the independent Mongolian government.⁶⁷ Although it was Moskvitin who first proposed the establishment of the company, Khaisan's participation in this joint project reveals his economic acumen.

Khaisan paid great attention to attracting foreign companies as well. According to Rustad, Khaisan asked Rustad to introduce a British mining company to him, with a promise of full support from the Mongolian government. Khaisan also suggested that the Mongolian government award the right to develop unknown gold mines to a British mining company, on condition that the company would receive support from the British government. Khaisan thought that drawing the British Empire to Mongolia would make it possible to maintain a balance against Russian influence. Thus, he tried to invite people of all countries to Mongolia and requested introductions of telegraph entrepreneurs, to whom the Russian side would react sensitively.⁶⁸ These activities indicate that Khaisan intended to attract a third power to Mongolia to develop natural resources and escape Russian influence, being part of his efforts to maintain Mongolian independence by making use of the power relations among the great powers.

Khaisan took part in the unification war of western Mongolia, conducted from the spring to August of 1912, and also in the unification war of Inner Mongolia that began in early 1913. Although no sources show why he—an official of the Interior Ministry—participated in these wars of national unification, the cause of Mongolian unification seems to have prompted him to engage in the wars. In the western Mongolian unification war, not only Outer Mongols but also various other groups of Mongol origin—including the Bargas, Chakhars, Uriyankhais, Dörböds, and Torquuds—participated, and Damdinsüren, Khaisan, and others from Inner

⁶⁷ *Kotwicz Collection*, p.181.

⁶⁸ *The Correspondence of G. E. Morrison 2 (1912-1920)*, pp.51-52.

Mongolia served as commanders. In the Inner Mongolian unification war as well, many Inner Mongols—including Khaisan and Nasan-Arbijikh—served as commanders, while Damdinsüren from the Barga was the commander-in-chief.⁶⁹

In this way, ever since the establishment of the Bogd Khaan government, Khaisan was involved in the entire field of activities. In return, the Bogd Khaan government sent 100 camels to Khaisan's home in the spring of 1912 and moved his family, brothers, and other relatives, around 50 altogether, to Outer Mongolia that summer, having them settle and live in Selenge Province of northern Mongolia in the autumn.⁷⁰ In 1913, however, a series of accusations and requests for the punishment of Khaisan ensued. As previous studies clarified in detail, Khaisan underwent ordeals—having his house searched, being tortured, and imprisoned—and was eventually removed from office. Whether or not those charges and accusations were based on facts, given the timing and main instigators, they seem unlikely to have been mere cases of personal corruption.

In connection with this, it is necessary to take a look at the power relations within the Bogd Khaan government. As the Bogd Khaan government did not have the Prime Minister's Office initially, the Ministry of Internal Affairs presided over the whole state affairs as the senior department. As a result, Tserenchimed and Khaisan—two leaders of the Ministry of Internal Affairs—took the initiative in the early Bogd Khaan government, leading to considerable dissatisfaction among other officials in the government. In a letter to Kotwicz (dated February 21, 1912), Agvan Dorzhiev of the Buryat, who lived in Khüree at that time, conveyed this mood of the early cabinet, saying “Da Lama [Tserenchimed] became Minister of Internal Affairs, and Khaisan received the title of Duke. These two people, with great authority, determine state affairs, and whatever they propose to the

⁶⁹ Lee Pyung-rae, “1912-1913 nyeon Bogd jeongbu-ui naemonggol tonghab sido-wa jwajcol” [The Bogd Khaan Government's Attempt to Integrate Inner Mongolia and Its Frustration in 1912-1913], *Jung'ang Asia yeongu* 14 (2009).

⁷⁰ Jamsran, *Mongolchuudyn sergen mandaltyn ekhen*, p. 150; Boldbaatar, *Chin zütgelt gün Khaisan*, pp.27-28.

Khaan will be done just as they propose. This offends so many aristocrats that no one knows what might happen [next].”⁷¹ The Russian merchant Moskvitin stated similarly, “they can not accept that a Lama from a low status [i.e., Tserenchimed]⁷² takes charge of state affairs, while aristocrats themselves cannot play any role. They hate Khaisan, too. Outer Mongols consider it inappropriate that an immigrant [i.e., Khaisan] achieves a successful career in Outer Mongolia.”⁷³

Russians were also not satisfied with Tserenchimed and Khaisan. In a letter to Kotwicz (dated March 24, 1912), Moskvitin expressed his view that Tserenchimed was becoming increasingly troublesome and hostile to him, and since Tserenchimed still exerted great influence on Bogd Khaan, there was little hope of toppling Tserenchimed, and Russia’s position in Mongolia would thus become more difficult than during the period of Qing rule.⁷⁴ The Russian ambassador in Beijing, V. N. Krupenskii, in a telegram to the Foreign Minister of the Russian Empire (dated May 7, 1912),⁷⁵ reported that there was serious strife between the ministers and princes in the Bogd Khaan government, and that Tserenchimed, along with some officials from the Kharchin, took political power and were unfriendly to Russia.

From the beginning, Russia tried to realize its own political and economic interests while recognizing China’s suzerainty over Outer Mongolia. In contrast, Tserenchimed and Khaisan pursued Mongolia’s complete independence, as well as the unification of Inner and Outer Mongolia. In fact, they had been in conflict with the Russian consul in Khüree over Mongolia’s future even before the proclamation of independence,⁷⁶ and this conflict became more intense as Tserenchimed took power in the new govern-

⁷¹ *Kotwicz Collection*, p.164.

