Japanese Rule and Colonial Dual Society in Korea*

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Abstract

Methods of viewing colonial societies have been hotly debated in the academic circle at home and abroad since the second half of the 1980s. Current discourse on the topic is dominated by three perspectives: the colonial exploitation theory, the colonial modernization theory, and the colonial modernity theory. In recent years, scholars' focal interests have gradually shifted to the colonial modernity theory. Research on colonial modernity stresses identifying "modernity" more than "coloniality" and tends to attach less importance to the issue of the nation in a colony (domination by a foreign tribe). Yet the issue of the nation is not something that can be overlooked in addressing colonial Korea. Many Japanese migrated to Korea immediately after the Russo-Japanese War, and their presence changed the colonial Korean society to a great extent. Japanese and Korean residents were separated in terms of area of residence, economic consumption, culture, education, and health service. This was largely due to a series of policies adopted by the Japanese Government-General in Korea to encourage Japanese to move to Korea, such as policies ensuring the same health and education services as available in the Japanese mainland. As a result, colonial Korean society turned into a dual society differentiated by a high class, majorly composed of Japanese and a handful of Koreans, and a low class, consisting of a great majority of Koreans and a few Japanese. In other words, colonial Korean society became a "multi-layered dual society" where nation and class were complicatedly intertwined.

Keywords: colonial dual society, coloniality, colonial modernity, Japanese residents in Korea

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Introduction

Since the 1980s, an intense debate has been underway among domestic and international academic communities about how to look at colonial society in Korea. The differing standpoints can be classified largely into three groups: the theory of colonial exploitation, the theory of colonial modernization, and the theory of colonial modernity. The earlier dispute was between the theory of colonial exploitation and colonial modernization. Recently, however, academic interest has inclined toward the theory of colonial modernity, and academics who adhered to the theory of colonial modernity have begun to branch out among themselves.[1]

The theory of colonial modernization and colonial modernity both aim to confirm the notion of modernity in colonial Korea and look into the nature of that modernity. Studies in the theory of colonial modernity, while stressing the confirmation of "modernity," appear to somewhat neglect verifying the term "coloniality." The theory, having stemmed from emphasis on the need of a postnationalist attitude in colonial research, tends to somewhat neglect probing into the issue of being ruled by another nation. More important is the fact that proponents of the theory, indulged in studies about discourse and culture rather than the realities of colonies, have failed to adequately disclose the features of modernity in colonial Korea. Hence, I think it is necessary to present a new viewpoint on colonial Korea.

In this article, attempts will be made, first of all, to digest the various viewpoints on colonial Korea that have been put forth in the

1. On recent research trends in the theory of colonial modernity at home and abroad, refer to the following publications: Cho Hyung Keun, "Bipan-gwa guljeol, jeonhwa sok-ui hanguk singminji geundaeseong ron: gujo, juche, gyeongheom-ui samgak gudo-reul jungsim-euro" (The Theory of Colonial Modernity of Korea amid Criticisms, Distortions, and Transitions: With a Focus on the Triangular Framework Comprising Structures, Players, and Experiences), *Yeoksa hakbo* (Korean Historical Review) 203 (2009): pp. 303-321; and Mitsui Takashi 三ッ井崇,「朝鮮」(Joseon), in『日本植民地研究の現状と課題』(The Present Status and Tasks of Researches into Japanese Colonies), edited by the Society of Japanese Colonial Studies (Tokyo: Atenesha, 2008).

domestic and international academic communities since the 1960s. It will then put in order the characteristics of Japan's rule of colonial Korea with help from established studies. Lastly, I will present a new viewpoint, classifying colonial Korea as a "colonial dual society."

Viewpoints on Colonial Korea

The viewpoints of academics studying colonial Korean society are classified largely into three theoretical groups. Each of them will be examined in order.

The Theory of Colonial Exploitation

The theory of colonial exploitation is the traditional stance of the Korean historical science community. Its core has it that imperial Japan exploited land, industrial resources like rice and cotton, and even manpower from colonial Korea. Developed in the 1960s and 1970s, the theory of colonial exploitation initially focused on imperial Japan's forceful taking of land and rice from Korea.[2] Recently stressed, however, is that the amount of capital taken by Japan was much greater by many times even than the monetary influx into Korea, and that the extent of materials and human resources exploited during wartime (1937-1945) exceeds imagination (Jung 1995). In sum, the theory of colonial exploitation is focused on economic exploitation involving land, rice, and labor.

Regarding the exploitation of land, experts assert that the Japanese Government-General of Korea exploited a wide area of land and

2. For representative studies, see: Yi Jae-mu,「朝鮮における'土地調査事業'の實體」(The Substance of "Land Survey Project" in Korea), in『社會科學研究』(Social Science Study) 7.5 (1955); Kim Yong-seob, "Sutal-eul wihan cheungnyang toji josa" (Land Survey for the Sake of Exploitation), in *Hanguk hyeondaesa* (History of Contemporary Korea) (Seoul: Singu Munhwasa, 1969); and Shin Yong-Ha, *Joseon toji josa saeopsa yeongu* (A Study of the History of Land Survey Project in Korea) (Seoul: Jisik Sanupsa, 1979).

nationalized it, making Japan the owner, during Japan's land survey project. The project adopted a declaration system and many lots of land were not declared for various reasons. This undeclared land was nationalized by the Japanese Government-General of Korea. Scholars such as Yi Jae-mu, Shin Yong-Ha, and Kim Yong-seob advanced such claims, which were widely accepted by Korean historians. Much empirical research on the land survey project done since the 1990s, however, refuted their assertion. Though a declaration system was adopted, studies claimed, few pieces of land were left undeclared because the system was enforced in village units led by village chiefs. Accordingly, instances in which pieces of land were nationalized due to non-declaration were few. Some cases of dispute emerged in the course of the land survey project, which, however, were applicable only to those plots of land whose ownership was uncertain as to whether they were owned by the royal court or private citizens (S. Jo 1986; Bae 1987). These studies lead to the conclusion that the Japanese Government-General of Korea exploited few patches of land.

