



# New Right Historiography and the Problem of Differentiation

Keiran MACRAE

## Abstract

*Founded in 2004, the New Right unraveled after just four years. Explanations for this point to a failure to attract public support. I discuss this failure in terms of what I call the problem of differentiation. Two visions of a rupture with the old right were articulated after 1987, for which historiography was central. The first is traceable to Yang Dong-an's call in 1988 for a "new right" uniting regime and opposition conservatives to manage the transition to democracy without substantively changing the old regime. Jo Gap-je endowed this movement with a unifying historical narrative in 1993. The second is traceable to Kim Il-yeong's call in 1995 for separating a positive historical narrative from support for the conservative establishment. These are two distinct visions of rupture with the old right, but the latter is burdened with the problem of differentiating itself from the former. As a case in point, Kim's historiography was coopted by the very conservative establishment he sought to resist. Drawing on elite theory, I argue he did not adequately address the problem of differentiation. This has implications for understanding the failure of the New Right and other efforts to break with the old right.*

**Keywords:** New Right historiography, Kim Il-yeong, Jo Gap-je, Yang Dong-an, elite theory, post-1987 South Korea

## Introduction

The New Right movement lasted four short years, from 2004 to 2008. Its failure is commonly explained in terms of a lack of public resonance (S. Chung 2017, 345; Vierthaler 2021, 25; Tikhonov 2019, 20–24). Crucially, even though historiography was central to the movement, it did not appear to offer a narrative distinctly *new*. Historians observed reiterations of Cold War themes of statism, anticommunism, and South Korea’s “genealogical legitimacy” (*jeongtongseong*) (T. Park 2007, 292–293; J. Kim 2016, 178–182; S. Yang 2021, 890) or colonial historiography (Chu 2008; G. Kim 2008, 119–126; Tikhonov 2019, 20). The New Right was thus judged as a public relations tool for protecting vested interests. As Vladimir Tikhonov (2019, 13) writes, “The conservative establishment needed new discourses, strategies and faces if it was to regain both the symbolic capital undermined by the collaboration controversy, and political power. The New Right movement was one of its chosen instruments.”

Yet the movement was beset by deep divisions over this very issue (H. Jo 2017, 183; Tikhonov 2019, 20; Vierthaler 2020, 61–62). As early as 2006, it had split into two broad camps, one pursuing a mass-based and the other a cultural-hegemonic political strategy (H. Jeong 2006, 229). In 2008, citing its corruption by the Lee Myung-bak administration, political scientist Kim Il-yeong declared the New Right “dead” (Jang 2008) and initiated a new “procon” (professional conservative) movement (I. Kim 2010b).<sup>1</sup> Viewed from this perspective, Tikhonov certainly describes how the New Right ended up, but not necessarily what was originally intended.

In this article, I revisit the New Right’s cooptation by the conservative establishment vis-à-vis two visions of rupture with the old right. The difference is simple: one is cosmetic—a public relations tactic—and the other genuine.<sup>2</sup> Indistinguishable on the surface, however, this creates what I

- 
1. Passing away suddenly in 2009 due to an illness, Kim Il-yeong was unable to see this movement through.
  2. The first of these visions is related to what political scientist Erik Mobrand (2021) describes as “faking democracy”—the right’s cynical appropriation of rhetoric and imagery of the democratic movement.

call the “problem of differentiation” (i.e., vulnerability to cooptation) for the latter.

The first vision originated in an article by Academy of Korean Studies professor Yang Dong-an (b. 1945), “Is the Right Dead?” (1988). The emerging “ideological war” (*sasangjeon*) of the post-authoritarian era, Yang argued, would require a “new right” (*sin uik*) to manage the political establishment’s association with authoritarianism. This would take the form of a coalition between regime and opposition conservatives, nominally led by the latter—what Yang called a “grand rally of the right” (*uik chonggwolgi*).<sup>3</sup>

Historiography became central to this vision in 1993 with an article by conservative journalist Jo Gap-je (1993), “Reconciliation between Park Chung-hee and Kim Young-sam” (see T. Park 2019, 290; Y. Chung 2021, 21n35).<sup>4</sup> Criticizing President Kim for his institutionalization of *minjung* historiography,<sup>5</sup> Jo articulated a historical narrative to tie together Yang’s “grand rally” by arguing each president had played a complementary role in gradual progress toward the present, trying to convince Kim his true ally

- 
3. The Ministry of Interior (Naemubu) would provoke a public sensation (*Dong-A Ilbo* 1988b; Nam 2005, 480) by distributing tens of thousands of copies of this article as “educational material” (*gyoyang jaryo*) within the government (*Dong-A Ilbo* 1988a). It has since become a canonical text for conservatives, periodically reposted online (e.g., J. Bae 2024).
  4. Once a renowned progressive journalist, Jo shifted rightward amid the democratic transition and became an outspoken champion of Cold War conservatism (*naengjeon bosu*), or the “old right” (Yun 2000, 19). Promoted in 1991 to editor-in-chief of the *Wolgan Joseon*, arguably South Korea’s most conservative monthly magazine, he emerged as a leading opinion-maker in South Korean society (J. Yi 2010). He was also an amateur historian and became Park Chung-hee’s most prolific biographer. Stretching back to the 1980s, the culmination of this work is Jo (2006).
  5. Leftist, ethnic nationalist *minjung* historiography began to dominate public memory in the 1980s (C. Park 1994, 350–351). Jo Gap-je (1993, 105–106) identified Kim Young-sam’s support for *minjung* historiography in his expression of gratitude to democratization activists in his inaugural speech while ignoring military veterans, description of the Korean War as a “civil war,” and plan to demolish the Government-General Headquarters (Chongdokbu). Probably the most important aspect of this institutionalization, however, was the introduction of the approval history textbook system (*gyogwaseo geominjeong jedo*), although the new textbooks were not introduced to classrooms until 2003 (Sin-cheol Yi 2013, 10–12).

was the conservative establishment and not democratic activists.

This first vision of a “new right” met with a second articulated by Kim Il-yeong (1960–2009) in an article titled, “How to Think about the Eighteen-Year Park Chung-hee Regime” (1995),<sup>6</sup> a direct response to Jo Gap-je’s proposed historical narrative. While comparing Jo to a mad shaman trying to resurrect the dead (I. Kim 1995, 208, 242, 248n1), he also regarded *minjung* historiography as no longer relevant considering the South Korean miracle in contrast with the failures of socialism. Calling for a via media between the two, he tried to present a positive historical narrative that distinguished between the achievements of past presidents and the legitimacy of the conservative establishment in the present. This can be seen as one of the earliest calls for genuine rupture with the old right.

Yet it was none other than Jo Gap-je who became the most enthusiastic proponent of Kim’s historiographical scheme. I argue Kim was coopted because he did not adequately address the problem of differentiation. To show this, I draw on elite theory to analyze and compare Jo and Kim’s respective narratives, demonstrating their similarity at a metahistorical level.

