Korea Journal, vol. 61, no. 4 (winter 2021): 102–134.
doi: 10.25024/kj.2021.61.4.102

Vacillating between the Cold War and the Culture War: *The Contemporary Predicament of the Korean Evangelical Right*

Myung-Sahm SUH

Abstract

Since the early 21st century, conservative evangelicals in South Korea have actively engaged in contentious politics, playing a central role in organizing the right-wing social movement in civil society. At first, such politicized evangelicals, who may be dubbed as the Korean version of the Evangelical Right, conjured up the old specter of the Korean War and stood against those who, in their minds, went against the Cold War dogmata of anticommunism and pro-Americanism. Over the last two decades, however, the Korean Evangelical Right has expanded its battle line to confront other types of perceived enemies on the Culture War front, especially Islam and LGBTQ persons. By tracing the genealogy of their social movement, this paper explores the ways in which the Korean Evangelical Right finds itself in the predicament of wavering between the geopolitics of the Cold War and the global politics of the Culture War, insofar as these two wars operate on different sets of the friend-foe distinctions.

Keywords: Evangelical Right, Cold War, Culture War, South Korea, social movement

This study was supported by the Ewha Womans University Research Grant of 2019.

Myung-Sahm SUH is assistant professor in the Department of Christian Studies at Ewha Womans University. Email: mssuh@ewha.ac.kr.

Introduction

Over the last 20 years or so, there has been a dramatic increase in the reactionary social movement of evangelical Protestants in South Korea. Blurring the boundary between religion and politics, conservative evangelical Christians, or simply the Evangelical Right,[1] have not only exerted significant influence on the geopolitics in the Korean Peninsula but also led battles against progressives and liberals on various socio-cultural issues. Thus, unless one devotes one's attention to their socio-political involvement, it would be practically impossible to make sense of the frequent politico-religious rallies of evangelical Christians chanting the slogans of anticommunism and pro-Americanism in the heart of Seoul (J. Lee 2003; Cho and Lee 2021; Hong and Paik 2021). Nor would it be easy to explain the unfolding of the Korean version of "culture wars" from the mid-2010s onward without taking into account evangelicals' active involvement in disputes surrounding Islam, LGBTQ rights, and other culturally sensitive issues (S. Kim 2009; Kang 2020; Hunter 1992). Like it or not, the Evangelical Right has become a force to be reckoned with in contemporary South Korea.

Thus, it is hardly surprising to see a growing academic interest in the Korean Evangelical Right (hereafter, KER)'s involvement in both Cold War geopolitics and Culture War conflicts (Cho 2011; 2017; N. Kim 2016, 2017; H. Kim 2017; J. Lee 2018). However, scholars still disagree on the question of how these two political struggles are related to politically active conservative evangelicals in South Korea. Are these two wars completely separate from each other? Does one of them encompass the other? Is the KER's participation in the Culture War merely an extension or a variation of its Cold War-redolent political struggles? Is there a continuity or discontinuity

1. By the Evangelical Right, I mean the conservative faction of evangelical Protestantism that actively participates in right-wing politics as part of their expression of traditional Christian faith with supernatural claims. As such, they are differentiated, on the one hand, from the ecumenical wing of Protestantism, which more or less seeks to reconcile the Christian tradition with the modern, secular world, and, on the other hand, from the Evangelical Left, which cherishes traditional Christian faith but takes a relatively progressive stance on many socio-political issues. See also Woodberry and Smith (1998); Swartz (2014); and Suh (2015).

between these two wars?

In trying to answer these questions, this paper offers a panoramic overview of the historical development of the KER—especially over the last two decades. By tracing a shifting picture, or genealogy, of their social movement, I will argue that conservative evangelicals in South Korea have uneasily alternated between the two distinct albeit overlapping political frames, namely the Cold War and the Culture War, without properly dealing with a fundamental incongruence between the two. In their Cold War framework, the KER has had a clear-cut friend-foe distinction, which is captured in their political mantra of anticommunism and pro-Americanism. However, the latest round of the global Culture War has upended such a Cold War dualism, as the United States and its Western allies increasingly promote a liberal position against Russia and other guardians of traditional *family values* in the global politics of gender and sexuality.

In what follows, I will first offer a critical review of the literature on the relationship between politics and evangelical Protestantism in South Korea. This will be followed by a chronicle of the development of the KER, with a special focus on its 21st-century manifestation. The historical narrative so constructed will reveal that the Evangelical Right in South Korea has continuously refashioned itself to address particular challenges of the time and, in doing so, has found itself wavering between the Cold War geopolitics and the global politics of the Culture War at different moments of history.

Explaining the Political Mobilization of the Evangelical Right in Contemporary South Korea

A good way to start a critical review of the existing literature is to use the rather perplexing expression "*jongbuk gei*"—a combination of two concepts, namely "*jongbuk*" (being submissive to North Korea) and "gei" (gay)—as a sort of signpost that stands at the crossroad between the Cold War and the Culture War (Cho 2011; 2017; H. Kim 2017; J. Lee 2018). While it is difficult to pinpoint its precise historical origin, this coinage, at least to my knowledge, began to gain wide currency sometime in late 2012 and

early 2013, when some 60 legislators of liberal and progressive parties tried to propose bills that would ban a wide range of discrimination based on socio-cultural grounds, including sexual orientation and gender identity. However, back then, those who drafted or sponsored the so-called Chabyeol geumjibeop (Anti-discrimination Bill) had to retract their proposals after facing visceral opposition from conservative evangelical activists. This was because the KER excoriated both homosexuality and the pro-North Korea left as social maladies that would gnaw at the national strength of South Korea from within (G. Lee 2013). Thus, they maliciously branded the key proponents of the bill as "pro-North gays," an unprecedented political stigma that has ever since been continuously applied to anyone trying to reintroduce it to the legislative process (Eom 2013).

Although one might find the phrase "pro-North Korean gay" strange or even ludicrous,[2] I nevertheless argue that this phrase is a telling sign of the times in the sense that it marks the point of conjuncture, as well as disjuncture, between the banal Cold War framework and the freshly unfolding conflict on the Culture War frontlines—the two wars that the KER has been engaged in over the last two decades. On the one hand, the emergence of this expression in the early 2010s was arguably a symptom of larger social change, or at least a subtle deflection from the prevailing influence of the Cold War, which has weighed on almost all the political tension and conflict in East Asia since the mid-20th century (Chen 2010). On the other hand, as the cultural politics of gender and sexuality, as well as the quarrels over Islam and multiculturalism, have been brought to the fore since the early and mid-2010s, the right-leaning evangelicals have come to the realization that they are now confronting a new breed of opponent. However, without fully knowing what it was up against, the KER has often subsumed the relatively unacquainted opponents, represented by *gays*, under the rubric of the more familiar enemies, represented by the *pro-North left*, as if putting new wine (in this case, gays) into an old wineskin (in this

2. In his article in *The Washington Times*, Taylor (2014) reports that North Korea officially takes a heteronationalistic stance and has no qualms about making homophobic remarks against sexual minorities. In other words, North Korea is on the same side as the KER when it comes to the cultural politics of gender and sexuality.

case, the pro-North left). Regardless of whether this odd combination would hold up for long or soon burst open, what is significant to note here is that the KER has definitely sensed an entry of a new *other* on their enemies list (Foucault 1984).

As such, the discourse of *pro-North gay* is located at the intersection of two interrelated and yet distinctive bodies of literature on the KER: (1) studies on their obsessive *Red Scare*, often stimulated by geopolitical conflicts on the Korean Peninsula, and (2) studies on the increasing concerns among Korean Protestants for issues like LGBTQ rights and Islam. First, the turn of the 21st century saw a proliferation of a new literature on the relationship between evangelical churches and conservative politics in the modern history of South Korea. Building upon a handful of earlier pioneering studies (Choe 1992a, 1992b; Kang 1996), a host of scholars took notice of the growing public influence of Korean evangelicals in the early 2000s and retrospectively recovered the history of their political engagement throughout the latter half of the 20th century (J. Lee 2003; D. Ryu 2004; Kang 2005; J. Kim 2005). Such a revisionist historiography punctured the myth about the Korean evangelicals' self-(mis)representation that they had kept a certain distance from worldly politics and paid undivided attention to the salvation of individual souls. Instead, it became obvious that many evangelical churches not only colluded with the right-wing, authoritarian government but were also at odds with liberal and progressive dissidents on grounds that the latter might destabilize South Korea's national security and thereby give North Korea an opening to invade the South once again.

