

# The Rule of Hong Taiji and the Use of Policies toward Joseon\*

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## Introduction

In the early seventeenth century when Hong Taiji (r. 1626-1643) became khan of the Later Jin (1616-1636),<sup>1</sup> its diplomatic relationship with Joseon, which had been relatively stable during the reign of Nurhaci (r. 1616-1626),<sup>2</sup> deteriorated to the point of two wars, the First Manchu Invasion in 1627 and the Second Manchu Invasion in 1637. The relationship between Qing china (1644-1911) and Joseon has received much attention in scholarly circles.<sup>3</sup> Research on the relationship between the

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<sup>1</sup> The Later Jin was a Manchurian state based on the Liaodong region prior to the change of the country's name to the Daqing (大清, 1636-1911). At this point, the ruler of the Later Jin, or Khan had no monopoly on political power.

<sup>2</sup> See Chen Jiexian, 2001, "Qing Taizu shiqi Manzhou yu Chaoxian guanxi kao," *Qing shi za bi* 6 (1985); Noh Ki-sik, "Manju ui heunggi wa Dong-Asia jilseo ui byeondong," *Jungguksa yeongu* 16: 1-35.

<sup>3</sup> Kim Jong-won, 1999, *Geunse Dong-Asia gwangyesa yeongu*, Seoul: Hyeon; Liu Jiaqu, *Qing chao chuqi de zhong han guanxi* (Taipei: Wenshizhe Chubanshe, 1986); Zhang Cunwu, *Qing-Han zongfan maoyi, 1637-1894* (Taipei: Zhongyang Yanjiu Yuan Jindai shi Vanjiu suo, 1978); Jeon Hae-

Later Jin-the predecessor of the Qing-and Joseon during the time has focused on how to characterize the nature of the two wars that occurred in a span of ten years and the resultant relationship between the two states. These studies can be grouped into those dealing mainly with the background to the wars and the treaties that followed,<sup>4</sup> those stressing the influence of economic factors in the relationship between the two states,<sup>5</sup> those examining the response of the Joseon court,<sup>6</sup> and those employing a more macroscopic perspective on the change in the East Asian order.<sup>7</sup> They have focused on the relationship between the two states in terms of politics, economics, society, culture, and diplomacy. In particular, studies emphasizing how the war was necessary for the Later Jin have approached the issue from economic and military perspectives. By so doing, they have underlined the fact that the Later Jin used war with Joseon as a means of handling its poor economic situation and removing the danger that Joseon posed against its anti-Ming military operation.

What we should not dismiss is the fact that during the beginning of Hong Taiji's reign, there were also many political changes within the court of the Later Jin and this political change played a crucial role in determining its diplomatic stance toward Joseon. Previous studies, as aforementioned, have tended to pay great attention to how Hong Taiji consoli-

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 jong, 1966, "Han-Jung jogong gwangye go" *Dongyang sahak yeongu* 1: 10-41; Jeon Hae-jong, 1971, "Cheongdae Han-Jung gwangye ui il gochal - Jogongji edo reul tonghayeo bon cheong ui taedo ui byeoncheon e daehayeo," *Dongyanghak* 1: 229-45; Choe So-ja, 1997, *Myeongcheong sidae Jung-Han gwangyesa yeongu*, Seoul: Ihwa Yeoja Daehakgyo Chulpanbu.

<sup>4</sup> Song Huijuan, 2003, "1627-1636 nianjian hou jin yu Chaoxian guanxi yanbian xin tan," *Dongjiang xue kan* 20.2: 97-101; Chen Jiexian, 1980, "Lue lun tian cong nianjian hou jin yu Chaoxian de guanxi," *Dongbang hakji* 24: 331-51; Liu, *Qing chao chuqi de zhong han guanxi* Chap. 1.

<sup>5</sup> Kim Jong-won, 1978, "Jeongmyo Horansi hugeum ui chulbyeong donggi" *Dongyang sahak yeongu* 12-13: 55-93.

<sup>6</sup> Kim Yong-heum, 2006, "Jeongmyo Horan gwa Juhwa-Jeokhwa nonjaeng," *Hanguk sasang sahak* 26: 159-99; Pak Hyeon-mo, 2003, "10 nyeongan ui wigi: Jeongmyo-Byeongja Horangi ui gonglon jeongchi bipan," *Hanguk jeongchihak hoebo* 37.2: 27-46; Jeon, 1975, "Jeongmyo Horan ui hwapyeong gyoseop e daehayeo,"; Choe, "Honan gwa DaemyeongCheong gwangye ui byeoncheon," *Idae sawon* 12: 54; Han Myung-gi, 2000, "Myeong-Cheong gyochegi Dongbuk-A jilseo wa Joseon jibaechung ui daeung," *Yeoksa wa hyeonsil* 37: 124-48.

<sup>7</sup> Noh, "Manju ui heunggi wa Dong-Asia jilseo ui byeondong," 3-14.

dated his rulership against any potential challengers from his Manchurian royal family.<sup>8</sup> The Hong Taiji's reign saw a transformation of political relations from governance, based on collegial deliberation, to the emergence of new political forces in support of Hong Taiji, and finally to the imperium of Hong Taiji. This shift within the court, I think, did affect the policy-making process towards Joseon and led to the two invasions in 1627 and 1637. With this in mind, this article explores how the political situation of the Later Jin in the early seventeenth century was interrelated with diplomatic relationship with Joseon. To do this, the content of this paper will be divided periodically into two distinct periods, the first when the relationship with Joseon deteriorated for a decade from 1626 and the second when the Later Jin was renamed the Great Qing (大清) against Ming China (1368-1644) in 1636.

## Defeating Political Enemies and the Use of Joseon

The campaign against Joseon began merely four months after Hong Taiji was enthroned as khan. There were two immediate reasons for this. One was the unfavorable economic situation of the Later Jin. The other was the need to address the stationing of the Ming troops under General Mao Wenlong (1576-1629) in the Joseon territory. However, notable changes took place within the power structure of the Later Jin court as Hng Taiji eliminated political enemies. The representative example is the treatment of Amin (1585-1640),<sup>9</sup> the son of Šurhaci who was the younger brother of Nurhaci.