⁷² *Navaannamjil, Övgön bicheechiin ügüülel*, p.187.

⁷³ *Kotwicz Collection*, p.150.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.174-176.

⁷⁵ Chen Chunhua trans., *Eguo waijiao wenshu xuanyi* [Selected Translations of Russian Diplomatic Documents] (Haerbin: Heilongjiang jiaoyu chubanshe, 1991), p.34.

⁷⁶ *Kotwicz Collection*, p.78.

ment after the Mongolian independence.⁷⁷ According to Moskvitin, Khaisan supported Tserenchimed's position, and thus whoever negotiated with them had to do so under tense conditions.⁷⁸ From Russia's perspective, therefore, the two needed to be ousted from power for Russia to realize its policy in Mongolia.

The Russian consul Lyuba fomented conflicts among the Mongol ruling class by telling princes and nobles "if one man is allowed to handle everything, no known knows what to happen later."⁷⁹ As can be seen from the report of Krupenskii, from early on, a feud was going on between the faction of Tserenchimed and that of other bureaucrats within the Bogd Khaan Government, and this conflict intensified as time went by.⁸⁰ Lyuba's advice was that Russia should intervene in the power struggle between the two groups. He also tried to undermine Tserenchimed's and Khaisan's influence by putting pressure on Bogd Khaan. The Russian Foreign Minister, S. D. Sazonov, who received the report from Krupenskii, sent a telegram to Lyuba, instructing him to request Bogd Khaan for the replacement of Tserenchimed with a prince whom Russia trusted. In response, Lyuba reminded Bogd Khaan that the Mongolian government was taking a series of measures contrary to Russian advice, and advanced his opinions as follows: if the Mongolian government admitted officials who were not from Outer Mongolia (for example, Khaisan and others from Inner Mongolia), that would have a bad influence on the government; and, he hoped that one of the Mongol princes would take the initiative in the Mongolian government. Bogd Khaan gave his consent to Lyuba's opinions, and Mongol princes met with Lyuba to let him know Bogd Khaan's consent. Finally, Lyuba re-

⁷⁷ In a letter to Kotwicz (dated February 4, 1912), Lyuba wrote that Tserenchimed was a "crooked fellow" (*ibid.*, p. 121). Moskvitin stated, in another letter to Kotwicz (dated March 24, 1912), that the relationship between Lyuba and Da Lama broke down due to the issue of "Mongolor" (*ibid.*, p. 174).

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p.174.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p.164.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p.230.

ported it to the Russian government.⁸¹

Thus, in July 1912, the Prime Minister's Office was established in the Bogd Khaan government, and Namnansüren was appointed Prime Minister. From then on, Russian officials and Outer Mongol princes continued their maneuvers against Tserenchimed and Khaisan. Notably, at the time of the Russo-Mongolian Agreement of November 3, 1912, when Tserenchimed objected to the plan proposed by Russia, the Russian delegate Korostovets threatened Tserenchimed by throwing the draft agreement to the floor.⁸² Furthermore, Korostovets met with Bogd Khaan and singled out Tserenchimed, Bintü Wang, Khaisan, and Puntsagtseren as anti-Russianists,⁸³ demanding ousting them from power. Whether by accident or not, among the four men, Bintü Wang died a suspicious death,⁸⁴ and Tserenchimed died of illness in the summer of 1914 on his way to his new post. Although there are no relevant sources, it is difficult to deny the possibility that Russian and Outer Mongolian leaders may have been involved in these two men's deaths.⁸⁵

In this regard, it is possible to see that Russian and Outer Mongolian leaders were involved in the ordeals of Khaisan. In connection with this, an unpublished letter from Ramstedt to Rudnev suggests many things. Specifically, Ramstedt indicated that Khaisan was persecuted by Russia and Out-

⁸¹ Chen Chunhua trans., *Eguo wajijiao wenshu xuanyi*, pp.33-34.

⁸² Korostovets, *Mōko kinseishi*, pp.274-275; *Kotwicz Collection*, p.247.

⁸³ Korostovets, *Mōko kinseishi*, p.423.

⁸⁴ Boyanmandu [Buyanmandakh], "Wo suo zhidao de Bintu wang Gunchuke sulong" [My Memories on Bintü Wang Günchügsüren], in *Neimenggu jinxiandai wanggong lu* [Records on Modern Inner Mongolian Princes] (Huhehaote: Zhongguo renmin zhengxie Neimenggu zizhiq weiyuanhui Neimenggu zizhiq weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui, 1988).