While this line of research has shed new light on the previously under-examined politico-religious alliance between evangelical churches and right-wing governments in modern South Korea, I find that some of these studies are too confined to the Cold War framework to fully appreciate the changing politico-religious landscape of today's South Korea. For them, the Cold War-based ideology of anticommunism and pro-Americanism still serves as a sort of *master frame* for all the collective actions of Korean evangelicals (see for example, Kang [2007, 2020]; Snow and Benford [1992]), although the latter have significantly expanded their public concerns to a variety of cultural issues. In fact, since the turn of the 2010s, there has been a relative

decrease in the circulation of anticommunist discourse and a substantial increase in disputes on Islam and gender conflicts in the media, including Christian ones (Joo 2017; Lee and Yi 2021).

On this note, there has recently been a surge of scholarly interest in the Korean evangelicals' involvement in various social movements on the Culture War fronts. Closely following a range of cultural disputes—from conscientious objection to the reconfiguration of the patriarchal family system, and also from the creation of the halal industry complex to the legislation of the Anti-discrimination Bill—scholars and public intellectuals have examined not only the KER's efforts to develop conservative discourses regarding such culturally sensitive and politically divided issues, but also their social movement to sway public opinion toward their faith-based values (S. Kim 2009; Cho 2011; 2017; Jung 2014; N. Kim 2016, 2017; Lee and Baek 2017; Siu 2018; Nayoung 2016; J. Kim 2020). While there is a wide variation in terms of topic and research methodologies, these studies have indeed moved beyond the Cold War intellectual frame and opened the door to a more complex understanding of the increasingly diverse public concerns of the KER.

Yet, what remains a moot point is whether and, if so, in what ways, the Evangelical Right's Culture War in 21st-century South Korea is under the shadow of the historical legacies and ongoing tensions of the Cold War in East Asia. Apart from a few studies that exclusively focus on the religio-emotional dynamics behind evangelicals' "politics of phobia" (N. Kim 2017; Jung 2014), most observers explain the emerging Culture War in South Korea with some reference to the geopolitical conflicts of the Cold War. Thus, while some scholars claim that Korean evangelicals' long-harbored resentment against North Korea has been projected onto other cultural minority groups within the South (Kang 2020), others find a trans-Pacific influence and/or parallelism between Korean evangelicals' participation in the Culture War and the counterpart of said war in the United States (Cho 2011; 2017; N. Kim 2017; H. Kim 2017). In one way or another, these studies share the assumption that the Culture War in today's South Korea is a variation of the Cold War conflict in East Asia, as the emergence of the neologism "pro-North gay" epitomizes the discursive connection between

these two politico-cultural sites of struggles.

To be sure, there is no doubt that the North-South divide on the Korean Peninsula, as well as the diplomatic tug-of-war between the major powers in the ongoing Cold War in East Asia, has served as the dominant political structure in South Korea since the mid-20th century. However, partly following a handful of keen observers (N. Kim 2017; Siu 2018), I argue that the latest manifestation of the Culture War in 21st-century South Korea has spawned a new breed of *anti-American Protestantism* or, more precisely, *anti-liberal-American evangelicalism*, based on the ideology of hetero-nationalism. Lest anyone take its significance lightly, I should stress the fact that this anti-liberal-American evangelicalism is arguably an unprecedented politico-religious category that is at odds with the Korean Protestant churches' long-held commitment to the pro-American stance (J. Lee 2003; D. Ryu 2004; J. Kim 2005).

In sum, there is still a significant confusion in the Evangelical Right's public engagement in contemporary South Korea. Confronting liberals and progressives along two political battle lines, conservative evangelicals have sometimes foregrounded the Cold War-based social movement under the banner of anticommunism and pro-Americanism and at other times concentrated their firepower to oppose cultural minority groups. Yet, these modern-day cultural crusaders, so to speak, oftentimes find themselves engaged in these two wars simultaneously without being fully aware of the incongruence between the two in terms of the friend-foe distinction. What is important, then, is to trace how the Cold War and the Culture War have intersected with and contradicted each other in the social movement of the KER.

Prelude to the Political Mobilization of the Korean Evangelical Right

Before turning to the contemporary social movement of the KER, let me offer a brief overview of their prior relations with the principalities and powers of the world in the previous century. In modern Korean history, Protestantism has often found its place in the ambiguous interstices

between the sacred and the secular, as well as between the religious and the political spheres. From its early mission period in the late 19th century to the Japanese colonial era in the first half of the 20th century, Protestant Christianity served as a crucial source and catalyst for the development and promotion of Christian-based nationalist ideology among the key leaders of the independence movement and the liberated Korea (C. Park 2003; Kane and Park 2009). By the mid-20th century, when Korea was freed from colonial rule and concomitantly divided in two with the onset of the Cold War, Protestant Christianity arguably became the quasi-state religion in the South and virtually took on the role of spiritual-ideological linchpin for the US-ROK alliance against the atheistic-communist bloc in East Asia (Lee and Suh 2017).

From then on, and throughout the second half of the 20th century, South Korea was ruled by a series of right-wing authoritarian governments, which more or less grounded their legitimacy on their opposition to North Korea and communist forces in alliance with the *Free World*. During this period, conservative evangelical churches, partly encouraged by their clandestine, American sponsor known as "The Family" (Sharlet 2008; N. Kim 2017), forged close ties with the governing authorities in South Korea and practiced what Paul Freston calls "ecclesiastical corporatism," that is, "to enlist state resources for church aggrandizement… and strengthen their positions vis-à-vis other faiths in the country's 'civil religion'" (2001, 285, 294).

Thus, when liberal-leaning intellectuals and religious leaders, mostly with ecumenical and Catholic backgrounds, began to raise dissenting voices against the repressive state from the early 1970s on (Chang 2015), the majority of evangelical churches more or less backed up the right-wing authoritarian government by evoking the principle of the separation of church and state, as well as championing the importance of maintaining social harmony in the face of the continuing threat of North Korean invasion. In other words, most evangelical churches went the extra mile to present themselves as apolitical while prioritizing other-worldly concerns over earthly politics. In doing so, they practically served as one of the key social bases of Cold War conservatism in South Korea for much of the

second half of the 20th century, seeking to ensure the national security against the communist force and maintain the politico-religious alliance with the United States amid the Cold War conflict (Kang 2007).

The Evangelical Right's Reassertion of the Political Dogma of the Cold War

However, from early 2003 onward, conservative evangelicals began to drop their façade of political neutrality and dived into the right-wing social movement to oppose the disruption of the Cold War dogmata of anticommunism and pro-Americanism (B. Kim 2003). For one thing, the old-fashioned evangelical Cold Warriors became increasingly uneasy about the thawing of tensions between the two Koreas at the turn of the 21st century. For 10 years, from 1998 to 2008, the two liberal-leaning governments of Kim Dae-jung and his successor, Roh Moo-hyun, implemented an engagement policy vis-à-vis North Korea in order to "induce incremental and voluntary changes in North Korea for peace, opening, and reforms through a patient pursuit of reconciliation, exchanges, and cooperation" (Bae and Moon 2014, 21). In particular, by the end of the 20th century, Kim Dae-jung's dovish approach to North-South relations apparently brought forth a peaceful mood on the Korean Peninsula, which culminated in 2000 with the first inter-Korea Summit, involving a cautious blessing from Bill Clinton's White House and around the world.[3]

However, once George W. Bush became the US president in 2001, the White House shifted its foreign policy toward Pyongyang and cast a shadow on South Korea's engagement policy toward the North. What is worse, Al-Qaeda's 9/11 attacks and America's subsequent "War on Terror" put further strain on the diplomatic relationship between Pyongyang and

3. A few months after the summit in June 2000, the Nobel Committee awarded the Peace Prize to then South Korean President, Kim Dae-jung, "for his work for democracy and human rights in South Korea and in East Asia in general, and for peace and reconciliation with North Korea in particular." See the official website of the Nobel Prize, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2000/summary/ (accessed October 31, 2021).

Washington. In his 2002 State of the Union Address, President George W. Bush blacklisted North Korea, along with Iran and Iraq, as part of an "axis of evil," which might provide missiles and weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups. In response to such an accusation, North Korea not only ceased to engage in diplomatic talks with South Korea and the United States, but also revealed its intention to develop weapons of mass destruction by withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in early 2003. As North Korea and the United States were heading toward a collision course, Kim Dae-jung's engagement policy toward North Korea seemed like a complete failure to those on the right in South Korea, who were still gripped by a *Red Scare*.

