



# The Eclectic Heritage-Scape of a Tense Border in the Paju DMZ, South Korea

Hyun Kyung LEE and Dacia VIEJO-ROSE

## Abstract

*Born of the fratricidal Korean War (1950–1953), Korea’s Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) endures as the oldest continuous frontline of the Cold War. It is also a sealed heritage site, replete with accumulated emotions, trauma, and tension. Given the strict restrictions to access, until recently the DMZ has remained largely imaginary to the public, yet it has been attracting growing interest. The appeal of the Paju DMZ is that it provides the only public window through which the North can be glimpsed from the South. First opened to international visitors in the 1970s through a so-called “security DMZ tour,” it was from 2000 increasingly promoted to both domestic and international visitors under the new name “peace and security DMZ tour.” Tracing the tour route in Paju, this study examines the formation of the Cold War heritage-scape to understand the role of border heritage in Korea today. We pay particular attention to the heritagization of the Paju DMZ from 1953 to the present. This study also assesses the degree to which the heritage-scape of the Paju DMZ contributes to the representation of peace and reconciliation that the tour aims to convey. We argue that Korea’s border heritage acts as a bellwether for the broader inter-Korean relationship.*

**Keywords:** Paju DMZ, DMZ tour, heritage-scape, heritagization, border, Cold War, Korean War

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This work was supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2020S1A5B5A01042686).

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## **Introduction**

In Park Sang-ho's 1965 film *DMZ*, the eponymous area appears at first to be a devastated landscape turned by war into a barren wasteland devoid of any order or meaning, a no-man's-land populated only by the detritus of decomposing war materiel. As the film unfolds, however, the viewer begins to sense that this apparently barren landscape is dense with symbolism and subtext. This is also a landscape of contradictions. A girl walks through a landscape of flowering plants, inhabited by rabbits and racoons, but she also passes razor wire, a skeleton and scraps of abandoned war materiel; she is rescued from a river by a young boy dressed in military apparel (MP helmet and gun) draped over ragged clothes. Today, the so-called Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) remains a place of contradictions and often incongruous symbolic and "territorial markers" (Jelin and Langland 2003), not least of which is the fact that it is quite heavily militarized. This is not entirely surprising, given that the few images of the space most people are familiar with, certainly outside the Koreas, involve highly choreographed acts of diplomatic encounter and tense military stalemate. From a heritage standpoint, what *is* surprising is just how extraordinarily eclectic the array of symbolic markers on display here is; this is what we set out to better understand here.

Border regions offer up particular ecosystems of heritage in that at these edges where national narratives meet, there is a specific impetus to mark territory, reflecting accounts of belonging and otherness, and negotiating the permeability of the border, be this through bridges or tunnels. The checkpoints and meeting spaces that borders are replete with also offer up interesting sites of performance and an expectation of gazes reflected across a divide. Looking in detail at a border in terms of heritage can thus shed light on the uses of heritage at multiple levels, to represent and communicate (often contradictory) meanings and messages.

The DMZ stands today at a crossroads, ready either to transform into a symbol of peace and reconciliation or to remain a festering wound apt to reopen. Born of the fratricidal Korean War (1950–1953), one of the *hottest* conflicts of the Cold War, the DMZ endures not only as the oldest

continuous Cold War frontline but as a sealed heritage site, replete with accumulated emotion, trauma, and tension. Preserved relatively intact, with access strictly controlled for seventy years, the DMZ is also known for its biodiversity (Yoon and Park 2016, 10). Nevertheless, given the strict access restrictions, the DMZ remains to the public a prohibited and largely imagined place. The Paju area of the DMZ provides the public a window through which this forbidden area can be glimpsed. Tracing the route of the DMZ tour in Paju, this paper examines the formation of the Cold War heritage-scape to understand the role of border heritage in South Korea today. It seeks to understand the extent to which the heritage-scape of the Paju DMZ contributes to the representation of peace and reconciliation.

The inter-Korean border's formation began in the last phase of Japan's colonial occupation of Korea, while the DMZ was set at the end of the Korean War. Unlike most linear political borders, the inter-Korean border is a composite spatial region defined by the 1953 Armistice Agreement that ended Korean War hostilities (Gelézeau 2011, 328). When the media and ordinary people refer to the DMZ, the term they use connotes the broader DMZ Region (DMZ *irwon* [一圓] in Korean), which actually consists of three parts: the DMZ proper, the Civilian Control Line (CCL), and the Border Area (*jeopgyeong jiyeok* in Korean) (Chung and Kim 2021, 160–161) (Fig. 2).<sup>1</sup> The DMZ Region is supposed to be a neutral and disarmed territory devoid of any human settlement; in fact, it is a heavily armed area with ever-increasing tensions as both North and South Korea seek to push the limits of their control (Yoon and Park 2016, 6; Gelézeau 2011, 328).

The DMZ Region has been profoundly affected by the domestic and international political climate. As a political theater, the region also projects the image of the Korean War to both domestic and international audiences. The Paju DMZ, located in the western DMZ Region, has received particular attention for two reasons: first, its concentration of sites, monuments, and


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1. The actual DMZ is the core limit of the North-South border, and runs 2 km to the north and south of the Military Demarcation Line (MDL), which denotes the center of the DMZ. The CCL was established by the South Korean secretary of defense and extends 10 km south from the MDL, while the Border Area extends 25 km south from the MDL (Chung and Kim 2021, 160–161).



**Figure 1.** Location of the Paju DMZ

Source: Created by Sangseon Park and Dami Kim.



**Figure 2.** Paju DMZ tour stops in the DMZ Region

Source: Created by Sangseon Park and Dami Kim.

memorials related to the Korean War and the Cold War; second, its incorporation of the Joint Security Area (JSA) used to host critical inter-Korean political meetings, such as the 2018 inter-Korean summits (Fig. 1). The Paju DMZ visually represents the heritage-scape of the Korean War in the post-colonial Cold War context. This heritage-scape has been constructed along with the development of the Paju DMZ tour (Fig. 2).

Since 1965, the Paju DMZ tour route has been expanded to cover the DMZ proper, the CCL, and the Border Area, responding to changes in the political climate. The Paju DMZ tour began in 1965, with international delegates visiting the JSA for the Pacific Asia Travel Association (PATA) meeting in Seoul (C. Lee 2020, 55). The JSA was opened to international visitors (e.g., ambassadors and global political leaders) from the 1970s, and to domestic visitors from 1980 (C. Lee 2020, 55). From the 1990s, the Paju DMZ tour began to be widely promoted to the public as a “security DMZ tour.” Amid the mood of peace that prevailed after the first inter-Korean summit in 2000, it was increasingly promoted to both domestic and international visitors and was renamed the “peace and security DMZ tour.” Diverse organizations, such as the Paju municipal government, Korail, Gyeonggi Tourism Organization etc., run over fifteen Paju DMZ tour programs (Lee 2020, 58–60). Among these, this paper focuses on one of the most popular routes: Imjingak à Third Infiltration Tunnel à Dora Observatory à Dorasan Station/Tongilchon Village à Ginseng Center.<sup>2</sup>

The existing literature on the DMZ is eclectic, like the heritage-scape of the area itself. Researchers from various disciplinary backgrounds have mainly focused on the site’s geopolitics—breaches, meetings, and exchanges along it—or have brought tourism studies’ paradigms to bear on the DMZ/border tour, focusing on the South Korean government-run “security tourism” from the 1990s onwards. Activists, too, have been interested in the DMZ’s potential as a space for experimenting with how ecological approaches and the management of nature can be used for peacebuilding (see Hunter 2015; Kim and De Mesquita 2015; Son 2014). Some studies attend to tourists’ views of this war heritage site, their emotional and psychological responses to it, and their motivation for visiting (see Bigley et al. 2010; Jung et al. 2016; C. Lee et al. 2007; Y. Shin 2007). Due to increasing interest in border tourism in the DMZ Region, recent literature has

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2. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Paju DMZ tour sites were closed for two and half years. The Paju DMZ tours resumed in May 2022 but with only five tour buses allowed to visit per day. During maintenance to Dorasan Station in 2022, Tongilchon replaced it as the tour route hub. In addition, the Ginseng Center, selling locally grown ginseng products, is omitted by some tour companies, and is hence listed in brackets.

concerned tourism politics and planning. The Cheorwon area and propaganda villages are frequently taken as case studies (see K. Jung 2017). Despite the Paju DMZ's symbolic significance, literature on the Paju DMZ's history and heritage tours is relatively scarce. The Paju DMZ has been defined as a "dark tour" site with the aspiration for peace (see S. Kim 2014). To provide a more concrete and comprehensive approach to the Paju DMZ, this paper investigates the 115 elements of the Paju DMZ tour route that convey political messages to domestic and international audiences. This paper adopts the idea of the "heritage-scape," which consists of the "imagined landscapes in a community, composed of selected sites...related to particular collective memories," developed by Viejo-Rose (2011, 12). Instead of examining each element individually, this paper perceives them as an entire heritage-scape, comprising influential relationships among heritage sites in the broader context. Data was collected through five site visits (2011–2022) and archival research (official documents and government websites).