Can we claim, then, that land exploitation committed in colonial Korea was insignificant? I think it necessary to pay attention to land exploitation not only in the frame of the land survey project, but in relation to Japanese agricultural firms and private landowners. Large numbers of Japanese farms, usurers, and merchants came to Korea to own land since 1905. The main methods they employed were obtaining land reclamation permits from the Japanese Government-General of Korea, acquiring land through mortgages usurers secured, and purchasing land at giveaway prices. Broadly speaking, these methods constitute land exploitation. Land plundering through mortgages set up by usurers, in particular, lasted until the end of colonial Korea (C. Park 2009).

Another assertion of colonial exploitation has it that large quantities of rice produced in Korea were taken to Japan. The Government-General of Korea, under the rice production expansion plan, substantially increased rice output in Korea. Exploitation theorists maintained that the quantity of rice transported to Japan following the imple-

mentation of the rice production expansion plan significantly exceeded the quantity of rice that was additionally produced in Korea. Academics upholding the theory of colonial modernity, as will be discussed later, refuted this viewpoint on grounds that the transactions were made in the market, which can hardly be seen as forceful exploitation. Rather, they argued that the rice export market was expanded as a result and that farmers and landowners enjoyed a better chance of increasing their revenue. They add that the quantity of rice that increased under the rice production expansion plan was larger than the quantity taken to Japan, and blame previous misconceptions on the erroneous statistics of the Government-General of Korea. They believe the data about rice production in the 1920s and 1930s to be smaller than the actual figures. Academics generally admit that the Government-General of Korea's rice production statistics had problems. It is uncertain, however, if the error range is as great as colonial modernization theorists claim. Hence, it is still difficult to conclude that the quantity of rice additionally taken to Japan was greater than the increased rice production in Korea. Although facts about the quantity of transported versus produced rice are unclear, it is certain that the proportion of the rice taken to Japan from Korea gradually increased to over 40 percent, while rice consumption per Korean kept decreasing.

Regarding the contention that the transportation of rice to Japan can hardly be regarded as exploitation, I believe that it is important to focus on production relationships more so than the fact that these transactions occurred in the market. Most Japanese and Korean landowners raised farm rent by 50 percent, and still some even raised rent by as much as 60 to 70 percent. Such exorbitant rent rates should be considered feudalistic, as they far exceed modern land rental rates. Forcing feudalistic ground rental rates in a modern society can be seen in and of itself as having the nature of economic exploitation. The Government-General of Korea implemented the rice production expansion plan for the purpose of taking large quantities of rice to Japan. To achieve this end, it was necessary for Japanese agricultural companies and Japanese and Korean landowners to trade

large quantities of rice on the market. To that end, the landowners needed to collect larger quantities of rice at high rent prices. Accordingly, the Government-General of Korea endeavored to guarantee high farm rental rates to landowners and vehemently suppressed disputes raised by protesting tenants. All in all, the very act of increasing rent by 50 percent or more can be deemed exploitation, and it is undeniable that the Government-General of Korea strongly supported this system.

Thus, it can be shown that the theory of colonial exploitation is still logical and persuasive, provided that the definition of exploitation is reexamined.

The Theory of Colonial Modernization

Some economic historians in Korea, the United States, and Japan began to support the theory of colonial modernization since the mid-1980s, objecting to the theory of colonial exploitation. They held that exploitation was not all that occurred during the colonial period, and also that there was development that occurred via exploitation. Objecting aspects of the exploitation of land and grains as claimed by the theory of colonial exploitation, modernization theorists asserted that such exploitation did not take place. The theory of colonial modernization focused more on the idea of development.

This theory is mainly concerned with economic development. Modernization theorists assert that per capita GDP (gross domestic product) increased as a result of the development of infrastructure such as railroads, roads, and ports, the increased production of grain, and the progression of industrialization. Furthermore, they stress that other social improvements occurred during this period: many schools were built, the number of hospitals increased, resulting in improved educational standards, lower infant mortality rates, better nutritional status, and a sharp increase in population. In terms of sociopolitical development, colonial modernization theory emphasizes that Korea was able to modernize due to the various modern systems introduced during this time. The development of education and industrial tech-

nology produced better trained manpower and that such Korean manpower and industrial infrastructure left by the Japanese played an important role in the process of Korean economic development in the postliberation period.

The theory of colonial modernization was advanced overseas by Mark Peattie of the United States and Syunro Matsumoto of Japan and domestically by Ahn Byung-Jik, Joo Ikjong, and Kim Nak Nyeon.[3] However, the theory was refuted even within the community of economic historians, its most prominent opponent being Huh Soo-Youl. Huh criticizes the fallible logic upon which the theory is based: the development of colonial Korea's economy is equal to the economic development of Koreans. Despite the agricultural development of colonial Korea, he asserted, the share of the Koreans in agricultural production declined statistically. Though there was an increase in the number of Korean laborers as well as their wages, thanks to the development of the mining industry, their real income fell. Except during wartime, Korean businesses grew in absolute terms; however, most of them were small in scale and clustered in a small number of highly competitive areas. They did not hold much leverage in the overall economic activities of Koreans, and consequently, income creation from a numerical increase in the figure of businesses was not large. He concluded that it is difficult to acknowledge the effect of increased income of Koreans from this so-called economic development.