The problem of differentiation I highlight contributes to the literature on the New Right in three ways. First, it complements a growing body of work on the New Right that views it more as a post-1987 rather than just a 2004–2008 phenomenon (S. Chung 2017; Y. Chung 2021; N. Lee 2022; Y. Bae 2008; Vierthaler 2023). Second, it adds to the understanding of post-

---

6. Kim is a somewhat neglected figure in the literature on New Right historiography, which focuses a great deal on An Byeong-jik and Yi Yeong-hun (e.g., G. Kim 2008; Miller 2010; S. Chung 2017). At least one notable exception is Kim Won (2011, 62–65). Vierthaler’s (2020) paper examining the New Right’s formative years before An Byeong-jik and Yi Yeong-hun emerged as its central intellectual figures is also important in this regard. It was typical of New Right scholars to have completed a PhD abroad, often developing an allergy to the nationalist bent of Korean historiography, but Kim belonged to the minority—along with An Byeong-jik and Yi Yeong-hun—that completed their entire education in Korea. Born in 1960 and finishing his PhD in 1991—unlike An and Yi—he was a member of the “386 generation” shaped by the tide of revisionist scholarship sweeping through Korean universities in the 1980s (e.g., I. Kim 1991) (Yi Yeong-hun completed his undergrad in 1970 and PhD in 1985). Considering this in combination with his steadfast insistence on challenging the conservative establishment right through to the New Right’s demise, his work demands greater attention.

1987 conservatism in South Korea in terms of internal conflict rather than just that with the left (Ha 2007; T. Park 2005, 2012a, 2012b). Finally, it helps to explain the failure of the New Right and broader discourses of rational or reformist conservatism (H. Jo 2017). In the article's conclusion, I discuss this in relation to ongoing conflicts on the right.

### Yang Dong-an's Vision: A "Grand Rally of the Right"

The transition to democracy in 1987 presented a fundamental challenge to South Korea's ruling class, rooted in power structures constructed through colonialism and authoritarianism. Roh Tae-woo's June 29 Declaration was a cunning maneuver that splintered not only the political opposition but the democratization movement itself, ultimately winning him the presidency. The following year, however, the opposition's takeover of the National Assembly, the opening of the public sphere, and a series of sensational secret visits to North Korea rocked the very foundations of South Korea's "national doctrine" (*guksi*) of anticommunism (H. Lee 2020).

Evincing a liberal turn, the Roh government responded by unveiling a new foreign policy of *Nordpolitik* (*bukbang jeongchaek*)—détente with communist countries and North Korea—in the July 7 Declaration. Signifying a potential for change well beyond mere elections, this provoked a fierce reaction (T. Park 2012b). Hardliners such as Minister of Government Administration (Chongmucheo) Kim Yong-gap (2011, 210–211) called for amending the Constitution to give the president the power to dissolve the National Assembly, and some within the military resorted to terrorist tactics in the assault of journalist O Hong-geun, who had called for purging the military culture from South Korean politics (*Hankyoreh* 1988). Conservatives thus divided over defining the scope of change initiated in 1987.

In this context, Academy of Korean Studies professor Yang Dong-an (1988) published his dramatically titled article in the August 1988 edition of the monthly magazine *Hyeondae gongnon* (Contemporary Public Opinion): "Is the Right Dead?" The problem, said Yang, was less the left's use of democracy as a façade for communist revolution itself than the right's failure

to identify this threat, remaining passive and divided. Rather than reverting to the old tactics of authoritarianism, however, he argued that the changed context of post-1987 South Korean society required a new kind of war—an ideological war, which would also require a “new right.” This, he said, would be a “grand rally of the right,” a coalition between regime and opposition conservatives nominally led by the latter to manage the public relations problem of the right’s association with authoritarianism. “The people retain disagreeable memories of right-wing movements,” he wrote, “which aided dictatorial regimes in destroying liberal democracy in the past. The rally of the right cannot secure the broad support of the people without washing away these disagreeable memories” (D. Yang 1988, 169).

A distinction should thus be drawn between Yang’s proposed “new right” (*sin uik*) and the New Right (Nyu raiteu) that emerged in the mid-2000s. Whereas the latter called for rupture with the old right, the former can be described as calling for continuity *disguised* as rupture. As Yang wrote, “In the rally of the right to repel the leftist challenge, there can be no distinction between old and new right, ruling and opposition right. The entirety of the rightist forces in this country must stand and unite. To more effectively suppress and eliminate the left, however, the rally must be fronted and led by a new, reformist right” (D. Yang 1988, 169).

Yang’s vision crystallized in 1990 with the formation of the Democratic Liberal Party (Minju jayudang), a merging of Roh Tae-woo’s Democratic Justice Party (Minju jeonguidang), Kim Jong-pil’s New Democratic Republican Party (Sin minju gonghwadang), and Kim Young-sam’s Reunification Democratic Party (Tongil minjudang).<sup>7</sup> Yet this unity would prove fragile. Elected president in 1992, Kim Young-sam promptly signaled rupture with the past, dubbing his the “civilian government” (*munmin jeongbu*) and initiating a well-publicized campaign of “setting history straight” (*yeoksa baro seugi*) (Sin-cheol Yi 2013, 10–11). This revealed a crucial lack in Yang’s vision: a unifying historical narrative. Conservative journalist Jo Gap-je would address this in 1993.

---

7. As the party’s name (DLP) suggests, Yang’s “grand rally” can also be understood as an attempt to mimic LDP dominance in Japan.

## The Grand Rally and Jo Gap-je's Historiographical Scheme

Under President Kim Young-sam, *minjung* historiography, which had challenged state-sponsored narratives of Korean history in the 1980s (C. Park 1994, 350–351), began a process of institutionalization (Sin-cheol Yi 2013, 10–12). For many on the right, this repeated the very same error pointed out by Yang several years earlier: a failure to properly identify the enemy. Especially galvanizing were President Kim's remarks at a press conference marking one hundred days in office. Called on by a reporter to clarify his view of Park Chung-hee's May 16, Kim stated, "I think May 16 was clearly a coup d'état. It was a major precipitant of historical regression" (Hwang 1993).

Later that year, conservative journalist Jo Gap-je called for "Reconciliation between Park Chung-hee and Kim Young-sam" in the *Wolgan Joseon*. Written in the style of an open letter to President Kim, its content can be summarized in two parts. First, Jo tried to convince Kim of the inferiority of *minjung* historiography. As evident in Kim's remarks about Park Chung-hee, the *minjung* perspective saw the prioritization of economic growth over democracy as having set back Korean history.<sup>8</sup> According to Jo, however, it was a "general principle of world history" (*sesangsa-ui ilban wonchik*) that changes in the "ideological superstructure" derive from changes in the "material substructure."<sup>9</sup> In other words, he asserted economic growth as a precondition for democracy: no the Park Chung-hee, no democracy. Whereas countries like the Soviet Union and the Philippines had tried and failed to pursue democracy and economic development simultaneously, countries like South Korea and the People's Republic of China (after 1978) had succeeded by pursuing economic growth first, democracy later (G. Jo 1993, 114). Jo accordingly suggested rearranging the major events of Korean history: against the *minjung* narrative of popular

---

8. Jo's characterization of *minjung* historiography (as well as Kim Il-yeong's, dealt with below) is undoubtedly a caricature, but I do not challenge it here.

9. Quoting Machiavelli, Jo (1993, 114) asserted that economic growth and democracy are analogous to what Machiavelli claimed all great republics possess in combination, namely, "arms and justice." For the original quote, see Machiavelli (1989, 3).

struggle, foregrounding the March First Movement, April Revolution, May 18 Gwangju Uprising, and June Uprising, he proposed a narrative ranging from the colonial-era independence movement through anticommunist nation founding, the Korean War, economic development, and democratization (108–110). Thus, he articulated a grand narrative of Korean history emphasizing elite-driven (as opposed to people-driven) progress.