This paper examines the four phases of the heritagization of the Paju DMZ: i) establishing a political theater (1953–1979); ii) a security tour (1980–1997); iii) a security and peace tour (1998–2008); and iv) security, peace, ecology, and cultural tour (2009–present). Each phase manifests interwoven political interactions at the international, inter-Korean, South Korean, and local levels, with various political and cultural visions spatially and visually represented, and focuses on how the Paju DMZ's heritage-scape has been constructed. To facilitate the spatial-temporal analysis of the Paju DMZ's heritagization, and to visualize the entirety of the Paju DMZ heritage-scape, we employ a visual methodology, mapping monuments, memorials, artwork, and tourism facilities according to the four phases. While analyzing and interpreting the visual messages of each heritage site, this paper discusses how each phase visually narrated the symbolic meanings of the heritage-scape and how the peace connotations have shifted in relation to its development. Finally, we argue that the Paju DMZ, as Korea's border area, acts as a bellwether for the broader inter-Korean relationship, and consider how the Paju DMZ contributes to the representation of peace and reconciliation.

## **Heritagization of the Paju DMZ: The Relationship Between Heritage and Borders**

Until recently, work on heritage and borders has focused primarily on either heritage sites *at* borders between countries or borders *as* heritage sites. In the first instance, the most written about case has been the case study of Preah Vihear (see, for example, Meskell 2016; Baaz and Lilja 2019; Silverman 2010), where a heritage site sits on a disputed border between Thailand and Cambodia and has resulted in skirmishes and tension, notably after UNESCO's World Heritage Committee looked favorably on Cambodia's nomination of the site and added it to the World Heritage List. In the second, borders, and in particular walls, have been explored as heritage sites, from Hadrian's Wall to the Great Wall of China to the Berlin Wall, but also those dividing cities, from Beirut to Belfast, Jerusalem to Nicosia (Calame and Charlesworth 2011). Of these, the Berlin Wall is particularly interesting; once a looming presence at the frontlines of the Cold War and subsequently chiseled down and commodified as its fragments became tourist souvenirs. Yet, research into its heritage dimensions indicates that the story is far more complicated, with tensions about how to maintain parts of the wall while also doing away with it (Schlör 2006; Bach 2016) and its place within the spatial heritage of Berlin (Dumont 2009; Baker 2005). The heritagization of no-go areas around such boundaries has also been explored in the cases of Berlin and the Green Line in Nicosia (Demetriou and Dimova 2019).

Both of these approaches also introduce a third one, which has more to do with temporal boundaries and the accumulated, at times contradictory, pasts of a site. This comes to the fore most explicitly in well-researched cases such as the Mosque of Cordoba, the Hagia Sophia of Istanbul, and the disputed religious site in Ayodhya, all with palimpsestic layers with different religious claims. All these borders are about demarcating separation, essentializing it in a way that simplifies difference—*us and them*—leaving little room for the ambiguity of overlapping similarities. Yet borders are not only stages for othering; they are also platforms where relationships are negotiated and aspirations for these relationships displayed. This makes the DMZ a unique case study, for here we find a collection of nearly 70 years'

accumulated markers that document the fluctuating tensions between the two halves of Korea. It remains a site in the making, invested with ideological, psychological, socio-political, and cultural meanings (see Gelézeau 2010).

Cultural heritage is not just a resource to be protected; it is a central element in the stories that society tells itself about itself and projects towards others—about its origins, character, future projects, values, and aspirations. This dual drive to project inwards in consolidating and maintaining a cohesive citizenry while simultaneously projecting an appealing and coherent image outwards is particularly evident at the edges—the transit zones and borders between nation-states, social groups or nations. In 2018, a conference and subsequent edited volume by Anna Källén at the University of Stockholm, entitled *Heritage and Borders* (Källén 2019), took the thinking on this further by bringing different perspectives on the topic into discussion. As our understanding of heritage has expanded, so have explorations of the value of heritage.

To understand the evolving heritage-scape of the Paju DMZ, it was essential to document not only when each element was first erected but also any resignification that each element went through, and in doing so, to chart changes in their use value, their affective value, and how these were being defined in relation to the rest of the heritage-scape. In discussing how to categorize the features that we were mapping, we sought to prioritize how these are currently being *presented* to the visiting public. However, a chronology indicating how this use changed over time is also indicated under the “date” column to account for the diachronic nature of these.

Twelve categories delineate most clearly the distinguishing characteristics of these elements, as follows: artwork, monument (for commemorating an historical event)/memorial (for mourning) (highlighting one or the other), diplomatic infrastructure, education facility, entertainment/leisure facility, military facility, transportation infrastructure, museum, park (outdoor exhibition), propaganda village, tourism facility (e.g., shop, visitor center), war materiel/war remains. For each phase of heritagization, we provide a table, including detailed information on the elements present in the Paju DMZ. One category, “symbolism,” is



extrapolated from an analysis of each element's visual/written contents.<sup>3</sup> In addition, a map visualizes the Paju DMZ heritage-scape, showing not only the distribution of elements but the phased history of the opening of each Paju DMZ tourism area, showing how the Paju DMZ heritage-scape has developed over time.<sup>4</sup>

### *Phase 1: Establishing a Political Theater (1954–1979)*

The first half of the 20th century saw seismic historical events on the Korean Peninsula: the Japanese colonial occupation of Korea (1910–1945), the division of the country at the 38th parallel (1945), US military rule (1945–1948), the establishment of the Republic of Korea (1948), and the Korean War (1950–1953). Immediately after Korea's liberation from imperial Japan, the ideological conflicts and the war between South and North Korea wrought the physical division of the peninsula, inflicted severe damage on both countries, and left Koreans culturally traumatized (Podoler 2011). The South Korean government had to overcome both domestic socio-political crises and poverty, competing with its counterpart in the North (H. Lee 2019). During his presidency (1963–1979), Park Chung-hee relied strongly on anticommunist rhetoric to support his nation-building process. Changes in the international political climate between the United States and the Soviet Union shaped Park's policies towards North Korea. The Korean Peninsula received particular attention as a frontline of the Cold War. In this

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3. This reflects the author's informed opinion; there will be nuances and degrees of difference in the interpretations of different audiences but they're outside this paper's scope.

4. Information in the table was collected from each element's official information panel, authored by stakeholders, including the Ministry of Military Defense and other South Korean government offices, the Paju municipal government, and the UN. Names written only in Korean have been translated by the authors. Where the official panel did not provide sufficient information, the authors supplemented this with archival research or by consulting civil officials. Seven elements with unknown years of establishment were excluded from this paper. These seven elements are as follows: US 187th Airborne Unit Memorial, Chronology- US Forces in the Korean War, Love of Country, Manghyang, My Country, and National Spirit in Imjingak Park, and Aspiration for Unification, Harmony, and Love in Unification Park (classified as monument/memorial).

atmosphere, the DMZ was considered a political symbol of the system of Korean division in the Cold War context (Chung and Kim 2021, 167). By analyzing the 17 components of the DMZ tour, we can better understand how Park Chung-hee endeavored to use the DMZ as a political stage from which to project South Korea’s anticommunist stance to the international community (see Table 1).

**Table 1.** List of Elements Forming the Paju DMZ (1953–1979)

No.	Name	Location	Year	Classification (use)	Language	Symbolism
1	Panmunjeom JSA (Joint Security Area)	JSA	1953.7.27, opened to international visitors from 1965	Diplomatic infrastructure	Korean English	Confrontation, division, Korean War
2	Freedom House	JSA	1965.9.30, renovated and reopened on 1998.7.9	Diplomatic infrastructure (JSA ‘hotline’ between North and South Korea)	Korean English	Inter-Korean communication
3	Bridge of No Return	JSA	1953	Originally War materiel; used as <b>monument</b> / memorial	Korean	POW repatriation, division, hope for reunification
4	Imjingak	Imjingak	1972; renovated in 2006; renovated again in 2022	Tourism facilities; park	Korean	Separated families, division, homesickness in the 1970s; reunification and security tourism, reconciliation, cooperation from 2006; peace and eco-park, hub for inter-Korean exchange in 2022
5	Bridge of Freedom	Imjingak	1953 Korean and UN soldiers were returned on this bridge; 1973 tour for Koreans and separated families	War materiel used as <b>monument</b> / memorial	None	Korean War, division, tragedy, repatriation, hope for unification and freedom