Huh noted that Japan, on the other hand, profited from their 8 billion yen investment in Korea, reaching 78.7 billion yen in 1945. Japan's investment in Korea saw enormous profits, which helped them to seize control of the Korean economy. He further claimed that the process modernization theorists call development was really a process in which the Japanese rapidly expanded their control of land and capital, two of the three elements of production; Koreans merely participated in this so-called development mainly through escalated labor supply, and economic prospects for Koreans declined. He estimated that the assets the Japanese left in Korea at the time of their

3. See Mark (1996); Matsumoto (1988); Ahn (1997); Joo (2005); and N. Kim (2005).

defeat by the Allies in World War II were devalued to one-tenth of their original worth over the course of the collapsed colonial economy and the Korean War. In addition, Huh argued that it is important for studies on colonial Korean history to examine the anti-Japanese national liberalization movements and the history of Japan's exploitation of Korea and to clarify how such national sentiments survived in the face of adverse rule by a foreign power (Huh 1999). Such ideas served as the foundation for his book entitled *Gaebal-eomneun gaebal* (Development Devoid of Development) published in 2005 (Huh 2005). The book maintains that even though Korea saw economic development under Japan's colonial rule, it was nothing but development by the Japanese for the Japanese.

Colonial modernization theorists rejected the logic Huh Soo-Youl presented in his book. Kim Nak Nyeon and Joo Ikjong pointed out problems in Huh's use of figures in the book, which Huh then recountered. In the process of this dispute, Kim Nak Nyeon and Joo Ikjong raised the issue of per capita income increase and improved living standards. Kim Nak Nyeon argued that during 1911-1940, average annual economic growth reached 3.7 percent, population increased by 1.3 percent, and per capita income rose by 2.4 percent (N. Kim 2006). But the figures accounted for the economic growth rate of all of Korea without separating the Koreans from the Japanese and without presenting the averages for the Koreans. Kim omitted the wealth disparity between the Japanese and Koreans. The income disparity between the Japanese and Koreans and also among the Koreans was serious at the time. Accordingly, the citation of the mean alone is insignificant.

Meanwhile, Joo Ikjong refuted the argument that income and living standards worsened in colonial Korea, supported by Huh Soo-Youl and Gill In Song. He asserted that from the early 1910s to the end of the 1930s, per capita income and consumption rose annually by 2.3 percent and 1.9 percent, respectively. Total calorie consumption per capita fell little despite the fallen grain consumption because the consumption of meat, vegetable, fruit, fish, shellfish, sauce, and processed food rose substantially. Height, which is correlated to the

status of nutrition, kept growing until the end of the 1920s, after which no noticeable change was observed. Given those factors, Joo Ikjong contended, living standards in colonial Korea should be seen as having improved rather than deteriorated. However, he did acknowledge that the feeling of deprivation felt by individuals would have been severe because their rising desire for consumption, a result of the introduction of modern consumer culture to then colonial Korea, increased much faster than the growth rate of income and consumption. Namely, his assertion has it that while living standards improved objectively, the relative sense of poverty deepened (Joo 2005). His argument failed to identify the main beneficiaries in the consumption of meat, vegetable, fruit, and processed foods, and his claim that living standards improved contradicts the fact that the number of farming households who suffered during the lean season continued to grow since the latter half of the 1930s. Newspapers of the time show an increasing number of stories involving farming households totally or partially devoid of food during the lean season. Farming households suffering from food shortage accounted for 48.3 percent of total farming households. Claims that living standards improved are doubtful in light of such situations.

The Theory of Colonial Modernity

The theory of colonial modernity began to emerge in the mid-1970s as a new trend of research in domestic and foreign academic communities. The theory of colonial modernity has firmly established itself in academic circles and now tends to lead research into the colonial era. The theory of colonial modernity contains various factions. This section will review the theory in four large groups.

The first group is the Korean Studies community in the United States. During the mid-1990s, Korean Studies scholars in the United States came up with the theory of colonial modernity after criticizing both theories of colonial modernization and exploitation from the standpoint of postmodernism that postulated postnationalism and postcolonialism (Shin and Robinson 1999). Gi-Wook Shin, Michael

Robinson, and Carter Eckert asserted that the above mentioned seemingly conflicting cognitive theories regarding colonial societies are all in fact the same because both attempt to comprehend history as a single-track development according to their monistic theory of modernism. According to them, both theories present single-track developmental logic sequences of feudalism to capitalism and underdeveloped to developing to developed country, and are captivated by the Hegelian view of history which views modernization as the progress and development of history. Noting the modernity apparent in colonial Korea, they gave attention to the nature of that modernity, paying particular attention to the relationship between colonial modernity and cultural hegemony. As a result, they viewed the modernity of colonial Korea as having been built actively by direct and indirect participation rather than accepted passively as an inevitable outcome. They stressed that the identities of people in colonial societies were constructed not only by the nation but additionally formed through dimensions such as class, gender, region, and social status. Such a discourse looking at Korea's contemporary history from the perspective of postmodernism and postnationalism greatly influenced the Korean academic community.