Second, Jo tried to convince Kim of the utility of such a narrative. Appealing to Kim's self-interest, he urged him to consider how Khrushchev and Gorbachev had destroyed their political legitimacy by condemning their predecessors while Deng Xiaoping had led China through a fragile transition by venerating his (G. Jo 1993, 111). Whereas the former had emphasized historical narratives of rupture (like *minjung* historiography), the latter had emphasized one of continuity. This was the essence of Jo's recommendation. The divisiveness of *minjung* historiography could do little but undermine Kim's own power.<sup>10</sup> In the narrative he proposed, however, both ruling and opposition conservatives—what he referred to as the “economy group” (*gyeongjepa*) and “democracy group” (*minjupa*) (G. Jo 1993, 114)—played mutually supportive roles: from nation-founding under Syngman Rhee and economic development under Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan to democratization under Roh Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam, each president complemented the next in a story of gradual development (106). This was a historical narrative appropriate to Yang Dong-an's “grand rally of the right.”

### Kim Il-yeong's Vision: Beyond the Conservative Establishment

Perceived as an attempt by a hardline conservative to undermine Korea's fledgling democracy (Seo 1993; Ko 1994; J. Yi 2010, 65), Jo Gap-je's article provoked substantial debate. Among its critics was the young political

---

10. Quoting Machiavelli's *The Prince* (G. Jo 1993, 125), Jo advised (threatened?) Kim on the dangers of drawing the ire of his “subjects.” For the original quote, see Machiavelli (2008, 287).

scientist Kim Il-yeong (1995), who responded in an article, “How to Think about the Eighteen-Year Park Chung-hee Regime.” Proposing a via media between the conservative establishment—represented by Jo Gap-je—and *minjung* historiography, Kim’s article is notable in tracing the origins of the New Right movement. Already at this time, Kim was critiquing the right from the inside.

Kim opens with a call to counter the conservative establishment’s “hegemonic offensive” (*hegemonijeok gongse*). With Korea’s development now upheld as a model for developing countries around the world, however, this response could not be unconditionally critical in the vein of *minjung* historiography (I. Kim 1995, 208–210). In other words, Kim recognized the practical need of a narrative that resonated with the Korean miracle but still avoided legitimizing the conservative establishment in the present.

Kim proposed to address this need by revisiting the relationship between industrialization and democratization. Jo Gap-je had asserted a “general principle of world history” that economic growth precedes democracy in contrast to the *minjung* perspective that democracy should precede or at least coincide with economic growth. Kim acknowledged clear support for Jo’s position, viewing the historical record. There were, he said, elective affinities between authoritarianism and capitalist economic development in the early stage of industrialization. Therefore, contra Kim Young-sam’s remark that Park Chung-hee had set history back, Kim claimed Park’s choice to pursue economic development first and democracy later had been consistent with South Korea’s historical circumstances (I. Kim 1995, 218–225).

What, then, was distinctive about this argument compared to Jo Gap-je’s? Opposed to Jo’s assertion of a “general principle of world history,” Kim insisted on the significance of focusing precisely on the relationship between industrialization and democratization. “One should not evaluate the Park Chung-hee regime,” he wrote, “apart from its temporal coordinates in the early phase of industrialization” (I. Kim 1995, 211). In other words, rather than the deductive claim that material precedes political development—potentially justifying authoritarianism at any time—Kim’s claim was inductive, limiting the justification of authoritarianism to a specific period

in the past.

To unpack this idea a little further, it is worth paying attention to two terms—“stadial relevance” (*sihyo* 時效) and the “senility of spirit-conjuring” (*mangnyeong* [亡靈]-*eul bulleo naeneun mangnyeong* [妄靈])—which appear in the following passage:

What they [i.e., Jo Gap-je and the conservative establishment] seek is to strengthen their present position through the beautification of the past. My intention, however, is to reveal how the *stadial relevance* of the Park Chung-hee regime has expired by understanding it in relation to the industrialization process. What I want to demonstrate is precisely the *senility of spirit-conjuring* in the name of “reevaluation” now, when industrialization has already been achieved to a high degree. I think this could be a way of academically and impartially evaluating the achievements and failures of the Park Chung-hee regime while also responding to the peculiar nostalgia of the older generation. (I. Kim 1995, 211, emphasis added)

First, through the concept of *sihyo*, which I translate as “stadial relevance,” Kim differentiated between *appropriate* and *inappropriate* authoritarianism. Regarding the authoritarian-developmental stage of industrialization as self-negating, he asserted that South Korea’s developmental stage had concluded with Park’s assassination in 1979. Far from Jo’s positive evaluation of Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, then, Kim harshly criticized them for “artificially extending” (*inwijeok-euro yeonjang*) Korea’s developmental stage purely for their own interests (240–241); Park’s authoritarianism had been stadially relevant to early industrial development, but Chun’s had not.

Second, as an extension of this concept of stadial relevance, Kim Il-yeong (1995, 208, 242, 248n1) used the phrase “senility of spirit-conjuring” invoking the image of a mad shaman, to attack Jo’s efforts to rehabilitate Park Chung-hee. Because the conservative establishment had been artificially preserved through the Chun era, in other words, it was no longer stadially relevant to the post-1987 era. This distinction between positive evaluation of Park Chung-hee in the past from support for the conservative

establishment in the present was the essence of his proposed via media rejecting what he regarded as excessively critical and excessively reverential historiography. Against the “grand rally” envisioned by Yang, then, Kim tacitly asserted the need for a genuinely *new* right.

### The Problem of Differentiation

None other than Jo Gap-je, however, became Kim Il-yeong’s most enthusiastic proponent. An abridgement of Kim’s 1995 article (I. Kim 1996) and an interview (D. Kim 1996) appeared in the March 1996 edition of the *Wolgan Joseon*. Jo (2006, 3:132–133) would also refer to Kim in his biography of Park Chung-hee and post pieces by him on his homepage (I. Kim 2005; Jo 2013). Thus, Jo coopted Kim’s narrative to buttress the very “old right” Kim opposed. The problem was that Kim’s narrative was not so distinct as he insisted. Drawing on elite theory to show the metahistorical similarities between Jo and Kim’s narratives, I argue that Kim rendered himself vulnerable to such cooptation by neglecting the problem of differentiation—the burden of advocating for rupture with an old right nominally advocating the same goal.

#### *Jo Gap-je’s Reception of Kim Il-yeong’s Narrative*

Examining Jo’s endorsement of Kim Il-yeong’s narrative, it is clear he thought it basically like his own, as reflected in the following exchange from the *Wolgan Joseon* interview:

Kim: As I made every effort to avoid the logic of the *Chosun Ilbo* and *Wolgan Joseon*, I was a bit taken aback by the *Wolgan Joseon*’s request for an interview. I don’t think my general point agreed with the *Wolgan Joseon*’s.

I: I asked him if there was not a considerably similar logic, putting aside the Fifth and Sixth Republics and just focusing on the Park Chung-hee era.

Kim: Refuting the *Chosun Ilbo*'s logic was honestly one of the article's objectives. Specifically, I read Editor-in-Chief Jo Gap-je's article, "Reconciliation between Park Chung-hee and Kim Young-sam," published in the November 1993 edition of the *Wolgan Joseon*, and found the logic quite courageous, with much to accept. Yet I also thought it was considerably dangerous, and ultimately wrote this article after reflecting on the subject of "democracy and development" for some time. I was concerned about the misuse of a linear logic and the deceitfulness of metaphors.

I: He thus intended to respond with an academic logic to the *Wolgan Joseon*'s 1993 journalistic proposal regarding reevaluation of the Park Chung-hee era.<sup>11</sup> (D. Kim 1996, 560)

The interviewer evidently interpreted the primary difference between Kim Il-yeong and Jo Gap-je in terms of their evaluation of Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, eliding Kim's emphasis on the "stadial relevance" of Park's authoritarianism. Despite Kim's purported intent to refute Jo, moreover, the interviewer described him as trying to provide a more academic basis for Jo's argument. The common ground between Kim and Jo—that is, their positive evaluation of Park Chung-hee—was thus foregrounded while their political differences were omitted.