While they grew increasingly anxious about North Korea's intention to add atomic weapons to its arsenal, conservative evangelicals in South Korea also faced, with grave concerns, a surge of anti-American or, to be more precise, anti-Bush, sentiments among younger South Koreans in late 2002 and early 2003 (Cumings 2005). In one respect, this was part of a contemporaneous global trend to condemn Bush's imperialistic aggression against Afghanistan and Iraq in the post-9/11 era. Yet, the more immediate trigger in South Korea's domestic context was a renewed controversy over the US-Korean Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). In the summer of 2002, an American armored vehicle leading a convoy accidentally killed two teenage girls who were casually walking along a local road in the small city of Yangju, 25 kilometers north of Seoul. However, while expressing condolences for the deceased and their grieving families, US military authorities invoked the SOFA to bring the two drivers under their jurisdiction, later declaring them "not guilty" in a US military court martial in November 2002. When the verdict was made public in the South Korean media, what originally began as a candlelight vigil for the two victims of this tragic accident quickly turned into a series of anti-American street rallies—which, at one point in December of 2002, drew up to one hundred thousand protesters. Thus, by early 2003, it was obvious that a growing number of people in South Korea were increasingly disillusioned with the USA's good-will toward their country (Moon 2004).

It was against this historical background that conservative evangelical

Christians played a major role in organizing a right-wing, civic movement network, called the Banhaek bangim gungmin hyeopuihoe (National Anti-nuclear and Anti-Kim [Jong-il] Council), and began to reassert the Cold War-based political dogmata of anticommunism and pro-Americanism in the public sphere (B. Kim 2003; J. Kim 2004). From January of 2003 onward, the Hanguk gidokgyo chong yeonhapoe (The Christian Council of Korea; hereafter CCK), then the umbrella association of fundamentalist-evangelical churches in South Korea, organized a series of half religious and half political rallies to condemn North Korea's nuclear ambitions, as well as to reconfirm the ROK-US alliance (J. Lee 2003; D. Ryu 2004). Gathering up to a hundred thousand faith-based protesters in the Seoul City Hall Plaza in 2003, these rallies unequivocally disclosed conservative evangelicals' resolution that they would no longer pretend to espouse political neutrality and instead represent the entire right-wing camp to fight for the Cold War-based political dogmata of anticommunism and pro-Americanism.

Furthermore, what initially started as a prayer rally in early 2003 evolved into evangelical Christians' organized efforts to make inroads into politics proper in two interrelated albeit distinguishable ways. For starters, in early 2004, a host of evangelical luminaries and politicians, including Kim Joon-gon of the Korean branch of the Campus Crusade for Christ and Cho Yong-gi of the Yeoido Full Gospel Church, launched a new political party explicitly bearing the name of Christianity, that is, the Hanguk gidokdang (Korean Christian Party, KCP). To their chagrin, however, it was disbanded shortly afterward for failing to win enough votes to gain a congressional seat in the general election held in April 2004, presumably because the majority of evangelical lay people still preferred the separation of church and state (Choe 2016). Still, the KCP turned out to be the prototype of similar politico-religious ventures in South Korean politics, as evangelical leaders with political ambitions have, for almost two decades now, repeatedly tried to send Christian politicians to the National Assembly (J. Lee 2020).

If the idea of a Christian political party may yet sound like a long shot in South Korea, faith-based NGOs have had better success in championing the conservative Cold War doctrine in the public sphere. In retrospect, the turning point was in 2004–2005, when some evangelical activists played

a central role in organizing the so-called "New Right" movement (D. Ryu 2009; Suh 2018). Among the key architects of this movement were ex-progressive Christian activists like Kim Jin-hong and Seo Gyeong-seok, who had had extensive experience in organizing social movement at the grassroots level. In the 1970s and well into the 1980s, these faith-based activists were classified as "pro-North Korean leftists" for their solidarity with labor and the urban poor while standing up against the powers of the authoritarian-capitalist structure. However, from the late 1980s onward, these pastors began to lean toward the conservative side and have recently re-appropriated the right-wing Cold War geopolitics by refining paleo-conservatives' anticommunism with reference to the American Neocon's interventionist foreign policy toward human rights issues in North Korea, as well as reaffirming pro-Americanism with the neoliberal preference for the US-centered globalization (Suh 2018). As their conservative turn was solidified in the 1990s and early 2000s, these pastors practically became the face of the New Right movement; for instance, Kim Jin-hong became the chairperson of Nyuraiteu jeongugyeonhap (New Right Union), which was the largest network of various organizations bearing the banner of the New Right.

Such politico-religious events that took place between 2003 and 2005 certainly revitalized the conservative force to reclaim their political powers and consequently brought the Cold War-based dogmata of anticommunism and pro-Americanism back into the mainstream politics of South Korea. From early 2005 onward, both the evangelical pastors of the CCK and the faith-based activists affiliated with the New Right movement united forces to advance the conservative cause in the public sphere, as they continuously issued public statements, organized prayer rallies, and openly supported conservative candidates running for public offices. Their joint efforts arguably made an important contribution to the landslide victory of Lee Myung-bak, a *born-again* businessman-turned-politician, in the 2007 presidential election—the victory that put an end to what conservatives dubbed the "lost decade" of liberal-left domination, from 1998 to 2008 (Yang 2020, 378). Thus began an almost ten-year period of conservative hegemony, which quickly resumed South Korea's Cold War-based opposition against

North Korea as well as its allegiance to the United States under George W. Bush.

The Disintegration of the Korean Evangelical Church

If the political mobilization of the Evangelical Right in the early 2000s induced the shift of power from the left to the right in 2008, their faith-based social movement began to fall into disarray from 2011 on. This was mainly caused by the tension between major denominations within the CCK in a rivalry that eventually led to the ecclesiastical schism and made it difficult for evangelical churches to join forces for any collective action in the years that followed. The trigger of this religious conflict was a public confession by the then outgoing president of the CCK, Lee Gwang-seon, who revealed a sort of open secret that he had bribed delegates from member churches to win in the previous CCK election a year earlier and, more importantly, that the practice of vote-buying had been common in ecclesiastical politics. Furthermore, while publicly seeking atonement, Lee Gwang-seon also pressured his successor, Gil Ja-yeon, not only to admit to the same wrongdoing but also to give up the office (J. Kim 2011). As the tension escalated between them, two competing factions began to emerge within the CCK.

Meanwhile, once this story of corruption and power struggles within the CCK became public, in early 2011, a number of evangelical leaders who had kept a certain distance from ecclesiastical politics started raising their voices in criticism. In his interview with *Sisa jeoneol* on February 17, 2011, Son Bong-ho, a scholar of ethics and evangelical NGO activist, expressed a deep sense of "shame and indignation" with regard to what had happened in the CCK and claimed that this ecclesiastical association was "beyond the point of reform" (An 2011). From his perspective, the only way out of such a mess was to disband the CCK once and for all. As his lamentation was echoed by other evangelical leaders, a number of churches and parachurch organizations organized a campaign to withdraw from the CCK across

denominational lines.[4] Within a year or so, the CCK practically lost its representative status among evangelical churches in South Korea, as one group after another severed its relationship with what used to be the largest ecclesiastical association of evangelical and fundamentalist churches.

Since the tearing apart of the overarching, evangelical "canopy" (cf. Berger [1967] 1990), there has been, as of 2011, a significant regrouping and restructuring in the Korean evangelical field. Whereas a handful of minority denominations and parachurch groups chose to stay in the CCK, a fair number of church groups that used to be its main pillars splintered to form an alternative interdenominational association under the name of the Hanguk gyohoe yeonhap (Communion of Churches in Korea; hereafter CCIK) in 2012. Since then, numerous attempts have been made to bring back all the scattered churches under one roof. Nevertheless, such endeavors unwittingly accelerated, rather than reversed, the ecclesiastical schism, with the establishment of another interdenominational association, called the Hanguk gyohoe chong yeonhap (United Christian Churches of Korea), in 2017. In one way or another, the conflict among the evangelical churches has run so deep that it seems increasingly difficult to glue them back together.