The second group, consisting of domestic academics, began to pay attention to the idea of colonial modernity from the mid-1990s. Scholars such as Kim Jin-Gyun and Jung Keun Sik criticized both the colonial modernization and exploitation theories in *Geundae juche-wa singminji gyuyul gwollyeok* (Modern Subjectivity and Disciplinary Power), which Kim and Jung co-edited in 1997. They maintained that "those two schools of thoughts are in identical terms in that they both positively view modernity, presuming that modernity is the goal that must be achieved (eventually)." At the same time, however, they argued that "if modernity itself is something that needs to be overcome, then the frame of discourse becomes substantially different." Saying that "problems contained in modernity have been taken no less seriously than their merits not only in the dimension of world history but in Korea as well," they noted and argued that posing a fundamental inquiry into the modern era and the overcoming West-

centric perspectives are two urgent tasks at hand for Korean social sciences. They concluded that in colonial territories, colonial traits and modernity were not two dichotomously separate elements but intertwined components of a single phenomenon. Imperial ruling power in a colony degraded its residents into objects of control while simultaneously demanding self-discipline, and modern discipline was further inculcated to form new personal identity types in societies such as families, schools, factories, reformatories, hospitals, and the military. They further pointed out that such modern discipline still carried the nature of colonial modern discipline. Their focus on the development of modern identities built from modern notions of discipline had a theoretical foundation on discourse critical of modernity represented by scholars such as Michel Foucault. They thought Western modernity stressed both freedom and discipline but that colonial modernity stressed discipline more so than freedom. These qualities of modernity present in colonial Korea led individuals to internalize discipline in all areas of life, ultimately creating a new identity type. These scholars of colonial modernity argued that the imperial power intended to create identity types fit to be "imperial Japan's subjects who had internalized modern discipline and who were ready to be mobilized at any time" (Kim and Jung 1997).

Their continuing research culminated in *Singminji-ui ilsang: jibae-wa gyunyeol* (The Daily Life of a Colony—Control and Fissures) (Kong and Jung 2006). Jung Keun Sik regretfully reflects that their 1997 book dealt with the problem of colonial disciplinary authority and the formation of modern subjectivity mainly through a theoretical perspective, and declares his intent to inquire into the formation of modern subjectivity by examining aspects of daily life transcending theoretical structures and systems. The scope of daily life this book discusses is wide, covering time, space, languages, consciousness, rituals, and popular culture as well as the basic necessities of life. "The core in research on daily life has been about finding the balance of control and resistance as well as coercion and consent," he writes. His focus on the importance of daily life under Japanese colonial rule, he explained, was based on his intention to steer away

from the established dichotomous framework of aggression/resistance and oppression/assimilation to a more nuanced and complex picture of reality. Instances of resistance on a smaller, more quotidian scale should be discussed in addition to formally defined anti-Japanese independence campaigns and independence movements. Further, Jung argues that it is necessary to look into how instances of indifference, evasion, amusement, and enjoyment were situated in daily life alongside cooperation and resistance. He adds that research into daily life aims to discover the social fissures unintentionally created by the imperial powers and ruling class rather than to identify imperial achievements (Kong and Jung 2006).

The third group pays attention to the colonial modernity that appeared in daily colonial life. Participating in the group are sociologists, historians, and Korean studies academics. Kim Dong No, Kim Young-geun, and Han Soo-Yeong noted the colonial modernity that emerged in the era of Japanese colonial rule in *Ilje-ui singminji jibae-wa ilsang saenghwal* (Colonial Rule by Imperial Japan and Daily Life) (Korean Studies Research Institute 2004). According to these scholars, daily life under Japanese colonial rule contained traits of both imperial Japan's colonial rule and modernity transplanted from outside Japan. The stated objectives of the book are to discuss how coloniality and modernity functioned in daily life, what changes they brought about in an individual's specific daily life, and what conflicts or clashes such changes caused in traditional customs and modes of life. They attempted find how traits of colonialism and modernity combined to form the notion of colonial modernity through examining daily life. They claimed that existing research failed to adequately describe the comprehensive qualities of colonial life because previous research concentrates only on either the colonialism or the modernity rather than the whole idea of colonial modernity. The authors of the book, unlike the second group, can be said to have concentrated on showing how colonialism and modernity were linked with each other rather than criticizing the concept of modernity itself. The themes that they dealt with in the aforementioned book include, among others, changes in the spatial structures of cities and rural communities,

changes in the everyday life patterns of the population, changes caused by the transplantation of capitalism in the patterns of speculation and consumption and also in fashion trends, and changes in folk religions, as well as the establishment of disciplinary mechanisms consisting of prisons, schools, and the police.[4]

The fourth group, earnestly supporting postmodern historical science, attempts to grasp the modern history of colonies from the perspectives of dimensions such as class, gender, race, culture, and language rather than by studying the the nation. Yun Hae-dong, Cheon Jeong-huan, and other scholars stressed the duality of the modern history of colonies in *Geundae-reul dasi ilneunda* (Rereading Our Modern History) (Yun et al. 2006). They wrote, "though it is common sense that modern history simultaneously has the aspects of liberation and oppression, a colony, too, has the dual existence of exploitation and oppression on the one hand and civilization and development on the other." Ordinary Koreans under colonial rule had the duality of resistance on the one hand and cooperation on the other; they termed the domain of such commoners as a "gray zone" (Yun et al. 2006).