6	Dokgae Bridge	Imjingak	1906; damaged during the Korean War; opened to the public in the 1970s	War materiel, tourism site	Korean English	Division, Korean War, tragedy
7	Korean War Monument to US Forces	Imjingak	1975.10.3	Monument/ <b>memorial</b>	Korean English	Cold War, Korean War, US army (50 flags for 50 US states), anticommunism, commemoration, sacrifice
8	Statue of Harry S. Truman	Imjingak	1975.10.3	<b>Monument/</b> memorial	Korean English	Cold War, Korean War, the US alliance
9	Let the iron horse run again (The train's unscheduled halt)	Imjingak	1979.12.21	War materiel	Korean English	Korean War, desire for the reunification, connection, consoling anguish
10	Korean War Monument to the Battles along the Imjingang	Imjingak	1979.12.30	Monument/ <b>memorial</b>	Korean English	Korean War, Cold War, International War (UN), sacrifice, freedom, peace, anticommunism
11	Torch of Unification	Imjingak	1979.12.30	<b>Monument/</b> memorial	Korean	Reunification
12	Tongilchon Village (Unification Village in English, also called Jangdan Soybean Village)	Tongilchon	1973; opened to the public in 1997; part of a tour in 2002	Propaganda village	Korean English	Propaganda, security education, unification
13	Unification Park	Unification Park	1973.6	Park (outdoor exhibition)	Korean English	Unification
14	Statue of Second Lt. Kim Man-sul	Unification Park	1973.10.19	<b>Monument/</b> memorial	Korean English	Korean War, war hero
15	Korean War Correspondents Memorial Monument	Unification Park	1977	Monument/ <b>memorial</b>	Korean English	Korean War, war sacrifice
16	Third Tunnel tank	Third Tunnel	Discovered in 1970s, opened to the public as a tour site from 1998	War materiel	Korean	Korean War
17	Third Tunnel	Third Tunnel	1978.10.17; 1997 opened to the public	War remains used as <b>monument/</b> Memorial	Korean English	Anticommunism, invasion, hostility toward the North Korea, division



**Figure 3.** Map of the Paju DMZ Heritage-scape (1953–1979)

Source: Created by Sangseon Park and Dami Kim.



**Figure 4.** a. Korean War Monument to US Forces (July 2022), b. JSA (December 2011), c. statue of Harry S. Truman (July 2022)

Source: Hyun Kyung Lee (a, c) and Dacia Viejo-Rose (b).

The JSA was the first part of the DMZ to be turned into a tour site, opened from 1965 to 1970 to limited international visitors, such as for international summit participants, Korean War veterans, and overseas Koreans (Jeong and Yoon 2020, 61n73). From 1970, the JSA opened officially to international tourists. It was considered a core part of the DMZ, having witnessed significant events in the Korean War. Upon the signing here of the Korean Armistice Agreement on July 27, 1953, an 800-meter (2,600 ft)-wide enclave was built here, roughly circular in shape and bisected by the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) separating South and North Korea (Specia and Wallace 2018) (Fig. 4b). The provisions of the Korean Armistice Agreement established the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) to supervise the implementation of the truce terms, and meetings of MAC representatives from the United Nations Command (UNC) and the Korean People's Army/Chinese People's Volunteers (KPA/CPV) were held at the JSA. This area was administered by the UNC until 2004 (Ministry of Unification n.d.; Specia and Wallace 2018).<sup>5</sup>

At first, the JSA was created as a neutral area with free movement for both sides anywhere within its boundaries; it was the only part of the DMZ at which North and South Korean military forces could stand face to face. This ended in 1976 when the neutral area was segregated into northern and southern halves following an incident in which North Korean soldiers killed two US Army officers (Ministry of Unification, n.d.).

Within the JSA, the Freedom House, built in 1965 by the South Korean Military Association, was used as a tourism center (*Donga ilbo* 1965) (see Table 1). The Bridge of No Return, which had been used to exchange prisoners of war (POWs) under the 1953 Armistice, was deployed as a significant piece of Cold War evidence in the JSA (Table 1). With the JSA taking on the identity of Cold War heritage site, seeking to attract foreign visitors who wanted a taste of the Cold War confrontation, a series of cross-border incidents involving tourists occurred there during the 1960s and 1970s (Jeong and Yoon 2020, 62). Several international tour delegates

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5. Since 2004, the South Korean military has administered the JSA (Ministry of Unification n.d.).

attempted to illegally cross the border, with Sweden's ambassador in China defecting to North Korea via the JSA in 1966. Debates on defections in either direction sharpened both inter-Korean and international confrontations at the height of the Cold War (Jeong and Yoon 2020, 62).

Yet the JSA was quickly turned into a border of peace amid the inter-Korean political dialogue held in the build-up to the 1971 South–North Red Cross Conference and at the time of the Joint Communiqué of July 4, 1972 between South and North Korea (Chung and Kim 2021, 166). In the 1970s, US-Soviet détente brought about a degree of relaxation to inter-Korean tensions. In this mood, these two conferences held in the JSA created hope for unification. The 1971 South–North Red Cross Conference helped open communication channels between the South and North with the establishment of a hotline between the Freedom House (South) and Panmunjom (North) (Ministry of Unification n.d.). Hence, the Freedom House transformed from merely a tourism center to assume a new status as an inter-Korean liaison office. This 1971 conference also influenced the establishment of Tongilchon (Unification Village) in 1973 (Jeong and Yoon 2020, 63). President Park Chung-hee sought to establish this model village in the CCL to prepare for reunification.<sup>6</sup> Tongilchon symbolized South Korea's will for reunification while simultaneously serving as a propaganda tool in the competition with North Korea by emphasizing both civilian defense and effective food production (Jun and Lee 2017, 27). During this phase, Tongilchon was added to the Cold War heritage-scape, but it was not yet opened to the public as part of the DMZ tour.

The outcome of the 1972 Joint Communiqué increased hopes for unification, and in turn influenced the establishment of the Imjingak in 1972 as a place of mourning and consolation, but also one of hope for the reunion of families separated by the division of the peninsula (Jeong and Yoon 2020, 66). The first phase saw three wartime materials presented: the Bridge of Freedom, Dokgae Bridge (Fig. 10a), and the site known as “Let the iron horse run again.” Like the Bridge of No Return within the JSA, the Bridge of Freedom had been used for POW exchanges in 1953. The

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6. This according to the inscription on the village's cornerstone, as cited in Na (2014).

damaged Dokgae Bridge and the rusted train presented as “Let the iron horse run again” were material objects damaged during the Korean War, symbolizing the aspiration toward reconnection with North Korea while nevertheless serving as painful wartime evidence of that broken relationship. In addition, the three monuments and memorials all represented the US alliance with South Korea during the Korean War, and one emphasized South Korea’s will and hope for unification (e.g. Korean War Monument to the US Forces and the statue of Harry S. Truman) (Fig. 1a and Fig.1c). Near the Imjingak, Unification Park was also created in 1973, housing two monuments or memorials commemorating heroes of the Korean War.

While the Imjingak and Unification Park contributed to expanding the Cold War heritage-scape with the message of hope for unification, a different tone was struck by the discovery in 1978 of the Third Tunnel, one of four tunnels today known to have been excavated by North Korea beneath the border, extending south of the JSA. South Korea considered the tunnel’s creation an act of aggression on the North’s part, and thus the feature symbolized the unceasing tensions between North and South Korea during the Cold War period (Zartman 2001, 97).

As can be seen, during this first phase of the DMZ’s heritagization 17 components were in play, although only the JSA and the Imjingak were opened to tourists, and then only in limited numbers and subject to heavy control. Nevertheless, the period was one in which the DMZ heritage-scape was expanded to establish a political theater to illustrate fluctuating international and inter-Korean relationships. In addition, this heritage-scape shows how the DMZ was an unstable border whose meanings rapidly shifted between military and psychological confrontation on the one hand and aspiration for peaceful unification on the other, according to changes in the political climate.

### *Phase 2: Security Tour and Separated Families (1980–1997)*

During the second phase of heritagization (1980–1997), the DMZ tour was imbued with themes of security and anticommunism (Chung and Kim 2021, 165). Sixteen components were added to the DMZ heritage-scape in

this period: memorials/monuments in Imjingak and Unification Park, Dora Observatory, and the Peace House (Table 2). In particular, the erection of memorials and monuments concerning separated families (e.g., Mangbaedan Altar) strengthened South Korea's rationale for unification by emphasizing kinship and ethnic nationalism. This in turn contributed to reframing the emotional DMZ heritage-scape at the civil level.


