



# The San Francisco Peace Treaty and Territorial Issues: *Information Pamphlets on Territorial Issues from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Their Impact*

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## Abstract

*This paper deals with the preparation and documentation activities of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (JMOFA) for the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951. Between 1946 and 1949, JMOFA produced seven volumes of pamphlets on territorial issues in the preparation process leading up to the peace treaty. Among them, a series of four pamphlets under the title of Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper was published. These pamphlets were distributed to the Allied Powers to good effect. Focus was placed on the Southern Kuriles, Ryukyus, and Liancourt Rocks (Dokdo), which Japan felt should be recognized as Japanese territory by the Allies. After the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan restored peaceful relations with the United States and its major allies, but hostile relations between Japan and its neighbors in East Asia persisted. It was natural that the Soviet Union (Russia), China, and Korea, excluded from the Peace Treaty, later came to engage in territorial disputes with Japan.*

**Keywords:** San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper, Southern Kuriles, Ryukyus, Senkaku (Diaoyu), Dokdo (Liancourt Rocks)

## Introduction

Since the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, Northeast Asia has had several island disputes: the Kuril Islands or Northern Territories dispute between Russia and Japan, the Dokdo or Takeshima (Liancourt Rocks) dispute between Korea and Japan, and the Senkaku or Diaoyu Islands dispute between China and Japan.

Neither China nor Korea were invited to the San Francisco peace negotiations. The USSR was invited and did participate, but did not sign the resulting peace treaty. China at the time was divided into the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan) as a result of its civil war, while Korea was divided into South and North Korea and descended into war in the course of the treaty talks. The absence of these three nations manifests the reality that the peace talks were not aimed at the restoration of peace for the people of Northeast Asia.

After the settlement of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, many questions and issues emerged regarding territories in Northeast Asia and more than a few suspicions and conspiracy theories have been raised as a result. One of these theories in Korea asserts that the Dokdo issue came to the surface when the island group was marked as Japanese territory in the 1949 peace treaty draft by the US Department of State, and that there may have been some Japanese lobbying at work behind the scenes. At the center of these maneuvers was William J. Sebald, who served as political adviser (POLAD) to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), Chief of the Diplomatic Section of SCAP Headquarters, and US representative to the Allied Council for Japan (J. Lee 2001; Yoshida 1958, 25–26, 60–70).

One study has argued that the cause of post-war territorial issues in Northeast Asia lies with the United States' tactical handling of the territorial disposition of Japan in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, a result in turn of the American Cold War strategic objective of preventing the communization of the Korean Peninsula and expanding American influence over Japan (Hara 2005, 29–71).

From 1946, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (JMOFA)<sup>1</sup> began to produce materials on territorial issues based on Japan's selective strategic priorities and provided these to the US Department of State through the SCAP Diplomatic Section. Through everyday contact, Japan turned the US into its advocate, and further, into a practical channel for promoting Japan's interests. The officials of the SCAP Diplomatic Section, including its chief, Sebald, and the officials of the POLAD-Japan office were sympathetic to Japan's concerns and demands and made active efforts to accommodate its interests. The opinions of the Japanese government were deemed reasonable, there was a stable channel to deliver them to the Department of State, and American diplomats and officials who relayed them were friendly toward Japan. This is the truth about the diplomatic and lobbying efforts by JMOFA between 1947 and 1951 regarding territorial issues (Jung 2010, 322–331). This paper looks into the effects and significance of the territory reports produced by JMOFA from 1946 to 1949 (Cheong 1991; Hara 1998; S. Lee 1998; Hara 2005; Jung 2010; Wada 2013).

## **Measures by Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Territorial Issues and the Production of Information Pamphlets**

### *Measures on Territorial Issues*

After the end of Pacific War, regarding the peace settlement, the JMOFA undertook research into the three areas—general, political, and economic clauses—with the focus of political clauses being territorial issues. Japan accepted there was nothing it could do about the terms of the Cairo Declaration (December 1943), Potsdam Declaration (July 1945), and General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's Instruction to his Commands Concerning the Basic Purpose of the Allied Occupation of Japan and the

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1. During the years of 1946–1947, the government department called the Gaimushō in Japanese had the English title of Foreign Office. The English name was later changed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. To avoid confusion, except when citing actual works, I use the term Ministry of Foreign Affairs (JMOFA) regardless of year.

Manners in which They are Carried Out by the Allied Forces (December 19, 1945), namely to “limit Japanese territory to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and minor islands”<sup>2</sup>; strip Japan of all its former islands in the Pacific; and oblige Japan to return Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores to China, withdraw from all occupied territories, and free Korea.<sup>3</sup> What mattered regarding postwar territorial issues was how to secure some one thousand minor islands in the vicinity of Japan, whose fate the Allies would determine.

The basic stance of the JMOFA was that Japan was responsible for the Pacific War, but not for what had happened prior to that conflict (Jo 2008, 46). Its stance on territorial issues was that it was even willing in principle to surrender territories acquired in ways that had been recognized as conventional under international law and practices at the time of their acquisition and which had long been regarded as Japanese territory by the international community. But it would not accept the international community’s judgment that Japan’s retention of these was criminal and that they must be separated from Japan as a punitive measure (Takasaki 1998, 7–8).

According to the guidelines and principles on territorial issues completed by the JMOFA in May 1946, we know that the territories that interested Japan the most were Amami Oshima, Izu Oshima, the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa), Southern Sakhalin, the Kurils, and Iwo Jima. Its goal was to have these islands acknowledged by the Allies as “minor islands adjacent to Japan proper.”<sup>4</sup>

The final position of the Japanese government on territorial issues is suggested in the “Statement to the US (draft)” it wrote in October 1950: it first declares that Japan conformed to the principles of the Atlantic Charter

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2. “Territorial Clauses” (領土條項), January 31, 1946 (JMOFA 2006, 46–47).

3. “Comparison and Analysis of the Allied Powers’ Presumable Proposals and Japan’s Own Desired Outcomes” (想定される聯合國側平和條約案と我か方希望との比較検討), January 26, 1946 (JMOFA 2006, 19).

4. “Expected Political Clauses in a Peace Treaty and Countermeasures for Possible Discrepancies (draft)” (對日平和條約に於ける政治條項の想定及對處方案), May 1946 (JMOFA 2006, 95–96).

and was thereby fully willing to surrender its title to Formosa and the Pescadores, free Korea, and give up its mandatory rule over the Micronesian islands in the Pacific (Nanyo). However, it contended that it should be allowed to retain islands that had always been historically and ethnically Japanese territory because they were not seized through war by Japan but had been part of Japanese territory continuously and for a long time. The islands listed by the JMOFA were the Kuril Islands, Habomai Islands and Shikot<sup>\*</sup>an, the Nansei Islands, the Ogasawara Islands, and Iwo Jima.<sup>5</sup>

*Information Pamphlets on Territorial Issues: Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper Series*

During its preparations for the peace talks from 1946 to 1949, the JMOFA produced information pamphlets on the islands they wished to have acknowledged as Japanese territory and distributed them to SCAP Headquarters and the Allied Powers. According to Yoshida Shigeru and Nishimura Kumao, director of the Ministry's Treaties Bureau, the JMOFA produced a total of seven volumes on territorial issues (Yoshida 1958, 25–26, 60–70; Nishimura 1971, 45–47).

From its first publication on territorial issues, *The Kurile Islands, the Habomais, and Shikotan* (November 1946), to *Japanese Economy in Asia* (December 1950), the JMOFA forwarded 36 volumes to the Department of State (Nishimura 1971, 45). Rather than books, these were more like pamphlets of dozens of pages.

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5. "Statement to the US (draft)" (對米陳述書[案]), October 4, 1950 (JMOFA 2007, 25–26).