With that said, what is especially relevant to our present concern is that such church splits resulted in the fading of Korean evangelicals' public influence in the early 2010s. True, even when they were busy competing to represent evangelical churches in South Korea (J. Ryu 2012), both the CCK and the CCIK continued to make their voices heard in the public arena. However, insofar as evangelical churches were divided, it was difficult for them to unite their forces and wield the political influence to the same degree as before. In fact, the disintegration in the evangelical field was arguably the crucial reason behind the relative political quietism of the Evangelical Right in the midst of the nation-wide turmoil surrounding the impeachment of former president Park Geun-hye in 2016–2017. When the right-wing government was in great crisis due to Park's scandalous connection with the allegedly "shamanistic" Choi family (Park 2018), the

4. A more detailed history of this campaign can be found at the following website: https://cckout.tistory.com/notice/59.

Evangelical Right was divided in its allegiance to the former president on trial for impeachment; while some evangelical leaders prudently distanced themselves from the failing administration, others openly joined forces with the ultraconservative camp and took part in the anti-impeachment rallies to support her (Yang 2020). In the end, the fractured right-wing camp was incapable of preventing the premature termination of the Park Geun-hye administration, and the political pendulum once again swung back to the liberal-left force in the post-impeachment presidential election of 2017.

Precursors of the Faith-based Culture War before the 2010s

While the KER was splintering into multiple factions in the early 2010s, by the mid-2010s their fixation on Cold War geopolitics began to shift toward a different kind of political struggle in the cultural realm. In saying this, I do not intend to give the impression that before the 2010s, evangelical Christians in South Korea were completely indifferent to cultural politics. As early as the 1990s, or even before that, Korean evangelicals generally assumed a conservative stance on a range of culturally divisive issues, from abortion to human embryonic cloning, and from homosexuality to Islam. For instance, the history of the anti-abortion movement in South Korea goes back to 1994, when several evangelical churches and faith-based NGOs, each of which had addressed the issue independently, formed together a nationwide movement network under the motto of "respect for life" (Sae Gajeong Pyeonjipbu 1994). Likewise, as Yeong Ran Kim's article in this same edition of *Korea Journal* shows, the late 1990s was a time when queer communities began to organize themselves and raise their voices in public. Perhaps in response to such a development, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Korean evangelicals started publishing articles in Christian newspapers and magazines to warn of the alleged dangers of homosexuality (Lee and Baek 2017; N. Kim 2017). By the late 2000s, such faith-based homophobia drove some hardline evangelical activists to wage *spiritual warfare* against homosexuality, as the liberal-left tried to support LGBTQ rights through law-making and policy changes (Y. Lee 2018). Last but not

least, the 2000s saw a surge of Islamophobia within the Korean evangelical circle in reaction to the 9/11 attacks, as well as the kidnapping and murder of Korean missionaries at the hands of Islamic militia groups in Iraq (in 2004) and Afghanistan (in 2007) (Koo 2018). It was against such a historical backdrop that, in the late 2000s, some evangelical churches and missionaries issued a clarion call to beware of Islam's encroaching influence on South Korea (J. Ryu 2009; Lee et al. 2009). All these instances attest to the fact that Korean evangelicals' interest in cultural politics runs as far back as the 1990s.

However, I argue that, until the late 2000s, Korean evangelical churches as a whole were not fully invested in the Culture War. Back in those days, it was relatively a small circle of evangelical vanguards who tried to draw attention to the politics of gender and sexuality but found few echoes in the broader evangelical field (Sae Gajeong Pyeonjipbu 1994). In a similar vein, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, conservative evangelicals were not so much interested in stirring up politics of Islamophobia in South Korea as they were in using the occasion as an opportunity for Christian evangelism in Iraq and the broader Middle East.

With that said, by the mid-2010s, the KER, albeit still divided after the disintegration of the CCK in 2011, began to subtly tone down, if not completely silence, its usual Cold War rhetoric, instead redirecting its attention to the Culture War with a rallying cry to stand against homosexuality and Islam. The most conspicuous example of such a cultural turn of the KER can be found in the promotional material of the Gidok chayudang (Christian Liberal Party; hereafter CLP), which was disseminated nationwide during the 2016 general election (Fig. 1). What is noteworthy in this flyer is that the CLP says nothing about the contemporaneous geopolitical conflict on the Korean Peninsula, and yet it explicitly foregrounds homophobia and Islamophobia on its political platform; from the CLP's perspective, homosexuality is a hotbed of AIDS, and Islam of terrorists and sexual predators. In fact, the same politico-religious messages were repeated over and over again by many evangelical church leaders in the mid-2010s, even though they were, at the time—and still continue to be—dispersed into different ecclesiastical associations (Yang 2015; Y. Lee 2016). It was almost as if conservative evangelicals needed such new common

enemies against which the divided evangelical community could jointly mobilize their forces once more. In a sense, by the mid-2010s, some—if not all—evangelical churches in South Korea became more or less tired of the Cold War dogmata of anticommunism and pro-Americanism, the politico-religious ideology that had bound them tightly together for nearly 70 years.



Figure 1. The official flier of the CLP distributed during the 2016 General Election

Source: Hankyoreh, April 10, 2016 (https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/polibar/739003.html).

The Spread of the Global Culture War in the Korean Evangelical Community

If this is the case, the question remains: Why did the KER refocus its attention away from the Cold War conflict to the Culture War in the mid-2010s? As a matter of fact, around that time, there were plenty of reasons for right-leaning evangelicals to worry about military threats from the North. Since Kim Jong-un inherited the leadership of North Korea after the untimely death of his father, Kim Jong-il, in late 2011, Pyongyang had

continuously ramped up tensions on the Korean Peninsula through armed attacks against the South as well as a series of nuclear, rocket and long-range missile tests. Thus, by the mid-2010s, those on the right in South Korea had all the more reason to fixate on North Korean threats, especially in preparation for the approaching general election in 2016. However, as the flier above indicates, the political wing of the KER was apparently not so much interested in condemning the North's military provocations as confronting new enemies like homosexuality and Islam on the battle lines of the Culture War.

Thus, in trying to offer an explanation, I argue that the KER's turn to the Culture War was largely inspired by, to use Appadurai's concept (2005), the global "ideoscape" of conservative evangelicals across the world, especially the diaspora of their discourses about homosexuality and, to a lesser extent, Islam (see Kuby [2018] and Gabriel [2009]). To speak of the latter first, a conspiracy theory has been circulating in the Korean evangelical community since the late 2000s, claiming that Islam has launched a secret scheme to conquer the entire world, including South Korea.[5] At first, some evangelical missionaries maintained that this theory had credence because its source was an official report published by the CIA (M. Lee 2008). Yet, critics found out that the said scenario of Islamic world conquest was actually from a 2005 book written by a Christian firebrand, Peter Hammond, who had been actively involved in a crusade against abortion, pornography, homosexuality, and Islam in the South African context (D. Kim 2008). If this is the case, it can be said that such an Islamophobic conspiracy theory was first formed in post-9/11 South Africa and later introduced to South Korea in a new package branded with the name of the CIA. Yet, until the late 2000s, there were counter-voices of reason in the broader Christian circle, and some

5. Such a conspiracy theory still circulates among Korean evangelicals to this day. For instance, see the report entitled, "Jeon segye iseullamhwa jeollyak" (The Strategy of Islamizing the Whole World), published in *Iseullam seongyo* (Islam Mission), September 28, 2020 (http://www.islammission.org/evangelism/islamization-strategy-2/). According to the translator of this report, this piece is based on Peter Hammond's 2005 book, *Slavery, Terrorism and Islam: The Historical Roots and Contemporary Threat* and had been published earlier on the American right-wing website FrontPage Magazine.

missionaries continuously called for a more prudent approach to Christian-Muslim relations (for example, Kim et al. [2007]).

Nonetheless, by the mid-2010s, the majority of evangelical churches in South Korea were up in arms to prevent what they thought was the Islamization of South Korea. In the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, triggered by the crash of housing market in the United States, both the government and the financial industry in South Korea tried to increase their economic interaction with Islamic countries by restructuring tax systems to accommodate the sukuk, i.e., Sharia-compliant Islamic bond, in 2011, as well as creating a halal industry complex in the city of Iksan in 2015. In these two instances, the governments were conservative and generally in tune with right-leaning evangelical Christians on many other political issues. Yet, entering the 2010s, the KER, now divided into the CCK and the CCIK, began to pay serious attention to the aforesaid conspiracy theory, insisting that South Korea should remain vigilant against the infiltration of Islamic culture in general and its finance in particular. While acknowledging that the introduction of sukuk and the halal industry might be beneficial to the South Korean economy, evangelical Christians in South Korea believed that the allure of Islamic "oil money" to be all part of the jihadist strategy to exert influence in non-Islamic countries (Y. Lee 2015). Coincidently, a series of terrorist attacks in France and other European countries in 2015 and subsequent years added fuel to the already-existing structure of Islamophobia within the South Korean evangelical community. In November 2015, in the wake of terrorist attacks in Paris, the then president of the CCIK, Yang Byeong-hui (2015), claimed that Europe basically brought this tragedy upon itself by adopting a policy of pro-Islamic multiculturalism. From his perspective, South Korea should learn from Europe's mistaken immigration policy and keep its guard up against the infiltration of Islam into society. All in all, what originally began as a conspiracy theory against Islam in the post-9/11 global conflict increasingly caught the ears of many evangelical Christians in South Korea, who actually acted on such a theory and put pressure on the South Korean government to change its economic policies in relation to the Islamic world.