Their research methodology includes analysis by standards of cultural conversion, philological conversion, and grass-roots history. Their definition of cultural studies stems from an interest in the class struggle changing in the latter industrial society and pays attention to inquiries into the groups of people considered to be the most subordinate subjects under imperial rule such as women and young people and their cultural identities. The field of cultural studies in Korea, too, has to be made in such a standpoint, they advocate.

They explain that the philological conversion of historical science attributes significance to narratives and discourse beyond the basic

4. In addition to the Korean Studies Research Institute (2004), the following books also discuss daily life in colonial Korea: Pang Kie-Chung, *Ilje pasijeum jibae jeongchaek-gwa minjung saenghwal* (The Domination Policy of Imperial Japanese Fascism and the Life of the Masses) (Seoul: Hyean, 2004); and Yi Sang-rok et al., *Ilsangsa-ro boneun hanguk geunhyeondaesa* (A Modern and Contemporary History of Korea Seen from Daily Affairs) (Seoul: Chaek-gwa Hamkke, 2006).

modern historical science methodology of simply reconstructing objective facts. They hold that analyses of discourse focused on the relations between text and politics can be a useful tool for understanding the historical characteristics of the era of Japanese colonial rule.

They also assert that the established history of the masses must be replaced by the fundamental reconstruction of the history of subalterns. Though subalterns basically denote the socially weak and lower classes or, in a broader sense, the ruled, there exist many differences between each subgroup. Therefore, their existence is incessantly changed according to the aspects of realities and discourses, being brought around by control, resisting control, and sometimes monopolizing control. Because the subordinate subjects do not leave records behind themselves, scholars must rely on these subalterns' memories. Scholars acknowledge that these memories, however, must be seen as subjective reflections of realities rather than objective depictions of the past.

As observed above, the theory of colonial modernity criticizes that previous research into the history of contemporary Korea was based on nationalism and modernism and advocates that the era of colonial rule needs to be viewed from a new standpoint. As a new methodology, they propose studies into how oppressive aspects contained in modernity express themselves in a colony, how the features of consumerism in a capitalist society are shown in a colony, and the cultural identities of subalterns like laborers, women, and the younger generation, and political traits appearing in texts. Such studies stimulate further inquiries into the colonial era by exploring many previously neglected themes and presenting new standpoints with which to form new understandings of the colonial era.

However, as mentioned in the introduction, the theory of colonial modernity is not without problems. First, the assertion that a nationalistic standpoint is no longer useful in understanding a colonial society is valid, but neglecting even the dispute between the nations is problematic. It is necessary to extend scholarly attention to class, gender, and social status, but the most important problem

underlying colonial societies is undoubtedly the issue of the nation—namely, the issue of being ruled by another nation. Hence, it is necessary to continuously keep in mind the nation when exploring colonial societies. Secondly, it is problematic that most studies under the theory of colonial modernity pay more attention to modernity than to colonialism. The modernity of a colony inevitably differs from the modernity of an empire. Therefore, priority in colonial modernity studies must be given to identifying colonial characteristics in contemporary history. In other words, specific colonial modernity, not universal colonial modernity, must be the object of attention. Third, though studies in culture and discourse are important, studies in the specific realities of colonial life should not be neglected. Historical science differs from literature and philosophy in its inquiries into historical truths. Accordingly, empirical inquiries into the pursuit of historical realities of a colonial society should be considered as important as ever.

Japan's Policy for Annexing and Colonizing Korea

In order to understand colonial Korea, one must first understand Japan's policy for annexing and colonizing Korea. The social structure of colonial Korea was defined primarily by Japan's colonization policy, which, in turn, was determined by the reasons why Japan annexed and colonized Korea.

Why did Japan annex and colonize Korea? It can be generally explained by the following reasons. Cited first from a political perspective are Japan's imperialistic ambitions. Japan fostered the measure of enriching and strengthening itself since the Meiji Restoration and from the 1880s onward, as shown in the argument for "dissociation from Asia" (*datsu-a ron* 脫亞論), and made it a national goal to distance itself from Asian countries to join the ranks of the Western imperialists. To that end, Japan thought it essential to secure colonies in order to advance to the Asian continent from their island. The Korean peninsula was thus seen as the first object of colonization

and a geographical foothold for moving forward to the continent (Kwon 2005). To occupy the Korean peninsula, Japan did not hesitate to risk the challenges of the 1894 Sino-Japanese War and the 1904 Russo-Japanese War. Japan attempted to make Korea its protectorate as early as 1894, only to fail in the face of backlash in Korea by forces such as the Donghak ("Eastern Learning") rebellion and interferences abroad by Russia, Germany, and France. Winning international support by way of establishing an alliance with Britain in 1902, however, Japan won the 1904 Russo-Japanese War and was eventually able to make Korea its protectorate. Facing continual Korean resistance against the protectorate, however, Japan judged it impossible to maintain extended and secure rule of Korea as a protectorate. Japan set up a policy of annexing Korea in 1907 and acted upon it in 1910, supported by Britain, Russia, and the United States.