**Table 2.** List of Elements Forming the Paju DMZ (1980–1997)

No.	Name	Location	Year	Classification (use)	Language	Symbolism
1	Dora Observatory (original)	Dora Observatory	Completed in 1986, opened in 1987	Tourism facility,	Korea English	Reunification, communication, reconciliation, division
2	Korean War Monument of the Second Infantry Division of the US Army	Imjingak Park	1981.11.24	Monument/ <b>memorial</b>	Korean English	Korean War, Cold War, international War, sacrifice (US military)
3	Monument for the song of Hwang Jin Yi	Imjingak Park	1982.5	<b>Monument/</b> memorial (poem composed by a famous gisaeng during the Joseon dynasty)	Korean classical Chinese	Enjoying art and love
4	Diplomatic Martyrs Memorial Tower	Imjingak Park	1984.10.5	Monument/ <b>memorial</b>	Korean English	Death, Cold War, terror, patriotism, sacrifice
5	Mangbaedan Altar	Imjingak Park	1985.9.26	<b>Monument/</b> memorial	Korean English Chinese Japanese	Anticommunism, anticolonialism, reunification, homesickness, separated families
6	Monument to victims of Gimpo International Airport bombing	Imjingak Park	1987.12.20	Monument/ <b>memorial</b>	Korean	Cold War, sacrifice, anticommunism, North-South Korea, commemoration



7	With Gyeongju	Imjingak Park	1990.7.30	<b>Monument/</b> memorial	Korean	Korean national symbols (flower and flag), patriotism
8	Monument of Peaceful Reunification	Imjingak Park	1990.7.30	<b>Monument/</b> memorial	Classical Chinese	Peace, reunification, patriotism
9	Purpose statement	Imjingak Park	1990.7.30	<b>Monument/</b> memorial	Korean	National spirit, patriotism, harmony, solidarity
10	Pagoda of the National Spirit	Imjingak Park	1990.7.30	<b>Monument/</b> Memorial	Korean	National spirit, patriotism, March First Independence Movement
11	30 Years Lost	Imjingak Park	1995.10.2	<b>Monument/</b> memorial	Korean English	Separated families, UNESCO Memory of the World, homesickness, reunification
12	Imjingak Station sign	Imjingak Park	1997	Originally war material; used as <b>monument/</b> memorial	Korean	Division, hope for unification
13	Peace House	JSA	1989.12.19	Diplomatic infrastructure	Korean English	Peace summit, peace communication (civilian)
14	Ten Suicide Bombers Memorial Tower	Unification Park	1980.5.23	Monument/ <b>memorial</b>	Korean English	Korean War, Cold War, sacrifice
15	Memorial to Col. Lee Yu-jung	Unification Park	1981.12.23	Monument/ <b>memorial</b>	Korean English	Korean War, heroism
16	Gaema Plateau Anticommunist Commando Memorial Tower	Unification Park	1987.6.25	Monument/ <b>memorial</b>	Korean English	Korean War, anticommunism, sacrifice

In 1980, the JSA tour was officially opened to both international and domestic tourists for security education purposes (Ministry of the National Defense 2018). While the JSA attracted tourists from far and wide, with South Korea keen to showcase its anticommunist endeavors in the midst of the Cold War, the Imjingak and Unification Park also strengthened their official narratives of national security concerning the US alliance, war, and



**Figure 5.** Map of the Paju DMZ Heritage-scape (1980–1997)

Source: Created by Sangseon Park and Dami Kim.



**Figure 6.** a. Mangbaedan Altar (July 2022), b. Dora Observatory (May 2018), c. Monument to victims of the Gimpo International Airport bombing (July 2022)

Source: Hyun Kyung Lee.

war heroes (e.g., through the Korean War Monument of the Second Infantry Division of the US Army in 1981 and the Imjingak Gaema Plateau Anticommunist Commando Memorial Tower in Unification Park in 1987) (see Table 2).

In order to better understand the role of national security rhetoric during the presidency of Chun Doo-hwan (1980–1997), two memorials are worth noting: the Diplomatic Martyrs Memorial Tower, erected in 1984, and the monument to victims of the Gimpo International Airport bombing, erected in 1987 at the Imjingak (Fig. 6c). The former commemorates 17 South Korean diplomatic officials killed by a North Korean bomb near the Martyrs' Mausoleum during President Chun's trip to Rangoon, Myanmar on October 9, 1983. The latter memorial was built to commemorate those killed or injured in an explosion at South Korea's Gimpo International Airport in 1986. Both these historic acts of terrorism represented not only North Korea's aggression against South Korea, but also the unceasing Korean War. These new memorials projected the significance of national security and anticommunism to both domestic and international society, at a time that President Chun, who had illegally seized power in 1980, was seeking to strengthen national security rhetoric in order to legitimize the military power that, he asserted, enabled him to protect South Korea from unexpected attack from the North during the unstable Cold War period.<sup>7</sup>

Meanwhile, monuments, memorials, and new facilities were also built for separated families, conveying a powerful message of hope for unification (see Table 2). In order to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of the armistice, the special live broadcast program *Finding Dispersed Families* was aired by the Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) from June 30 to November 14, 1983 (UNESCO n.d.). The program proved a national sensation: originally scheduled to air for 95 minutes, it ultimately ran for a total of 453 hours and 45 minutes over 138 days, broadcasting requests for help to reconnect family

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7. Both President Park Chung-hee and President Chun Doo-hwan tried to justify the country's military dictatorship by citing North Korea's threat to South Korea, though some putative threats by the North were later proven to be operations by the South Korean government meant to strengthen South Koreans' reliance on a powerful military government. See for example, Jeong (2022).

members separated by the Korean War (Cultural Heritage Administration n.d.). In this context, Mangbaedan Altar was established in 1985 at the Imjingak in order to provide a place where citizens could honor and perform the ancestral rites for parents and other ancestors they had left behind in North Korea (M. Kim 2020) (Fig. 6a). Ancestor worship is one of the most significant of Korea's Confucian traditions and happens mainly on Lunar New Year's Day and the Full Moon Festival (Chuseok). This altar gave expression to separated families' earnest desire to unify the motherland, and evoked South Koreans' collective sentiment of the nation as "one blood and one family" (M. Kim 2020). Thus, it helped build in South Korean society a powerful rationale for reunification based on kinship.

In addition, in an effort to ease these families' pain, the Dora Observatory was erected in the Paju DMZ in 1986 and opened in 1987, run by the First Division of the South Korean army during this second phase in the development of the Paju DMZ heritage-scape (Chi et al. 2018, 612; Jeong and Yoon 2020, 70) (Fig. 6b). During this second phase, the government built nine observatories in the DMZ Region; these were beloved by separated families suffering from homesickness (Chi et al. 2018). South Korean sociologist Jeong Geun Sik pinpointed the significant role of observatories in the context of the DMZ border tour as places that helped visitors not only to "observe" the frontier beyond the border, but also to "prospect" the positive future of unification, beyond the current reality of division (Jeong and Yoon 2020, 70). Due to its location, at the northernmost point of the MDL on the western front, the Dora Observatory attracted both separated families and foreign visitors, especially those to the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul, as the site provided a viewpoint from which visitors could glimpse North Korean military facilities and the lives of ordinary North Koreans in Kaesong City (Jeong and Yoon 2020, 71).

While two key terms, *national security* and *separated families*, thus dominated the DMZ heritage-scape in the 1980s, the international mood of peace also influenced the planning of the Paju DMZ's heritage-scape into the 1990s. In the late 1980s, the Cold War system began to collapse, as indexed by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, German reunification in 1990, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Amid the international

proclamation of the end of the Cold War, the word “peace” emerged as a key theme in the DMZ. In a speech before the UN General Assembly in 1988, South Korean President Roh Tae-woo (1988–1993) officially suggested “constructing a peaceful city in the DMZ” (Chung and Kim 2021, 166). In turn, South Korea made further efforts to expand the inter-Korean peace dialogue by completing the Freedom House in 1989 (Ministry of National Defense 2018) (Table 2). Subsequently, President Kim Young-sam (1993–1998) endeavored to create the DMZ Eco Park in cooperation with North Korea, and with support from the United National Environmental Program (UNEP) and International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) (E. Park 2013, 236–238; Ryu 2015, 32). These efforts might have provided firm ground for building up the DMZ *security and peace* tour during the third phase of the Paju DMZ heritage-scape. The Cold War was ongoing on the Korean Peninsula in the 1990s, and the frozen inter-Korean relationship meant the DMZ tour and heritage-scape would continue its focus on national security and anticommunism rather than peace (Chung and Kim 2021, 166).

### *Phase 3: Security and Peace Tour (1998–2008)*

During the first and second phases, the DMZ heritage-scape was constructed, and some parts of the DMZ area were opened to visitors. Only limited numbers of tourists were allowed to enter the DMZ, however, and no systematic DMZ tour route was operated. The third phase (1998–2008) saw milestones concerning the development of South Korean package tourism and the broad promotion of security and peace education to international and domestic visitors (Chung and Kim 2021, 169; C. Lee 2020, 56). Thirty components were added to the DMZ heritage-scape, transforming its main narrative from a tense and frozen Cold War border into a border for reconciliation and peace (see Table 3).

These dramatic changes stemmed from South Korea’s Sunshine Policy (or Comprehensive Engagement Policy towards North Korea) initiated by President Kim Dae-jung (1998–2003) in 1998 and continued by Rho Moo-hyun (2003–2008) (K. Son 2006, 1), which sought to embrace North Korea,

and ultimately encourage North Korea's spontaneous disarmament (Kim Hogarth 2012, 99–100). The Sunshine Policy stimulated active cultural and economic exchanges between the two Koreas, which enhanced their mutual relations in various ways (Paik 2002; K. Son 2006).

Under the Sunshine Policy, South Korea's endeavors to increase economic cooperation with North Korea were assisted by Jung Joo-young (1915–2001), the legendary founder and chairman of Hyundai Group, who was born to an impoverished family in what is now North Korea. In 1998, he herded 1,001 cows through the DMZ to North Korea, which he claimed was a repayment a thousand times over for a cow he took when he escaped his father's farm (Chang 2021). Jung's "1001 unification cows" visit to North Korea was the first case since 1953 of a civilian entering North Korea through the JSA (Little Korea 1998) and a monumental event that paved the way for civilian exchanges between the two Koreas (Chang 2021).