To turn to the cultural politics surrounding sexual orientation and

gender identity, it was around the mid-2010s when the mainstream evangelical community in South Korea became more seriously aware of the fact that LGBTQ politics was the hot-button issue at the global level. In the Euro-American world in particular, the religiously inspired Culture War began to take center stage in political debates in the 1970s and 1980s as a sort of reactionary counter-movement against the "Sexual Revolution" of the 1960s and 1970s (Fetner 2008; Putnam and Campbell 2012; Kuby 2018). From the 1990s onward, the Culture War of Western origin rapidly expanded to a global scale, as activist networks of both sides took their causes to the United Nations and other international institutions (Buss and Herman 2003; Bob 2012). Although cultural conservatives with diverse religious backgrounds formed an inter-religious alliance—Clifford Bob has somewhat oddly referred to this as "the Baptist-Burqa link" or "traditional families network" (2012, 36–37)—to hold their ground in the battle lines of the Culture War, the tide was turning in favor of those on the liberal side in the 21st century. A summation of this trend is the United Nations' 2011 resolution on "Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity," which reframed and newly affirmed the rights of LGBT persons with reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations General Assembly 2011a). By the end of that same year, the UN published its first official report on human rights violations against LGBT persons around the world and recommended all member countries "repeal laws used to criminalize individuals on grounds of homosexuality… and enact comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation that includes discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity" (United Nations General Assembly 2011b). Thus, in the early 2010s, the conservatives' attempts to preserve the traditional or *natural* form of family had apparently become a lost cause in the global Culture War.

Soon after, evangelical churches in South Korea found themselves sucked into a maelstrom of conflict over the politics of gender and sexuality at the global level. To my knowledge, the first of such occasion took place on June 7, 2013, when an American diplomat named Brian Breuhaus paid an unusual visit to the CCK to have a sit-down with its then president, Hong Jae-cheol. While relatively little is known about why this American Minister-

Counselor wanted to speak with Korean church leaders, his position in the embassy and the timing of his visit indicate that the main theme of discussion was LGBTQ rights. For one thing, within the US Embassy in Seoul, Mr. Breuhaus was in charge of the political section, especially focusing on issues related to labor, gender, and human rights. Secondly, in the summer of 2013 the KER was still savoring its latest triumph of stymieing the proposal of the aforesaid Anti-discrimination Bill in the National Assembly. Thus, when it became obvious that this bill would never pass without the connivance—if not support—of the evangelical circle, the American diplomat presumably tried to reason with the faith-based cultural conservatives who were standing at the forefront of the battle against liberal activists for LGBTQ rights in South Korea. In any case, the CCK's brief summary of this meeting contains only the voice of the KER: Rev. Hong insisted that Korean churches would embrace homosexuals with Christ's love by curing them of their "disease," as well as teaching them how to live a "normal life" according to the Divine order of creation (CCK 2013).

In retrospect, Breuhaus's visit to the CCK can be explained as a diplomatic gesture to give Korean evangelicals, well known for their pro-American stance up to that point, a sort of heads-up about what was going to happen in the near future. A few weeks later, on June 26, 2013, the US Supreme Court struck down the third section of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which had defined marriage as "the union of one man and one woman." Since it called for the federal government to recognize for the first time the equal rights to marriage of same-sex couples, the decision evidently delivered a heavy blow to cultural conservatives who strove to uphold traditional family values. More importantly, when the news reached South Korea, Rev. Hong (2013) issued, on June 28—which was practically the next day if we take into account the time difference—a public statement that clearly deviated from the KER's usual Cold War-based geopolitical stance:

> The Christian Council of Korea expresses serious concern about the US Supreme Court's ruling to judge unconstitutional the tradition of defining marriage as being between heterosexuals… Is it not the case that the

> United States has been able to become the world's greatest power thanks to God's blessing? … We are afraid that such a blessing may be transferred elsewhere if the United States acts against the Bible… Meanwhile, the Federal Assembly of Russia has recently passed an anti-homosexual bill which bans any pro-gay propaganda toward the under-aged … We should never accept or follow improper practices like homosexuality even if it is part of American culture.

A few points deserve our attention here. First, the KER generally believes that homosexuality is an exotic culture—something imported from the United States or other Western countries (N. Kim 2017; Siu 2018). Second, Korean evangelicals lament that those countries that used to comprise Christendom are increasingly losing touch with their Christian origins and ignoring biblical teachings about family and marriage. Third, these right-wing evangelicals are having second thoughts about South Korea's conventional friend-foe distinction in the Cold War framework. When it comes to the Culture War, they now feel more affinity with conservative Russia than the liberal United States (see Wilkinson [2014]).

Such fundamental disagreements on homosexuality drove a further wedge between the KER and its erstwhile Cold War allies in the West. In 2014, the US Embassy, along with its French and German counterparts and the American-based IT company Google, officially endorsed and took part in the annual Queer Festival in South Korea for the first time. From then on, a growing number of foreign embassies—mostly those of Euro-American countries and that of Israel—have become regular fixtures in this annual gathering of sexual minorities and their allies in South Korea, issuing statements of support for LGBTQ rights as well as running booths during the festival. However, as if to match the international recognition of the queer movement in South Korea, the backlash from faith-based homophobic activist groups has turned all the more fierce since the mid-2010s. Thus, when the Pride March took place on June 7, 2014, there was the first-ever physical skirmish between these two opposing circles, as hundreds of evangelical Christians organized counter-rallies and blocked the progression of the parade for several hours (Y. Lee 2018, 213–214). Furthermore, a

few days later, on June 10, 2014, the Hanguk gyohoe eollonhoe (Korean Association of Church Communication) issued a press release expressing a firm resolution to defend the "traditional Korean morality" from the "cultural plundering" of the United States, and also denouncing the latter for siding with the pro-gay "progressive left," which once took an anti-American stance in the Cold War framework (D. Kim 2014; N. Kim 2017).

In retrospect, the United States' liberal reorientation of its foreign policy regarding the politics of gender and sexual orientation on the frontlines of the Culture War in the early to mid-2010s created a sort of cognitive dissonance in the minds of the KER. Whereas conservative evangelicals in South Korea still wished to keep intact the ROK-US alliance in view of the ongoing Cold War tensions in East Asia, their faith-based objection to homosexuality made them take an oppositional stance against liberal America as one of the major advocates of LGBTQ rights in the global Culture War. This is to say that, in the politico-religious imagination of Korean evangelicals, if the US was on the good side of the Cold War conflict, it was now placed on the evil side in the Culture War. Thus, some anti-queer evangelical activists in South Korea now claim that South Korea needs to step up to assume "the leading position" in the global "spiritual ranking" and help the Western world save itself from moral lapse and religious apostasy (Gil 2018, 47).

Conclusion

This paper has traced the ways in which the KER has built its faith-based social movement within the frames of the Cold War and the Culture War over the last two decades. While steering away from the tendency to confuse and collapse these two political struggles of conservative evangelicals, I tried to concentrate on the specific historical circumstances in which their politico-religious activism emerged to meet the particular challenges of the time.

What emerged from such discussions is the division of their social movement largely into three phases. First, from the year 2003 onward,

many evangelical churches were galvanized into collective action mainly within the Cold War framework. In response to the rising anti-American sentiments within South Korean society, as well as the escalating military tensions between North Korea and the United States, the CCK organized politico-religious rallies to revamp the Cold War-based political dogmata of anticommunism and pro-Americanism. Second, beginning in 2011, the Korean evangelical field as a whole suffered from an ecclesiastical schism that divided the CCK into multiple competing associations. This split significantly sapped the energy of their collective action, and the KER went through a prolonged period of political quietism. The third and latest phase began sometime around the mid-2010s, when the KER redirected its firepower to oppose Islam and homosexuality on the frontlines of the Culture War. While Islamophobia and homophobia had been an undercurrent among evangelical Christians for quite some time, the KER jumped into the Culture War proper in reaction to the global spread of Islamic financial power as well as the ascendance of LGBTQ rights in international politics.