This emphasis on the compatibility of Jo and Kim's narratives was also reflected in the anonymously appended editor's preface to the abridged article.

The Park Chung-hee group, which suppressed the traditional ruling class and emerged as a new state elite through the May 16 coup d'état, constituted an authoritarian regime that ardently strived to realize the developmentalist goal of nationalist modernization. There is no example of a developing nation that has successfully pursued democratization and

---

11. I have added the headings here for clarity. "I" refers to interviewer. This format, in which the interviewer comments to the reader on the interviewees' answers, is common in South Korean media.

industrialization simultaneously. Park Chung-hee's choice of development strategy, pursuing industrialization first and democratization later, was thus well adapted to the flow of world history, and denunciation of the Park Chung-hee regime, emphasizing only the deleterious side effects of that choice, reflects a flawed analytical framework. (I. Kim 1996, 552)

Here Park Chung-hee's choice to pursue economic development over democracy is described as appropriate to the "flow of world history" (not merely the early phase of industrialization). The same characterization can be found in Jo's introduction of Kim's (2005) work on his homepage, using the tagline, "Park Chung-hee's development model conformed to a principle of world history."<sup>12</sup>

Aside from this general emphasis on compatibility, the editor's preface also revealed two other aspects of Kim's narrative that appeared especially significant to Jo. First, it highlighted the distinction between a *traditional* and *state* elite. This was a relatively minor part of Kim's (1995, 233–234) article, but Jo evidently found it highly significant. In his biography of Park Chung-hee, he writes, "Sungkyunkwan University professor of political science Kim Il-yeong classifies the Liberal Party and Democratic Party as a traditional elite rooted in traditional society and the military group that emerged after May 16 as a state elite. In general, a traditional elite is defined by a fixation on factional interests whereas a state elite is defined by a focus on the national interest and national development" (G. Jo 2006, 3:132–133). One may observe the distinction is conveyed in general terms, omitting the specificity of the transition to industrial society. This line of thinking was also reflected in the *Wolgan Joseon* interview, in which Kim was asked whether Kim Young-sam and Kim Jong-pil, respectively, corresponded to traditional and state elites in the present. Forced to reiterate the principle of stadial relevance, he labelled this precisely the kind of "senile spirit-conjuring" he had targeted in his article (D. Kim 1996, 562).

---

12. This piece was originally published in the *Bak Jeong-hui daetongnyeong ginyeom saeophoe hoebo* (President Park Chung-hee Commemoration Association Bulletin). Jo posted it again along with articles by himself and sociologist Jo Ije (G. Jo 2013), a juxtaposition again implying the similarity between Kim and Jo's ideas.

Second, the preface also emphasized Kim's rejection of *minjung* historiography, calling it a "flawed analytical framework." The title of the *Wolgan Joseon* article was also changed to reflect this. Whereas the original was presented as a question, the abridged version confidently declared, "The Eighteen-Year Park Chung-hee Regime Must Be Affirmed" (I. Kim 1996, 552). Likewise, the accompanying interview opens with the subtitle, "The Park Chung-hee Affirmation of One Who Entered University in 1979" (D. Kim 1996, 560), emphasizing Kim's *conversion*, so to speak, as a scholar shaped by *minjung* historiography in the 1980s.

Contrary to Kim's insistence on the distinction of his narrative, then, Jo found it perfectly consistent with his own. Who, then, was right? Did Jo pick through Kim's article to support his own conclusions? Did Kim overestimate the difference he emphasized?

### *Elite Theory and Conservative Historiography*

By comparing Jo Gap-je and Kim Il-yeong's proposed historical narratives, Jo's perception of their compatibility appears justified. What they shared was the metahistorical premise of history as a story of inter-elite struggles. To show this, I draw on elite theory.

As is well known, elite theory originated with Vilfredo Pareto (1935) and Gaetano Mosca (1939).<sup>13</sup> While scholars variously characterize its principles,<sup>14</sup> its most basic premise is that society is composed of elites and masses. As Mosca (1939, 50) writes, "In all societies—from societies that are very meagerly developed and have barely attained the dawns of civilization, down to the most advanced and powerful societies—two classes of people appear—a class that rules and a class that is ruled." The differences between regime types—whether oligarchy, aristocracy, autarky, or democracy—are secondary to this fundamental characteristic, which Pareto

---

13. There is, of course, also Roberto Michels' ([1915] 2001) famous application. Max Weber, too, is sometimes classed as an elite theorist (Pakulski 2012).

14. Compare, for example, Burnham (1943, 223–226); Orwell (1997, 73); and Dye and Zeigler (2008, 3).

called “social heterogeneity” (1935, 1541/\$2205).<sup>15</sup>

Starting with this central idea, history becomes a story of intra- and inter-elite struggle, what Pareto (1935, 185, §278) called the “circulation of elites” (see also Higley and Pakulski 2012; Verzichelli 2018). This is an explicitly anti-Marxist metanarrative (Pakulski 2018, 17): to Marx and Engels’ ([1888] 1978, 473) notion of history as a story of “class struggle,” Pareto (1935, 1,430, §2053) replies, “History is a graveyard of aristocracies.” Elite theorists thus reject the possibility of establishing a classless society, because revolution can do no more than exchange rule by one elite for another (Burnham 1943, 216). Thus, anticommunism appears not just as a political but also *scientific* premise.<sup>16</sup>

Analogous to the struggles within a society are those between societies (Lopreato 1980, xl), victory in which is determined by the quality of a society’s elites—their ability to respond to external threats (Aron 1970, 151–152; Higley 2018, 35; Pakulski 2018, 21). For elite theorists, then, explaining the successes and failures of history becomes a question of determining the quality of a society’s elite. This aspect of elite theory was best conceptualized by Arnold Toynbee (1934–1961) as the principle of “challenge and response.”

Finally, an elite’s subsistence requires what Mosca called a “political formula.” “Ruling classes do not justify their power exclusively by de facto possession of it,” he writes, “but try to find a moral and legal basis for it, representing it as the logical and necessary consequence of doctrines and beliefs that are generally recognized and accepted” (Mosca 1939, 70). In other words, a ruling class’ survival depends on its ability to devise legitimizing myths.<sup>17</sup>

15. Michels’ ([1915] 2001, 224) expression, “iron law of oligarchy,” is much better known.

16. This is the reason for the attraction to Pareto at Harvard in the 1930s, as documented by sociologist Barbara Heyl (1968). The Harvard “Pareto Circle” emerged under the aegis of biochemist Lawrence J. Henderson and in association with eminent scholars such as Talcott Parsons and Joseph Schumpeter as an explicit response to the popularity of Marxism on campus.

17. The idea of ruling through fraud as well as force is of course a reflection of the Machiavellian influence on elite theory. Machiavelli (2008, 281) urged a prince to be like a lion to fend off the wolves and a fox to avoid the snares. It also echoes Plato’s idea of a “noble lie.” See Melzer (2014, 60–67). In Pareto’s (1935, 1299–1301/\$1866–1868) terminology,

These four characteristics are present in both Jo Gap-je and Kim Il-yeong's narratives. First, they both implicitly subscribed to the principle of social heterogeneity in their dismissals of *minjung* historiography. This is significant in the context of South Korean society in the 1990s, when, as historian Namhee Lee (2022, 3) describes, a "politics of time" began to "disavow the revolutionary politics of the twentieth century in general, and in particular the 1980s *minjung* project." This sense of disillusionment with the radical politics of the 1980s is perhaps best captured in future New Right member Sin Ji-ho's (1992) well known piece, "Do You Still Dream of the 'Revolution?'" In this regard, Jo and Kim both rode the wave of post-1989 Cold War triumphalism (Macrae 2016, 353–354; N. Lee 2022, 95–120; Vierthaler 2023).