**Table 1.** List of 36 Reference Works in English Forwarded to the US Department of State by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs

| Classification        | Item   | Publication date   |           |
|-----------------------|--|--|-----------|
| 1. General issues     | 1. Japan's status quo (politics)   | Feb. 1950  |           |
|                       | 2. Japan's status quo (economy)  | Dec. 1949  |           |
| 2. Territorial issues | 1. The Kurile Islands, the Habomais, and Shikotan  | Nov. 1946  |           |
|                       | 2. South Kuriles, Habomai Islands, Shikotan Island   | Apr. 1949  |           |
|                       | 3. Sakhalin  | Jan. 1949  |           |
|                       | 4. Ryukyu and other Nansei Islands   | Mar. 1947  |           |
|                       | 5. The Bonin Island Group, the Volcano Island Group  | June 1947  |           |
|                       | 6. Minor Islands in the Pacific and in the Japan Sea   | June 1947  |           |
|                       | 7. Tsushima  | June 1949  |           |
| 3. Political issues   | 1. Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice  | Feb. 1948  |           |
|                       | 2. Japanese nationals in the territories to be separated from Japan and foreigners who originated from those territories and reside in Japan | Feb. 1948  |           |
|                       | 3. Japan's police system   | June 1948  |           |
|                       | 4. Status of foreigners in Japan   | June 1950  |           |
|                       | 5. Japan and international treaties  | Mar. 1949  |           |
|                       | 6. Treatment of Japanese nationals overseas  | Oct. 1949  |           |
| 4. Economic issues    | A. Related to the future   | 1. Minimum quality of life that should be allowed for Japan  | Aug. 1948 |
|                       |  | 2. Actual quality of life in Japan   | Dec. 1947 |
|                       |  | 3. Attachment to the above no. 2   | Dec. 1947 |
|                       |  | 4. Fisheries   | Jan. 1948 |
|                       |  | 5. Japan's shipping industry   | Mar. 1948 |
|                       |  | 6. Problems with Japan's civil aviation  | Jan. 1948 |
|                       |  | 7. Japan's population problems   | June 1948 |
|                       |  | 8. Japan's whale hunting   | Jan. 1949 |
|                       |  | 9. Damage/losses Japan suffered in the Pacific War (Attachment: Damage/losses by the atomic bombs) | Apr. 1949 |

|                   |                               |  |            |
|-------------------|-------------------------------|--|------------|
|                   | B. Related to existing claims | 1. Japan's overseas debts and Japan's claims and obligations in the territories to be separated from Japan | June 1948  |
|                   |                               | 2. Status of rooted property   | Sept. 1948 |
|                   |                               | 3. Occupation costs  | July 1948  |
|                   |                               | 4. Industrial property rights  | Oct. 1948  |
|                   |                               | 5. Foreigners' copyright issues  | Apr. 1948  |
|                   |                               | 6. Capture and inspection  | Feb. 1949  |
|                   |                               | 7. Allied property in Japan  | Sept. 1950 |
|                   |                               | 8. Reparations   | May 1950   |
| 5. Special issues |                               | 1. Submarine cables  | May 1948   |
|                   |                               | 2. Weather and oceanographic observation in Japan  | May 1948   |
|                   |                               | 3. Narcotics   | Feb. 1950  |

Source: Nishimura (1971, 45–47).

There were in all seven volumes on territorial issues, with four of them published as a series under the English title, *Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper* (日本の附屬小島) (Jung 2010, 331–342). Their availability to the public is as follows:

**Table 2.** List of 7 References Works in English on Territorial Issues Forwarded to the Department of State by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs

|   | Japanese title         | English title  | Publica-<br>tion date | Language<br>available | Countries where<br>public access is<br>allowed |
|---|------------------------|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|--|
| ① | 日本の附屬小島 I, 千島齒舞及び色丹島   | Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper, Part I: The Kurile Islands, the Habomais, and Shikotan | Nov. 1946             | English               | US, Australia                                  |
| ② | 日本の附屬小島 II, 琉球及び他の南西諸島 | Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper, Part II: Ryukyu and Other Nansei Islands               | Mar. 1947             | English               | US, Japan                                      |

|   |                       |   |           |         |           |
|---|-----------------------|---|-----------|---------|-----------|
| ③ | 日本の附屬小島Ⅲ, 小笠原及び火山列島   | Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper, Part III: The Bonin Island Group, the Volcano Island Group            | Mar. 1947 | English | US        |
| ④ | 日本の附屬小島Ⅳ, 太平洋及び日本海小諸島 | Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper, Part IV: Minor Islands in the Pacific, Minor Islands in the Japan Sea | June 1947 | English | US        |
| ⑤ | 樺太                    | (Unknown)   | Jan. 1949 |         |           |
| ⑥ | 南千島, 齒舞, 色丹島          | South Kuriles, Habomai Islands, Shikotan Island   | Apr. 1949 |         |           |
| ⑦ | 對馬                    | Tsushima  | July 1949 | English | US, Japan |

Source: Compiled by author based on Nishimura (1971, 45–47); “Statement to the US (draft)” (對米陳述書[案]), October 4, 1950 (JMOFA, 2007, 24–30); NARA, RG 84, Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Office of the US Political Adviser for Japan-Tokyo, Classified General Correspondence, 1945–1949, Box 22; NARA, RG 59, Decimal File, 894.014/7-1447, 894.014/9-2347.

The four volumes (Parts I–IV) of the *Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper* series are in the collection of the US National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).<sup>6</sup> The Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan recently made public only Part II (Wada 2013, 232), and it is known that Australia has Part I in its possession (Hara 1998; Wada 2013, 100, 232).

The other three volumes are: V. *Sakhalin*, VI. *South Kuriles, Habomai Islands, Shikotan Island*, and VII. *Tsushima*, the last of which was made public in the United States and Japan.<sup>7</sup> Volumes V and VI have not yet been actually seen. The Japanese titles of the *Nihon no fuzoku kojima* 日本の附屬小島 (Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper) series appear in JMOFA documents.<sup>8</sup>

6. NARA, RG 84, Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Office of the US Political Adviser for Japan-Tokyo, Classified General Correspondence, 1945–49, Box 22; RG 59, Decimal File, 894.014/7-1447, 894.014/9-2347.

7. NARA, RG 59, Decimal File, 794.022/1-2450; Wada (2013, 237–238).

8. “Statement to the US (draft)” (對米陳述書[案]), October 4, 1950 (JMOFA 2007, 24–30).



## **Impact of the Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper Series, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Information Pamphlets on Territorial Issues**

Part I of the series was published and distributed in November 1946, Parts II and III in March 1947, and Part IV in June 1947. The series title was the same throughout, with the names of the islands given as subtitles for each respective pamphlet. This order of publication may indicate the degree of importance and priority given to the islands by Japan.

The islands discussed in these first volumes in the series are: 1) the Kuril Islands, the Habomai Islands, and Shikotan; 2) the Ryukyu and other Nansei Islands; 3) the Ogasawara Islands and the Iwo Islands (the Bonin Islands and the Volcano Islands); and 4) minor islands in the Pacific (the Daito Islands, Marcus Island [Minami-Tori-shima], and Parece Vela [Okinotorishima]) and Minor Islands in the Japan Sea. This order reflected the degree of importance set by the JMOFA (Jung 2010, 331–365).

According to POLAD-Japan, 20 copies of these pamphlets were sent to the US Department of State via POLAD-Japan on three occasions (February, July, and September 1947),<sup>9</sup> and different sections of SCAP Headquarters also received them. These reference materials had already been delivered to the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs' Working Group on Japan Treaty and geographers from early 1947 when the Department of State began composing drafts for the peace treaty with Japan.