Following Jung Joo-young's endeavors to normalize inter-Korea relations, the first inter-Korean summit took place in 2000 in Pyongyang, North Korea. This summit drew international and domestic attention to the hope for peaceful reunification, meaning an end to the Cold War and North Korea's nuclear threat (S. Kim 2018). While the peace winds blew through the long-frozen DMZ borderland, inter-Korean cultural and economic exchanges were activated: from 2002, South Koreans were permitted to visit Mt. Geumgang (Kumgang) in North Korea;<sup>8</sup> the same year, South Korean companies employed North Korean workers in constructing the Kaesong Industrial Complex (National Institute for Unification Education 2015; Encyclopedia of Korean Culture n.d.).

Meanwhile, public interest in the DMZ sharply increased. President Kim Dae-jung promoted the DMZ tour (Chung and Kim 2021, 169), promulgating the Borderland Promotion Law in 2000 to extend tour routes in the DMZ Region (Chung and Kim 2021, 168–169). President Kim's

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8. Mt. Geumgang sightseeing excursions started via a tourist ship in 1998 when Jung Joo-young visited the North. Significant time and resources were invested to make it possible to visit Mt. Geumgang and promote the tour; the South Korean government opened the land route in 2002 (National Institute for Unification Education 2015).

Sunshine Policies were taken up by his successor President Roh Moo-hyun, who pursued grand plans to develop DMZ tourism through the Ten-year Comprehensive Plan for the Borderland (2003), Borderland Peace Tourism Belt Plan (2004), and Strategies for the Peace and Life Zone (PLZ) Tour (2007) (Chung and Kim 2021, 169–170).

While DMZ tourism was closely linked to the term *peace* under the Sunshine Policy, the Paju DMZ area was spotlighted as a symbol of peace through the planned reconnection of the Pyongyang–Seoul rail service through Dorasan Station. Immediately after the 2000 Inter-Korea Summit, construction commenced to restore the broken Gyeongui Line, with Dorasan Station opening as a DMZ tour spot on April 2, 2002, just before the 2002 Korea–Japan World Cup (Table 3). This station was built to catalyze tourism around this mega sports event and to project South Korea’s vision after unification as a trade hub connecting the a reunified Korea, China, and Russia. As manifested by the motto, “Not the last station from the South, but the first station toward the North,” displayed at Dorasan Station, this station symbolized the change from fractured inter-Korean relations toward eventual Korean reunification. Inside Dorasan Station is also exhibited the “Map of the Eurasian rail network after unification,” implying the potential of Korean reunification to expand a unified Korean network towards Europe (Fig. 8a).<sup>9</sup>

This place’s symbolic meanings concerning reconciliation and cooperation between North and South Korea were internationally acknowledged by US President George Bush’s 2002 visit to Dorasan Station, where he officially announced the US’s support and will to restore the Gyeongui Line (H. Park 2002). Not merely a symbolic gesture, the station’s opening saw freight trains travelling between the two Koreas every weekday in 2007, shipping freight to the Kaesong Industrial Complex and returning with finished goods (Ministry of Unification n.d.). The station complex also housed Dorasan Peace Park, constructed during 2006–2008 under the national Dorasan Peace Tourism Belt project to make the Paju DMZ area also symbolic of “peace” (S. Kim 2004). Dorasan Station reflected how,

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9. This description of Dorasan Station is based on the authors’ site visit of May 1, 2018.

under the Sunshine Policy, the idea of peace carried connotations of development and incorporation with North Korea.

Meanwhile, President Roh actively promoted the politics of decentralization and regionalization, enabling each province to propose tourism plans for the DMZ Region (Chung and Kim 2021, 170). The Gyeonggi provincial government, which governed the Paju DMZ, championed a World Peace Zone (WPZ) project to form a peace belt between Paju and Kaesong, aspiring to convert the region into a global symbol of peace and reconciliation (S. Kim 2004). The Gyeonggi provincial government and Paju municipal government collaborated to promote Paju DMZ tourism (Chung and Kim 2021, 170–172), with the municipal authority, inherited from the Korean Veterans Association, having the right to run what had been the Paju DMZ security tour, now rebranded a “peace and security tour” (Jeong and Yoon 2020, 70; J. Kim 2022). Since 2002, Dorasan Station and Tongilchon village have featured in one of the most popular Paju DMZ tour routes: Imjingak à Third Tunnel à Dora Observatory à Dorasan Station or Tongilchon Village à JSA.

During this third phase, Imjingang Station was constructed in 2001 to facilitate visitor access to Imjingak. Whereas war memorials had dominated Imjingak in the first and second phases, peace and reunification-themed monuments, such as the Peace Bell and the Stones of Peace Wall now appeared here. The Imjingak complex was extended in 2005 with the construction of the nearly 300,000-square-meter Pyeonghwa-Nuri (Peace World), and an outdoor stage and artistic works with a peace theme (Peace-Harmony Memorial and the Hill of Wind) (Table 3). These artistic works, showcasing diverse colors, materials, and forms, mark the emergence of new types of monuments/memorials with which the public might more easily engage. It is also interesting to note the opening in 2001 of Peace Land, an amusement park, and Peace Train, a ride, in Imjingak (Fig. 8c). Whereas earlier development phases in Imjingak had stressed serious political messages, such as anticommunism and the tragedy of the Cold War, these purely leisure and entertainment facilities illustrate the expansion of the Paju DMZ’s Cold War heritage-scape to incorporate commodified tourist purposes under the rubric of *peace*.



**Table 3.** List of Elements Forming the Paju DMZ (1998–2008)

No.	Name	Location	Year	Classification (use)	Language	Symbolism
1	Dorasan Station	Dorasan Station	Constructed 2000–2002	Transportation infrastructure, also used as <b>monument</b> / memorial	Korean English	Reunification, inter-Korean cooperation, development, peace
2	Dorasan Peace Park	Dorasan Station	Planned 2002; constructed 2006–2008	Park (outdoor exhibition)	Korean English	Peace, ecology
3	Statue of Mugunghwa Garden	Imjingak Park	1999.3.5	<b>Monument</b> / memorial	Korean	Korean national symbols (flower and flag) patriotism, national spirit, female power, anti-Japanese sentiment
4	Stones of Peace Wall (stones from 86 battlefields worldwide)	Imjingak Park	2000.1.1	<b>Monument</b> / memorial	Korean English	War, international peace
5	Re-examination of Mugunghwa History	Imjingak Park	2000.1.20	<b>Monument</b> / memorial	Korean	Korean national symbols (flower and flag) patriotism, anti-Japanese sentiment, national spirit
6	Mugunghwa Garden	Imjingak Park	2000.1.20	<b>Monument</b> / memorial	Korean	Korean national symbols (flower and flag) patriotism, national spirit, female power, anti-Japanese sentiment
7	Ground for New Millennium	Imjingak Park	2000.6.25	<b>Monument</b> / memorial	Korean English	Korean War, peace, reunification, future
8	Memorial to Chamorro troops who were attached to the US Army and served in the Korean War	Imjingak Park	2000.10.5	Monument/ <b>memorial</b> (US army list of names)	Korean English	Korean War, Cold War

8	Peace Bell	Imjingak Park	2000	<b>Monument/</b> memorial	Korean	Peace, tolling a bell for reunification
9	Pyeonghwa Land (Peace Land)	Imjingak Park	2001.5.1	Entertainment/ leisure (amusement park)	Korean English	Tourism, commodification
10	Peace Train	Imjingak Park	2001.5.1	Leisure/ entertainment	Korean English	Tourism, commodification, connection
11	Memorial to 247 Japanese-American troops	Imjingak Park	2001.5	Monument / Memorial	Korean English	Korean War, Cold War, US alliance
12	DMZ gift shop	Imjingak Park	2006 (with Imjingak renovation)	Tourism facilities (souvenir shop)	Korean English	Tourism, commodification, produce grown in the DMZ (wine, honey, bean chocolate), military apparel and camouflage
13	Candlelight Pavilion	Imjingak Pyeonghwa-Nuri	2005.8.1 (P)	Museum	Korean English	Children, world peace, unity
14	Pyeonghwa-Nuri outdoor stage (Hill of Music)	Imjingak Pyeonghwa-Nuri	2005	Entertainment/ leisure	Korean English	Tourism (concerts), pop culture, peace
15	Hill of Wind	Imjingak Pyeonghwa-Nuri	2005	Artwork	Korean English	Peace, reunification (freedom of movement between the two Koreas)
16	Peace-harmony	Imjingak Pyeonghwa-Nuri	2006.3.1	<b>Monument/</b> memorial	Korean	Reunification, peace
17	Call for Unification	Imjingak Pyeonghwa-Nuri	2007	Artwork	Korean English	Call for unification
18	Imjingang Station	Imjingang Station	2001.9.30	Transportation infrastructure	Korean English	Tourism, connection, hope for reconciliation
19	Monument of poem 'ceasefire line'	Imjingang Station	2001.11	<b>Monument/</b> memorial	Korean	Korean War, separation, pain