⁸⁵ J. Boldbaatar, *Da lam* (Ulaanbaatar: Shinjlekh ukhaany akademi Tütükhii khüreen, 1997), pp.46-52. A Mongolian source states that Tserenchimed was sent to western Mongolia due to discord with Namnansüren (Navaannamjil, *Övgön bicheechiin ügüülel*, p.202), while a Chinese source testifies that the Russian consul Miller was involved in Tserenchimed's death (The Second Historical Archives of China, 1045-260, 1914. 8.22.). Zhou Xuejun also deals with this issue comprehensively. For details, see Zhou Xuejun, "Zhebuzun danba zhengquan 'Neige zongli dachen' shezhi kao" [A Study on the Establishment of 'Prime Minister' of the Jebtsundamba Government], *Zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu* 1999-3 (1999).

er Mongolian nobles, saying “Khanddorj and other Outer Mongolian princes criticized Khaisan as a demagogue ... It is a tragedy that Khaisan, who was the most enthusiastic friend of Russia and the most intelligent, was sacrificed through the conspiracy of Lyuba and became a betrayer of Russia.”⁸⁶

First, in early 1913, Namsrai, the Minister of Justice, filed a lawsuit against Khaisan on the grounds that Khaisan called in Russians and Chinese and let them farm and cut hay in the pastureland granted to him by a decree of Bogd Khaan. Here, it is notable that the litigant was a representative pro-Russianist singled out by Korostovets.⁸⁷ Probably a little before this lawsuit, although the exact date cannot be confirmed, Khaisan was subjected to searches of his house on suspicion of atrocious acts (killings of innocent people and arson) and the theft of spoils during the western Mongolian unification war, as well as collusion with the Beijing government of China.⁸⁸

Moreover, in October 1913, Raashminjüür from the Jirim League in Inner Mongolia—then the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Mongolian government—brought charges against Khaisan, alleging that Khaisan was communicating secretly with the Beijing government. Due to this accusation, Khaisan was subjected to a great deal of suffering, including imprisonment, torture, and the seizure of family property. Navannamjil, who witnessed this incident firsthand, remarked on this case that the accusations were all lies and slander caused by the resentment and vengeance of Khaisan’s opponents, and that Khaisan did not confess anything and then was set free without punishment after the case was transferred to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.⁸⁹ Thus, Navannamjil evaluated this incident as a political conspiracy. Adding support to this interpretation is the fact that Ko-

⁸⁶ Pentti Aalto, “Ramstedt and the Mongolian Independence Movement,” pp.127-128.

⁸⁷ Korostovets, *Mōko kinseishi*, p.248.

⁸⁸ According to compilers of the sources about Khaisan, Togtokh from Inner Mongolia accused Khaisan. Bai Yukun, “Haishan,” pp.159-160; Deshan, *Mengguolejin Hailetuti shi shulüe*, pp.82-83.

⁸⁹ “Güing Qayisan-u tuqai,” pp.11-12.

dama—a Japanese who visited Outer Mongolia around the time (September 4-26, 1913)—associated the arrest and detention of Khaisan with the Russian consul.⁹⁰

The accusations against Khaisan, however, do not seem to have been entirely groundless. Various sources show that Khaisan indeed continued to maintain relations with the Prince of the Kharchin Banner—Khaisan’s hometown—and with the Beijing government. According to his letters to the Beijing government, Khaisan sent several Inner Mongolian princes to Beijing.⁹¹ Kodama, who met Khaisan in Khüree, also confirmed that Khaisan remained in correspondence with the Prince of the Kharchin Banner. The Russian consul, A. Ya. Miller, also reminded Kodama of the fact that Khaisan had continued corresponding with the Prince of Kharchin and maintained relationships with the Beijing government.⁹² At any rate, Khaisan seems to have tried to make a breakthrough on the side of China after the Russo-Mongolian Agreement was concluded in late 1912. And, this appears to have provided the pretext for the attacks on Khaisan by Outer Mongolian leaders, Inner Mongols residing in Khüree, and particularly Russia, all of whom were in conflict with him.

Concluding Remarks: The Frustration of Mongolian Unification and Return to China

After the imprisonment, Khaisan was soon released for reasons of health, yet he seems to have remained under a kind of house arrest. According to sources, although Khaisan was reinstated and set free from house arrest thanks to Tserenchimed’s efforts, he spent his time in Outer Mongolia dispirited. As an example, Khaisan refused to participate in the work of drafting the Royal Regulations of the Mongolian State (欽定蒙古國則例). He finally went via Kyakhta to Beijing, where Yuan Shikai gave him an

⁹⁰ “Gokuhi Kodama Toshimasa shi Mōko shisatsuki batsui,” p.752.

⁹¹ The Second Historical Archives of China, 1045-1260, 1914. 2.

⁹² “Gokuhi Kodama Toshimasa shi Mōko shisatsuki batsui,” p.751.

audience and ennobled him with the title of beise, providing him with a luxurious house as well. Khaisan kept himself indoors, devoting himself to the translation of the *Mongolian-Chinese Original Sounds of the Five Regions* (蒙漢合璧五方元音), which he published in Beijing in the spring of 1917. When he died of illness in the same year, the Beijing government sent his body and family to his hometown for a grand funeral.⁹³

From a broader perspective, Khaisan's return to China came amid the massive return home of Inner Mongols, who had participated in the Bogd Khaan government, after the 1915 Kyakhta Trilateral Treaty. But, considering his position in the history of the Mongolian independence movement in the 1910s, the complex international relations surrounding Mongolia before and after the proclamation of independence, and the power struggle within the Bogd Khaan government, it is hard to see Khaisan's return to China just as a part of the collective return of Inner Mongols. This article will not discuss the process leading up to Khaisan's return because previous studies clarified this aspect of his life in detail. In this conclusion, the present author will discuss why Khaisan went back to China and when he sought his return, finally assessing his life from the perspective of the rise and fall of Mongolian nationalism in the 1910s.