To understand the relationship between Hong Taiji and Amin, it is

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<sup>8</sup> Kim Jong-won, Geunse Dong-Asia *gwangyesa yeongu*, 159-162; Park Hyeon-mo, 2002, "Jeongmyo Horangi ui gungnaeoe jeongchi," *Gugje jeongchi nonchong* 42. 4: 217-35.

<sup>9</sup> Amin was the sixth son of Šurhaci and came under Nurhaci's command after the death of his father. His military accomplishments during the wars with the Ula tribe in 1608 and 1613 earned him a promotion to the rank of taiji (台吉). In 1629, when Hong Taiji advanced close to Beijing, Amin remained in Shenyang to handle government affairs. See Arthur W. Hummel, ed., 1944, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (1644-1912)*, vol. 1, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 8-9.

important to contextualize the political system of the Later Jin under its founder, Nurhachi. In 1621, Nurhachi proposed a collegial system in which eight *beiles* (Venerable Prince or Notable Lord) would jointly deliberate and decide on state affairs. The following year, he tried to change the system further so that power could not be concentrated in the hands of the khan alone.<sup>10</sup> Even, he reformed the decision-making process so that twenty four judges should discuss state affairs and report their conclusions to Grand Ministers who then should deliberate and report their opinions to the eight *beiles* for the final decision.

Specifically, following Nurhachi's instructions, four *Amba Beiles* of Hong Taiji, Amin, Daišan (1583-1648), and Manggūltai (1587-1633) took turns administering state affairs for one month with the khan presiding over the court council (御殿) twice a month. This led to the expectation that 1) state affairs, including the enthronement and dethronement of the khan, would be determined by the four *Amba Beiles* together,<sup>11</sup> 2) political power should be also shared by the four *beiles* in lieu of any autocracy by the khan himself, and 3) policy decisions went administratively through multiple stages of deliberation by the four *beiles*.

Interestingly, while Hong Taiji took charge of state affairs, the other three *beiles* sat alongside Hong Taiji facing south, which signified no discrimination among the four *beiles* in seat arrangement at the court. This case displayed how they ruled jointly. Moreover, when performing rituals at the Dang zi (堂子), where offerings were made to traditional tribal deities of the Later Jin in the new year, Hong Taiji first bowed to the deities

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<sup>10</sup> For more information regarding the system of the Council of the Eight Manchu Lords (八王合議制), see Guo Songyi, Li Xinda, and Li Shangying, 2002, *Qing chao dianzhang zhidu*, Changchun: Jilin Wenshi Chubanshe, 11-12; Bai Xinliang, 2002, *Qing dai zhongshu juece yanjiu*, Shenyang: Liaoning Renmin Chubanshe: 33; Yang Zhen, 2000, "Hou jin ba wang gongzhi guozheng zhi yanjiu," *Zhongguo shi yanjiu* 1: 122-123.

<sup>11</sup> It has been suggested that the reason why Nurhachi insisted on ruling through the collegial deliberative system was to protect his younger and less powerful sons like Dorgon from any factional strife at the political center. See Bai Xinliang, *Qing dai zhongshu juece yanjiu*, 32-33; Yang Zhen, "Hou jin ba wang gongzhi guozheng zhi yanjiu," 123.

and finally to his uncles and brothers.<sup>12</sup> This gives a clear indication of the status of the future khan Hong Taiji.

Under these circumstances, Nurhachi did not even name a successor on his deathbed and Hong Taiji became khan.<sup>13</sup> Yoto (?-1638) and Sahaliyan (1604-1636) first discussed the enthronement of Hong Taiji and secured the consent of their father, Daišan. The next day Daišan presided over a meeting and brought up the matter of nominating Hong Taiji to be khan. Amin, Manggūltai, Abatai (1592-1643), Degelei (1597-1635), Jirgalang (1599-1655), Ajige (1605-1651), Dorgon (1612-1650), Dodo (1614-1649), Dudu (1597-1642), and Hooqe (1609-1648) agreed altogether to the decision and asked Hong Taiji to take the throne. What is noticeable is that Amin, even though he was instrumental in the enthronement of Hong Taiji, had no intention of being subject to him. Prior to the above decision, Amin sent an emissary to Hong Taiji and offered his conditional support by stating that “I [Amin] and the other *beiles* will nominate you to be Khan, on the condition that you allow me to leave and live in the Waifan (外藩).” Amin was looking for a way to circumvent the power of Hong Taiji, who refused that offer.

What surprises us is that Hong Taiji sent Amin to attack Joseon during the First Manchu Invasion in 1627.<sup>14</sup> Given that the khan must have had questions about Amin’s loyalty, sending him to spearhead the campaign seemed to be a risky action. What made Hong Taiji choose his disobedient uncle to lead the military campaign against Joseon? This question is closely related to the policy-making process of the Later Jin. In or-

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<sup>12</sup> “Ba huangzi jin wen siwei,” *Man wen mi dang*, vol. 101, Taipei: Wenhai Chubanshe, 1967, 69–72; “Taizu qi yu si beile” *Man wen mi dang*, 87; 3rd lunar month, 3rd day, 1622, *Qing Taizu shilu*, vol. 4, Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1986.

<sup>13</sup> For more reference to the enthronement of Hong Taiji, see Mitamura Taisuke, 1941, “Shin no taisō no sokui jijō ni tsuite,” *Tōyō shi kenkyū* 6.2; Ishibashi Takao, 1944, “Shinsho kōtei ken no keisei katei,” *Tōyō shi kenkyū* 53.1; Wang Sizhi, 1984, “Huang Taiji ji li yu zhu beile de maodun,” *Lishi dangan* 3; Okada Hideo, 1972, “Shin no taisō shiritsu no jijō,” in *Yamamoto hakase kanreki kinen tōyō shi ronsou*, ed., Yōkyō: Yamakawa Shuppansha; Li Guangtao, 1953, “Qing Taizong duo wei kao,” *Dalu zazhi* 6.5; Li Hongbin, 1981, “Hong Taiji jisi de ji ge wenti.” *Lishi dangan* 3.