20	Unification Bridge (North Gate)	Paju DMZ	1998.6.15	Transportation infrastructure	Korean English	Reunification, peace, connection
21	Third Tunnel military police mockup	Third Tunnel	2002	Tourism facilities	None	Division, security
22	Third Tunnel gift shop	Third Tunnel	2002	Tourism facilities	Korean English	Commodification, tourism, local products, ecology
23	Unifying the Earth	Third Tunnel	2002.5.30	Artwork	None	Reunification, international peace, connection towards Europe and the world
24	DMZ Theater and exhibition hall	Third Tunnel	2002.5.31 (renovated 2019–2021)	Education facilities	Korean English	Korean War, Cold War, anticommunism and security education, ecosystem, war tragedy, efforts towards reunification, development of the inter-Korean relationship
25	DMZ Pavilion	Third Tunnel	2002.5.31.	Education facilities	Korean English	Anticommunism and security education
26	Third Tunnel mockup	Third Tunnel	2002.6.30	Tourism facilities	Korean English Chinese Japanese	Division, North Korean invasion, security education
27	Third Tunnel walkway	Third Tunnel	2004.6	Tourism facilities	Korean English	Security education
28	Third Tunnel garden	Third Tunnel	2005.12.20	Tourism facilities	Korean English	Tourism, rest
29	Third Tunnel garden waterwheel	Third Tunnel	2005.12.20	Tourism facilities	Korean English Chinese Japanese	Tradition, tourism
30	Third Tunnel garden deer water fountain	Third Tunnel	2005.12.20	Tourism facilities	None	Ecology, peace, unification




Figure 7. Map of the Paju DMZ Heritage-scape (1998–2008)

Source: Created by Sangseon Park and Dami Kim.




Figure 8. a. Platform in Dorasan Station (May 2018), b. Unifying the Earth (July 2022), c. Pyeonghwa Land (July 2022), d. Mugunghwa Statue (July 2022)

Source: Hyun Kyung Lee.

Two further third-phase developments merit attention. The first concerns monuments/memorials relating to anti-colonialism and nationalism formed in 2000 as the Mugunghwa Garden at the Imjingak. The *mugunghwa* (Rose of Sharon) is the Korean national flower, a symbolic “flower that blooms forever and never fades” (National Archives of Korea n.d.). In this garden, the *mugunghwa* is showcased to emphasize Korea’s survival during the Japanese colonial rule over Korea (1910–1945) (Fig. 8d).<sup>10</sup> With many historians tracing the roots of Korea’s division to the Japanese colonial period, the garden’s anti-colonial message might signal to South Koreans that inter-Korean reunification may be achieved by overcoming the Japanese colonial period.

Second, the Third Tunnel site juxtaposes North Korea’s aggression and threat with South Korea’s national pride and confidence in protecting itself from North Korea. The Third Tunnel was first opened to the public in 1997 (Table 1) and become a tourist site from 2002. Popular in national security education initiatives, the tunnel and the nearby DMZ Theater and Exhibition Hall present material evidence of North Korea’s attempts to invade South Korea in the 1970s (Table 3). At the same time, the site’s mock-up depicting powerful South Korean soldiers and a scientific analysis of the Third Tunnel can be interpreted as representing South Korea’s confidence to achieve peaceful unification despite North Korea’s warmongering.

#### *Phase 4: Security, Peace, Ecology, and Cultural Tour (2009–present)*

The inter-Korean climate of peace changed again in 2008 after a North Korean soldier at Mt. Geumgang shot dead a South Korean tourist who had accidentally crossed into a military area (Watts 2008). It was the first death of a civilian at the hands of a North Korean soldier and halted South Korean tourism at Mt. Geumgang (Ministry of Unification n.d.). Rail services to Kaesong via Dorasan Station ended in 2008 (Ministry of Unification n.d.). The inauguration of the conservative Lee Myung-bak as the South Korean

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10. According to information panel at Mugunghwa Garden, observed during authors’ fieldwork on July 21, 2022.

president in 2008 ended the Sunshine Policy. During the presidencies of Lee and his conservative successor Park Geun-hye (2013–2017), inter-Korean economic and cultural exchanges deteriorated, with military confrontations in 2010 and the suspension of the Kaesong Industrial Complex in 2016 (Chung and Kim 2021, 172). Despite the collapse of economic and cultural cooperation between the two Koreas, the Paju DMZ tour was facilitated and well supported by collaboration between the South Korean government, the Gyeonggi provincial government, and the Paju municipal government (Chung and Kim 2021, 172–173). In this phase, a total of 52 components were added to the Paju DMZ heritage-scape, and the main themes of the Paju DMZ tour developed from security and peace to that of security, peace, ecology, and culture.

During this fourth phase, the development of the Paju DMZ tour and the formation of the Paju DMZ heritage-scape related not to separated families or the inter-Korean relationship, but to national and local tourism development. In 2011, the South Korean government passed the Border Area Support Special Law, enabling central and municipal governments to initiate new DMZ Region tourist policies and to deregulate central control over the DMZ Region (Chung and Kim 2021, 173). The term “peace” in connection with the Paju DMZ was now no longer linked to inter-Korean cooperation and reconciliation but to ecology and nature. Ecology and nature in the Paju DMZ frequently symbolize resilience, the strength to survive war, and the frozen inter-Korean relationship; correspondingly, the Paju municipal government created an eco-tourism trail in the Imjingak area to attract local residents and domestic tourists (Paju Municipal Government 2021). In addition, President Park Geun-hye proposed the DMZ World Ecology and Peace Park project at the UN General Assembly in 2014, presenting this park as a starting point to bridging nature and people in the two Koreas (Heo 2017). Her proposal was internationally welcomed, even by China (Kai 2014), and also spurred domestic tourism plans, including the Korea Ecology and Peace Belt Project (2013–2022) as well as a 2013 collaborative peace-belt plan to facilitate Korea’s ecology and cultural tourism (Chung and Kim 2021, 173).

Against this backdrop, the Paju municipal government began to host an

annual art competition (2010–2017) themed around “peace and unification,” with selected winning works installed in Pyeonghwa-Nuri Park, Imjingak (for example, ‘Now on My Way to Meet You’ and ‘Hope Tree’ in 2011 and ‘Water-History’ in 2015). Some artworks were related to ecology, such as ‘Coexistence’ in 2010 and “Revival-Buck” in 2012, emphasizing the power of nature, such as animals living in the DMZ that could freely move across the border. At the Imjingak, the “Mulberry on the Steam Locomotive” was displayed in 2009, symbolizing the power of nature to survive war and the hope for unification (Table 5). Compared to earlier phases, more war materials were now exhibited in both Imjingak Park and Pyeonghwa-Nuri Park: the steam locomotive at Jangdan Station on the Gyeongui Line was designated as a Registered Cultural Heritage property in 2004 and put on display in 2009, while the damaged Dokgae Bridge, which had symbolized war trauma and division, was renovated to build a Dokgae Bridge skywalk and souvenir shop in 2016 (Table 5 and Fig. 10b). Pertinently, Camp Greaves, a US military base built in 1953 and decommissioned in 2004, reverted to South Korean government control in 2007 and was converted into a history and cultural experiential facility in 2013, used as a youth camp and filming location, and has been centered as a peace and cultural tourism site in the Paju DMZ (Gyeonggi Province 2021). In line with national and local policies, in this phase the Paju DMZ heritage-scape was expanded to incorporate art, ecology, and culture themes, while not directly narrating themes of anticommunism or war trauma. Compared to the initial three phases, the visual representation of the Paju DMZ has undergone a transformation from the utilization of military and war materiel (hard power) to the incorporation of cultural, natural, and artistic resources (soft power). This has helped to change the Korean popular perception of the Paju DMZ from that of a serious site for security and military education to an ordinary dating or picnicking spot. In turn, the Paju DMZ is now able to embrace a wide range of visitors, including those who visit for fun and entertainment.

While the Paju DMZ area developed into one of the most important tourist sites in South Korea despite the frigid inter-Korean relationship, an atmosphere of peace descended again on the Paju DMZ in 2018. The 2018

inter-Korean summit took place on the South Korean side of the JSA, between South Korea's liberal president, Moon Jae-in and the supreme leader of North Korea, Kim Jong-un. When they met at the JSA, they crossed the DMZ border with big smiles; the scene showed just how easy crossing this border is and how immediate reunification might be. Detailed discussions were held in the Peace House on denuclearization, peace establishment, and improving inter-Korean relations (S. Kim 2018). Immediately after the summit, tourist numbers in the Paju DMZ surged, with international and domestic attention perceiving the Paju DMZ as a tourist site and a significant Cold War and Korean War heritage site. Yet the mood of peace was short-lived, disappearing after the failure of the 2019 North Korea–US summit in Hanoi. Regardless of the shifting political mood, the Gyeonggi provincial government and Paju municipal government sought to further promote the Paju DMZ tour by opening the Civil Control Zone (CCZ) to tourists and expanding the Imjingak tourism site across the Imjin River (Fig. 9).