The JMOFA is also believed to have sent these pamphlets to other nations besides the United States, including Australia, the United Kingdom, and other Allies belonging to the Far Eastern Commission.

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9. United States Political Adviser for Japan, Despatch no.1296, Subject: Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan (September 23, 1947) (NARA, RG 84, Office of the US Political Adviser for Japan-Tokyo, Classified General Correspondence, 1945–1949, Box 22).

*Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper, Part I: The Kurile Islands, the Habomais, and Shikotan (November 1946)*


*Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper, Part I* treats the Kurils (Kuriles), Shikotan, and the Habomais north of Hokkaido. As is widely known, the Yalta Accord (February 1945) stipulated that Southern Sakhalin be returned and the Kurils handed over to the Soviet Union. The problem was the scope of the Kurils.

This pamphlet, published in November 1946, divided the Kuril Islands into the northern and southern Kurils, and argued the southern Kurils (Etorofu-to and Shikotan) had been Japanese territory “since early days,” while the Habomai Islands and Shikotan were not part of the Kurils, but of Hokkaido (Jung 2010, 340).

JMOFA explained the Kuril Islands as a combination of the northern Kurils north of Uruppu (Urup) and the southern Kurils, which consisted of Yutorofu (Etorofu) and Kunashiri. It argued that the northern Kurils were peacefully acquired through the 1875 Treaty of Saint Petersburg, and the southern Kurils had always been Japanese territory, with Japan’s sovereignty over them confirmed in the 1854 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Japan and Russia (Treaty of Shimoda) (FO, Japanese Government 1946, 2–7). It claimed that if the intent of the Yalta Conference was to restore Japan’s territorial borders as they were just prior to the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905),<sup>10</sup> the return of Southern Sakhalin would suffice but the return of the entire Kurils, including the southern Kurils, could not be accepted (Jung 2010, 340).

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10. “Statement to the US (draft)” (對米陳述書[案]), October 4, 1950 (JMOFA 2007, 26).



**Figure 1.** Map attached to *Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper, Part I* (November 1946) (distinguishing between the southern Kurils and northern Kurils, Shikotan, and the Habomais)

Source: FO, Japanese Government (1946).

Regarding Shikotan and the Habomai Islands, JMOFA contended that these islands were not part of the Kurils but extensions of Hokkaido's Nemuro Peninsula, which the Soviets occupied after the war (FO, Japanese Government 1946, 9–10; Jung 2010, 340). In other words, JMOFA argued that the Kuril Islands to be handed over to the Soviet Union under the

Yalta Conference did not include Etorofu and the Kunashiri Islands, which belonged to the southern Kurils, and Shikotan and the Habomai Islands, extensions of the Nemuro Peninsula, were illegally occupied by the Soviets only after the end of hostilities.<sup>11</sup>

Nevertheless, this pamphlet differs from the official view held by the Japanese government since 1956 in a few ways:

First, though JMOFA distinguished between the northern and southern Kurils and claimed Japan's sovereignty over the southern Kurils, it admitted to Etorofu-to and Kunashiri being part of the southern Kurils, thereby falling under the overall scope of the Kurils to be handed over to the Soviet Union. They marked the northern and southern Kurils with different patterns (⊗ and ⊞) in the attached map (Figure 1), but made it clear that the southern Kurils were still part of the Kuril Islands.

Second, the JMOFA colored all of Shikotan and the Habomai Islands black to mark them as extensions of Hokkaido. But here it is unclear whether Shikotan is an extension of Hokkaido or the Kurils. Even materials referred to by the JMOFA described Shikotan and the Habomai Islands as belonging to the Kurils.

The *Russian Encyclopedia* (I. E. Andreevsky, ed., 1890) described the Habomai Islands and Shikotan as part of the Kurils, while the *Grand Russian Encyclopedia* (P. N. Milyukov, ed., 1904) excluded about half of the Habomai Islands from the Kurils (FO, Japanese Government 1946, 7n1). The *American Sailing Directory* (1930) separated the Habomai Islands and Shikotan from the Kurils and featured them under the heading of Hokkaido, while the *British Sailing Directory* (1940), after describing the Kuril Islands, gave a separate paragraph to the Habomais and Shikotan. The longitudinal and latitudinal scope of the Kurils as defined by the *Encyclopedia Britannica* (1911) excluded the Habomai Islands and Shikotan, but still in the main

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11. "The General Order No. 1 issued on September 2, 1945 by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers did not specify to whom the Japanese forces in the Habomais and Shikotan should surrender. However, the 4th Brigade stationed in these islands, being under the command of the 89th Division in Kunashiri Island, surrendered to the Soviet Commander-in-Chief. The Habomais and Shikotan have since been under Soviet occupation as well as the Kurile islands" (FO, Japanese Government, 1946, 9n5).

text, Kunashiri and Shikotan were referred to as being among the principal islands of the Kurils (FO, Japanese Government 1946, 8n3).

Third, though *Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper, Part I* cited Shikotan together with the Habomai Islands, even Japan itself recognized Shikotan as belonging not to Nemuro province, an extension of Hokkaido, but to Chishima, namely, the Kurils. When the Development Commission was established in Hokkaido in 1869 and 11 provinces founded, Shikotan became part of Nemuro province, but was incorporated into Chishima province of Nemuro prefecture in 1885. Shikotan's relations with Kunashiri and Etorofu subsequently deepened, with the trio often called the "three minami Chishima Islands" (Park 2014, 154–155). To increase the odds of Shikotan remaining in Japanese possession, the JMOFA identified Shikotan, which belonged to the southern Kurils in actuality, as part of Nemuro province and described it as part of Hokkaido.

After the publication of Part I of the series on the Kuril Islands, Habomai Islands, and Shikotan in November 1946, the POLAD-Japan office and the Department of State held different discussions on how to handle the southern Kurils, Shikotan, and the Habomais (Wada 2013, 89–105). Treaty drafts written by the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs from 1947 and those by the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 1951 all disputed the scope of the Kuril Islands: they generally agreed that Etorofu-to and Kunashiri belonged to the Kurils but disagreed on whether Shikotan and the Habomai Islands did as well (Wada 2013, 96–97).<sup>12</sup>

In 1949, POLAD-Japan, led by Sebald, strove to accommodate the view of the JMOFA on the Kuril Islands. Sebald forwarded two reports to the Department of State, "Economic Importance to Japan of Etorofu, Kunashiri,

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12. Working Group on Japan Treaty, Notes of Meeting on Friday, August 1, 1947 (NARA, RG 59, Office of Northeast Asia Affairs, Records Relating to the Treaty of Peace with Japan - Subject File, 1945-51, Lot 56D527, Box 5); "Treaty of Peace with Japan" November 2, 1949 (NARA, RG 59, 740.0011PW(Peace)/11-1449); FO 371/92535, FJ 1022/171, "Japanese Peace Treaty: Second revised draft of the Japanese Peace Treaty," March 1951; FO 371/92538, FJ 1022/222, "Provisional Draft of Japanese Peace Treaty (United Kingdom)," April 7, 1951, The National Archives (TNA), United Kingdom.

Habomai, and Shikotan Islands” (December 12, 1949)<sup>13</sup> and “Japanese Petition for Return of Southern Kuril Islands” (December 31, 1949),<sup>14</sup> arguing that historic grounds for these four islands being part of the Kurils were weak, and thereby, they should not be incorporated by the Soviet Union.