<sup>14</sup> 1st lunar month, 8th day, 1627, Manbun Rōtō Kenkyūkai, trans. and annot., 1955-1956, *Manbun rōtō*, vol. 4, Tōkyō: Tōyō bunko, 2.

der to mobilize troops for the conquest of Joseon, the khan needed the consent of the four *beiles* who shared power at the time. In such a situation, a conflict with Amin, one member of the four *beiles*, could have worsened an already unstable political system and might have reached the point of disintegration.<sup>15</sup> For that matter, it was difficult for Hong Taiji to oppose the appointment of Amin as the leader of the invasion.

In fact, all four *beiles* had different ideas as to the invasion. Hong Taiji hoped that a successful invasion would help overcome the socioeconomic crises of the Later Jin at the time and consolidate his regal authority. On the other hand, it is likely that Amin saw the invasion as an opportunity to forge an independent path separate from the Later Jin. Daišan, the second son of Nurhaci, and Manggūltai, the fifth son of Nurhaci, for their part, hoped to strengthen their position within the court while exercising political leverage, whenever available, at the court. These competing interests made it practically impossible for Hong Taiji to oppose Amin leading the invasion force, regardless of the risk he was taking. What about the case of Amin?

In two months, the war came to an end. While negotiations between the two states were in progress, however, Amin insisted on marching down to expose his ambition to seize the capital of Joseon and stay there. He even asked Dudu, the son of Cuyen (1580-1615) - the eldest son of Nurhaci and the older brother of Hong Taiji - to move to Joseon and settle down together with him.<sup>16</sup> However, other *beiles* participating in the campaign were not sympathetic to Amin's ambitions. Dudu was enraged greatly by Amin's absurd proposal. Furthermore, Yoto was pressuring Amin a quick retreat with the prisoners captured from Joseon because the Later Jin was simultaneously fighting against the Ming and the Mongols.

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<sup>15</sup> Nicola Di Cosmo, 1999, "State Formation and Periodization in Inner Asian History," *Journal of World History* 10.1: 1-40.

<sup>16</sup> When Amin returned after losing Yongping, the first charge listed was his behavior at the time of the Joseon expedition. Dudu said, "That *beile* [Amin] said he would only take me, but what should I do? The *beile* is guilty and I am also guilty." Thus, although Dudu said that he did not know why Amin had chosen him, in reality he seemed to have been aware of Amin's intentions. 6th lunar month, 7th day, 1630, Manbun Rōtō Kenkyūkai, *Manbun rōtō*, vol. 4, 404.

Given this, Amin had the issue of retreat discussed among the ministers of the Eight Banners who had followed him to attack Joseon. Except for the minister under Amin's banner, which was the Bordered Blue Banner (鑲藍旗), the remaining seven ministers wanted to withdraw their forces. After the discussion, Yoto excluded Amin from the negotiations with Joseon<sup>17</sup> and Amin lost the support of the other *beiles*. After all, Hong Taiji's gamble of putting Amin in charge of the invasion paid off. Three years later, Hong Taiji ordered Amin to station in Yongping (永平) and defend the region. Amin lost it due to a counterattack by the Ming army. As a result, Hong Taiji had him arrested and imprisoned. Among the sixteen charges brought against him, the first, second, and tenth charges accused Amin of attempting to desert from the Later Jin and threatening its security.<sup>18</sup>

Hong Taiji eventually was able to eliminate his uncle, who appeared to be his most dangerous political opponent, for two main reasons. The first is the support of the *beiles* dispatched to Joseon. Yoto stood firmly for the enthronement of Hong Taiji and Jirgalang<sup>19</sup>, who was Amin's younger brother, also helped Yoto to conclude peace negotiations with Joseon and enjoyed Hong Taiji's trust. The other reason for Hong Taiji's political victory is connected to the harsh economic situation, deteriorated by severe famines, at the time of Nurhaci's demise and Hong Taiji's enthronement. Most of the *beiles*, such as Yoto and Sahaliyan, felt that Hong Taiji, active and aggressive in disposition, would be more effective at overcoming this crisis than the conservative Daišan. Hong Taiji

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<sup>17</sup> 3rd month, 1627, Manbun Rōtō Kenkyūkai, *Manbun rōtō*, vol. 4, 49–50. The reason why Amin wanted to go to the capital of Joseon was that he would investigate the fortresses of the Ming and Joseon in person. Chen Wenshi, 1991, *Ming Qing zhengzhi shehui shilun*, Taipei: Xuesheng Shuju, 493.

<sup>18</sup> 4th lunar month 7th day, Manbun Rōtō Kenkyūkai, *Manbun rōtō*, vol. 4, 401–16.

<sup>19</sup> After Nurhaci's death, Amin asked Hong Taiji if he would go his own way and Hong Taiji consulted Jirgalang to find out what Amin had planned. After expelling Amin, Hong Taiji handed over the Bordered Blue Banner (鑲藍旗) under Amin to Jirgalang. When Amin announced that he would advance towards the capital of Joseon, Yoto countered that the other banners would not follow Amin and persuaded Amin through Jirgalang. 6th lunar month, 7th day, 1630, Manbun Rōtō Kenkyūkai, *Manbun rōtō*, vol. 4, 401–05.

had also proved himself to be an excellent military commander.<sup>20</sup> This faith was not shaken by Amin's instigation to seek an independent space out of control of the new khan through the Joseon campaign in 1627.