As seen in the periods 2010–2017 and 2019–present, the frozen inter-Korean relationship did not hamper the Paju DMZ tour or the formation of the Paju DMZ heritage-scape. The provincial and municipal government's tourism initiatives proceeded as planned, completed in 2020, and a new Dora Observatory was opened in 2018, along with installations by international artists (such as 'One Two Three Swing!'). The Paju DMZ tour was suspended during the COVID-19 pandemic. Still, new facilities and infrastructure were built, and when the Paju DMZ tour partly resumed in 2022, a new Paju Imjingak Peace Gondola brought tourists to the newly opened CCZ. It is worth noting that the new components in the CCZ do not showcase profound peace and reunification messages. Rather, they provide scenic spots for tourists to photograph the landscape of North Korea.

Commodification and commercialization characterized the development of the Paju DMZ tour and heritage-scape during its fourth phase. With the Paju municipal government managing the Paju DMZ tour, souvenir shops in Imjingak, the Third Tunnel, and Tongilchon village showcase local produce: chocolate and ice cream made from the Jangdan bean grown in Tongilchon village and wine and honey cultivated in the



DMZ Region (Fig. 10d). Retailers emphasize that cultivation in the DMZ means the ingredients are uncontaminated (by industrial or human activity). Nature and ecology are rendered consumable under the term *well-being*. In this context, the Paju DMZ heritage-scape reflects Paju city’s desire for economic development, often stymied by the strict national security discourse. The Paju DMZ heritage-scape is now being developed with *peace branding* promoted by the Paju municipal government. Hence, the commodification of the Paju DMZ area has been accelerated, and *peace* now bears connotations of local economic development and tourism.

It is worth noting why the Paju DMZ’s heritage-scape was extended, developed, and commodified regardless of the inter-Korean relationship. During the first three stages considered here, the messages and visual representations that formed the heritage-scape were deeply responsive to the inter-Korean relationship. However, the fourth stage has shown a different trajectory, one in which the Paju DMZ has developed predominantly not in response to political and governmental agendas, but to economic and local desires. This is related to the strengthened local power to manage the Paju DMZ, and the local government has endeavored to shift the emphasis of Paju DMZ’s heritage-scape from the political and military-scape dimension to the cultural and eco-scape. In addition, many members of separated families have now died, and the number of Koreans who are emotionally attached to inter-Korean reunification and reconciliation has been decreasing. Hence, the new generation is more attracted to the present commodified Paju DMZ heritage-scape than to its former emotional and military-focused heritage-scape.

**Table 4.** List of Elements Forming the Paju DMZ (2009–present)


No.	Name	Location	Year	Classification (use)	Language	Symbolism
1	Dora Observatory (new)	Dora Observatory	2018.10.22	Tourism facilities	Korean English	Reunification, communication, reconciliation, division

2	Dora Observatory sign	Dora Observatory	2018.10.22	Tourism facilities	Korean	Reunification, communication, reconciliation, division
3	Dorasan Bongsudae (beacon tower) mockup	Dora Observatory	2018.10.22	Artwork	Korean English Chinese Japanese	Symbol of Dora Bongsu (beacon – traditional heritage)
4	One Two Three Swing!	Dora Observatory	2019	Artwork	Korean English	Border-crossing, collective power/ reconciled power, international collaboration
5	Dorasan Unification Platform	Dorasan Station	2015.10.14	Monument/ memorial	Korean English	Reunification, connection
6	Unification of North and South Museum	Dorasan Station	2015.10.14	Museum	Korean English	German reunification, reunification, reconciliation, and peace
7	Camp Greaves	CCZ near Imjingak	1953 à 2013	War materiel; tourism facilities (converted into youth camp, filming location)	Korean English	War, division. tourism, US alliance
8	Gallery Greaves (bowling alley)	Imjingak (CCZ)	1953 à 2020	War materiel; converted into museum (art gallery)	Korean English	US alliance, artistic work for peace and unification
9	Aircraft warning panel markers	Imjingak (CCZ)	1953.7 (displayed in 2020)	War materiel used as <b>monument</b> / Memorial	Korean	US alliance, Korean War, division, Cold War
10	Pyeonghwajeong	Imjingak (CCZ)	2020	Tourism facilities (Korean traditional shelter)	Korean	Peace, rest, tourism
11	Imjin River Peace Lighthouse	Imjingak (CCZ)	2020	<b>Monument</b> / memorial	Korean English	Peace, inter-Korean relationships, tourism
12	Slow mailbox for unification	Imjingak (CCZ)	2020	<b>Monument</b> / memorial	Korean English	Unification, peace, tourism
13	Foot bridge	Imjingak (CCZ)	2020	Originally war materiel; used as commemorative monument	Korean	Peace, tourism

14	First Observatory	Imjingak (CCZ)	2020	Tourism facilities	None	Peace and reunification, tourism
15	Mulberry on the Steam Locomotive	Imjingak Park	2009	<b>Monument/</b> memorial	Korean English Chinese Japanese	Hope (plant that grew in the DMZ after the Korean War)
16	Steam Locomotive at Jangdan Station of the Gyeongui Line outdoor exhibition center	Imjingak Park	2009.6.25	Museum (outdoor exhibition)	Korean English Chinese	Ribbons symbolize hope for reunification
17	Steam Locomotive at Jangdan Station on the Gyeongui Line	Imjingak Park	1950.12.3; designated registered heritage property in 2004, displayed in 2009	War materiel	Korean English Chinese Japanese	Division, Korean War, war tragedy
18	Korean War Veterans Memorial	Imjingak Park	2011.6.25	Monument/ <b>memorial</b>	Korean English	Patriotism, sacrifice, Korean War, military
19	BEAT 131 bunker exhibition	Imjingak Park	2013.3	Museum (exhibition)	Korean English	Korean War, Cold War, international war, North Korean soldiers
20	Imjingak shelter	Imjingak Park	2013.7.29	Military facility	Korean	Military
21	Imjingak slow mailbox for unification	Imjingak Park	2016.11.29	<b>Monument/</b> memorial	Korean English	Peace, unification, tourism
22	Dokgae Bridge souvenir shop	Imjingak Park	2016	Tourism facilities (souvenir shop)	Korean English	Commodification, tourism
23	Dokgae Bridge Skywalk	Imjingak Park	2016	War materiel; used as <b>monument/</b> memorial, tourism facilities from 2016 (skywalk)	Korean English	Division, Korean, War tragedy, new lane towards peace
24	National Memorial Hall of Korean War Abductees	Imjingak Park	2017.11.29	Museum	Korean English	Korean War, separated families, peace and reunification, human rights, anticommunism
25	Imjingangbyeon Eco Trail Information Center	Imjingak Park	2018	Tourism facilities	Korean	Ecology, peace


26	Information board of DMZ Peace Trail	Imjingak Park	2018	Tourism facilities (visitor information services)	Korean	Peace trail, ecology
27	Information board of Peace History Tour	Imjingak Park	2018	Tourism facilities (Visitor information services)	Korean	Peace history, tourism
28	Statue of Peace Toward the Reunification of Korea	Imjingak Park	2019.4.27	<b>Monument/</b> memorial (comfort women in North and South Korea)	Korean English	Anti-war and Japanese sentiments, reunification, peace
29	FourB DMZ (cafe)	Imjingak Park	2019.4.30	Tourism facilities	Korean	Tourism, commodification
30	Paju Imjingak Peace Gondola	Imjingak Park	2020.1.29	Tourism facilities	Korean	Tourism, commodification
31	One Korea Peace Railway	Imjingak Park	2021.11.19	<b>Monument/</b> memorial	Korean	Connection, reunification, peace, prosperity, Eurasia (3rd anniversary of Panmunjom Declaration in 2018)
32	Korean Peninsula Ecological Peace Tourism Information Centre	Imjingak Park	2022.8.8	Tourism facility (visitor center)	Korean English	Ecology, nature, tourism, peace
33	DMZ Live	Imjingak Park	2022.8.8	Tourism facility (visitor center)	Korean English	Tourism, peace, nature, ecology
34	Sotdaejeip	Imjingak Pyeonghwa-Nuri	2009	Artwork	Korean English	Growing desire for peace and stability, Korean shamanism (sotdae)
35	Korean War Children's Memorial	Imjingak Pyeonghwa-Nuri	2010.9.4	Monument/ <b>memorial</b>	Korean English	Korean War, child victims
36	Coexistence	Imjingak Pyeonghwa-Nuri	2010.11	Artwork	Korean English	DMZ (peace and life), ecology
37	Traditional Korean Game Center	Imjingak Pyeonghwa-Nuri	2010	Tourism facilities	Korean	Tourism, tradition, Korean independence, Korean spirit
39	Now on My Way to Meet You; Hope Tree	Imjingak Pyeonghwa-Nuri	2011	Artwork	Korean English	Hope and peace