Second, they both narrated history in terms of the "circulation of elites," as evident in their shared understanding of the significance of Park Chung-hee's coup d'état. Here, it is important to reflect on their shared anti-Marxist politics. Even while Kim genuinely tried to distance himself from the conservative establishment, it is difficult to see how his narrative could have succeeded without explicitly challenging the old right's sacred doctrine of anticommunism.

Third, both paid attention to elite quality. Rejecting Kim Young-sam's claim that Park Chung-hee had "set back" Korean history, they saw Park as representing a new elite capable of carrying out Korea's modernization, replacing the old elite that had failed to modernize and prevent colonization by Japan in 1910—this is the reason conservatives so often narrate the late Joseon period (not to mention North Korea) in terms of failure and South Korean history in terms of success.<sup>18</sup> This can explain why Jo drew attention to Kim's distinction between a traditional and state elite, even if it was just a detail set against his larger argument.

Finally, they both recognized the importance of historiography for a

---

the political formula can be understood as a kind of "derivation." See also Burnham (1943, 191n\*).

18. For an example of the Joseon elite's "failure" in preventing Korea's colonization, see Lew (1985).

political formula—historiography as a tool of consolidating political power. The differences between their narratives can be seen as disagreements over the specific details of this formula—precisely *how* to make use of the past for the present in a way that best resonates with the public. In this regard, the lines of debate were not as severe as Kim perceived. Because the conservative establishment nominally supported rupture with the old right, conservatives like Kim were burdened with the task of demonstrating the rupture they sought with the old right was not just superficial. Kim tried to differentiate his argument in terms of the concept of “stadial relevance”: Authoritarianism was appropriate to the transition to industrial society but not once this developmental stage had passed. Yet he did not deviate from the fundamental question of what kind of elite is required for historical success, and this kind of debate would have been very comfortable for the likes of Jo Gap-je.

## Conclusion

Viewing Kim Il-yeong’s work over time, it is difficult to argue he ever sufficiently confronted the problem of differentiation. Indeed, by the time of the New Right’s emergence, the left had completely supplanted the conservative establishment in his critical crosshairs. In the introduction to his most important work on contemporary history, *Founding a Nation, Enriching a Nation* (I. Kim 2004),<sup>19</sup> published as the New Right movement got underway, he wrote, “Burke once compared the French Revolution to a fever, and the same fever grips our society now. The causes are many, but among them are clearly the revisionists’ obsession with paternal erasure and the 386 generation’s understanding of history” (I. Kim 2004, 12).<sup>20</sup> Such

---

19. A second edition was later published (I. Kim 2010a). The two are virtually identical, but the latter replaces the Bang Il-yeong Culture Foundation preface with one by publisher Kim Do-jong and appends condolences (Kim passed away in 2009) written by Kim’s friends and colleagues. I refer to the 2004 version, but all page numbers correspond to the 2010 version.

20. In South Korea, “revisionism” is used as a proper noun to refer to *minjung* and otherwise critical historiography that emerged in the 1980s. See Macrae (2023, 168–169).

words are hardly representative of a *new right*. Neither was the fact of the book's funding by the Bang Il-yeong Culture Foundation (Bang Il-yeong munhwa jaedan)—a member of the *Chosun Ilbo* family.<sup>21</sup> It seems, then, that Kim did not adequately recognize the significant burden of pursuing rupture with an old right that nominally pursues the same objective.

The problem of differentiation is relevant beyond just the New Right. Beginning at least with Kim's (1995) call to counter the conservative establishment, one can draw a line through calls for ideological and genuine conservatism in the late 1990s (Kang 2005), the New Right movement of the mid-2000s, and pleas for reformist and rational conservatism since then (H. Jo 2017). In this regard, the conservative establishment has proved extremely adept at absorbing its purported opponents.

Since Yoon Suk Yeol's December 2024 martial law declaration, conservatives are in crisis again. Two of their presidents have been impeached in less than a decade and they have failed to win a general election since 2012. Following Yoon's lead, some have resorted to support for martial law, claims of election fraud, and far-right mobilization, what can be seen as a reversion to the coercion Yang Dong-an claimed was no longer appropriate after 1987. In a word, the right has fared poorly in Yang's "ideological war." Yet this only draws the failure to break with the old right into greater relief. Where is the alternative? Notable politicians including Yu Seung-min, New Reform Party (Gaehyeok sindang) leader Yi Jun-seok, Seoul mayor O Se-hun, and even Yoon's former right-hand man Han Dong-hun have renewed appeals to "rational conservatism" (*hamnijeok bosujuui*) (JTBC News 2024; Sang-heon Yi 2025; S. Jeong 2025; Han 2025). Meanwhile,

---

21. Bang Il-yeong, of course, was *Chosun Ilbo* chairman from 1964 to 1993. The series was titled the Bang Il-yeong Culture Foundation Korean Contemporary History Lectures (*Bang Il-yeong munhwa jaedan Hanguk hyeondaesa gangjwa*). Three out of five of the books (H. Yang 2004; I. Sin 2004; Yu 2004) are devoted to North Korea (the other, besides Kim's, pertains to R.O.K.-U.S. relations [Cha 2004]). The series preface, moreover, mentions little else, characterizing the books as pushing back against engagement with North Korea by better informing the public about the true nature of North Korea (I. Kim 2004, 4–6). See the homepage at <https://www.bangfound.org>. Historian Im Dae-sik (2005, 31n4) also notes Kim's funding by the foundation.

two familiar slogans—“unity” (*dangyeol*) and “innovation” (*hyeoksin*) (*MBN News* 2025)—emerged in the battle for control of the People Power Party (Gungmin-ui him) following its defeat in the June 2025 snap presidential election. Could this represent a potential for the yet unrealized rupture with the old right, or is it the same old veneer? In this article, I have tried to make at least one thing clear: genuine pursuit of rupture with the old right requires recognizing and adequately addressing the problem of differentiation. A historiography focusing merely on the relationship between elites and historical success will not suffice.