Having received Sebald’s reviews of the drafts, the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs requested the Office of the Legal Adviser for a legal review of the southern Kurils. This was because the draft treaty dated October 13, 1949 treated these islands as Japanese territory and the draft treaty dated November 2, 1949 had them as Soviet territory, while a telegram dated November 14, 1949 from Sebald argued that they belonged to Japan.<sup>15</sup> The Bureau provided nine documents as references, which included two important ones written by the JMOFA.<sup>16</sup> Neither documents nor other information produced by the USSR were available to the Department of State. Such materials often defined the Habomai Islands and Shikotan as constituents of the Kurils, along with the islands of Etorofu and Kunashiri.

The Office of the Legal Adviser determined that the Habomai Islands and Shikotan were not part of the Kurils to be handed over to the Soviet Union, but Kunashiri and Etorofu-to were. Namely, it ruled that the former two islands were Japanese territory while the latter two were Soviet territory.<sup>17</sup> As a result, the Department of State decided that the Habomai Islands and Shikotan were to be Japanese territory and Kunashiri and Etorofu Soviet territory.

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13. Despatch by Sebald to the Secretary of State, Subject: Economic Importance to Japan of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Habomai, and Shikotan Islands. (December 12, 1949), no.866 (NARA, RG 59, Decimal File, 740.0011PW(Peace)/12-1249).
  14. Despatch by Sebald to the Secretary of State, Subject: Japanese Petition for Return of Southern Kuril Islands (December 31, 1949) (NARA, RG 59, Decimal File, 740.0011PW(Peace)/12-3149).
  15. Memorandum by Hamilton (FE) to Fisher (L), Subject: Southern Kurile Islands (November 22, 1949) (NARA, RG 59, Decimal File 740.0011PW(Peace)/11-2249).
  16. Japanese Government, “South Kuriles; Habomai Islands; Shikotan Island” (April 1949); Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan (1947).
  17. Memorandum by Conrad E. Snow (L/P) to Hamilton (FE), Subject: Southern Kurile Islands and the Shikotan Archipelago (November 25, 1949) (NARA, RG 59, Decimal File, 740.0011PW(Peace)/11-2549).

In the process leading up to the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, the Japanese government accepted that the Kurils to be handed over to the Soviet Union included Kunashiri and Etorofu, or the southern Kurils. Nevertheless, backed by the US, it contended that the Soviets were wrongfully occupying the Habomai Islands and Shikotan.

In 1956, the Soviet Union and Japan signed the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration and agreed to the return of Shikotan and the Habomai Islands after the conclusion of a peace treaty. Shikotan and the Hobami Islands are relatively small in size and adjacent to Japanese Hokkaido, but Etorofu and Kunashiri are large and more grounds existed to contest ownership. Later faced with severe criticism by domestic political circles for having surrendered Kunashiri and Etorofu, the Japanese government came, by 1961, to claim that they were not part of the Kurils (Wada 2013, 109–118, 145–178). These territorial issues remain unresolved to this day.

*Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper, Part II: Ryukyu and Other Nansei Islands (March 1947)*

*Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper, Part II* deals with the Ryukyu Islands, which are known as Nansei Shoto or Ryukyu Retto in Japanese, and came under potential US trusteeship after the San Francisco Peace Treaty. This pamphlet divided Nansei Shoto into Kagoshima prefecture (Satsunan Islands) and Okinawa prefecture (Ryukyu Islands): the former included the Osumi Islands and Amami Oshima and the latter included Okinawa and the Sakishima Islands.

Japan expected they could not refuse the placement of the Ryukyu Islands under the trusteeship of the United States or another Allied power should that be decided upon.<sup>18</sup> Instead, Japan emphasized its sovereignty over Amami Oshima, an important, densely populated island south of 30th north latitude. Amami Oshima-related petitions accounted for the largest share of

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
18. “Expected Political Clauses in a Peace Treaty and Countermeasures for Possible Discrepancies (draft)” (對日平和條約に於ける政治條項の想定及對處方針[案]), May 1946 (JMOFA 2006, 95–96).



the petitions that inundated the office of American special envoy John Foster Dulles, the Department of State, and SCAP Headquarters during the peace treaty process. Amami Oshima was excluded from Japanese administration by the San Francisco Peace Treaty but returned to Japan in December 1953 (Yoshida 1958, 66–67). In *Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper, Part II*, JMOFA, on alert for any sign of transfer of the Ryukyus to China, provided historical evidence of Japanese sovereignty over the islands. But JMOFA also commented on the Diaoyu Islands (Senkaku Islands), whose ownership is currently being disputed with China. This group is called the Senkaku Shoto (Senkaku Islands) in Japanese, the Diaoyu Islands in Chinese, the Diaoyutai Islands in Taiwanese, and the Pinnacle Islands in English. This English name, Pinnacle Islands, written in Chinese characters, became Sento 尖頭 or Senkaku 尖閣. This pamphlet described the islands as follows:

...the Sento Islands (total area 2 sq. m.) lying north of Sakishima sub-group are uninhabited and of little importance. (FO, Japanese Government 1947a, 2)





**Figure 2.** Nansei Islands map attached to Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan, Part II (March 1947)

Source: FO, Japanese Government (1947a).

The JMOFA recorded the Senkaku Islands as the “Sento Islands” and ascribed to these uninhabited islands “little importance,” which is very unusual considering the current dispute over them. This reveals what Japan really thought of them at that time.

As noted, the name Sento Shoto, or Sento Islands, is a translation of the English name Pinnacle Islets. This first appeared in 1908 in Japanese naval records, which recorded them as 6 li (24km) east of Gyocho Jima (Hoa pin su in English, Diaoyu Yu in Chinese) (Unryu 2000, 91).

Then what impact did Part II of the series, created by the JMOFA, have on the US Department of States? First of all, the Japanese name, Nansei Shoto, was officially used in the San Francisco Treaty. The official draft treaty, dated March 1951, mentioned the “Ryukyu Islands south of 29th north latitude,” which the Japanese government requested be replaced with the “Nansei Islands south of 29th north latitude.” As far as rationale, it explained, “The Amami Islands, which do not belong to the Ryukyu Islands, but to the Satsunan Islands, lie south of 29th north latitude, while the Nansei Islands include both the Satsunan and Ryukyu Islands, that is, all the islands between Kyushu and Formosa (Taiwan).”<sup>19</sup>

Sebald forwarded this request to the Department of State by telegram the same day he received it, together with his report that the Japanese government’s suggestion for Nansei “...appears historically correct according (to) Jap[anese] usage. ‘Ryukyu Islands’ not coextensive with ‘Nansei Islands,’ former term applying only to those islands formerly included within Okinawa prefecture (Okinawa and Sankishima sub-groups, including Daito and Sento Islands).”<sup>20</sup>

This opinion of Sebald’s is very noteworthy because he firstly considered Nansei as an accurate name and secondly explained that the Ryukyu Islands included the Sento Islands. His opinion, a representation of Japan’s position, can be regarded as a US record that backed up Sento/Senkaku as Japanese territory. Still, he quoted incorrect information that Sento belonged to “Sankishima” (i.e., Sakishima).

Upon receipt of Sebald’s telegram, Robert A. Fearey, a working-level official at the Department of State, consulted with Samuel W. Boggs, a Department of State geography specialist, on the question. From his study of the US Hydrographic Report, Boggs found that “the Nansei Islands extend in an arc form off the northeastern coast of Taiwan to the southern end of Kyushu. This chain of islands is divided into five groups called, from south to north, Sakishima Gunto, Okinawa Gunto, Amami Gunto, Tokara Gunto,

19. “Observations on the Provisional Draft of a Japanese Peace Treaty” (平和條約草案に對するわが方意見), April 4, 1951 (JMOFA 2006, 351–352).