Needless to say, this periodization is only presented as a means to sketch a chronological map of the KER's social movement, especially in the 21st century. There is no doubt that spillovers and overlaps exist between these periods. The KER's collective action couched in Cold War dogma have continuously reappeared in later periods, even when political disputes have increasingly taken place in the cultural realm. Conversely, Korean evangelicals' phobia against cultural minority groups like Islam and LGBTQ persons were also present in the earlier phases when the geopolitical conflicts of the Cold War cast a shadow over almost all political conflicts.

Yet, it is also important to distinguish these phases, for there are obvious discontinuities. True, some elements of the Cold War can be readily transposed to the battlefield of the Culture War. For instance, the expression "Axis of Evil," made by George W. Bush in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, served as a sort of discursive linkage with which the KER could easily translate its anticommunism into Islamophobia. However, Korean evangelicals' long-held commitment to the US-ROK alliance poses a fundamental predicament to them, since they now encounter as

enemies the liberal wing of the United States and its Western allies in the cultural politics of sexual orientation and gender identity. Conversely, some evangelical leaders in South Korea somewhat ambivalently tout Russia and other countries for their refusal to acknowledge gay rights. With yesterday's friends' having become today's enemies, it must be acknowledged that a substantial shift has taken place in the social movement of conservative evangelicals in contemporary South Korea.

That said, the KER is likely to continue to use the frames of both the Cold War and the Culture War, shuffling them helter-skelter and occasionally pulling out one card over another depending on the specific political situation at a given time. In fact, in more recent years, when conservative evangelicals played a pivotal role in organizing a series of massive right-wing rallies at Gwanghwamun Plaza in 2019–2020, the then charismatic head of the CCK, Jun Kwang-hoon, *vertically* stood up against the incumbent left-leaning government while horizontally marginalizing what he viewed as threats to the national security and moral rectitude of South Korea, namely homosexuality, Islam, and North Korea (see DeHanas and Shterin [2018]). Plus, in all of these rallies, the protesters always waved the *taegeukgi* (South Korean flag) and the American national flag side by side in order to express their unwavering allegiance to the right-leaning United States under the Donald Trump administration. After all, the friend-foe distinction can be revised all the time. Even the best of friends can become distant after a quarrel or conflict, and, when the dust has settled, can make up for their past grievances and restore their friendship. Meanwhile, the enemy of one's enemy is not necessarily one's friend. Considering Korean evangelicals' intolerance toward non-Christian traditions (Kang 2020), it would be difficult for the KER to join hands with conservative Islamic groups even if they confronted the same enemy in the cultural politics of gender and sexuality.

REFERENCES

An, Seong-mo. 2011. "Hanguk gyohoe, gaesingyo yeoksasang gajang tarakaetda" (Korean Churches have Fallen to the Lowest Level in the History of Protestantism). *Sisa jeoneol* (Sisa Journal). February 21. https://www.sisajournal.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=131405 (accessed November 10, 2021).

Appadurai, Arjun.2005. *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Bae, Jong-Yun, and Chung-in Moon. 2014. "South Korea's Engagement Policy: Revisiting a Human Rights Policy." *Critical Asian Studies* 46.1: 15–38.

Berger, Peter L. [1967] 1990. *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion*. New York: Anchor.

Bob, Clifford. 2012. *The Global Right Wing and the Clash of World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Buss, Dorris, and Didi Herman. 2003. *Globalizing Family Values: The Christian Right in International Politics*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

CCK (The Christian Council of Korea). 2013. "Juhan miguk daesagwan jeongchigwa beuraieon beuruhauseu seogigwan, hangichong naebang" (Minister-Counselor, Brian Breuhaus, of the US Embassy visits the CCK). June 7. http://www.cck.or.kr/chnet2/board/view.php?id=366&code=news_2011&cate (accessed November 12, 2021).

Chang, Paul Y. 2015. *Protest Dialectics: State Repression and South Korea's Democracy Movement, 1970–1979*. Redwood City: Stanford University Press.

Chen, Kuan-Hsing. 2010. *Asia as Method: Toward Deimperialization*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Cho, Min-ah. 2011. "The Other Side of Their Zeal: Evangelical Nationalism and Anticommunism in the Korean Christian Fundamentalist Antigay Movement Since the 1990s." *Theology & Sexuality* 17.3: 297–318.

_____. 2017. "Geudaedeul-ui 'saek' 'gye': Chabyeolgeumjibeop bandae tujaeng-gwa 'jongbuk gei'-ui tansaeng-eul tonghae boneun gidokgyo upadeul-ui taja mandeulgi" ('Lust' and 'Caution' of Yours: The Christian Right's Creation of a Batter through its Struggle against the Anti-discrimination Law and the Formulation of the 'Pro-North Korean Gay'). In *Dangsindeul-ui singuk: Hanguk sahoe-ui bosujuui-wa geuriseudogyo* (The Godly State of Yours: Conservatism and Christian Religion in Korean Society), edited by Je3sidae geuriseudogyo yeonguso, 315–352. Paju: Dolbegae.

Cho, Sarah, and Juheon Lee. 2021. "Waving Israeli Flags at Right-Wing Christian

Rallies in South Korea." *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 51.3: 496–515.

Choe, Jong-cheol. 1992a. "Hanguk gidokgyo gyohoedeul-ui jeongchijeok taedo, 1972–1990: Jonggyo jipdandeul-ui jeongchijeok igyeon-e daehan hana-ui sahoehakjeok haeseok(1)" (Political Attitudes of Christian Churches in Korea, 1972–1990 [1]: A Sociological Interpretation of Political Differences among Religious Groups [1]). *Gyeongje-wa sahoe* (Economy and Society) 15: 205–225.

_____. 1992b. "Hanguk gidokgyo gyohoedeul-ui jeongchijeok taedo, 1972–1990 (II)" (Political Attitudes of Christian Churches in Korea, 1972–1990 [II]). *Gyeongje-wa sahoe* (Economy and Society) 16: 225–241.

Choe, Seung-hyeon. 2016. "Gyoin 65.7% 'mokhoeja, jeongchi chamyeohamyeon an dwae'" (65.7 Percent of Lay Protestants Answered 'Pastors should not Participate in Political Disputes'). *News & Joy*. December 13. https://www.newsnjoy.or.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=207751 (accessed November 12, 2021).

Cumings, Bruce. 2005. "The Structural Basis of 'Anti-Americanism' in the Republic of Korea." In *Korean Attitudes Toward the United States: Changing Dynamics*, edited by David I. Steinberg, 91–115. Abingdon: Routledge.

DeHanas, D. Nilsson, and Marat Shterin. 2018. "Religion and the Rise of Populism." *Religion, State & Society* 46.3: 177–185.

Eom, Jiwon. 2013. "Minjudang, chabyeol geumji beoban cheolhoe…Bosu gidokgyogye gongse-e 'mureup'" (Minju Party Withdraws the Proposal for Anti-discrimination Bill…Takes a 'Knee' in the Face of Attacks by the Conservative Christian Circle). *Hankyoreh*. April 21. http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society_general/583900.html#csidx6976782cf2fb8b4ab12e0abc79bbf58 (accessed November 12, 2021).

Fetner, Tina. 2008. *How the Religious Right Shaped Lesbian and Gay Activism*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Foucault, Michel. 1984. "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History." In *The Foucault Reader*, edited by Paul Rainbow, 76–100. New York: Pantheon.

Freston, Paul. 2001. *Evangelicals and Politics in Asia, Africa and Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gabriel, Mark A. 2009. *Iseullam-gwa tereorijeum: Geu ppuri-reul chajaseo* (Islam and Terrorism: In Search of its Roots). Translated by Chanmi Lee. Seoul: Geulmadang. Originally published as *Islam and Terrorism* (Lake Mary, FL: Charisma House, 2002).

Gil, Won-pyeong. 2018. "Dongseongae-ui seoncheonseong" (Congenita of Homosexuality). In *Gidokgyo dongseongae daechaek akademi* (Homosexuality Countermeasure Academy). Paper presented at a conference at Onnuri

Church, February 26–27, Seoul, Korea.