Why did Khaisan eventually return to China despite his early awakening of national consciousness, his participation in anti-Chinese movements, and his leading role in the 1911 declaration of independence? Mongolian researchers explain that Khaisan returned to China due to the difficult situations he faced, such as his imprisonment and torture, as well as the frustration of full Mongolian independence and unification that resulted from the 1915 Kyakhta Trilateral Treaty. Fan Mingfang argues that Khaisan decided to go to Beijing for his own safety because the Beijing government's counterattack against the Mongol army that had advanced onto Inner Mongolia came into full swing in the autumn of 1913. Lan Meihua explains that Khaisan began his activities with China in his mind because of his personal "unpleasant experiences," such as his disappointment over the

⁹³ Bai Yukun, "Haishan," p.161; Deshan, *Mengguolejin Hailletuti shi shulüe*, p.84.

Russo-Mongolian Agreement (November 3, 1912), the unfruitful return of the Mongol delegation to Russia in pursuit of Russian aid, and the punishment on him for the Khovd incident. Lastly, Nakami Tatsuo explains Khaisan's return to China as an example of the self-contradiction faced by the Inner Mongols of the time, which resulted from the principle of power in international relations—a major component of 20th-century Mongolian history.

All of these explanations seem to reflect the reasons why Khaisan chose to go to China, but the most plausible one is the third. Although Lan Meihua does not specify the exact time when Khaisan sought to return, judging from the cited sources, she seems to consider that Khaisan tried to prepare for a breakthrough for his future between late 1912 and early 1913. The result of the Russo-Mongolian Agreement—in sum, autonomous Outer Mongolia under Chinese suzerainty—must have been frustrating to Khaisan who had insisted on Mongolia's full independence, as well as the unification of Inner and Outer Mongolia. That Tserenchimed left for Harbin in early 1913 to negotiate with Japan could be seen as a desperate effort to escape Russia's increasing influence. Here, it is noteworthy that Tserenchimed attempted to negotiate with Japan at the time that the Mongol delegation to Russia headed by Khanddorj repeated fruitless negotiations with Russia. As pointed out by Nakami Tatsuo, while Khanddorj's visit to Russia was made at the level of the Bogd Khaan government, Tserenchimed's attempt to negotiate with Japan is likely to have been made at the request of nationalists.⁹⁴ This suggests, on the one hand, a possibility that the attempt to negotiate with Japan arose from dissatisfaction with the policy of the Bogd Khaan government, while on the other hand implying something about the power relations within the government.

As mentioned above, from the early days of the Bogd Khaan government, there were conflicts within the cabinet. According to relevant sources, power struggles between the pro-Russian faction and nationalist group

⁹⁴ Nakami Tatsuo, "Bogudo=Han seiken no tainichi kōshō doryoku to teikokushugi rekkyō" [Independent Mongolia and the Imperialist Powers: 1911-1914], *Ajia Afurika gengo bunka kenkyū* [Journal of Asian and African Studies] 17 (1979): pp.9-17.

arose in early 1913, and many Inner Mongols aimed to leave Khüree at this time.⁹⁵ Further, in April 1913, a general of Uliastai named Nayantu reported that Khaisan had already been inclined toward China,⁹⁶ and there is another record that Khaisan presented a copy of the Russo-Mongolian Agreement to Yuan Shikai at an unknown time.⁹⁷ In addition, in September 1913, Khaisan sent his son—Hai Yongfu (海永傳)—to Beijing to enunciate his support for republicanism.⁹⁸

If these sources are accurate, it can be argued that Khaisan agonized over his course of action with the Beijing government in his mind between the signing of the Russo-Mongolian Agreement (November 3, 1912) and the spring of 1913, and finally decided to go to Beijing in around September 1913. The present author does not believe that Khaisan went to Beijing only for his own safety because evaluating Khaisan's decision that way would be an oversimplification of the choice made by a man who had devoted his entire life to Mongolian independence. The world that Khaisan had dreamt about involved the full independence and unification of Mongolia and Mongol peoples, but the Russo-Mongolian Agreement deprived him of this dream completely. Khaisan tried to prevent Russia's scheme—realizing Russia's interests in Mongolia while recognizing Chinese suzerainty over Mongolia—and yet his efforts gave rise to frictions with Russia and Outer Mongolian princes who were dependent on Russia. These conflicts eventually led to his political ordeal.

Khaisan's suffering began with the lawsuit by Namsrai that was raised when the negotiation with Japan led by Khaisan's faction ended in failure, and the conflict between the pro-Russian faction and nationalist group emerged. As discussed above, this lawsuit by Namsrai probably resulted from the conspiracy of Outer Mongolian princes and the Russian consul; and, in the process, Bintü Wang from Inner Mongolia, who had

⁹⁵ The Second Historical Archives of China, 1002-1062(2), 1913. 3. 7.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 1002-1062(2), 1913. 4.17.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 1045-1290, 1913. 6.25.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 1045-1260, 1914. 8.22.

shared the same intentions with Khaisan, met a sudden death (June 1913).⁹⁹ Faced with his internal and external difficulties, Khaisan probably took the abnormal death of Bintü Wang as a direct threat to himself, and this would be the decisive reason for his choice to go to Beijing. The fact that Khaisan sent his son to Beijing in September 1913 indicates that he made his decision before that time.