---

## REFERENCES

- Aron, Raymond. 1970. *Main Currents in Sociological Thought 2: Durkheim, Pareto, Weber*. Translated by Richard Howard and Helen Weaver. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books.
- Bae, Jin-yeong. 2024. "Chongseon champae sanghwang-eseo dasi ingneun Yang Dong-an gyosu-ui 'uik-eun jugeonneunga?'" (Rereading Professor Yang Dong-an's 'Is the Right Dead?' in the Wake of the Crushing Defeat in the General Election). *Wolgan Joseon News Room*. April 14. [https://m.monthly.chosun.com/client/mdaily/daily\\_view.asp?idx=19496&Newsnumb=20240419496](https://m.monthly.chosun.com/client/mdaily/daily_view.asp?idx=19496&Newsnumb=20240419496).
- Bae, Yeong-sun. 2008. "Segyehwa ihu hanguksa insik-ui talminjokjuuijeok gyeonghyang: Geunhyeondaesa insik-ui bosu ugyeonghwa-reul jungsim-euro" (The Post-nationalist Tendency in Korean Cognition since the Onset of Globalization: Focusing on the Conservative and Rightward Turn in Modern and Contemporary Historical Consciousness). *Minjok munhwa nonchong* (Yeungnam Journal of Korean Culture Studies) 40: 58–92.
- Burnham, James. 1943. *The Machiavellians: Defenders of Freedom*. New York: The John Day Company.
- Cha, Sang-cheol. 2004. *Han-mi dongmaeng 50-nyeon* (Fifty Years of the R.O.K.-U.S. Alliance). Seoul: Saenggak-ui namu.
- Chu, Chinoh. 2008. "Nyu raiteu-ui singmin sagwan buhwal peurojekteu: Geundae chogi seosul-ui munjejeom" (The New Right's Project to Revive Colonialist Historiography: Problems with the Narrative on the Modern Era). *Yeoksa bipyeong* (Critical Review of History) 83: 297–320.
- Chung, Seung-jin. 2017. "Nyu raiteu-ui iron-gwa sasang: An Byeong-jik, Yi Yeong-hun-ui choegeun seonggwa-reul jungsim-euro" (Theory and Ideology of the New Right: Focusing on the Recent Achievements of Ahn Byung-jik and Lee Young-hoon). *Yeoksa-wa hyeonsil* (Quarterly Review of Korean History) 106: 325–350.
- Chung, Yong Wook. 2021. "Hanguk-ui yeoksa galdeung-gwa gwageosa jeongni: Mugeun galdeung-ui sohwan-inga sae jeongcheseong hyeongseong-ui jintong-inga" (Historical Conflict and Restoration of Truth and Justice in Korean Society: The Resurgence of Old Conflicts or the Growing Pains of Forming a New Identity?). *Yeoksa hakbo* (Korean Historical Review) 249: 1–41.
- Dong-A Ilbo. 1988a. "'Uik chonggwolgi' chaek sido baepo" (Pamphlet 'Grand Rally of the Right' Distributed throughout the Country). August 26.
- Dong-A Ilbo. 1988b. "Jeonggye pamun bureun Yang Dong-an gyosu 'uik-eun

- jugeonneunga' (yoji)" (Summary of Yang Dong-an's 'Is the Right Dead?': A Source of Political Ferment). August 30.
- Dye, Thomas R., and Harmon Zeigler. 2008. *The Irony of Democracy: An Uncommon Introduction to American Politics*. 14th ed. Boston, MA: Wadsworth.
- Ha, Jong-mun. 2007. "Ban-il minjokjuui-wa nyu raiteu" (Anti-Japanese Nationalism and the New Right). *Yeoksa bipyeong* (Critical Review of History) 78: 175–197.
- Han, Dong-hun. 2025. *Gungmin-i meonjeo imnida: Han Dong-hun-ui seontaek* (The People Come First: Han Dong-hun's Choice). Seoul: Medici media.
- Hankyoreh. 1988. "O Hong-geun bujang tereo gunin beomhaeng balkyeojeo O Gukbang janggwan munchaek ganeungseong" (Revelations that Terror against Chief Reporter O Hong-geun Carried Out by Military, Possibility of Reprimand of Minister of National Defense O). August 26.
- Heyl, Barbara S. 1968. "The Harvard 'Pareto Circle.'" *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 4.4: 316–334.
- Higley, John. 2018. "Continuities and Discontinuities in Elite Theory." In *The Palgrave Handbook of Political Elites*, edited by Heinrich Best and John Higley, 25–39. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Higley, John, and Jan Pakulski. 2012. "Pareto's Theory of Elite Cycles: A Reconsideration and Application." In *Vilfredo Pareto: Beyond Disciplinary Boundaries*, edited by Joseph V. Femia and Alasdair J. Marshall, 111–130. Farnham, UK: Ashgate.
- Hwang, Heon. 1993. "Kim Yeong-sam daetongnyeong, 5.16 kudeta-ro gyujeong" (President Kim Young-sam Defines May 16 as a Coup d'État). *MBC News*. June 3. [https://imnews.imbc.com/replay/1993/nwdesk/article/1756021\\_30684.html](https://imnews.imbc.com/replay/1993/nwdesk/article/1756021_30684.html).
- Im, Dae-sik. 2005. "Gwageosa naejeon-eul apdu go: Geodaehan eummo-wa yakhan gori yeotbogi" (The Looming Civil War over Matters of the Past: Jottings on a Great Conspiracy and the Weak Link in the Chain). *Yeoksa bipyeong* (Critical Review of History) 71: 16–31.
- Jang, Yun-seon. 2008. "'Nyu raiteu-neun jugeotda, jongeon seoneon haeya': Bosu jisigin Kim Il-yeong gyosu jujang...Jajungjiran?" ('The New Right is Dead, Its End Must be Declared': Conservative Intellectual Professor Kim Il-yeong's Argument... Infighting?). *Oh My News*. November 27.
- Jeong, Hae-gu. 2006. "Nyu raiteu undong-ui hyeonsil insik-e daehan bipanjeok geomto" (A Critical Examination of the New Right Movement's Understanding of the Present). *Yeoksa bipyeong* (Critical Review of History) 76: 215–237.
- Jeong, Sang-ho. 2025. "Uri-ga han beon do gajiji motan, 'hamnijeok bosu jeongdang': Hanguk sahoe jinja wiheom-eun bosu kareutel-ui banheonbeopjeok geuguhwa" (Something We Have Never Had, a 'Rational Conservative Party': The Real

- Danger for Society is the Anti-constitutional Right-wing Radicalization of the Conservative Cartel). *Oh My News*. January 9. [https://www.ohmynews.com/NWS\\_Web/View/at\\_pg.aspx?CNTN\\_CD=A0003095147](https://www.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/View/at_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=A0003095147).
- Jo, Gap-je. 1993. "Bak Jeong-hui-wa Kim Yeong-sam-ui hwahae: Kim Yeong-sam daetongnyeong-ui yeoksagwan munje" (Reconciliation between Park Chung-hee and Kim Young-sam: The Problem with President Kim Young-sam's View of History). *Wolgan Joseon* (November): 104–127.
- Jo, Gap-je. 2006. *Bak Jeong-hui: Han geundaehwa hyeongmyeongga-ui bijeonghan saengae* (Park Chung-hee: The Tragic Life of a Modernization Revolutionary). 13 vols. Seoul: CHOGABJE.COM.
- Jo, Gap-je. 2013. "Bak Jeong-hui-e daehan se gaji sigak: Kim Il-yeong, Jo Ije, Jo Gap-je-ui nonpyeong" (Three Perspectives on Park Chung-hee: Remarks by Kim Il-yeong, Jo Ije, and Jo Gap-je). *Chogabje.com*. December 30. [https://www.chogabje.com/board/view.asp?C\\_IDX=54154&C\\_CC=BJ](https://www.chogabje.com/board/view.asp?C_IDX=54154&C_CC=BJ).
- Jo, Hyeong-geun. 2017. "Hamnijeok bosu-neun eonje olkka? Hanguk upa-ui hyeoksin ganeungseong-e daehan tamsaek" (When Will Rational Conservatism Emerge? Exploring the Potential for Innovating the Korean Right). *Munhwa gwahak* (Culture/Science) 91: 160–184.
- JTBC News*. 2024. "Huihan hage deureo manneunda: 'Soreum'...3-nyeon jeon 'Yun Seok-yeol yeongsang' boni; #Nyuseu da" (Stunningly Accurate: 'Goosebumps...'; Viewing Videos of Yoon Suk Yeol from Three Years Ago; #It's News). YouTube video, 11:46. December 21.
- Kang, Jung In. 2005. "The Dilemma of Korean Conservatism." *Korea Journal* 45.1: 202–232.
- Kim, Deok-han. 1996. "Inteobyu: Seongdae Kim Il-yeong gyosu; 'Jeonggwon-ui jeongtongseong-eun hyoyulseong-gwa yeongye hayeo pandan haeya hamnida'" (Interview: Sungkyunkwan University Professor Kim Il-yeong; 'Regime Legitimacy Must be Judged in Terms of Efficacy'). *Wolgan Joseon* (March): 560–565.
- Kim, Gi-hyeop. 2008. *Nyu raiteu bipan* (Critique of the New Right). Paju: Dolbegae.
- Kim, Il-yeong. 1991. "Yi Seung-man tongchigi jeongchi cheje-ui seonggyeok-e gwanhan yeongu" (A Study on the Character of the Political Regime under Syngman Rhee). PhD diss., Sungkyunkwan University.
- Kim, Il-yeong. 1995. "Bak Jeong-hui cheje 18-nyeon, otteoke bol geot inga" (How to Think about the Eighteen-Year Park Chung-hee Regime). *Sasang* (Thought) 27: 208–256.
- Kim, Il-yeong. 1996. "Bak Jeong-hui 18-nyeon geungjeong haeya handa: 'Bak Jeong-hui cheje 18-nyeon eotteoke bol geot inga'" (*Sasang* 1995-nyeon gyeoul ho