Hong, Jae-cheol. 2013. "Mi daebeobwon-ui iseonggan gyeolhon-ui wiheon pangyeol-e daehayeo" (On the US Supreme Court's Judgment that Heterosexual Marriage is Unconstitutional). CCK public statement issued on June 28, 2013. http://www.cck.or.kr/chnet2/board/view.php?id=371&code=news_2011&cate=&start=50&category=&word=&viewType=&category_id.

Hong, Ji Yeon, and Christopher Paik. 2021. "Hate Thy Communist Neighbor: Protestants and Politics in South Korea." *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 186: 707–723.

Hunter, Davison James. 1992. *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Control the Family, Art, Education, Law, and Politics in America*. New York: Basic Books.

Jang, Seung-jin, and Shang E. Ha. 2011. "Rally around the Cross: Jonggyo-wa jeongbu-e daehan hangukindeul-ui taedo, 2003–2009" (Rally around the Cross: Religion and Korean Attitudes toward Government, 2003–2009). *Hanguk jeongchihak hoebo* (Korean Political Science Review) 45.5: 297–317.

Joo, Jaewon. 2017. "Minjuhwa ihu hanguk eollon-ui bangong damnon yeondaegi" (The Anti-communism Discourses of the Korean Press after the Democratization). *Eollon-gwa sahoe* (Communication and Society) 25.3: 158–220.

Jung, Won Hee. 2014. "Hanguk gaesingyo-ui dongseongae nonjaeng-gwa sahoejeok silcheon: Gamjeong-ui donghak-gwa uirye-reul jungsim-euro" (Homosexual Debate and Social Practice in Korean Protestant: Focusing on the Dynamics of Emotion and Ritual). *Hanguk sahoehak* (Korean Journal of Sociology) 48.2: 165–202.

Kane, Danielle, and Jung Mee Park. 2009. "The Puzzle of Korean Christianity: Geopolitical Networks and Religious Conversion in Early Twentieth-Century East Asia." *American Journal of Sociology* 115.2: 365–404.

Kang, In-cheol. 1996. *Hanguk gidok gyohoe-wa gukga simin sahoe, 1945–1960* (Korean Christian Churches, the State, and Civil Society, 1945–1960). Seoul: Hanguk gidokgyo yeoksa yeonguso.

_____. 2005. "Hanguk gaesingyo bangongjuui-ui hyeongseong-gwa jaesaengsan" (The Production and Reproduction of Anti-Communism in the Korean Protestant Churches). *Yeoksa bipyeong* (Critical Review of History) 70: 40–63.

_____. 2007. *Hanguk-ui gaesingyo-wa bangongjuui* (Korean Protestantism and Anticommunism). Seoul: Jungsim.

_____. 2020. "Hanguk gaesingyo-wa bosujeok simin undong: Gaesingyo upa-ui geuku-hyeomo jeongchi-reul jungsim-euro" (Korean Protestantism and the Conservative Civil Movement). *Inmunhak yeongu* (Journal of Humanities) 33:

3–30.

Kim, Beom-su. 2003. "Geodaehan jeonhwanjeom banhaek bangim jayu tongil 3.1jeol gungmin daehoe naemak: Gungmin chamyeo, gungmin seonggeum, gungmin haengdong-euro daeseonggong" (A Grand Turning Point: Backstory of the March First National Gathering of the NCANAK for Freedom and Unification: Success through Public Participation, Public Donation, and Public Action). *Wolgan joseon* (Monthly Chosun) 4 (April): 601–606.

Kim, Da-eun. 2014. "Miguk, munhwajeok chimtal jahaengharyeoneunga?" (Is the USA Trying to Carry Out a Cultural Plundering?). *Newspower*. June 10. http://www.newspower.co.kr/sub_read.html?uid=24983&section=sc4&section2 (accessed November 12, 2021).

Kim, Dong-mun. 2008. "'8dangye iseullamhwa jeollyak' bogoseo-ga CIA jeongbo?" (Is the Report, 'The 8-step Strategy of Islamization,' Based on a CIA Source?). *Keuriseucheon tudei* (Christian Today). December 8. https://www.christiantoday.co.kr/news/198338 (accessed November 12, 2021).

Kim, Gyeong-jae, et al. 2007. *Muryehan bogeum: Hanguk gidokgyo-ui seongyo, geu munje-wa daean-eul seongchalhanda* (Rude Gospel: Reflecting on the Problems of and Alternatives to Korean Christian Missionary Work). Seoul: Sanchaekja.

Kim, Hong-do. ca. 2005. *A Real Voice of Korea*. Seoul: Kumnan Methodist Church.

Kim, Hyun Jun. 2017. "Gaesingyo uik cheongnyeon daejung undong-ui hyeongseong: Geugujeongchi-eseo gaesingyo-ui hyoyong-gwa munhwa gujo" (The Emergence of the Protestant Right-wing Youth Populist Movement). *Munhwa gwahak* (Cultural Science) 91: 60–83.

Kim, Jang Saeng. 2020. "Hanguk-ui geunbonjuui gaesingyo-wa dongseongae hyeomo" (Korean Protestant Fundamentalism and Homophobia). *Sahoe gwahak yeongu* (Journal of Social Science) 27: 99–128.

Kim, Jin-ho. 2005. "Hanguk gaesingyo-ui migukjuui, geu singminjijeok muuisig-e daehayeo" (An Essay on the Colonial Unconsciousness : Americanism of Korean Protestantism). *Yeoksa bipyeong* (Critical Review of History) 70: 64–81.

Kim, Jin-su. 2004. "'Wang bosu'-ui nun banhaek bangim gungmin hyeobuihoe-ui silche: 'Muhan jeonjin' jeonsul-ro 'cheje sasu' naseon uik gidongtagyeokdae" (The True Identity of the Eye of the 'Giant Conservative Force,' the NCANAK). *Shin donga* (Magazine Dong-a) 543 (December): 136–147.

Kim, Jin-yeong. 2011. "Lee Gwangseon moksa-ui geumgwonseongeo yangsimseoneon gijahoegyeonmun jeonmun" (The Complete Text of Rev. Lee Gwangseon's Press Release about Confessing to His Involvement in the Bankrolled Election). *Keuriseucheon tudei* (Christian Today). February 9. https://www.christiantoday.co.kr/news/244406 (accessed November 12, 2021).

Kim, Nami. 2016. *The Gendered Politics of the Korean Protestant Right: Hegemonic Masculinity*. New York City: Springer.

_____. 2017. "Hanguk gaesingyo upa-ui jendeohwadoen dongseongae bandae undong: Gaesingyo upa-ui 'saeroun jeok'deul-gwa oraedoen buran" (The Korean Protestant Right's Gendered Anti-homosexual Movement: The Protestant Right's 'New Enemy' and Old Anxiety). In *Dangsindeul-ui singuk: Hanguk sahoe-ui bosujuui-wa geuriseudogyo* (The Godly State of Yours), edited by Je3sidae geuriseudogyo yeonguso, 263–314. Paju: Dolbegae.

Kim, Sung-Gun. 2009. "Munhwajeok segyehwa-wa hanguksahoe-ui munhwajeonjaeng" (Cultural Globalization and Culture War within Contemporary Korean Society). *Damnon 201* (Discourse 201) 12.2: 27–52.

Koo, Gi Yeon. 2018. "Islamophobia and the Politics of Representation of Islam in Korea." *Journal of Korean Religions* 9.1: 159–192.

Kuby, Gabriele. 2018. *Geullobeol seonghyeongmyeong* (Global Sexual Revolution). Translated by So-young Jeong. Seoul: Balgeun saenggak. Originally published as *Die globale sexuelle Revolution: Zerstörung der Freiheit im Namen der Freiheit* (Kißlegg: Fe-Medienvertags GmbH, 2012).

Lee, Cheng-Pang, and Myungsahm Suh. 2017. "State Building and Religion: Explaining the Diverged Path of Religious Change in Taiwan and South Korea, 1950–1980." *American Journal of Sociology* 123.2: 465–509.

Lee, Gyeong. "Nuga 'jongbukgei'-reul mandeureonaenna?" (Who Coined the Expression, Pro-North Gay?). Haengdonghaneun seongsosuja ingwon yeondae (Human Rights Action Network of Sexual Minorities). August 8, 2013, https://lgbtpride.tistory.com/598 (accessed November 12, 2021).