20. Telegram by Sebald to the Secretary of State, no. 1750 (April 4, 1951) (NARA, RG 59, Decimal File, 694.001/4-451).

and Sumi Gunto.” As such, he responded that “Nansei was technically more accurate” and should be used.<sup>21</sup>

Fearey accurately pointed out that “Ryukyu” was a much more familiar name and that it was likely that the Japanese government had suggested “Nansei” because it was a Japanese name (‘Ryukyu’ derives from the Chinese ‘Loochoo’) and they wanted to hint at future ownership. Fearey marked six island groups, including five mentioned by Boggs and the Daito Group next to them, on the attached map. On this same map, Fearey wrote Sento under Sekibisho (赤尾嶼), but Sekibisho was actually a different island. What was used here was a portion of the US Hydrographic Office (HO) Chart 1500 used by the Department of State that also showed Japanese, Korean, and Taiwan territories, but not such small places as Sento. This was a problem related to the large-scale of the map, but also due to the weak interest in “uninhabited islands of little importance.” In any case, Fearey and Boggs did not include Sento as part of the Nansei Islands.<sup>22</sup>

In summary, the JMOFA in 1947 described the Senkaku Islands as the Sento Islands lying north of the Sakishima sub-group and as uninhabited and of little importance. Sebald in 1951 thought Sento belonged to the “Sankishima” sub-group, which he viewed as part of Okinawa prefecture. For their part, Fearey and Boggs indicated the Sento Islands at the wrong location and determined they did not belong to the Nansei Islands. All of this was because they were given little importance: hence the use of inaccurate names (Sento and Sankishima) and an inaccurate location (below Sekibisho). Of course, Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, wherein Nansei Shoto appears, does not mention the Senkaku or Sento Islands.

*Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper, Part III: The Bonin Island Group, the Volcano Island Group (March 1947)*

*Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper, Part III*, published in March 1947,


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21. Memorandum by Fearey to Allison, Subject: Nansei Shoto (April 5, 1951) (NARA, RG 59, Decimal File, 694.001/4-551).

22. Telegram by Sebald to the Secretary of State, no. 1750 (April 4, 1951) (NARA, RG 59, Decimal File, 694.001/4-451).

deals with the Bonin Islands, or Ogasawara Islands, and the Volcano Islands (Kazan Retto or Iwo Islands in Japanese). Japan argued that the former were incorporated into Japanese territory in 1875 and the latter in 1891.

This pamphlet was mainly meant to explain when Japan found these islands and how it came to take possession of them after disputes with European states and the United States (FO, Japanese Government 1947b, 1–8).



**Figure 3.** Map attached to *Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan, Part III* (March 1947)  
Source: FO, Japanese Government (1947b).

The Battle for Iwo Jima was a major battle of the Pacific War, after which the Iwo Islands were occupied by the US Navy. The United States considered both the Bonin and Iwo Islands as strategic locations and planned to place them under its trusteeship.

The Soviet Union opposed US trusteeship of the Ryukyu, Bonin, and other islands. The United States forwarded the official treaty draft to the Soviet Union in March 1951, to which the latter sent back its comments on May 7. When seen only from a logical perspective, ironically, the Soviet suggestion was the most reasonable and advantageous to Japan. It suggested that, 1) a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, composed of representatives of the United States, United Kingdom, USSR, and the People's Republic of China, be convened in June or July 1951, to begin preparation of the peace treaty with Japan; 2) Formosa and the Pescadores be returned to "China"; 3) there was no legal justification that could be adduced for removing the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands from Japanese control; 4) the treaty contain guarantees against the restoration of Japanese militarism, including limitations on the size of the Japanese armed forces; 5) the occupation forces be withdrawn within a year of the formal conclusion of peace; 6) there be no limitations on the development of Japan's peaceful economy; 7) the treaty prohibit Japan from entering into any coalition directed against any of the states which fought with their armed forces against Japan; and 8) the signatories to a treaty agree to support Japan joining the United Nations.<sup>23</sup> These suggestions were meant mainly to have a Japanese peace settlement examined at a foreign minister conference that would include representatives of the People's Republic of China and to object to turning the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands into military bases under US trusteeship. In its reply (May 19, 1951), the US side rejected the proposal for a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers.

In the end, the two islands were placed under potential US trusteeship under Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty but eventually trusteeship was not accomplished. These islands were returned to Japan in 1968.


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23. "Summary of Negotiations Leading Up to the Conclusion of the Treaty of Peace with Japan," by Robert A. Fearey (September 18, 1951), 9 (NARA, RG 59, Records Relating to the Treaty of Peace with Japan, Subject File, 1945–1951, Lot 56D527, Box 1).



*Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan, Part IV: Minor Islands in the Pacific, Minor Islands in the Japan Sea (June 1947)*

*Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper, Part IV*, the last of the series, begins with a cover and one-page map, continues with a one-page table of contents and 12 pages of text, and ends with another one-page map. It discusses, 1) the Daito Islands, 2) Marcus Island (Minami-Tori-shima), and 3) Parece Vela Island (Okinotorishima) in the portion “Minor Islands in the Pacific,” and 1) Liancourt Rocks (Takeshima, Dokdo) and 2) Utsuryo (Dagelet Island, Ulleungdo) in the portion “Minor Islands in the Japan Sea (East Sea)” (FO, Japanese Government 1947c; Jung 2010, 342–365).



**Figure 4.** Map attached to *Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan, Part IV* (June 1947)  
Source: FO, Japanese Government (1947c).

The Daito Islands, Marcus Island, and Parece Vela Island were not covered in *Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper, Part III*, and *Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper, Part IV* was also the first to include Ulleungdo and Dokdo in the East Sea.

The most conspicuous point here is that the JMOFA argued that Dokdo and Ulleungdo fell under the scope of islands adjacent to Japan in this pamphlet officially published for the Allies in June 1947. As other pamphlets in the series did, this one consistently talked about islands over which Japan deemed sovereign ownership to be contested and which it wanted to be recognized as its adjacent islands. The JMOFA did not feature any of the islands that were clearly Japanese territory in this series, such as Tsushima Island, Iki Island, and the Oki Islands, but only those contested islands where the JMOFA saw a chance of claiming them as Japanese territory. While *Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper, Part III* talked about the Ryukyus, it makes no mention of Taiwan because, of course, it was not Japanese territory. On the other hand, Ulleungdo and Dokdo were included among Japan's adjacent islands together with the numerous islands along its east coast (Jung 2010, 342–350).

It is surprising to find Dokdo, and even Ulleungdo, among the islands over which Japan claimed sovereignty. This is probably the reason Part IV has not been made public in Japan. Despite its complete lack of claim over Ulleungdo, Japan still included it because it had clear intentions for the island. That is, by denying or damaging Korea's unquestionable sovereign ownership of Ulleungdo, it intended to deny Korea's ownership of Dokdo, islets adjacent to Ulleungdo. While attacking Ulleungdo, Japan's true target was Dokdo.

Dokdo and Ulleungdo are covered in five pages of body text (FO, Japanese Government 1947c, 8–12) and two pages of maps where the JMOFA marked them as Japanese territory. The East Sea is also marked as the Japan Sea. Let us look at the Ulleungdo text first:

## II. Dagelet Island (Matsu-shima, Utsuryo or Ul-lung Island)

### 2. History

It was only in 1787 that the island [Ulleungdo] was first mentioned,

by the name of Dagelet, in the world history of discoveries by Captain Jean François de La Pérouse of the French navy. In Japanese documents, however, reference was made as early as 1004 to Uruma Island, an old Japanese equivalent for Ul-lung Island.

The Island was known to Koreans also from ancient times. Several attempts at colonization were made by Koreans after the middle of the 13th century. The island became later a convenient hiding-place by criminals and brigands. The Korean Government from 1400 and onward adhered for a long time to a policy of keeping it uninhabited.