## The Growth of New Political Forces and the Joseon Question

From 1632 to 1633, the bureaucratic groups driving policy decisions in the Later Jin can be divided into the Six Ministries (Liu-bu 六部) and the Literary Office (Wenguan 文館). The two political organizations differed from those at the beginning of Hong Taiji's reign. They emerged simultaneously to exclude Amin and Manggūltai from power.<sup>21</sup> Hong Taiji held Amin accountable for the loss of the Yongping area and incarcerated him in 1631. He also expelled Manggūltai for wielding a sword in his presence during the attack on Dalinghe (大凌河) in 1632. After these events, Daišan, the only remaining members of *Amba Beiles*, gave his consent to cease facing south (南面) and sitting alongside Hong Taiji. In the process, Hong Taiji started pushing forward institutional reforms to strengthen his might within and beyond the Later Jin.

In 1631, Hong Taiji established the Six Ministries at the suggestion of the Han Chinese who submitted themselves to the Later Jin. He then put one *beile* in charge of each ministry. In this way, he brought the *beiles*, who had wielded independent powers based on their banners up to this point, into the central officialdom. The transition did not go smoothly. Some of the *beiles* preferred to conduct business from their home without going to their offices. They also ignored established procedures and were often criticized for making decisions in favor of their own banners. Despite these problems, however, the significance of the new measure taken by Hong Taiji lies in the fact that the *beiles*, who had existed

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<sup>20</sup> Chen Wenshi, *Ming Qing zhengzhi shehui shilun*, 431–32.

<sup>21</sup> Manggūltai, the fifth son of Nurhachi, displayed his military talents in the campaign against the Ula tribe in 1612. He was given the Plain Blue Banner (正藍旗) and became one of the four *hošoi* (和碩) *beiles* in 1616. Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Qing Period (1644–1912)*, 562.

as independent political and military units of the Manchurian royal family of the Later Jin, were now integrated into the framework of central government. On the other hand, the Literary Office originated during the reign of Nurhachi.<sup>22</sup> It was set up in need of communication between the Manchu ruling elites and the Han Chinese who managed general administration except military affairs.<sup>23</sup> However, the Manchus outnumbered the Han Chinese in the office from the beginning and they petitioned Hong Taiji to appoint a *beile* as the head of the organization.<sup>24</sup> Moreover, Han Chinese bureaucrats working in the Literary Office complained that all the documents were written in Manchu and their Manchu colleagues monopolized information.<sup>25</sup>

The Six Ministries and the Literary Office were connected through an office called the Qixinlang (啓心郎) attached to the Six Ministries and responsible for advice and assistance. Notably, Hong Taiji made the Qixinlang entitled to take his suggestions directly to Hong Taiji himself in the case of rejection by his superior *beile*. At the same time, officials of the Literary Office were authorized to report on the activities of the Qixinlang.<sup>26</sup> The Literary Office itself was in charge of issuing and recording documents, delivering the khan's instructions, and discussing government affairs.<sup>27</sup> The office also did propose the establishment of the Grand

<sup>22</sup> Regarding the establishment of the Literary Office, see Kanda Nobuo, 1960, "Shinsho no bun-kan tsuite," *Tōyō shi kenkyū* 19.3.

<sup>23</sup> Miyazaki Ichisada, 1975, "Shincho ni okeru kuni-go mondai no ichimen," *Ajia kenkyū* 3: 15; Chen Jiexian, 1989, "Cong Qing chu zhongyang jian zhi kan manzhou hanhua," in *Jindai zhongguo chuqi lishi yan tao hui lunwen ji*, vol. 1, Taipei: Taiwan Shangwu Yin Shuguan: 135-136.

<sup>24</sup> "Yang Fangxing tiaochen shizheng zou" 楊方興條陳時政奏 [Yang Fangxing's Memorial on Current Affairs], 11th lunar month, 18th day, 1631, *Tiancong chao chen gong zou yi* (Taipei: Lian Guo Feng Chubanshe, 1969): 41.

<sup>25</sup> "Yang Fangxing tiaochen shizheng zou," 11th lunar month, 18th day, 1631, *Tiancong chao chen gong zou yi*.

<sup>26</sup> 8th lunar month, 8th day, 1632, *Qing Taizong shilu*, vol. 12; "Bao Chengxian Yi kaocha qixinlang youlie zou" 鮑承先議考察啓心郎優劣奏 [Bao Chengxian's Memorial on the Discussion of the Pros and Cons of Qixinlang], *Tiancong chao chen gong zou yi*.

<sup>27</sup> "Wang Wenkui tiaochen shiyi zou" 王文奎條陳時宜奏 [Wang Wenkui's Memorial on the Appropriate Administration], 9th lunar month, 1632, *Tiancong chao chen gong zou yi*; 12th lunar month, 5th day, 1635, *Qing Taizong shilu*, vol. 26; 2nd lunar month, 14th day, 1631, *Qing Taizong*

Secretariat (內閣) to replace the Deliberative Council of Princes & Ministers and the Six Ministries.<sup>28</sup> Without any complete control over the *beile*,<sup>29</sup> still, the dual institutional axes of the Six Ministries and the Literary Office enabled Hong Taiji to manage state affairs, keep the *beiles* in check, and gradually have dominion over the government.

Meanwhile, the issues of tributary goods, sent from Joseon to the Later Jin, and repatriating fugitives from Manchuria became two major reasons for conflict between the two states. From 1633, tensions rose when the Later Jin demanded the repatriation of its fugitives and the Warka people originally from the regions along the Ussuri River. Joseon contended that there were no such people to return. This disagreement was further exacerbated not only by the dissatisfaction of the Later Jin with the quantity of tributary goods from Joseon, but also the reluctance of Joseon to provide troops and ships for the Later Jin against the Ming and to sever diplomatic relationship with the Ming.<sup>30</sup> As a result, the Joseon envoys of 1633 were forced to bring back their tributary goods as the Later Jin refused to accept them.<sup>31</sup>

In the same year, Inggüldai, sent to Joseon as an envoy, reported that Joseon was building a fortress on a mountain peak south of Uiju (義州) under the pretext of defending against Japan. This news received a hostile reception in the Qing court and several officials even argued for a

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*shilu*, vol. 6. In addition to these, the officials of the Literary Office also interpreted Hong Taiji's dreams. 10th month, 16th day, 1635, *Qing Taizong shilu*, vol. 25.