- gejae) yoyak” (The Eighteen-Year Park Chung-hee Regime Must be Affirmed: Summary of ‘How to Think about the Eighteen-Year Park Chung-hee Regime’ [Featured in the Winter 1995 Issue of *Sasang*]). *Wolgan Joseon* (March): 552–559.
- Kim, Il-yeong. 2004. *Geonguk-gwa buguk: Hyeondae hanguk jeongchisa gangui* (Founding a Nation, Enriching a Nation: A Lecture on Contemporary Korean Political History). Seoul: Saenggak-ui namu.
- Kim, Il-yeong. 2005. “Bak Jeong-hui-sik gaebal model-eun segyesa-ui wollei” (Park Chung-hee’s Development Model a Principal of World History). *Chogabje.com*. October 16. [https://www.chogabje.com/board/view.asp?C\\_IDX=7898&C\\_CC=AZ](https://www.chogabje.com/board/view.asp?C_IDX=7898&C_CC=AZ).
- Kim, Il-yeong. 2010a. *Geonguk-gwa buguk: Yi Seung-man, Bak Jeong-hui sidae jaejomyeong* (Founding a Nation, Enriching a Nation: Shedding New Light on the Syngman Rhee and Park Chung-hee Eras). Seoul: Giparang.
- Kim, Il-yeong. 2010b. *Pumgyeok inneun bosu-reul kkum kkuda: Go Kim Il-yeong kalleomjip* (Dreaming of a Dignified Conservatism: Collected Columns of Late Professor Kim Il-yeong). Paju: Idam books.
- Kim, Jeong-in. 2016. *Yeoksa jeonjaeng, gwageo-reul haeseok haneun ssaum* (History Wars: Battles over Interpreting the Past). Seoul: Chaek sesang.
- Kim, Won. 2011. *Bak Jeong-hui sidae-ui yuryeong-deul: Gieok, sageon, geurigo jeongchi* (Specters of the Park Chung-hee Era: Memory, Event, and Politics). Seoul: Hyeonsil munhwa yeongu.
- Kim, Yong-gap. 2011. “Minjok-ui myeongjeol seollal-eul hoebok han daetongnyeong” (The President Who Restored the National Holiday of Lunar New Year). In *No Tae-u daetongnyeong-eul malhanda: Gungnaeoe insa 175-in-ui girok* (Speaking of President Roh Tae-woo: Records of 175 Domestic and International Figures), edited by Jae-bong No, et al., 209–213. Paju: Donghwa chulpansa.
- Ko, Seong-guk. 1994. “Jo Gap-je bujang, wae dangsin geul-i munje inga” (Editor-in-chief Jo Gap-je, Why Your Articles are a Problem). *Gil* (June): 80–91.
- Lee, Haeng-seon. 2020. “1988–1994-nyeon bukhan bangmungi-wa dae-bukgwan: Bukhan baro algi undong – Kim Il-seong samang” (Travel Diaries on Visits to North Korea between 1988 and 1994 and Views of North Korea: From the Know North Korea Movement to Kim Il-sung’s Death). *Hanguk munhak yeongu* (Studies in Korean Literature) 64: 325–363.
- Lee, Namhee. 2022. *Memory Construction and the Politics of Time in Neoliberal South Korea*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Lew, Young-Ick. 1985. “Japanese Challenge and Korean Response, 1876–1910: A

- Brief Historical Survey.” *Korea Journal* 25.12: 36–51.
- Lopreato, Joseph. 1980. “Introduction.” In *Compendium of General Sociology*, by Vilfredo Pareto, xiii–xliv. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Machiavelli, Niccolò. 1989. “A Provision for Infantry (A Selection from the Preamble).” In *Machiavelli: The Chief Works and Others*, vol. 1. Translated by Allan Gilbert, 3–4. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Machiavelli, Niccolò. 2008. *The Prince*. Translated by James B. Atkinson. Cambridge, MA: Hackett Publishing Company.
- Macrae, Keiran. 2016. “Post-Cold War Conservative Reappraisals of Syngman Rhee: Neoliberalism and the New Right.” *Seoul Journal of Korean Studies* 29.2: 327–359.
- Macrae, Keiran. 2023. “New Right Historiography and Historical Revisionism: Post-Cold War Reappraisals of Park Chung Hee.” PhD diss., Seoul National University.
- Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. [1888] 1978. *The Manifesto of the Communist Party*. In *The Marx-Engels Reader*, 2nd ed., edited by Robert C. Tucker, 469–500. New York: W. W. Norton and Company.
- MBN News. 2025. “Dangyeol vs hyeoksin: Gungmin-ui him naehong gyeokhwa... Jeongdang daehoe deungnok sijak” (People Power Party Infighting Intensifies over Unity vs. Innovation: Registration for the Party Convention Begins). YouTube video, 2:06. July 30.
- Melzer, Arthur M. 2014. *Philosophy between the Lines: The Lost History of Esoteric Writing*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Michels, Robert. [1915] 2001. *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*. Translated by Eden and Cedar Paul. Kitchener: Batoche Books.
- Miller, Owen. 2010. “The Idea of Stagnation in Korean Historiography: From Fukuda Tokuzō to the New Right.” *Korean Histories* 2.1: 3–12.
- Mobrand, Erik. 2021. “Prosecution Reform and the Politics of Faking Democracy in South Korea.” *Critical Asian Studies* 53.2: 259–283.
- Mosca, Gaetano. 1939. *The Ruling Class*. Translated by Hannah D. Kahn, edited and revised by Arthur Livingston. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company.
- Nam, Si-uk. 2005. *Hanguk bosu seryeok yeongu* (A Study of Conservatives in Korea). Paju: Nanam chulpan.
- Orwell, George. 1997. “Review of *The Machiavellians* by James Burnham.” In *The Complete Works of George Orwell*, vol. 16, edited by Peter Davison, 72–74. London: Secker & Warburg.
- Pakulski, Jan. 2012. “The Weberian Foundations of Modern Elite Theory and