Given these facts, Khaisan's choice was somehow inevitable. In a situation where Outer Mongolian princes' persecution of him, the jealousy of his fellow Inner Mongols in Khüree, and Russia's checks on him were all intensifying, there remained no choice for him but to go to Beijing. Moreover, under the circumstance in which Mongolian independence and unification had foundered completely, it would have made no difference for him whether China or Russia controlled the country. From his standpoint, in contrast to Russia's hostility to him, China welcomed his return. In addition, he had many acquaintances in China, and his hometown was under Chinese dominion. In this respect, Khaisan's return was fundamentally different from that of other Inner Mongols who went back to China after the 1915 Kyakhta Treaty. While Khaisan's choice was inevitable, others' returns were voluntary.

Khaisan's return to China had a couple of significant meanings in terms of the development of Mongolian nationalism that erupted at the turn of the 20th century, as well as the fates of Inner Mongolian leaders of the time. First, his return to China symbolized the frustration of the Mongolian independence and unification movement. Given the process Khaisan made his inevitable choice, the main factors that thwarted the Mongolian unification movement were the schism among the Mongol leaders that forced Khaisan to leave Khüree, as well as the Russian intervention that penetrated and manipulated the internal discord.

⁹⁹ The preface to *Menghan hebi wufang yuanyin* [Mongolian-Chinese Original Sounds of the Five Regions] was written by Bintü Wang (see *Menghan hebi wufang yuanyin*, pp.9-11). According to the preface, Bintü Wang met Khaisan in the summer of 1912 (壬子) in Khüree, and Khaisan asked him to write a preface at that time. Given that the duke [i.e., Khaisan] was diligent and that [the book] would be useful for future students, Bintü Wang composed the preface happily. This passage shows that the relationship between Khaisan and Bintü Wang was good.

Second, the trajectory of Khaisan's life—from his hometown in Inner Mongolia, to Harbin, to Khüree, and eventually to Beijing—represents Inner Mongolia's position and fate under foreign domination. As Qing China had suffered both internal and external troubles since the mid-19th century, Inner Mongolia was also drawn into the vortex of rapid change: The massive immigration of Han Chinese aggravated the ethnic conflict between the Mongols and Chinese, the class conflict between the Mongol nobility and the ruled intensified, and, lastly, Russian, Japanese, and other foreign interventions began in Inner Mongolia. In this situation, Inner Mongolian leaders split into three groups. Some Inner Mongolian leaders toiled to maintain their traditional privileges with the slogan of “Mongol-Chinese Unity” (蒙漢團結), while others pursued their private interests by taking advantage of the conflicts between Qing China (Republican China, from 1912), Mongols, and foreign powers. The last group joined the struggle against the Han Chinese and strove for Mongolian independence,¹⁰⁰ and Khaisan belonged to this third group.

The ruling class in Inner Mongolia also stood at a crossroads of similar choices after the 1911 declaration of independence. When the Bogd Khaan government requested Inner Mongolian princes to join the new Mongolian state, some princes participated in the new state, others clearly refused, and the others waited and saw the situation, finally turning to the Beijing government.¹⁰¹ Later, as Outer Mongolia fell into the status of an autonomous country under Chinese suzerainty with the 1915 Kyakhta Tri-lateral Treaty, there arose yet another matter of choice for the Inner Mongols in Khüree: Whether to remain in Khüree or return to their homeland. In the circumstance that Mongolian independence had been nullified, there was little justification to remain in Khüree. On top of that, the Chinese government proclaimed that the Inner Mongols in Khüree would be pardoned, and free travel and communication would be allowed between In-

¹⁰⁰ Borjigin Bürensain, “Harachin · Tomedo imin to Mongoru shakai” [Kharchin-Tümed Immigrants and Mongolian Society], in *Kingendai Mongoru tōbu no henyō* [The Transformation of Eastern Mongolia in the Modern Period] (Tokyo: Yuzankaku, 2007).

¹⁰¹ Lee Pyung-rae, “1912-1913 nyeon Bogd jeongbu-ui naemonggol tonghab sido-wa jwajcol.”

ner and Outer Mongols.¹⁰² At that time, many Inner Mongols left Khüree for their homeland, although not a small number of them remained.

It is not easy to give a definite answer to the question of why some Inner Mongols chose to stay in Khüree and others to return home. Considering the number of people who returned to their homeland, their decision does not seem to have resulted from their wish to live in their hometown. As can be seen from Khaisan's words that the Outer Mongols treated the Inner Mongols arrogantly,¹⁰³ the Inner Mongols in Khüree were held in check by the Outer Mongols.¹⁰⁴ A report by the Russian consul Miller also stated that the attitude of the Outer Mongols toward the Inner Mongols was haughty. Miller's report provides further information on the Inner Mongols' dissatisfaction: They wanted to leave Khüree because they were not able to cultivate lands due to the climate of Outer Mongolia, as well as the Bogd Khaan government was ineffective, imposing higher tax rates compared to China, and not giving lands or financial benefits to them.¹⁰⁵ In particular, after the 1915 Kyakhta Treaty, the Outer Mongols ostracized the Inner Mongols. Thus, those from Inner Mongolia were not able to secure stability in Outer Mongolia.¹⁰⁶

For the Inner Mongols, who had a feeling of superiority over the Outer Mongols,¹⁰⁷ such a situation would not be bearable. It is thus hard to view the Inner Mongols' return to China purely due to personal safety concerns. The Inner Mongols in Khüree—traitors in the eyes of the Beijing government—must have had inevitable reasons to decide to return to China. Admittedly, some Inner Mongols—such as Damdinsüren from the Bargu—remained in Khüree. Yet, it seems that they were still in uncomfort-

¹⁰² O. Batsaikhan, *Khyatad, Oros, Mongol gurvan ulsyn 1915 ony Khiagtyn geree* (Ulaanbaatar: Mongol ulsyn ündesni arkhivyn gazar, Shinjlekh ukhaany akademi Tüükhiin khüreelel, 1999), p.548.