<sup>28</sup> 1st lunar month, 1st day, 1631, *Qing Taizong shilu*, vol. 8; 5th lunar month, 6th day, 1633, *Qing Taizong shilu*, vol. 14; "Ma Guangyuan jingxian yu zhong zou" 馬光遠敬獻愚忠奏 [Ma Guangyuan's Memorial with Humble and Loyal Dedication] 11th lunar month, 28th day, 1632, *Tiancong chao chen gong zou yi*.

<sup>29</sup> Ishibashi Takao, 1997, "Manju (滿洲) ōchō-ron," *Minshin jidai shi no shomondai*, Tōkyō: Kyūko Shoin: 1-32.

<sup>30</sup> Kim Jong-won, *Geunse Dong-Asia gwangyesa yeongu*, 132-424; Chen Jiexian, "Qing tai zu shiqi manzhou yu chaoxian guanxi kao," 332-34.

<sup>31</sup> 1st lunar month, 15th day, 1633, Zhongguo di yi Lishi Dang'an Guan, ed., *Qingchu neiguo shiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 1 (Beijing: Guangming Ribao Chubanshe, 1985); 1st lunar month, 25th day, 1633, *Joseon Injo sillok*, vol. 28.

war with Joseon.<sup>32</sup> At this time, Hong Taiji asked the *beiles* and the ministers for their opinions on which country he needed to conquer first, among the Ming, Joseon, or the Chahars. The majority of officials recommended dealing with the Ming first because once the Ming falls down Joseon would have little choice but to surrender to the Later Jin.

Those who advocated dealing with the Ming first, including Jirgalang and Dorgon, were responsible for the Six Ministries.<sup>33</sup> A substantial number of officials from the Literary Office also favored attacking the Ming. What the officials of the Literary Office saw as merit of attacking the Ming was that it would facilitate the recruitment of talented people and the reform of the established institutions. They also pointed to a variety of issues, including the Han Chinese captured in the Battle of Dalinghe (大凌河) around the Liaoning area, and marked the Shanhai Pass (山海關) as one of the strategic priorities for the conquest of the Ming. Additionally, they went against any peace negotiations with the Ming, inasmuch as these negotiation might be simply a Ming strategy to buy time for military mobilization.<sup>34</sup>

The new political forces, based largely on the Literary Office, started exerting a prominent influence on policy decisions of the Later Jin court in the Hong Taiji's reign, especially with respect to relations with

<sup>32</sup> 6th lunar month, 5th day, 1633, *Zhongguo di yi Lishi Dang'an Guan, Qingchu neiguo shiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 1, 20.

<sup>33</sup> 7th lunar month, 8th day, 1631, *Qing Taizong shilu*, vol. 9; 6th lunar month, 14th day, 1633, *Qing Taizong shilu*, vol. 14., 17.

<sup>34</sup> Jiang xin qing zao jue xi zheng zou 姜新請早決西征奏 [Jiang Xin's Memorial Requesting the Western Conquest], 1st lunar month, 1632, *Tiancong chao chen gong zou yi*, 5–6; Hu gong ming chenyan tu bao zou 胡貢明陳言圖報奏 [Hu Gongming's Memorial on Mapping], 8th lunar month, 1632, *Tiancong chao chen gong zou yi*, 11; Jiang Yunshen yijue he chengfou zou 江云深議決和成否奏 [Jiang Yunshen's Memorial on the Decision to Oppose the Making of Peace], *Tiancong chao chen gong zou yi*, 21; Gaoshi Jun jin chen guan jian zou 高士俊謹陳管見奏 [Gaoshi Jun's Memorial Cordially Presenting His Opinion], *Tiancong chao chen gong zou yi*, 23–24; Li Qifeng jin jin zhongyan zou 李栖風盡進忠言奏 [Li Qifeng's Memorial Giving His Sincere Counsel], 1st month, 29th day, 1632, *Tiancong chao chen gong zou yi*, 26–27. Hong Taiji used a double strategy of peace negotiation and warfare in relation to the Ming. This policy continued throughout his reign. Despite ongoing suggestions of many Han Chinese officials that he attack and capture Beijing, he did not change his mind. See Noh, "Manju ui heunggi wa Dong-Asia jilseo ui byeondong", 25.

Joseon. In the summer of 1633, when the court was debating its response to the tributary goods supplied by Joseon, a Literary Office official advised that the most appropriate course of action would be to accept them.<sup>35</sup> Two days later, Hong Taiji and the *beiles* gathered at Chongzheng Hall (崇政殿) and summoned the envoys from Joseon and examined the goods from Joseon. Shortly thereafter, in a letter given to the Joseon envoy, the court stated that even though it was not pleased with the goods, it had decided to receive them for the sake of peace between the two states.<sup>36</sup> This instance shows the growing impact of the new political forces on the Joseon matter within the Later Jin court.

At the same time, the letter criticized Joseon for not actively seeking to broker peace between the Qing and the Ming and requested Joseon to mediate between the two states.<sup>37</sup> However, this was a strategic feint by the Later Jin. Hong Taiji had ordered the Han Chinese officials in the Literary Office to devise a plan to attack the Ming. One of the tricky issues was to mobilize their armies.<sup>38</sup> In response, they suggested to falsely propose peace with the Ming, thereby buying time to advance troops for attacking the Ming, while the Ming is preoccupied with dissecting their real intentions. To this end, Joseon was used as an intermediary to falseheartedly propose peace with the Ming as a strategic deception.<sup>39</sup> At this juncture, ironically, it is Joseon that became an instrumental factor in the Ming front of the Later Jin and the occupation of its dominant position in Northeast Asia.