40	Monuments For Unification	Imjingak Pyeonghwa-Nuri	2012.4.30	<b>Monument/</b> memorial	Korean	Title: Festival, reconciliation, coexistence, peace
41	Revival-buck	Imjingak Pyeonghwa-Nuri	2012	Artwork	Korean English	Deserted existences and eagerness for survival, ecology, war
42	F-4D PHANTOM II	Imjingak Pyeonghwa-Nuri	2013.10.5	War materiel	Korean	Patriotism, US alliance, Cold War, military
43	Monuments for the Victory of the Marine Corps	Imjingak Pyeonghwa-Nuri	2014.11.13	<b>Monument/</b> memorial	Korean	Korean War, patriotism, military
44	Foot of Peace	Imjingak Pyeonghwa-Nuri	2015.12.23	Monument/ <b>memorial</b>	Korean	Korean War, military, peace, anticommunism
45	Water-History	Imjingak Pyeonghwa-Nuri	2015	Artwork	Korean English	DMZ, representing our life and hope, reunification
46	Re-Born Race	Imjingak Pyeonghwa-Nuri	2016 (one-off event)	<b>Monument/</b> memorial	Korean	DMZ, peace, reconciliation
47	DMZ Ecotourism Center	Imjingak Pyeonghwa-Nuri	2017	Tourism facility (visitor center)	Korean English	Ecology, nature, peace, tourism
48	We Are One	Imjingak Pyeonghwa-Nuri	2020.9.19	Artwork	Korean English	Peace, reunification, prosperity (2nd anniversary of Pyongyang Statement)
49	Panmunjom Tourist Support Center	Imjingak Pyeonghwa-Nuri	2020.11	Tourism facility (visitor center)	Korean English	Tourism
50	DMZ	Third Tunnel	2009.6	Artwork	Korean English	Peace, ecosystem, noble sacrifice and hope, security of the Third Tunnel
51	Paju Tourism Center	Third Tunnel	2012.11.15	Tourism facilities	Korean English	Tourism
52	DMZ Exhibition Hall Monument	Third Tunnel	2013.6.12	<b>Monument/</b> memorial	Korean	Hope for contributing to world peace, transformation from battle site to peace site, security education



**Figure 9.** Map of the Paju DMZ Heritage-scape (2009–present)

Source: Created by Sangseon Park and Dami Kim.



**Figure 10.** a. Dokgae Bridge, b. Dokgae Bridge Skywalk, c. Statue of Peace Toward the Reunification of Korea, d. DMZ Third Tunnel souvenir shop (July 2022)

Source: Hyun Kyung Lee.

## Conclusion: What the DMZ Reveals about Heritage and Borders

An important distinction in the study of heritage and borders is the materiality, or lack thereof, for borders we know exist as much, if not more so, in the mind than on the ground. In an exploration of space and dwelling, Martin Heidegger wrote, “[a] boundary is not that at which something stops but, as the Greeks recognized, the boundary is that from which something *begins its presencing*” and that “[...] *spaces receive their being from locations and not from ‘space’*” (1971, 154; emphasis in original). In this article we mapped out those locations along the DMZ and the heritage space that they form.

What is uniquely visible in the spaces of the DMZ that were the focus of this study is the materialization of a chronology of ever-shifting aspirations and hopes, and a strong sense of familial ties on the one hand despite manifest fears, grief, tense apprehension, mistrust, and mourning on the other. Above, we saw how in the 1980s and 1990s, the markers erected here were ones yearning for unity related to kinship. With the recent trauma of separated families, the pathos of loss and the bonds of kinship were emphasized, with tradition deployed to this end with, for example, the Mangbaedan Altar built in the 1980s to accommodate ancestor worship traditions. In the 2000s the tone was significantly different, focused instead on political and economic unity as infrastructure was built to make communications and travel possible again across the divide. The key words of the rhetoric now were reunification, reconciliation, and cooperation with security tourism becoming established. Then in the 2010s it shifted somewhat to a focus on local economic development as increasingly notions of peace parks and eco-parks began to be seen regardless of the inter-Korean political climate.

Despite the shifts, a clear leitmotif of (re)unification runs throughout the periods, and it is curious to note the presence of monuments expressing anti-Japanese and anticommunist stances. Monuments symbolizing anti-Japanese/colonial sentiments were erected when the inter-Korean relationship was improving in the late 2000s and again in the late 2010s. The Statue of Peace Toward the Reunification of Korea, erected in 2019 to

celebrate the first anniversary of the 2018 inter-Korean summit, depicts two comfort women, symbolizing South and North Koreans who not only seek a Japanese official apology for the World War II-era sexual enslavement of Koreans by the Japanese army, but also aspire together for peace and reunification (Table 4 and Fig. 10c). This implies the two Koreas' bond through a common desire to overcome past traumas. What is more recent is the emphasis on nature and how the buffer zone of the DMZ cutting across the peninsula has inadvertently created a sanctuary for animals and plants alike, which can offer a unique opportunity for joint management. This has developed in conjunction with the increased commodification of initiatives across the DMZ, from a ginseng center and gift shops selling everything from wine, chocolate, and honey sourced from DMZ-grown natural resources, Tongilchon village dedicated to soybean production, a youth camp (formerly Camp Greaves), and the Peace Land (Pyeonghwa Land) theme park at the Imjingak. Throughout the heritagization process, a signifier of *peace* has shifted from a justification of kinship-based unification to a rose-tinted view of an inter-Korean future achieved through economic integration. Today, *peace* has become an aspiration and a consumable through merchandise and the experience of DMZ tours, connected to Paju city branding and the local heritage industry.

With the shift in the semiotics of the heritage-scape of the DMZ, the styles of the markers also changed. In the 1980s and 1990s they were rather large monuments commemorating international involvement in the Korean War but also constituting relatively conventional war memorial forms, with plaques listing names of squadrons or soldiers on stone monoliths. In the 2000s, we saw smaller monuments and a more significant number of artistic interventions, which from the 2010s, begin to reference peace and reconciliation rather than war, such as in Pyeonghwa-Nuri Park, Imjingak. This trend continued in the 2010s with the newly opened Civilian Control Zone incorporating the peace pavilion, peace lighthouse, and slow mailbox. Three forms of material culture stand out in this heritage-scape: trains, bridges, and tunnels. Trains, rail tracks, rail bridges, and stations all appear in various guises as war materiel, ruins, entertainment/leisure sites, and new development projects (such as Dorasan Station). They attest to the eagerness



to connect with North Korea, as the signs on the walls of Dorasan Station pointing to the tracks for the train to Pyongyang indicate. The symbolism of the bridges is also varied, with the Dokgae bridges offering a juxtaposition between old and new, but also heavily laden with significance linked to the accounts of prisoner exchanges and family reunions. Finally, the tunnels are a counterpoint to the bridges, representing an ever-present threat, evidencing North Korea's aggression and intimating South Korea's military and technological superiority. Traditionally falling broadly into categories along the lines of factual/historical and artistic/aesthetic value (Riegl 1903; Lipe 1984), the symbolic, affective, and use values have recently come to the fore. We see this clearly in the evolution of the markers along the DMZ as well.

The DMZ is a particularly poignant heritage border, where the changing dynamics of tensions and rapprochement have been materialized in a concentrated manner in a relatively small area. It remains malleable, susceptible to any of its symbolic facets highlighted, such as peace and unification or a rehearsal of war traumas that reopen national scars. Between these two contradictory symbolic meanings, it is also a border that has both attracted territorial markers in the shape of monuments and become heritage, increasingly attracting tourism. It is a border where expectations, hopes, fears, and the rupture of the divide and aspirations for unity have been explicitly performed and planted as material markers. In addition, this border is still in the process of negotiation, the Korean War having never formally ended, and the border's characteristics have not been clearly determined. The DMZ reflects not only fluctuating ideological and political messages as a meta-border at the national and international levels, but also changing cultural, economic, and psychological narratives as a soft border at the local and individual levels. Thus, The DMZ offers a unique case through which to explore the uses of heritage at a border.

Returning to Park Sang-ho's film *DMZ*. The two children are separated from families ostensibly on opposing sides of the recently ended conflict. When they first meet, they try to establish their identities and mutual belonging, but a confused conversation results on their respective families and how they should refer to each other. Like much of the film, this

conversation speaks volumes about tangled identities and disrupted kinship ties. Finally, they decide to refer to each other as “little sister” and “big brother” and so decide on a relationship of mutual responsibility.

At this moment, 70 years after the DMZ was created under the provisions of the Korean Armistice Agreement along the 38th parallel dividing the peninsula, its semiotics are once again being rewritten as a generational shift is changing the connotations of unity and reunification. In this shift, there is a possibility that as the living memory of the war begins to fade, and the kinship ties across the Koreas wane, the division might become accepted by younger generations as a fact of life rather than a violent aberration to be rectified, a curiosity to be visited rather than a problem to be solved. It is, therefore, more important than ever to carefully examine the legacies of the war and what heritage will be taken forward in building a future for the Korean nation.

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