As the island was thus virtually abandoned by the Korean government, the Japanese continued to frequent it in increasing numbers. The expedition of TOYOTOMI, Hideyoshi to Korea in 1592 served to accelerate activities of the Japanese in this area, and for about a century thereafter the island remained in all appearances a Japanese fishing base.

From the beginning of the 17th century repeated negotiations were carried on between Japan and Korea on the question of ownership of the island. ...

The Korean authorities, however, made no change in its policy to keep the island uninhabited even after the above mentioned incident. ...

... in the early years of Meiji (around 1868), a movement gathered force in Japan urging the development of "Matsu-shima"... As it was ascertained that "Matsu-shima" was none other than the island which...and which the Japanese had been prohibited from entering, the petitions were not taken up by the Japanese Government, although Japanese still continued to go to the island...The Annexation of Korea in 1910 brought the island under the rule of the Government-General of Chosen (Korea). (FO, Japanese Government 1947c, 10-12; underline added)

As seen in the underlined parts above, the JMOFA demonstrated its intent to clearly describe Ulleungdo as Japanese territory or under Japanese rule. According to the pamphlet, Japan first recognized Ulleungdo in the 11th century and Korea attempted to colonize it only after the middle of the 12th century and adhered to a policy of keeping it uninhabited from the 15th century onward. For a century after the Japanese invasion of Korea in 1592, the Japanese ruled the island. At the end of the 17th century, Korea's ownership of Ulleungdo was recognized after a long dispute but the Korean



authorities continued to keep the island uninhabited, while the Japanese never stopped fishing near the island. Also, in the latter part of the 19th century, there was a movement and petitions urging the development of Ulleungdo, and despite the government's disapproval, Japanese still continued to go to the island. That is to say, the pamphlet claims that Japan first recognized Ulleungdo and had it under its rule for a century, there had been disputes over sovereignty, and while Korea practically left it unattended, Japan developed the island (FO, Japanese Government 1947c, 9–10).

This tone completely disregarded the historical records regarding Ulleungdo, widely known in Korea, which begin with its conquest and incorporation by Korea's ancient Silla kingdom in 512 (Ulleungdo was then the autonomous nation of Usan-guk), but instead posit the 11th-century Japanese record as the oldest. This hints at why Japan added Ulleungdo to its list of adjacent islands.

As these pamphlets were designed to assert Japan's ownership of certain islands, Ulleungdo, which was undoubtedly Korean territory then as it is now, should not have been featured. Most of the islands included in the pamphlets were those the Allies excluded from Japanese administration or over which sovereignty was disputed. As the Japanese title of the series, "Japan's Adjacent Islands," implied, it is beyond question that Japan viewed Ulleungdo as one such island.

It was impossible, then as now, to have Ulleungdo recognized as Japanese territory in consideration of both historical facts and common sense. Then why was it included among Japan's adjacent islands in the JMOFA's official territory references for the Allies? Two reasons can be thought of in this regard.

First, from the latter half of the 19th century, Japan exhibited ambitions of ownership over Ulleungdo, not Dokdo. But they had to turn their attention to Dokdo, Ulleungdo's adjacent island, because history undoubtedly established Ulleungdo as Korean territory. In premodern Japanese materials where Dokdo is mentioned, it appeared together with Ulleungdo as its annexed island. It never appears alone and was deemed to function only through its affiliation with Ulleungdo. The actual reason the

Korean Empire declared Ulleungdo a county in 1900 was to make clear its ownership of the island in response to Japan's growing encroachment (Song 1999, 93–132). The first book Japan published after the declaration of its illegal incorporation of Dokdo in 1905 was *Takeshima oyobi Utsuyōtō* (Dokdo and Ulleungdo) (Okuhara 1907) This recognition of Ulleungdo and Dokdo as one entity naturally continued up to 1947.

Second, the JMOFA attacked Korea's lax policy toward the inhabited Ulleungdo despite Korea's clear ownership of it, and thereby intended to reveal that Korea did not even have a policy on the uninhabited Dokdo. This was a calculated move to take Dokdo by ostensibly attacking Ulleungdo.

The pamphlet's description of Dokdo is false and fraudulent. Let us look at a portion of it:

I. Liancourt Rocks (Take-shima)

2. History

... the Japanese knew the existence of the Liancourt Rocks from the ancient times.....

As for European acquaintance with the Rocks, it was in 1849 that the Liancourt, a French whaling ship, first sighted them and gave them their present name.....

It should be noted that while there is a Korean name for Dagelet, none exists for the Liancourt Rocks and they are not shown in the maps made in Korea.

On February 22, 1905, the Governor of Shimane prefecture, by a prefectural proclamation, placed the Liancourts under the jurisdiction of the Oki Islands Branch Office of the Shimane prefectural government. (Note 3: *The United States Hydrographical Survey* at present deals with Liancourt Rocks under the head of Oki group of islands.)

3. Industry

In 1904, however, the inhabitants of Oki Islands began to hunt sea-lions on these islets and thereafter each summer the [Oki] islanders, using Dagelet as their base, went regularly to the Rocks and built sheds as temporary quarters for the season. (FO, Japanese Government 1947c, 9–10; underline added)

According to the JMOFA, the Japanese had known of the existence of Dokdo from ancient times, naming it Matsu-shima in 1667, and the Europeans named it Liancourt Rocks only in 1849. Unlike with Ulleungdo, the pamphlet claims there was traditionally no Korean name for the Liancourt Rocks and they were not shown on Korean-made maps. If Japan alone had had historical and geographical evidence on the islets and if they had been undoubtedly Japanese territory, as they claimed, there would be no reason to bring up Korea in the text. By referring to Korea here, Japan essentially admitted that there was indeed material evidence that Dokdo was Korean territory and it had concerns in this regard. This also explains why Ulleungdo was featured in the pamphlet. Without explaining the situation surrounding Ulleungdo, they could not explain Dokdo.

The account that there was no Korean name for Dokdo and these rocks were not shown on Korean-made maps is an entirely fraudulent claim. Dokdo (Usan-do) has appeared in countless Korean maps and geography books since at least the 17th century. The name Dokdo is often found even in Japanese materials. Another name, Seokdo, can be seen in Imperial Decree No. 41 of 1900.

The assertion that the Japanese began fishing from the Liancourt Rocks in 1904 and Shimane prefecture incorporated them on February 22, 1905, was meant to justify the Japanese invasion. The fact that Oki islanders had to use Ulleungdo as their base to fish at Dokdo over a long period only proved that Dokdo was already considered as affiliated with Ulleungdo so that they had to start from there. As this was a time when Imperial Japan was encroaching on Korea, the Oki islanders were able to use Ulleungdo for their fishing operations at Dokdo.

As is well known, in September 1904, Nakai Yozaburo 中井養三郎, a fisherman from Shimane prefecture, requested that the Japanese government incorporate Dokdo as Japanese territory and lease it to him. On January 28, 1905, the Japanese government did so by naming Dokdo Takeshima and promulgated this through a Shimane prefecture public notice. Nakai and the Japanese government were aware that Dokdo was Korean territory. The Korean Empire was belatedly informed of the situation through a report by the magistrate of Ulleungdo, Sim Heung-taek, in 1906. However, the royal

palace had been invaded by Japanese troops in the turbulence of the Russo-Japanese War and Korea's sovereign diplomatic rights had been lost. The outcry raised by the Korean press regarding what was happening to Dokdo is well known. Dokdo was seized by violence and greed during the first phase of Japan's invasion of Korea.