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<sup>35</sup> Bao chengxian chen chaoxian shi zou 鮑承先陳朝鮮事奏 [Bao Chengxian's Memorial on Joseon Affairs], 5th lunar month, 24th day, 1633, *Tiancong chao chen gong zou yi*, 68.

<sup>36</sup> 6th lunar month, 16th day, 1633, *Joseon Injo Sillok*, vol. 28.

<sup>37</sup> 5th lunar month, 26th day, 1633, *Tiancong chao chen gong zou yi*, vol. 1, 17–18; 6th lunar month, 5th day, *Tiancong chao chen gong zou yi*, 20–21.

<sup>38</sup> 6th lunar month, 5th day, 1632, *Qing Taizong shilu*, vol. 12; “Ning Wanwo Fan Wencheng Ma Guozhu zou yi zhengming” 寧完我范文程馬國柱奏議證明 [Memorial by Ning Wanwo, Fan Wencheng and Ma Guozhu on the Conquest of the Ming], *Man wen mi dang*, 180–81.

<sup>39</sup> Hong Taiji's objective was to maintain a stable relationship with the Ming and keep a firm hold on Liaodong. This strategy impelled him to conduct both peace negotiations and military attacks until the final conquest of the Ming in 1644. See Zhao Yadi, 1996, “Huang Taiji daming chao ce-lue de zhuanbian,” *Lishi jiao xue* 4: 31–33.

## New World Order under Hong Taiji and the Use of Joseon

In 1635, Hong Taiji gathered his officials to discuss the concept of *tianzi* (Son of Heaven 天子) and asked rhetorically if the Han Chinese had referred to the emperor as *tianzi* whether virtuous or not. He contended that only a virtuous individual could be designated *tianzi*, hinting that he was planning a change in how the regime should be perceived.<sup>40</sup> Alongside this, he declared, “Our country originally consisted of the Manchu, Hada, Ula, Yehe, and Hoifa. Those who do not know better often call us Jurchens. From now on, everyone should call our people Manchus. Those who call us Jurchens shall be punished.” This was a departure from Nurhachi’s declaration that they were the successors to and descendants of the Jin Dynasty (1115-1234) dating back to the twelfth century.<sup>41</sup> Hong Taiji’s step differentiated his regime from the Later Jin, inherited from his father, in both scale and character.<sup>42</sup>

What initially triggered this transformation was the merger of the Chahar Mongols. On becoming khan in 1626, Hong Taiji made alliances with the Mongol tribes opposed to Ligdan Khan (1588-1634) of the Chahars in order to hold the Chahar in check but avoided a direct confrontation with them. He also promoted economic activities by the Mongols in

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<sup>40</sup> 5th lunar month, 20th day, 1635, *Qingchu neiguo shiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, vol.1, 167; *Chiu Man chou tang: Tensou 9 nen*, Tōkyō: Tōyō bunko, 1972, 144–45.

<sup>41</sup> Pamela Kyle Crossley, 1999, *A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 145. Nurhachi said that they were not only of the same ethnicity as the subjects of the Jin Dynasty, but also lived in the same area, spoke the same language and even belonged to the same clan. He called the Ming the “Southern Dynasty” (南朝), an repetition of the term the Jin employed against the Song Dynasty (960-1279) in the south. For more reference to the declaration of the Manchus, see 10th lunar month, 13th day, 1635, *Qingchu neiguo shiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 1, 205.

<sup>42</sup> He further developed this idea by creating a Manchu myth related to Bukuri Yongšon. Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror*, 193–98. This story, which appears at the beginning of the Manchu Annals, became known by Musike (穆希克) who surrendered in the expedition of Hong Taiji toward the Amur region. 5th lunar month, 6th day, 1635, *Qingchu neiguo shiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 1, 160–61.

the region around the Great Wall and incorporated some Mongol forces, seceding from the Chahars, into the Later Jin. In 1634 when Ligdan passed away, he subjugated the remaining Chahar forces, thus ending the confrontation with the remaining strong Mongols after Nurhaci's campaign against Liaodong.<sup>43</sup> One year later, he hosted a banquet for Ligdan's wife and son.<sup>44</sup> At the banquet, he declared that he had obtained the seal of Mongol Khanate and confirmed his vast influence up to the Amur River.<sup>45</sup> After the celebration, the Han Chinese officials offered their congratulations on the seizure of the seal and proposed to Hong Taiji to publicize this auspicious occasion and to establish an honorary title (尊號) for his reign. However, at this point, Hong Taiji did not accept their request.<sup>46</sup>

On the 4th day of the second month of 1636, Han Chinese officials, this time with the support of the *beiles*, raised the issue once again.<sup>47</sup> They decided to present a memorial to Hong Taiji through the Manchu officials in the Palace Academy for the Advancement of Literature (*nei hongwen yuan* 內弘文院), the Palace Secretariat Academy (*nei mishu yuan* 內秘書院), and the Manchu Qixinlang of the Ministry of Rites.<sup>48</sup> They petitioned Hong Taiji to accept the honorary title on the grounds

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<sup>43</sup> Noh Ki-sik, "Manju ui Monggol chahareu byeonghap gwa geu uimi," *Junggukhak nonchong* 14 (2001): 88–90.

<sup>44</sup> 9th lunar month, 25th day, 1635, *Qingchu neiguo shiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 1, 202.

<sup>45</sup> See Sun Wenliang and Li Zhiting, 1993, *Tian cong han chong de di*, Changchun: Jilin Wenshi Chubanshe; Cho Byeong-hak, 2004, "Hugeum ui heuglyong-gang jubyeon bujuk e daehan pyeongjeong-gwajeong mit boksok jeongchaek," *Monggol hak* 17; Chen Peng, 2004, "Qing Taizong tongyi Heilongjiang liuyu chutan," *Manzu yanjiu* 4: 253-257.