As mentioned above, Japan was not satisfied with merely colonizing the Korean peninsula. As early as the late 1890s, Japan harbored the ambition of advancing to the Asian continent through the Korean peninsula and was absorbed in securing concessions in Manchuria, blatantly expressing such an ambition after victory in the 1905 Russo-Japanese War. Since Japan's annexation of Korea in 1910 was just one step towards Manchuria, it was necessary for Japan to make Korea a second Hokkaido. In other words, the Korean peninsula was regarded as a region to be integrated sooner or later into mainland Japan. Thus Japan's domination policies emerged into policies such as the assimilation strategy of the 1910s and the inland expansion strategy of the 1920s. The assimilation strategy called for culturally assimilating the Koreans into the Japanese through language and history education, thus obliterating Koreans' unique national consciousness. Imperial Japan's assimilation policy in the 1910s, based on this strategy, was still in its initial stage. The inland expansion strategy of the 1920s emerged in attempts to oppress Koreans' aspirations for independence following the 1919 March First Independence Movement by claiming to eventually grant suffrage to Koreans. Some Koreans demanded autonomy to form a colonial assembly, and some quarters of the Government-General of Korea supported the demand.

But the Japanese government concluded in the early 1930s that no autonomy can be granted to Koreans. Tokyo regarded the Korean peninsula as a space to be integrated into its mainland in the future, not a space to be given political autonomy in any form (C. Park 1992).

The second reason for Japan's annexation of Korea was the need for colonies following the instatement of capitalism in Japan. With Western powers entering the era of imperialism in the 1880s, protectionism prevailed in trade, and the world powers were bent on exploring colonies in a bid to secure commodity markets. Important to Japan's capitalism, which entered a process of industrial revolution in the 1890s, was to secure export markets for its products as well. Japan needed colonies. The Korean peninsula was at the top of Japan's priority list for potential monopolistic commodity markets. Capitalist Japan also needed secure supplies of raw materials like cotton and cocoons for its cotton and silk weaving industries. Southern Korea was confirmed to be adequate for cotton cultivation, and Japanese capitalists demanded a secure cotton cultivation and supply from the region for the Japanese government. In addition, Korea's potential underground resources like coal and minerals were regarded as important for the development of Japan's capitalism. Korea was thus regarded as essential for Japan in order to serve as a commodity market and a source of raw materials. In addition, an outsourcing of surplus capital that accumulated in Japan following World War I emerged as a problem, and Japanese colonies like Taiwan and Korea were identified as prior destinations for surplus Japanese capital. Japan's capital advance to Korea was somewhat sluggish in the 1920s but became active when the Great Depression was overcome in the early 1930s.

The third reason for Japan's annexation of Korea lay in Japan's social needs for overcoming its food shortage following a population boom and needs for resettlement. Entering an industrialization and urbanization process in the latter half of the 1880s, Japan began to confront an explosive rise in population, and rice became a staple food with a shift in food consumption patterns. As a consequence,

rice prices spiralled up and the first rice disturbance occurred in 1890. Population increase and food shortage became serious social issues by the 1900s. Alternatives that emerged were resettlement to and rice import from Korea. Japan's import of rice from Korea began in the 1890s and increased sharply thereafter (Omameuda 2006, 138-139).

Japan's population increased by about 400,000 in 1900, 500,000 per year in the 1910s, and 700,000 per year in the 1920s. The rapid population rise resulted in an explosive demand for food; the first thing that the Japanese government attempted was to increase rice import from Korea by increasing Korean rice production, resulting in the rice production expansion plan of the 1920s. Of Korea's annual rice output amounting to 20 million *seok*[5] in the first half of the 1930s, about 8 million *seok* were taken to Japan.

Japanese resettlement to Korea increased drastically after Japan's victory in the 1905 Russo-Japanese War. Starting in the latter half of the nineteenth century, many Japanese migrated to Hokkaido and other parts of Japan and some even emigrated to North and South America and Australia. When it became difficult for the Japanese to emigrate to North America in the 1900s, resettlement in Korea and Manchuria emerged as an alternative. Foreign Minister Jutaro Komura, who played a leading role in concocting Japan's annexation of Korea, proposed that one million Japanese be resettled in Korea and Manchuria over 20 years. Shinpei Goto, the first president of the Manchurian Railroad Company, proposed that 500,000 Japanese be resettled in Korea and Manchuria over a decade. Their proposals were implemented. By August 1945, the number of Japanese who resettled in Manchuria reached 830,000 and those resettled in Korea 750,000.[6]

The resettlement of the Japanese in Korea, as shown in Figure 1, drastically increased from 1905 to the mid-1910s and steadily rose

5. One *seok* equals 144 kilograms.

6. In addition, 380,000 Japanese immigrated to Taiwan, 500,000 to mainland China, and 400,000 to Sakhalin. Refer to Yim (2008, 181, 203).



Figure 1. The Number of Japanese Residing in Korea

from around 1920 to the early 1940s. During that period, an average of about 20,000 Japanese resettled in Korea per year. The resettlement of the Japanese in Korea was significant not only in resolving Japan's problems of overpopulation but also in establishing a firm base in moving to Manchuria and Chinese territories under its occupation. The Japanese residing in Korea during the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars played a major role in the transport of supplies and food to the Japanese forces and also as interpreters (Takasaki 2006, 57-62). For Japan, who aimed to occupy Manchuria and even Chinese territories in the future, it was necessary to resettle as many Japanese people as possible in Korea. Japanese resettlement in Korea carried an important political significance. In addition, the resettlement could help to facilitate the cultural assimilation of Koreans into the Japanese. From an economic perspective, it was important for the Japanese to take the lead in increased food production, cotton cultivation, and underground resource development. Accordingly, Tokyo positively encouraged and backed up Japanese resettlement in Korea.