¹⁰³ Ramstedt, *Ilgob charye dongbang yeohaeng*, p.203.

¹⁰⁴ Nakami Tatsuo, "Haisan to Otai," p.133.

¹⁰⁵ Chen Chunhua trans., *Eguo waijiao wenshu xuanyi*, pp. 328-330, pp.339-340.

¹⁰⁶ Lü Yiran ed., *Beiyang zhengfu shiqi de Menggu diqu lishi ziliao*, p.194.

¹⁰⁷ Chen Chunhua trans., *Eguo waijiao wenshu xuanyi*, pp.227-228.

able relations with the Outer Mongols, given that they requested the Bogd Khaan government to establish an administrative district only for the Inner Mongols. The Bogd Khaan government refused this request. Presumably, for this reason, Inner Mongols fled Outer Mongolia to Inner Mongolia even in 1917.¹⁰⁸ In light of these situations, Khaisan's choice is understandable. Khaisan's decision to return to China resulted ultimately from the insurmountable schism between the Inner and Outer Mongols. Due to this schism, the Inner Mongolian leaders who refused to participate in the Bogd Khaan government had difficulties in abandoning their ties with China. By taking advantage of this schism, the foreign powers around Mongolia endeavored to realize their own interests, and under the pressure from the foreign powers, the burgeoning Mongolian nationalism failed to come to fruition.

¹⁰⁸Tachibana Makoto, "Kyafuta kyōtei-go no kihuku Mongorujin no unmei" [The Fate of the Mongols Joined Bogd Khaan's Government after the Kiakhta Agreement], *Waseda daigaku Mongoru kenkyūjo kiyō* [Bulletin of Waseda Institute for Mongolian Studies] 5 (2009).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

- Arkhiiv vneshnei politiki Rossiskoi imperii [Archives of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire]. F. Kitaiskii stol 143, Opis 491, d. 644.
- Arkhiiv vneshnei politiki Rossiskoi imperii. F. Kitaiskii stol 143, Opis 491, d. 645.
- Batsaikhan, O. *Mongolyn tusgaar togtol ba Khyatad, Oros, Mongol gurvan ulsyn 1915 ony Khiagtyn geree 1911-1915*. Ulaanbaatar: Mongol ulsyn shinjlekh ukhaany akademi, Tüükhiin khüreelen, Olon ulsyn sudlalyn khüreelen, 2002.
- Bai Yukun 白玉崑. “Haishan” 海山. In *Neimenggu wenshi ziliao* 內蒙古文史資料 [Materials on Inner Mongolian Literature and History] vol. 14. Huhehaote Zhongguo renmin zhengxie Neimenggu zizhiqu weiyuanhui Neimenggu zizhiqu weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui 中國人民政協內蒙古自治區委員會內蒙古自治區委員會文史資料研究委員會, 1984.
- Boyanmandu 博彥滿都 [Buyanmandakh]. “Wo suo zhidao de Bintu wang Gunchuke sulong” 我所知道的賓圖王棍楚克蘇降 [My Memories on Bintü Wang Günchügsüren]. In *Neimenggu jinxiandai wanggong lu* 內蒙古近現代王公錄 [Records on Modern Inner Mongolian Princes]. Huhehaote Zhongguo renmin zhengxie Neimenggu zizhiqu weiyuanhui Neimenggu zizhiqu weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui 中國人民政協內蒙古自治區委員會內蒙古自治區委員會文史資料研究委員會, 1988.
- Chen Chunhua 陳春華, trans. *Eguo waijiao wenshu xuanyi* 俄國外交文書選譯 [Selected Translations of Russian Diplomatic Documents]. Haerbin: Heilongjiang jiaoyu chubanshe, 1991.
- Dendev, L. *XX зууны Монголын түүхийн ех сурвалж* [Materials on 20th-Century Mongolian History], Uigarjin Mongol bichgees kirill üsegt buulgaj, khevleld beltgesen O. Batsaikhan. Ulaanbaatar: Mongol ulsyn shinjlekh ukhaany akademi, Olon ulsyn sudlalyn khüreelen, 2003.
- Deshan 德山. *Mengguolejin Hailletuti shi shulüe* 蒙郭勒津海勒圖惕氏述略 [A Brief Memoir of Hailletuti of the Mongoljin], trans. Bao Yongqing 包永清 and Qingshan 青山. Huhehaote: Neimenggu daxue chubanshe, 1997.
- “Gokuhi Kodama Toshimasa shi Mōko shisatsuki batsui” 極秘兒玉利正氏蒙古視察記 拔萃 [Top Secret Excerpts of Mr. Kodama Toshimasa’s Inspection Report on