<sup>46</sup> Tiancong 6th year, 10th month, 1st day, *Qingchu neiguo shiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 1, 202; Tiancong 9th year, 10th month, 1st day, *Chiu Man chou tang*, 306–07.

<sup>47</sup> The description in this section of the event of 12th month, 28th day of Tiancong 9th year is based on the records of 12th lunar month, 28th day, 1635, *Qingchu neiguo shiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 1, 221–24 and those of the same date in *Chiu Man chou tang*, 369–83.

<sup>48</sup> Many studies on the political system of the Qing dynasty identify April 1636 as the point when the Literary Office was expanded and reorganized into the Three Palace Academies (內三院)—Palace Historiographic Academy (內國史院), Palace Academy for the Advancement of Literature (內弘文院), and Palace Secretariat Academy (內秘書院)—.

that the three Ming generals Kong Youde (?-1652), Geng Zhongming (1604-1649), and Shang Kexi (1604-1676) had already surrendered and the Chahars and other surrounding tribes were now under the control of the Later Jin. What is more, the son of Ligdan Khan had surrendered and the acquisition of the seal proved symbolically to be high time to glorify the zenith of his supreme authority.<sup>49</sup> However, Hong Taiji once again turned down the proposal as he had not yet accomplished his grand undertaking to become the unrivaled leading power of Northeast Asia.

Hong Taiji's reluctance as above might suggest that he was preoccupied with the continuing warfare with the Ming that remained still unconquered. However, considering subsequent developments, Hong Taiji's intentions lay elsewhere. In the face of Hong Taiji's continued refusal to an honorary title, Sahaliyan, a *beile* in charge of the Ministry of Rites, uttered, "The reason the Khan does not receive the honorary title is because we, the *beiles*, have erred." He felt that the relationship between a ruler and subjects had to be settled by taking the oath of allegiance. Upon receiving this report, Hong Taiji was pleased: "What the *Beile* Sahaliyan said truly won my heart." He then stated that he would decide whether to receive the honorary title after the *beiles* had sworn their allegiance. That evening, he called the Manchu officials and Han Chinese officials together and told them, "Several *beiles* have requested the acceptance of an honorary title but it cannot be accepted because the region has not yet been unified and we cannot know the will of Heaven." The Han Chinese officials of the Literary Office transmitted their opinion as follows: "Following the way of Heaven and accepting the people's requests, the honorary title should be determined and the place of the Emperor should be succeeded."

What is clear is that the Han Chinese bureaucrats took the lead in formalizing the issue of how to enhance the regnal title for Hong Taiji and paved a path for a channel where the Manchu *beiles* communicated their views among themselves regarding the matter. The Manchu bureau-

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<sup>49</sup> 12th lunar month, 28th day, 1635, *Qingchu neiguo shiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 1, 221.

crats in the Literary Office also sided with their Han Chinese colleagues. Through the Literary Office, Hong Taiji created a political route where the *beiles*, the most powerful in the court, could participate in the process of adopting a highly elevated title for khan and completely submitting to Hong Taiji himself.

The day after the meeting between Hong Taiji and the officials from the Literary Office, Sahaliyan convened a meeting of *beiles* and conveyed the message that “each should duly make a pledge to reform so that the Khan can accept the honorary title.” All the *beiles* immediately pledged their loyalty to the khan. However, Hong Taiji discovered that due to illness, Daišan was the only *beile* not to pledge loyalty. He therefore instructed Sahaliyan to keep the letters of the pledges of loyalty from the other *beiles* until he received the one from Daišan as well. He also issued instructions that the oath should not mention any previous defiance or disobedience by the *beiles* but rather proclaim that they would fulfill their responsibilities with loyalty in their hearts. At the same time, he made it clear that those who had other intentions would be punished. On hearing this, Daišan was anxious to take his oath and on the 4th day of the second month of 1636; he and the other *beiles* swore allegiance to Hong Taiji.<sup>50</sup>

The matter of adopting honorific title did not end with the oath-taking of the *beile*. The Mongol nobility also wished to be part of the process of obedience to the Manchurian unifier Hong Taiji. Moreover, Hong Taiji raised the issue of sending an envoy to Joseon by saying, “It is appropriate to discuss the issue with the king of Joseon since the king of Joseon and I have a brotherly bond.” Sahaliyan proposed that unlike previous envoys to Joseon, the delegation should include the *beiles* and the Mongol nobility. He also suggested that the delegation to Joseon would show off the fact that the Mongol tribes, whose military force was tremendously strong, had submitted voluntarily to Hong Taiji. Hong Taiji

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<sup>50</sup> In *Qingchu neiguo shiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 1, 222, the entry for the twenty-ninth day of the twelfth lunar month in 1635 includes the expression “the next day.” However, the event is still included in the entry for the twenty-eighth day.

agreed and an unprecedented size of delegation departed for Joseon.<sup>51</sup>

In fact, Hong Taiji had sought the recognition of Joseon for several months even before this diplomatic maneuver. He wanted the Joseon court to admit military prowess of his regime vis-à-vis that of the faltering Ming. In 1635, he sent a letter to the king of Joseon and announced that he attacked the Heilongjiang region, where over 10,000 people surrendered and that he had also attacked the Ningyuan (寧遠) region of the Ming.<sup>52</sup> On the 19th day of the seventh month of 1635, he informed Joseon that all the remaining Chahar Mongols had surrendered, the Ming armies around Songshan (松山), located south of Jinzhou in Liaoning Province, had been severely damaged, and more than 6000 people had surrendered. The triumphant performance of the Qing contrasted with the bad news from the Ming that the Hongwu Emperor's tomb desecrated and the Ming troops fell into disarray.<sup>53</sup> When it comes to the political power, on the 24th day of the eleventh month, 1635, Hong Taiji summoned the envoys from Joseon and showed them the seal of the Mongol Chahar Khan.<sup>54</sup> He also took issue with a letter from the Joseon court: "Why have all the previous letters from Joseon used the character 奉 [feng], but now they use only the character 致 [zhi]? Are they regarding me lightly?" In addition, another document emphasized that the Ming was running out of luck, pointing out that Ming officials were deceiving the emperor.<sup>55</sup>

When arriving in Joseon, the Qing envoys demanded that Joseon acknowledge the recently acquired higher status of Hong Taiji after the Ming lost the will of heaven and affirmed that the Qing received a new

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<sup>51</sup> 12th lunar month, 28th day, 1635, *Qingchu neiguo shiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 1, 223–224.