Reorganization of Colonial Korea into a Dual Society

Colonial Korean society underwent reorganization into a dual society under imperial Japan's colonization. It was changing into a dichotomized society of upper and lower classes in many respects instead of an integrated one. Dual society aspects of colonial Korea appeared in all areas such as politics, economy, society, and culture. The phenomenon of a dual society emerged in: 1) the segregation of the Japanese from the Koreans and Japanese discrimination against the Koreans in daily life; and 2) the expanding economic gap between the ruling class comprised of Japanese bureaucrats, landowners, and merchants and some Korean landowners, and the ruled, composed of the majority of Korean farmers and laborers.

Segregation and Discrimination in Daily Life

As large numbers of Japanese resettled in Korea, a phenomenon of segregation daily life and policy discrimination began to occur. To begin with, residential segregation was evident. As shown in a sample research on major cities, including Seoul, the residential areas of the Japanese and Koreans were segregated. In the case of Seoul, Japanese lived in the southern villages located south of the Cheonggyecheon stream and Koreans in the northern village (Y. Kim 2002; B. Kim 2009).[7] Such phenomena appeared not only in major port cities, which started as open ports, but also in traditional cities such as Pyongyang and Daegu. Under the policies of the Government-General of Korea and city governments, serious discrimination emerged between Japanese and Korean residential areas with respect to roads, electricity, water, and sewage systems. Such segregation in residential areas was accompanied by a segregation phenomenon in the consumption and cultural lives of the Japanese and Koreans. The lives of the Japanese and Koreans in urban areas gradually dichotomized.

7. According to page 152 of B. Kim (2009), Japanese and Taiwanese residential areas were segregated from each other in Taipei, Taiwan as well.

Segregation and discrimination policies were more conspicuous in education. Schools attended by Japanese students and those attended by their Korean counterparts differed from each other in educational systems and their designations. Schools for the Japanese in the 1910s had six-year elementary, five-year middle, and four-year high school courses. In comparison, schools for the Koreans had a four-year elementary course, a four-year middle school course for boys and a three-year middle school course for girls. Faced with grievances from the Koreans, the discriminatory educational system, under the second Korea Education Decree in 1922, changed into a six-year elementary course, a five-year middle school course for boys and a five- or four-year middle school courses for girls. Though the educational system was eventually made identical in length for Japanese and Korean students, nationally separated education remained unchanged in respects to school designations with students classified as "those who speak the Japanese language" and "those who don't speak the Japanese language" and the definition described in school designations. Discrimination in school names was abolished under the third Korea Education Decree in 1938, and educational segregation based on nation of origin, too, was abolished institutionally. In reality, however, the coeducation of Japanese and Korean students was quite limited in scope, and the students of the two nations were not adequately integrated.

There existed a big difference in school attendance rates as well. The elementary school attendance rate for Korean children, due to a shortage in schools, did not surpass 20 percent until 1933 and remained below 50 percent even in 1942.[8] This contrasted with the fact that almost all of their Japanese counterparts attended elementary

8. This is in stark contrast with the fact that primary school attendance rates reached nearly 100 percent in 15 years after Korea's liberation in 1945. The fact that education expenditures accounted for only 3.5 percent of the Government-General of Korea's entire budget in 1929 shows the little interest the Government-General of Korea paid to education in Korea. Expenditures for the police, court, and prison, in comparison, accounted for 12 percent of the total budget. Education expenditures in Japan's mainland at the time accounted for 8.1 percent of the mainland's budget. Refer to Yi and Kim (1932, 56, 61).

school under a compulsory education system which was enforced in mainland Japan.

Middle school education was even poorer. There existed only 49 middle schools for boys and girls, and nearly half of them were private. The Government-General of Korea made little effort to establish more public middle schools. Because nearly no new middle schools were set up, only about 5 percent of primary school graduates could enter middle schools in 1940 despite rising elementary school graduation rates. In 1943, Korean elementary school children numbered 1,997,492 and Korean middle school students 89,292, the latter accounting for 4.4 percent of the former. In comparison, Japanese elementary schoolchildren numbered 98,200 and middle school students 41,200, the latter comprising 42 percent of the former (M. Yi 1949, 382). The difference between the two groups was nearly tenfold. The neglect of middle school education for Koreans came from a policy of providing them primarily with elementary education and low-grade vocational education. This was the same case as in Taiwan, another colony of Japan (Kita 1992, 281).



Figure 2. Elementary School Attendance Rate in Colonial Korea

Discrimination in medical services was also serious. Korea had a total of 128 hospitals in 1933, consisting of 4 set up by the Government-General of Korea, 32 by provincial offices, 10 by other public institutions, 48 private Japanese hospitals, 10 private Korean ones, and 25 foreign private ones. Of relatively big size and scale were those hospitals under the jurisdiction of the Government-General of Korea and provincial offices, which mainly served the Japanese. Their outpatients in 1930 consisted of more than 160,000 Japanese and about 230,000 Koreans. The ratio of using such hospitals in terms of population proportion was very high for the Japanese. Japanese medical treatment ratio (patient ratio in proportion to population) steadily improved from 7.1 percent in 1910 to 30.1 percent in 1920 and 55.3 percent in 1942. In contrast, the ratio for the Koreans edged from 0.3 percent in 1910 to 1.0 percent in 1920 and peaked to 2.1 percent in 1942. Such a low ratio of Koreans using those hospitals can be attributed in part to expensive medical costs and primarily to the language barrier between them and the mainly Japanese medical staff.[9] Koreans demanded that more Korean doctors be employed at hospitals set up by the Government-General of Korea and provincial offices, only to be largely neglected. Such hospitals virtually served Japanese residents in Korea and Koreans who were fluent in the Japanese language.