- Mongolia]. In *Nihon gaikō bunsho* 日本外交文書 [Japanese Diplomatic Documents] vol. 1. 1914.
- Kalaqin youyiqi beizi Haishan 喀喇沁右翼旗貝子海山, ed. and trans. *Menghan hebi wufang yuanyin* 蒙漢合璧五方原音 [In Mongolian-Chinese Original Sounds of the Five Regions]. Beijing, 1917.
- Korostovets コロストヴィエツツ. *Mōko kinseishi* 蒙古近世史 [A History of Modern Mongolia], trans. Takayama Yōkichi 高山洋吉. Tokyo: Morikita shoten, 1943.
- Lü Yiran 呂一燃, ed. *Beiyang zhengfu shiqi de Menggu diqu lishi ziliao* 北洋政府時期的蒙古地區歷史資料 [Historical Materials on the Mongol Regions during the Beiyang Government Period]. Haerbin: Heilongjiang jiaoyu chubanshe, 1999.
- Magsarjav, N. *Mongol ulsyn shine tüükh* [A New History of Mongolia], Mongoloos kiril bichigt bulgasan O. Batsaikhan and Z. Lonjid. Ulaanbaatar: Mongol ulsyn shinjlekh ukhaany akademi, Tüükhiin khüreele, Mongol ulsyn zasgiin gazryn arkhiv, 1994.
- Mongol ulsyn ündesnii arkhiv. FA-47, D-1, Kh/N-7, nug-1, kh-262.
- Navaannamjil, G. *Övgön bicheechiin ügüülel* [A Writing of an Old Scribe]. Ulaanbaatar: Ulsyn khevleliin gazar, 1956.
- Ochir, A. and G. Pürvee, eds. *Mongolyn ard түмний 1911 ony үндесний еркн чөлөө тусгаар тогтнолын тölөө темчел, Barimt bichig emkhetgel 1900-1914*. Ulaanbaatar: Ulsyn khevleliin gazar, 1982.
- Pentti Aalto, G. J. “Ramstedt and the Mongolian Independence Movement.” *Studia Mongolica*, Tom. 1(9) Fasc. 1-17, 1973.
- Shinjlekh ukhaany akademi Tüükhiin khüreelelengiin gar bichmel san (“Güing Qayisan-u tuqai”).
- Ramstedt, G. J. *Ilgob charye dongbang yeohaeng* 일곱 차례 동방 여행 [Seven Journeys to the East], trans. Go Song-mu 고송무. Seoul: Mineumsa, 1986.
- V. Kotvichiin khuviin arkhivaas oldson Mongolyn tüükhend kholbogdokh zarim bichig, Sudlan khevlüülsen akad. B. Shirendev, Erkhelsen akad. Sh. Natsagdorj. Ulaanbaatar: Shinjlekh ukhaany akademiin khevlel, 1972.
- Wang Guojun 王國鈞. *Menggu jiwen* 蒙古紀聞 [A Record on Mongolia], ed. and anno. Ma Xi 瑪希 and Xu Shiming 徐世明. Huhehaote: Neimenggu renmin chubanshe, 2006.

Wu Xiangxiang 吳相湘, ed. *Zhongguo xiandai shiliao congshu* 中國現代史料叢書 [A Collection of Historical Sources on Modern Chinese History] vol. 1. Taipei: Jingshi wenbianshe, 1962.

Wu Ziyun 吳紫云. “Haishan jianli” 海山簡歷 [A Brief History of Khaisan]. In *Neimenggu wenshi ziliao* 內蒙古文史資料 vol. 14. Huhehaote: Zhongguo renmin zhengxie Neimenggu zizhiqu weiyuanhui Neimenggu zizhiqu weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui 中國人民政協內蒙古自治區委員會內蒙古自治區委員會文史資料研究委員會, 1984.

The Correspondence of G. E. Morrison 2 (1912-1920), ed. Lo Hui-Min. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.

The Second Historical Archives of China. 1002-62(2), 1913. 3. 7.

_____. 1002-62(2), 1913. 4.17.

_____. 1045-290, 1913. 6.25.

_____. 1045-260, 1914. 2.

_____. 1045-260, 1914. 8.22.

Secondary Sources

Baildagch バイルダグチ. “Hukai to Shinmatsu~Minkoku shoki niokeru nai Mongoru tōbu no seikyoku henka” 阜海と清末~民國初期における内モンゴル東部の政局變化 [Fuhai and Political Changes in Eastern Inner Mongolia from the Late Qing Period to the Early Days of the Republic of China], trans. Borjigin Bürensain ボルジギン・ブレンサイン. *Shiteki* 史滴 22, 2002.

Batsaikhan, O. *Khyatad, Oros, Mongol gurvan ulsyn 1915 ony Khiagtyn geree*. Ulaanbaatar: Mongol ulsyn ündesni arkhivyn gazar, Shinjlekh ukhaany akademi Tüükhiiin khüreeleen, 1999.

_____. *Mongolyn süülchiin ejen khaan VIII Bogd Javjandamba*. Ulaanbaatar: Mongol ulsyn shinjlekh ukhaany akademi, Olon ulsyn sudlalyn khüreeleen, 2008.

Belov, E. A. *Rossiya i Mongoliya v nachale XX veka (1911-1919)* [Russia and Mongolia at the beginning of the 20th Century (1911-1919)]. Moscow: IV RAN, 1998.

Boldbaatar, J. *Da lam*. Ulaanbaatar: Shinjlekh ukhaany akademi Tüükhiiin khüreeleen, 1997.