<sup>52</sup> 5th lunar month, 13th day, 1635, *Qingchu neiguo shiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 1, 164; 5th month, 18th day, 1635, *Qing Taizong shilu*, vol. 23.

<sup>53</sup> 6th lunar month, 16th day, 1635, *Qingchu neiguo shiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 1, 170.

<sup>54</sup> 10th lunar month, 15th day, 1635, *Qingchu neiguo shiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 1, 205.

<sup>55</sup> 12th lunar month, 30th day, 1635, *Joseon Injo sillok*, vol. 31; 12th lunar month, 20th day, 1635, *Qingchu neiguo shiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 1, 217–218.

mandate from Heaven (天命).<sup>56</sup> However, Joseon was unwilling to accept Hong Taiji's higher title and the envoys ended up returning with their purpose unfulfilled. When Hong Taiji sent his envoys with large numbers of Mongols, the Joseon court responded, "If he wants to call himself the Son of Heaven and to ascend to the position of Emperor, he can become an emperor in his own country and rule over his own nation." As the court saw it, the reason for this large delegation to Joseon was to threaten them and "to announce to the whole world that Joseon has acknowledged him as the Son of Heaven."<sup>57</sup>

This event precipitated vociferous calls for an invasion of Joseon within the Qing court. However, Hong Taiji went against the hasty opinion by stating that "Let the sons of both the King of Joseon and several of his ministers be sent as hostages. If Joseon sends them, this matter will be concluded. If they do not, then, we will discuss invading Joseon again."<sup>58</sup> So, although the original plan in which Joseon takes part willingly in the process of accepting and affirming the imperial status of Hong Taiji did not go as expected, in the fifth month of 1636 Hong Taiji declared the birth of a new order by renaming the country Great Qing, calling himself emperor, and declaring his reign title as Chongde (崇德).

At this time, he rationalized Joseon's stubborn refusal to be incorporated into the Qing-led order: "The world under Heaven is not a world of one person but a world of peoples." He also underlined that having virtue was a condition for the Son of Heaven and that the mandate of Heaven had moved from the Liao (907-1125) to Jin to Yuan (1206-1368) and Ming Dynasties, and now to the Qing dynasty where virtue now resided.<sup>59</sup> Likewise, Hong Taiji sought to convince Joseon that his new Qing was to be the rightful successor to the Ming, pressure Joseon to recognize his new regime, and leave the Ming behind as an outcast unfit for

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<sup>56</sup> 2nd lunar month, 2nd day, 1636, Manbun Rôtō Kenkyūkai, *Manbun rōtō*, vol. 4, 906-911.

<sup>57</sup> 2nd lunar month, 21st day, 1636, *Joseon Injo sillok*, vol. 32.

<sup>58</sup> 3rd lunar month, 20th day, 1636, Manbun Rôtō Kenkyūkai, *Manbun rōtō*, vol. 4, 966-972.

<sup>59</sup> 4th lunar month, 15th day, 1636, Manbun Rôtō Kenkyūkai, *Manbun rōtō*, vol. 4, 998-999.

the Qing-led world order. Hence, he was entirely dissatisfied with the fact that the recalcitrant Joseon rejected to acknowledge and show respect to his new regime. The last measure was to be taken and that is how the Second Manchu Invasion took place in the twelfth month of 1636.

## Concluding Remarks

The policies of the Later Jin toward Joseon were closely related to the change in power relations within the regime, particularly Hong Taiji's consolidation of power. This change in power relations occurred in three stages. In the first period, Hong Taiji, ascending the throne, shared power with the other three members of the four *Amba beiles*. In the second stage, he made vigorous effort to expel Amin from power to change the status of the existing *beiles* with the help of new political forces within the court. Finally, he managed to strengthen his new regime by receiving a higher honorary title and renaming his state as Great Qing. The Manchu Invasion in 1626 reflected the discord between Hong Taiji and Amin. Although Amin consented to the nomination of Hong Taiji as khan, he had no desire to be controlled by this new khan. It was only during this campaign that the intentions of Amin became evident. At that time, his attempt to tread an independent path was unsuccessful due to opposition from several of his fellow *beiles*. In terms of power struggle within the Later Jin court, therefore, Joseon turned out to be one part of that battlefield especially between Hong Taiji and Amin.

Hong Taiji used Joseon to prevent economic crisis from causing a disintegration of the political unity under his reign and to dismantle, both symbolically and militarily, defense mechanism advantageous to the Ming. The diplomatic relations of the Later Jin with Joseon became further complicated by the recurring issue of repatriating fugitives. From 1634 onwards, veiled conflicts between the two states escalated as the Later Jin demanded the return of escaped Jurchens and the Warka people while Joseon insisted that there are no fugitives to send back. These tensions reached their height when the Later Jin refused to even unpack the

tributary goods carried by Joseon envoys. However, although the relationship with Joseon seriously deteriorated, it did not reach a point of war due to the influence of the emerging political force. The increasingly influential Literary Office, dedicated to the consolidation of Hong Taiji's political power, advocated focusing on the war with the Ming. In the fifth month of 1636, renaming his state Great Qing, however, he used once again Joseon to affirm its new imperial status and evince his highest authority in the regional world order beyond the stumbling Ming. When Joseon was reluctant to accept the indubitably leading position of the new Qing under his reign, what remained to be done was to coerce it with armed force.

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