- Democratic Elitism.” *Historical Social Research* 37.1: 38–56.
- Pakulski, Jan. 2018. “Classical Elite Theory: Pareto and Weber.” In *The Palgrave Handbook of Political Elites*, edited by Heinrich Best and John Higley, 17–24. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Pareto, Vilfredo. 1935. *The Mind and Society*. 4 vols. Edited by Arthur Livingston. Translated by Andrew Bongiorno and Arthur Livingston. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company.
- Park, Chan-seung. 1994. “Bundan sidae namhan-ui hanguk sahak” (Korean Historiography in Division-era South Korea). In *Hanguk-ui yeoksaga-wa yeoksahak (ha)* (Korea’s Historians and Historiography [Vol. 2]), edited by Dong-geol Jo, Yeong-u Han, and Chan-seung Park, 327–372. Paju: Changbi.
- Park, Tae-gyun. 2005. “Hanguk bosu ideollogi-ui teukjing-gwa dilemma: Han Seung-jo pamun-ui yeoksajeok uimi” (The Characteristics and Dilemma of Korean Conservative Ideology: The Historical Meaning of the Han Seung-jo Controversy). *Hwanghae munhwa* (Hwanghae Review) 47: 205–233.
- Park, Tae-gyun. 2007. “Nyu raiteu-ui deungjang-gwa yeoksa insik nonjaeng” (The Emergence of the New Right and Debates over Historical Interpretation). *Hwanghae munhwa* (Hwanghae Review) 56: 285–302.
- Park, Tae-gyun. 2012a. “Segyehwa sidae hangukjeok inyeom jihyeong-ui giwon: Tallaengjeon sigi jeonhu yeoksa insik byeonhwa-reul jungsim-euro” (Origins of the Korean Ideological Terrain in the Globalization Era: Changes in Historical Perceptions around the End of the Cold War). In *Tallaengjeonsa-ui insik: Segyehwa sidae hanguk sahoe-ui munje uisik* (Perceptions of Post-Cold War History: Critical Awareness in Korean Society in the Globalization Era), edited by In-hwi Park, et al., 495–524. Paju: Hangilsa.
- Park, Tae-gyun. 2012b. “Segyesajeok jeonhwangi-wa No Tae-u jeongbu” (A World-historical Turning Point and the Roh Tae-woo Government). In *No Tae-u sidae-ui jaeinsik: Jeonhwangi-ui hanguk sahoe* (A Reconsideration of the Roh Tae-woo Era: South Korean Society at a Turning Point), edited by Won-taek Kang, 133–166. Paju: Nanam.
- Park, Tae-gyun. 2019. “Yeoksa gyogwaseo gukjeonghwa nonjaeng” (Debate over the Nationalization of History Textbooks). In *Nonjaeng-euro ingneun hanguk hyeondaesa* (Reading Contemporary Korean History through Its Controversies), by Ho-gi Kim and Tae-gyun Park, 284–291. Seoul: Medici media.
- Seo, Jin-yeong. 1993. “Wolgan Joseon 11-wol ho ‘Bak Jeong-hui-wa Kim Yeong-sam-ui hwahae’-e iui itta: ‘Pangaehyeokjeok sago’-reul gyeonggye handa” (An Objection to ‘Reconciliation between Park Chung-hee and Kim Yeong-sam’ in

- the November Edition of the *Wolgan Joseon*: Beware 'Anti-reform Thought'). *Wolgan Joseon* (December): 221–225.
- Sin, Il-cheol. 2004. *Bukhan juche sasang-ui hyeongseong-gwa soetoe* (Formation and Decline of North Korea's Juche Ideology). Seoul: Saenggak-ui namu.
- Sin, Ji-ho. 1992. "Dangsin-eun ajikdo 'hyeongmyeong'-eul kkum kkuneunga" (Do You Still Dream of the 'Revolution?'). *Wolgan gil-eul channeun saram-deul* (People Seeking a Way Monthly) 92.8: 158–162.
- Tikhonov, Vladimir. 2019. "The Rise and Fall of the New Right Movement and the Historical Wars in 2000s South Korea." *European Journal of Korean Studies* 18.2: 5–36.
- Toynbee, Arnold. 1934–1961. *A Study of History*. 12 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Verzichelli, Luca. 2018. "Elite Circulation and Stability." In *The Palgrave Handbook of Political Elites*, edited by Heinrich Best and John Higley, 573–591. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Vierthaler, Patrick. 2020. "A Reconsideration of the New Right's Formative Period (2003–2008): Conservative Experiences, Mass Media and Cultural Memory in Post-Authoritarian South Korea." *European Journal of Korean Studies* 20.1: 35–84.
- Vierthaler, Patrick. 2021. "The New Right and the 1948 Foundation View: A Failed Revision of South Korean Cultural Memory." *Vienna Journal of East Asian Studies* 13: 1–33.
- Vierthaler, Patrick. 2023. "Asymmetric Remembering in Post-Authoritarian South Korea: The Contested Cultural Memory of Liberation, Division and State Foundation, 1987–2022." PhD diss., Kyoto University.
- Yang, Dong-an. 1988. "Uik-eun jugeonneunga" (Is the Right Dead?). *Hyeondae gongnon* (Contemporary Public Opinion) 8: 154–169.
- Yang, Ho-min. 2004. *38-seon-eseo hyujeonseon-euro* (From the Thirty-Eighth Parallel to the Ceasefire Line). Seoul: Saenggak-ui namu.
- Yang, Sungik. 2021. "An Old Right in New Bottles: State without Nation in South Korean New Right Historiography." *Journal of Asian Studies* 80.4: 889–909.
- Yi, Jeong-hun. 2010. "Bangol gija-ui hyeondaesa: 'Sasil-eun inyeom-e useon handa'" (The Contemporary History of a Contrarian Reporter: 'Facts Take Precedence over Ideology'). In *Hanbando-ui modeun gwollyeok-e dojeon hae on 'bangol gija' Jo Gap-je: Inteobu moeum; Joong-Ang ilbo, Sindong-a*, KBS, MBC, Yahu, Baek Ji-yeon ('Contrarian Reporter' Jo Gap-je Who Has Challenged All Powers on the Korean Peninsula: Collected Interviews; *Joong-Ang ilbo, Sindong-a*, KBS, MBC, Yahoo, and Baek Ji-yeon), edited by CHOGABJE.COM, 7–83. Seoul:

CHOGABJE.COM.

- Yi, Sang-heon. 2025. “‘Yi Jae-myeong igil saram-eun...’ Jungdo pyobang yeogwon juja-deul kkumteul daenda” (‘The One to Beat Lee Jae Myung...’ Self-proclaimed Ruling-party Moderates Begin to Stir). *Dong-A Ilbo*. January 22. <https://www.donga.com/news/Politics/article/all/20250122/130913133/1>.
- Yi, Sin-cheol. 2013. “Talsingmin·tallaengjeon·minjujuui-e daehan dojeon, ‘nyu raiteu’ *hanguksa* gyogwaseo” (New Right’s ‘Korean History’ Textbook: An Attack on Post-colonialism, Democracy, and the Post-Cold War). *Yeoksa munje yeongu* (Critical Studies on Modern Korean History) 30: 7–50.
- Yu, Hyo-yeol. 2004. *Bukhan-ui sahoejuui: Geonseol-gwa jwajeol* (Socialism in North Korea: Construction and Breakdown). Seoul: Saenggak-ui namu.
- Yun, Geon-cha. 2000. *Hyeondae hanguk-ui sasang heureum: Jisigin-gwa geu sasang 1980–90-nyeondae* (Intellectual Currents in Contemporary Korea: Intellectuals and Their Ideas in the 1980s and 1990s). Translated by Hwa-gyeong Jang. Seoul: Dangdae.