Some 40 years later, while the two halves of Korea were still occupied by American and Soviet troops and under their respective military administrations, Japan published this pamphlet claiming Dokdo and Ulleungdo to be its adjacent islands. At that time, Korea was standing at a crossroads between national division and unification. Koreans had yet to have their own government. The two powers on the Korean Peninsula decided to establish provisional governments and trusteeship rule through the US-Soviet Joint Commission as a way to establish peace on the peninsula, but this was when Korean hopes for unification and true independence were dashed with the full-blown emergence of the global Cold War. Without Koreans knowing or having their own government to represent them, their territorial sovereignty was being threatened by none other than Japan, the country from which Korea had just been liberated.

Further, Japan lied without compunction to advance its territorial interests. The lie that "while there is a Korean name for Dagelet, none exists for the Liancourt Rocks and they are not shown in the maps made in Korea" vividly demonstrates Japan's stance on Korea, its just-liberated colony.

This Japanese stance had an impact on SCAP Headquarters and the Department of State from 1947 and this pamphlet Part IV was used as rational evidence for rejecting Korea's claims on several occasions during the peace treaty process. SCAP Headquarters used this pamphlet to reject Korean claims and interests on largely two occasions. In August 1948, the Patriotic Old Men's Association of Korea (Uguk noinhoe) appealed to General MacArthur regarding Korea's sovereign ownership of Dokdo and Ulleungdo.<sup>24</sup> Richard Finn of the POLAD-Japan office reviewed the petition

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24. US Political Adviser for Japan no. 612 (September 16, 1948). Subject: Korean Petition Concerning Sovereignty of "Docksum," Ullungo Do, Tsushima, and "Parang" Islands (NARA, RG 84, Entry 2828, Japan: Office of US Political Adviser for Japan [Tokyo], Classified General Correspondence [1945–1949, 1950–], Box 34).

but rejected the Korean claim, citing the information in the Japanese pamphlet. The POLAD-Japan office was already well-informed of the pamphlets and deemed them credible.<sup>25</sup>

In his review of a draft treaty sent by telegram to the Department of State in November 1949, Sebald suggested that Dokdo (Liancourt Rocks, Takeshima) be specified part of Japanese territory and such security considerations be made as the installation of weather and radar stations on them.<sup>26</sup> Though he did not mention it, there is no doubt that Sebald had consulted *Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper, Part IV*.

As a result, the US draft treaties produced between 1949 and 1950 recorded that 1) Takeshima had been formally claimed by Japan in 1905, apparently without protest by Korea, and placed under the jurisdiction of the Oki Islands Branch Office of Shimane prefecture, and 2) unlike Dagelet Island, Takeshima had no Korean name and did not appear ever to have been claimed by Korea.<sup>27</sup> These views mirrored the claims of the pamphlet. Sebald's argument, made in November 1949, had a decisive influence on the Department of State's decision regarding sovereign ownership of Dokdo at that time.

The Department of State had organized the Working Group on Japan Treaty and had been preparing for a peace treaty since August 1946, beginning to compose drafts on territory clauses in early 1947. As evidenced by Department of State geographer Boggs, who used the Part I pamphlet as a major reference in July 1947,<sup>28</sup> these pamphlets prepared by the JMOFA

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25. GHQ, FEC, Check Sheet, G-2 to Diplomatic Section, Subject: Petition of Patriotic Old Men's Association of Seoul, Korea. September 27, 1948.

26. William J. Sebald, POLAD-Japan to W. Walton Butterworth, November 14, 1949 (NARA, RG 59, Decimal File, 740.0011PW(Peace)/11-1449); Sebald to the Secretary of State, Subject: Comment on Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan, November 19, 1949 (NARA, RG 59, Decimal File, 740.0011PW(Peace)/11-1949).

27. "Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan," December 29, 1949 (NARA, RG 59, Lot 56D527, Box 6); "Commentary on Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan" (RG 59, Decimal File, 694.001/7-1850).

28. "Draft of Treaty with Japan," July 24, 1947, by Samuel W. Boggs (SA-E/GE) (NARA, RG 59, Records of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs Relating to the Treaty of Peace with Japan, Lot 56D527, Box 5); Memorandum by Boggs (SA-E/GE) to Fearey (FE) July 24, 1947 (NARA, RG 59, Decimal File, 740.0011PW(Peace)/7-2447).

became official references for the Working Group. As of July 1947, they accepted Japan's claims by including the Ryukyus as Japanese territory and adjudging that Kunashiri and Etorofu-to, "which ethnically, economically, and historically have been part of Japan," did not fall under the scope of the Kurils defined under the Yalta Conference.<sup>29</sup> In just seven months since the JMOFA produced these pamphlets, specialists and policymakers at the Department of State were using them as "objective and rational references" (Jung 2010, 362–365). Prime Minister Yoshida recalled how the JMOFA sent Japanese information booklets to Washington from 1948 by courtesy of the Diplomatic Section, SCAP, but in a strictly unofficial mode. These booklets and their contents were appraised as "very good reference data" by Washington. "By the time the US government started writing draft peace treaties the same year [1950], Japanese-prepared documents had already been delivered to them in sufficient quantity" (Yoshida 1958, 25–26).

When Korea and the United States were discussing a peace treaty with Japan in July and August 1951, this Part IV pamphlet was used as an "objective" reference. Boggs wrote reports about the Liancourt Rocks (Dokdo) on three occasions and had to rely on the JMOFA's pamphlet, the only available literature available in English on the subject.<sup>30</sup>

Consequently, Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk wrote in a memorandum on August 10, 1951, that "this normally uninhabited rock formation was according to our information never treated as part of Korea and, since about 1905, has been under the jurisdiction of the Oki Islands Branch Office of Shimane prefecture of Japan. The island does not appear ever before to have been claimed by Korea."<sup>31</sup> The JMOFA's 1947

29. Working Group on Japan Treaty, Notes of Meeting on Friday, August 1, 1947 (NARA, RG 59, Lot 56D527, Box 5).

30. Memorandum by Boggs, OIR/GE to Fearey, NA, Subject: Spratly Island and the Paracels, in Draft Japanese Peace Treaty, July 13, 1951 (NARA, RG 59, Decimal File, 694.001/7-1351); Memorandum by Fearey to Allison, Subject: Proposed Changes for August 13 Draft, July 30, 1951. p. 3 (NARA, RG 59, State Department, Records Relating to the Japanese Peace and Security Treaties, 1946–1952, Lot 78D173, Box 2).

31. Letter by Dean Acheson to You Chan Yang, Ambassador of Korea, August 10, 1951 (NARA, RG 59, Japanese Peace Treaty Files of John Foster Dulles, 1946–1952, Lot 54D423, Box 7; RG 59, Decimal File, 694.001/8-1051).

pamphlet was used as the most important basis for the Department of State's conclusion.

### *Tsushima (July 1949)*

Of the pamphlets on territorial issues produced by the JMOFA between 1946 and 1949, the circumstances around the writing of *Tsushima* are clearer. It was written in response to ownership claims over *Tsushima* and demands for its return raised in Korea before and after the establishment of the ROK government in 1948. ROK President Rhee Syngman's demand for the return of *Tsushima* in August 1948 generated great press, which covered reactions and rebuttals in Japan.<sup>32</sup> The Chinese media of Taipei issued reports that, as the Ryukyus and *Tsushima*, which had been Chinese and Korean territory, respectively, three hundred years ago, were taken by Japan, they should be returned to their respective owners (*Dong-A Ilbo*, August 19, 1948). As such, some Chinese media associated the return of the Ryukyus to China with that of *Tsushima* to Korea. The demand for the return of *Tsushima* by President Rhee and other Korean government officials continued until early 1949 and Japan saw a need to respond. In the end, the JMOFA took up the job in mid-1949 and completed *Tsushima* in July 1949, which was forwarded to the Department of State in late December 1949.<sup>33</sup>

This pamphlet consists of a cover, a one-page table of contents, and 33 pages of text. Its highlight was exchanges between Korea and Japan (JMOFA 1949b, 6–16). By virtue of its geographic location, *Tsushima* had played an important role in Korean-Japanese communication since ancient times. The island's *wako* ('Japanese raiders') had an impact on Korean-Japanese relations. It also served as a relay base for Korean diplomatic missions after the Japanese invasions of Korea from 1592 to 1598.