- _____. *Chin zütgelt gūn Khaisan*. Ulaanbaatar: Mongol ulsyn ikh surguul, 2002.
- Borjigin Bürensain ボルジギン・ブレンサイン. *Kingendai niokeru Mongorujin nōkō sonraku shakai no keisei* 近現代におけるモンゴル人農耕村落社會の形成 [The Formation of Mongol Agricultural Village Society in the Modern Period]. Tokyo: Kazama shōbo, 2002.
- _____. “Harachin·Tomedo imin to Mongoru shakai” ハラチン・トメド移民とモンゴル社會 [Kharchin-Tümed Immigrants and Mongolian Society]. In *Kingendai Mongoru tōbu no henyō* 近現代モンゴル東部の變容 [The Transformation of Eastern Mongolia in the Modern Period]. Tokyo: Yuzankaku, 2007.
- Deleg, G. *Mongol togtmol khevleliin tūukhen temdeglel*. Ulaanbaatar: Ulsyn khevleliin khereg erkhelek khoroo, 1965.
- Fan Mingfang 樊明方. “Haishan yu 1911 nian Waimenggu duli” 海山與1911年外蒙古獨立 [Khaisan and the Independence of Outer Mongolia in 1911]. *Zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu* 中國邊疆史地研究 15-4, 2005.
- _____. “Qingmo Waimeng xinzheng shuping” 清末外蒙新政述評 [A Review of Outer Mongolia’s New Policies in the Late Qing Period]. *Xiyu yanjiu* 西域研究 2005-1, 2005.
- Jamsran, L. *Mongolchuudyn sergen mandaltyn ekhen* [The Beginning of the Mongols’ Renaissance]. Ulaanbaatar: Soyombo khevleliin gazar, 1992.
- Lan Meihua 藍美華. “Neimenggu yu 1911 nian Menggu duli yundong” 內蒙古與1911年蒙古獨立運動 [Inner Mongolia and the Mongolian Independence Movement in 1911]. *Hanxue yanjiu* 漢學研究 23-1, 2005.
- _____. “China’s New Administration in Mongolia.” In *Mongolia in the Twentieth Century: Landlocked Cosmopolitan*, eds. Stephen Kotkin and Bruce A. Elleman. New York and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1999.
- Lee Pyung-rae 이평래. “20 segi chogi areu Monggol wanggong deul-ui shinjeong-e daehan insik” 20세기 초기 아르 몽골 왕公들의 新政에 대한 인식 [Ar-Mongol Princes’ Perceptions of the New Policies in the Early 20th Century]. In *Kim Mungyeong gyosu jeongnyeon toeim ginyeom dong Asia sa nonchong* 김문경교수 정년퇴임기념 동아시아사 논총, 1996.
- _____. “1912-1913 nyeon Bogd jeongbu-ui naemonggol tonghab sido-wa jwajeol” 1912-1913년 북드 정부의 내몽골 통합 시도와 좌절 [The Bogd Khaan Government’s Attempt to Integrate Inner Mongolia and Its Frustration in 1912-1913]. *Jung’ang Asia yeongu* 중앙아시아연구 14, 2009.

- _____. “Haisan-gwa <Monggol Shinmun>” 하이산과 <몽골신문> [Khaisan and the Mongolian Newspaper]. *Monggolhak* 몽골학 64, 2021.
- Li Guilian 李貴連. “Haishan ji qi ‘Menghan hebi wufang yuanyin’ yanjiu” 海山及其《蒙漢合璧五方元音》研究 [A Study on Khaisan and His Book Entitled *Mongolian-Chinese Original Sounds of the Five Regions*]. *Zhangchun daxue xuebao* 長春大學學報, 2018.
- Nakami Tatsuo 中見立夫. “Haisan to Otai: Bogudo·Han seiken niokeru nan Mongorujin” ハイサンとオタイ: ボグド・ハン政權における南モンゴル人 [Khaisan and Otai: Southern Mongols in the Bogd Khan Government]. *Tōyō gakuho* 東洋學報 57-1・2, 1976.
- _____. “Bogudo=Han seiken no tainichi kōshō doryoku to teikokushugi rekkyō” ボグド=ハン政權の対日交渉努力と帝國主義列強 [Independent Mongolia and the Imperialist Powers: 1911-1914]. *Ajia·Afurika gengo bunka kenkyū* アジア・アフリカ言語文化研究 [Journal of Asian and African Studies] 17, 1979.
- Puntsagorov, Ts. *Mongolyn avtonomit üeiin tūikh* [A History of Mongolia’s Autonomous Period]. Ulaanbaatar: Ulsyn khevlel ba khevleliin üildverlelig erkhekh gazar, 1955.
- Shirendev, B. *Mongol ardyn khuv’sgalyn tūikh* [A History of the Mongolian People’s Revolution]. Ulaanbaatar: Ulsyn khevleliin gazar, 1969.
- Tachibana Makoto 橘誠. “Kyafuta kyōtei-go no kihuku Mongorujin no unmei” キャフタ協定後の歸服モンゴル人の運命 [The Fate of the Mongols Joined Bogd Khaan’s Government after the Kiakhta Agreement]. *Waseda daigaku Mongoru kenkyūjo kiyō* 早稲田大学モンゴル研究所紀要 [Bulletin of Waseda Institute for Mongolian Studies] 5, 2009.
- Zhou Xuejun 周學軍. “Zhebuzun danba zhengquan ‘Neige zongli dachen’ shezhi kao” 哲布尊丹巴政權‘內閣總理大臣’設置考 [A Study on the Establishment of ‘Prime Minister’ of the Jebtsundamba Government]. *Zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu* 中國邊疆史地研究 1999-3, 1999.