Lee, Ji Sung. 2018. "Hyeomo-ui sidae, hanguk gidokgyo-ui yeokal: Geugu gaesingyo-ui jongbukgei hyeomo-reul jungsim-euro" (The Role of Korean Christianity in the Age of Disgust: Focusing on 'Pro-north korean gay' Disgust of the Extreme Right Wing Protestantism). *Gidokgyo sahoe yulli* (Korean Journal of Christian Social Ethics) 42: 211–240.

Lee, Jin-gu. 2003. "Hanguk gaesingyo-wa chinmi bangong ideollogi" (Korean Protestantism and Its Pro-American and Anticommunist Ideology). *Autsaideo* (Outsider) 12 (April): 18–31.

_____. 2007. "Hanguk gaesingyo-wa seongyo jegukjuui" (Korean Protestantism and Missionary Imperialism). In *Muryehan bogeum: Hanguk gidokgyo-ui seongyo, geu munje-wa daean-eul seongchalhanda* (Rude Gospel), edited by Gyeong-jae Kim, et al., 76–93. Seoul: Sanchaekja.

_____. 2020. "Hanguk gidokgyo jeongdang-ui gwejeok." (Trajectory of Korean Christian Parties) *Gidokgyo sasang* (Christian Thought) 736: 17–27.

Lee, Man-seok. 2008. "Iseullam-ui hanguk nae hwaldong" (Islamic Activities within Korea). *Keuriseucheon tudei* (Christian Today). September 18. https://www.christiantoday.co.kr/news/194734 (accessed November 12, 2021).

Lee, Gwang-ha. 2009. "Gungnae iseullam, eotteoke bol geosinga" (How to View Domestic Islam). *News & Joy.* February 11. http://www.newsnjoy.or.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=26972 (accessed November 12, 2021).

Lee, Na Young, and Jo-Yeon Baek. 2017. "'Seonggwahak yeongu hyeophoe'-reul jungsim-euro bon 'gaesingyo' dongseongae 'hyeomo damnon'" ('Politics of Disgust': Korean Conservative Protestant Discourses against Homosexuality). *Yeoseonghak yeongu* (Journal of Womens Studies) 27.1: 67–108.

Lee, Wondong, and Joseph Yi. 2021. "South Korean Evangelical Narratives on North Koreans and Homosexuals." *Journal of Homosexuality* 68.12: 1923–1949.

Lee, Yong-hee. 2018. "Dongseongae hapbeophwa jeoji-ui yeoksa" (History of Blocking the Legalization of Homosexuality). *Gidokgyo dongseongae daechaek akademi* (Homosexuality Countermeasure Academy). Paper presented at a conference at Onnuri Church, February 26–27, Seoul, Korea.

Lee, Young-hoon. 2015. "Hallal sikpum-e daehan jeongbu jiwon bangchim-eul jaegohara" (Reconsider the Government's Policy to Support the Halal Food Industry). CCK public statement, April 24. http://news.kmib.co.kr/article/view.asp?arcid=0009375468&code=61221111&sid1=%EC%B4? (accessed November 12, 2021).

_____. 2016. "Gongmyeong jeongdaehan je 20dae chongseon-i doegireul gidaehanda" (We Expect the 20th General Election to be Fair and Square). CCK public statement, April 6. http://www.cck.or.kr/chnet2/board/view.php?id=575&code=news_2011&cate=&start=50&category=body&word=%B1%B9%B0%A1&viewType=&category_id= (accessed November 12, 2021).

Moon, Chung-in. 2004. "Changing South Korean Perception of the United States Since September 11." *Aziya kenkyu* (Asian Studies) 50.2: 45–57.

Nayoung. 2016. "Hanguk gaesingyo geunbonjuui-ui gabujangseong-gwa dongseongae hyeomo" (Patriarchy of Korean Protestant Fundamentalism and Homophobia). *Silcheon munhak* (Practical Literature) 124: 18–28.

Park, Chŏng-sin. 2003. *Protestantism and Politics in Korea*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Park, Shalon. 2018. "The Politics of Impeaching Shamanism: Regulating Religions in the Korean Public Sphere." *Journal of Church and State* 60.4: 636–660.

Puar, Jasbir. K. 2007. *Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Putnam, D. Robert, and David E. Campbell. 2012. *American Grace: How Religion*

Divides and Unites Us. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Sae Gajeong Pyeonjipbu. 1994. "Naktae bandae undongyeonhab-eul gyeolseonghamyeo: Gidogin han moksoriro 'saengmyeongjonjunghaja!'" (As We Are Launching the Association for Anti-abortion Movement). *Sae gajeong* (New Home) 445 (April): 76–77.

Ryu, Dae-young. 2004. "2cheonnyeondae hanguk gaesingyo bosujuuijadeul-ui chinmi-bangongjuui ihae" (Understanding Conservative Christians' Pro-American and Anticommunist Activities in the 2000s). *Gyeongje-wa sahoe* (Economy and Society) 62: 54–81.

_____. 2009. *Hanguk geunhyeondaesa-wa gidokgyo* (Modern and Contemporary History of Korea and Christianity). Seoul: Pureun Yeoksa.

Ryu, Jae-gwang. 2009. "Iseullamhwa makgi wihan '4HIM undong' sijak" (The Establishment of the '4HIM Movement' to Prevent the Islamization Process). Keuriseucheon tudei (Christian Today). April 6. https://www.christiantoday.co.kr/news/201669 (accessed November 12, 2021).

_____. 2012. "Hangichong Hong Jae-cheol daepyo 'Cho yong-gi moksa-ui sinanggwan balpyo hwanyeong'" (President of the CCK, Hong Jae-cheol, Appreciates Rev. Yong-gi Cho's Statement of Faith). *Keuriseucheon tudei* (Christian Today). September 27. https://www.christiantoday.co.kr/news/258396 (accessed November 12, 2021).

Sharlet, Jeff. 2008. The Family: *The Secret Fundamentalism at the Heart of American Power*. New York: Harper Perennial.

Siu. 2018. *Kwieo apokallipseu* (Queer Apocalypse). Seoul: Hyeonsil munhwa.

Snow, A. David, and Robert D. Benford. 1992. "Master Frames and Cycles of Protest." In *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory,* edited by Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller, 133–155. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Suh, Myung-Sahm. 2015. "Glocalization of 'Christian Social Responsibility': The Contested Legacy of the Lausanne Movement among Neo-Evangelicals in South Korea." *Religions* 6.4: 1391–1410.

_____. 2018. "The Political Turn as an Act of Transgression: The Case of Left-Turned-Right Christian Activists." In *Transgression in Korea: Beyond Resistance and Control*, edited by Juhn Y. Ahn, 139–164. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Swartz, David. R. 2014. *Moral Minority: The Evangelical Left in an Age of Conservatism*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania.

Taylor, Adam. 2014. "North Korea Slams U.N. Human Rights Report Because It Was Led by Gay Man." *Washington Post*. April 22. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/04/22/north-korean-state-media-slams-u-n-

human-rights-report-because-it-was-led-by-a-gay-man/ (accessed November 12, 2021).

United Nations General Assembly. 2011a. "17/19 Human rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity." Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council on July 14. A/HRC/REC/17/19. Available at https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G1 1/148/76/PDF/G1114876.pdf?OpenElement (accessed November 12, 2021).

_____. 2011b. "Discriminatory Laws and Practices and Acts of Violence against Individuals Based on Their Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity." Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (November 17, 2011). A/HRC/19/41. Available at https://www.ohchr.org/documents/issues/discrimination/a.hrc. 19.41_english.pdf (accessed November 12, 2021).

Wilkinson, Cai. 2014. "Putting 'Traditional Values' Into Practice: The Rise and Contestation of Anti-Homopropaganda Laws in Russia." *Journal of Human Rights* 13.3: 363–379.

Woodberry, Robert. D., and Christian S. Smith. 1998. "Fundamentalism et al: Conservative Protestants in America." *Annual Review of Sociology* 24: 25–56.

Yang, Byeong-hui. 2015. "Yamanjeok tereo gonggyeok gyeolko nam-ui il-i anida" (Barbaric Terrorist Attacks Are Not Someone Else's Business). CCIK public statement, November 16. https://www.christiandaily.co.kr/news/64682 (accessed November 12, 2021).

Yang, Myungji. 2020. "Defending 'Liberal Democracy'? Why Older South Koreans Took to the Streets Against the 2016–17 Candlelight Protests." *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 25.3: 365–382.

Received: 2021.06.14. Revised: 2021.08.13. Accepted: 2021.08.24.