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32. "Tsushima henkan wa gensoku ni kaesu" (Return of *Tsushima* Goes against Principle), *Asahi shimbun*, August 2, 1948; "Tsushima no henkan, Rhee daitōryō yōkyū" (President Rhee Demands Return of *Tsushima*), *Asahi shimbun*, August 19, 1948. For more information on *Tsushima*, see Jung (2012).

33. Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Assignment of Work on a Peace Treaty" (平和條約問題作業分擔), November 12, 1949 (JMOFA 2006, 453–454).

Overall, Tsushima did not deal with grounds Korea provided for its claim, but instead placed emphasis on illegal activities by Korean residents on Tsushima. This was probably because Tsushima was clearly Japanese territory in terms of both history and international law. Its supplement provided statistics on Korean residents, illegal Korean entrants, and other types of Korean criminals. Its claims included that Koreans accounted for 3 percent (or 2,140 people) of the Tsushima population and were involved with the heavily leftist Korean Residents' League (Jaeil joseonin yeonmaeng) there, and that the biggest problem the island faced was illegal Korean entrants and arrestees, with 60 percent of illegal entrants detained in Nagasaki prefecture being Korean nationals arrested on Tsushima.

The *Tsushima* pamphlet was submitted to the Department of State in late December 1949 and Sebald, the political adviser for Japan, forwarded it to the Department of State on January 24, 1950.<sup>34</sup> But, in reality, Japan was not really concerned about its ownership of the island because this had already been confirmed in General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's Instruction to his Commands Concerning the Basic Purpose of the Allied Occupation of Japan and the Manners in which They Are Carried Out by the Allied Forces (December 19, 1945). This pamphlet was produced and distributed to refute the Korean government's claim and was also propagandistic in nature. The ownership over the island itself was never seriously disputed.

## Conclusion

Thus far, this paper has examined how the JMOFA came up with pamphlets on territorial issues as part of the preparation process leading up to the peace treaty talks between 1946 and 1949 as well examined the contents and characteristics of these pamphlets, which were distributed to the Allied Powers.

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34. Subject: Proposed Development of Iki and Tsushima Islands, January 24, 1950 (NARA, RG 59, Decimal File, 794.022/1-2450).



In 1946, the JMOFA launched full-scale preparations on territorial issues that would be reflected in the eventual peace treaty, and as part of these endeavors, produced a total of seven volumes of reference material on major territorial issues alone for distribution to the United States and other Allies. The focus of these publications was on “minor islands” the Allies would allow Japan to retain. Between November 1946 and June 1947, the JMOFA published a series of four pamphlets under the series title, *Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper*. The wording of the series title, “Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan,” clearly reflected the Potsdam Declaration’s article: “Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such minor islands as we determine.” The order in which the contents were published reflects the degree of importance of the islands as determined by the JMOFA: the Kuril Islands, the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa), the Bonin Islands, and finally Dokdo and Ulleungdo. Additional references on territorial issues also appeared, which included *Sakhalin* (January 1949), *South Kuriles*, *Habomai Islands*, *Shikotan Island* (April 1949), and *Tsushima* (July 1949).

The JMOFA went ahead and produced sufficient references on territorial issues that were regarded as proper by the Allies. This production of references was possible thanks to a vast collection of backup data in existence; securing of grounds for ownership in terms of both history and international law; development of plausible arguments; and the availability of human resources dedicated to territorial issues. Not only that, the Japanese government managed to get these references into the hands of those who were handling Japanese territorial issues in the United States government and the governments of other Allied Powers. Thereupon, Japan was able to express its concerns on territorial issues during the process of preparing a peace treaty as well as after that treaty was concluded.

Though having been defeated in the war, Japan was still in possession of diplomatic experience, relevant systems, and well-trained personnel, and was able to predict possible approaches on Japanese territorial issues by such powers as the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. The JMOFA understood the importance of territorial issues, collected and analyzed relevant data, identified historical and legal grounds for its claims,

and developed logic to finally produce and deliver references to those in charge of territorial issues on the Allied side. The Japanese even managed to persuade the Allied policy-makers of the justification of their references and arguments. The production and distribution of reference materials on territorial issues was at the core of the JMOFA's campaign to induce a favorable outcome from the Allies regarding its territories. Between 1946 and 1947, it successfully produced and distributed English references on major territorial issues, thereby overwhelming other interested countries, which were not making any such preparations, let alone putting their thoughts into writing.

With the United States reversing its policy toward Japan in 1948, and with the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, concluding a peace treaty with Japan and the rearmament of Japan became inevitable. With the appointment of John Foster Dulles as a special envoy to the peace treaty talks with Japan in 1950, the movement for an early peace without the consent of Soviets, such as an announcement of Dulles' "Seven Principles," gained full momentum.

While Japan was officially and formally ending hostile relations with the victorious countries of World War II and restoring peace, the situation was different for its two neighbors, Korea and China. Despite being one of the victors, China was mired in its own civil war, which became serious in Manchuria in 1946, leading by 1949 to the Chinese Communist Party gaining control of almost the entire mainland with the Kuomintang withdrawing to Taiwan. The political and military standoff on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait did not allow China to properly respond to the San Francisco Peace Treaty.

Korea was divided, with two separate governments established in 1948 in the southern and northern halves of the peninsula. When the Korean War broke out in 1950, the United States/United Nations, the Soviet Union, and China entered the conflict, turning it into the largest international war in East Asia since the end of World War II. When Dulles made his second official visit to Tokyo in February 1951, Seoul had been recaptured by enemy forces, this time the Chinese. The Korean government was in crisis, as it faced possible evacuation to Jeju or Okinawa. The overwhelming goal of

Korea's diplomats was simple survival. That is, while Japan was regaining peace, Korea and China, previously colonized and occupied by Japan, were mired in civil war. Ironically, the communization of China and the Korean War prompted the conclusion of the peace treaty with Japan. Another irony is that Japan's peace came because of wars in two nations it had previously invaded.

In the end, the desires of the Japanese government were to some extent reflected in the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Its stance on the southern Kurils gained the approval of POLAD-Japan and the Department of State, but the treaty, in which the Soviet Union did not participate, left the relevant clause vague. Japan's suggestion for the Ryukyus—the use of such names as Nansei Shoto and Nanpo Shoto—was accommodated in the treaty text. The Senkaku or Diaoyu Islands, which JMOFA spelled “Sento” Islands in the pamphlet, were not mentioned in the treaty and neither was Dokdo, which Japan supposedly laid claim to.

Since his appearance at the negotiating table in 1950, Dulles pursued a simpler treaty document, and this was achieved. Different interests and conflicts among the various nations were not resolved but simply patched up, with territorial clauses greatly simplified. The United States introduced the handling of the ex-mandatory territories in the South Pacific and Okinawa (the Ryukyus) that concerned its own interests and let the other territorial clauses remain vague.

With the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, peace was formally restored between Japan and the United States and its major allies, but hostile relations persisted between Japan and its neighbors in East Asia. It was only natural that Russia, China, and Korea, excluded from the San Francisco Peace Treaty, later came to engage in territorial disputes with Japan. On the surface, these seem to be conflicts with Japan only, but in truth, the United States, which attempted to use Cold War logic to deal with the outcomes of World War II, was a hidden cause.

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