Polarization in Economic Aspects

An average of approximately 20,000 Japanese resettled in Korea annually during the colonial period. Most of the Japanese resettled in Korea lived in cities convenient to inhabit. Although the rates of Japanese living in suburban or rural cities were similar in 1920, the steady increase in city residents brought the proportion of Japanese resettlers living in cities to about two thirds in 1944. Even the Japanese living in suburban or rural areas, also, resided in well-developed towns.

9. Koreans capable of speaking the Japanese language in 1927 numbered about 1.17 million, 420,000 at the normal level, and 750,000 at the preliminary level. That accounted for only 6.3 percent of the Korean population of about 18.5 million.

What kinds of occupations did the Japanese have? According to figure 3, nearly 40 percent were public servants, 25 percent were engaged in commerce and transportation, and about 19 percent were in industry. Farmers accounted for only about 4 percent of Japanese resettlers. Public servants, occupying the biggest portion, included members of the staff of the Government-General of Korea, local government officials, teachers, and policemen. In other words, approximately 300,000 Japanese, or 40 percent of about 750,000 Japanese residents in Korea toward the end of Japan's colonial rule in Korea, could be considered ruling manpower. This was in sharp contrast to the relatively small numbers of Britons and Frenchmen who resided in India and Vietnam, their respective colonies, during the same period.[10] This is one of the most glaring characteristics of Japan's colonial rule of Korea. In addition, Japanese commercial and industrial



Figure 3. Population Structure by Occupation of Japanese Residents in Korea in 1942

10. The Frenchmen who resided in Vietnam were mostly colonial ruling manpower whose number stood at merely about 20,000 (Hanel 1942, 250).

enterprisers above a certain socioeconomic level exercised economic power in cities. As representatives in chambers of commerce and industry and city councils, they led the politics and economy of relevant cities. These commercial and industrial entrepreneurs, along with the above-mentioned ruling manpower, emerged as a new ruling class.

Those Japanese who resettled in Korea grasped economic power as well as political power. Japanese landowners and agricultural firms occupied approximately 11 percent of the farmland in all of Korea. The Japanese living in cities had near total control of the urban economic power. As shown in table 1, the Japanese residing in Korea's five major cities (Seoul, Busan, Pyongyang, Daegu, and Incheon) accounting for about a quarter of the whole population, owned approximately 64 percent of the land, and paid 70 percent of taxes. In contrast, the Koreans, accounting for about 64 percent of the population, owned only 33 percent of the land and paid about 25 percent of taxes. As shown in table 2, the Japanese residing in Korea's five major cities owned 5.7 times more land than their Korean counterparts and paid 12.3 times more taxes than the Koreans. Of a total of 38 commercial firms with a capital of 1 million yen or above in Seoul, 28 were owned by Japanese and 10 by Koreans. There was also a big gap between the aggregated capital of the two

Table 1. Economic Status in Five Major Cities

(percentage in parentheses)

Classification	Koreans	Japanese	Foreigners	Total
Population (ea)	632,167 (73.95)	213,405 (24.97)	9,188 (1.08)	854,769 (100.0)
Land owned (*pyeong*)	4,045,494 (32,97)	7,787,443 (63.46)	437,564 (3.57)	12,270,501 (100.0)
Amount of taxes (yen)	1,726,888 (24.51)	4,950,681 (70.26)	367,012 (5.21)	7,044,581 (100.0)

Source: Yi and Kim (1935, vol. 5, 112).

Table 2. Individuals' Land Ownership and Amount of Taxes in Five Major Cities

Classification	Koreans	Japanese	Foreigners	Average
Land owned (*pyeong*)	6.40	36.49	47.62	14.36
Amount of taxes (yen)	2.73	33.20	39.94	8.24

Source: Yi and Kim (1935, vol. 5, 112).

groups, that of Japanese firms amounting to 28.18 million yen and that of Korean firms 6.95 million yen (S. Park 2006, 314). Polarization phenomena gradually took place, widening the huge gap between Japanese resettlers and Koreans.

The economic polarization phenomena between Korean landowners/capitalists and farmers/laborers also deepened gradually. Land possessed by landowners, who accounted for as little as 3 percent of total households, increased more and more to reach 50 percent of rice fields in 1942. The share of tenants in the total number of households grew accordingly, soaring from 37 percent in 1917 to 53 percent in 1942. For the Japanese to carry more rice to Japan, it was necessary to have more rice in the market. That required an expanded landowner system and high tenancy rents. The increase of rice fields cultivated by owner farmers or the decrease of tenancy rents would have resulted in a reduced marketing of rice. Accordingly, the Government-General of Korea attempted to maintain high tenancy rents at a steady 50 percent, and thoroughly suppressed disputes raised by tenants by threatening to raise the rent; lowering tenancy rents by 10 percent could bring about a 20 percent fall in marketed rice. In this respect, alliances with Korean landowners were essential and needed to be protected. Korean landowners, protected by the power of the Government-General of Korea, cemented their position as part of the ruling class.

Conclusion: Presentation of the Theory of Colonial Dual Society

As reviewed thus far, the segregation and discrimination of Koreans in daily life and the economic polarization of the Japanese residents and Koreans in colonial Korea deepened over time. The residential areas of the Japanese and Koreans were segregated, accompanied by discrimination in consumption and culture. Segregation existed in education and medical services as well. Such phenomena emerged as a result of the Government-General of Korea's policies ensuring Japanese resettlers in Korea with the same educational and medical services offered to the Japanese at home in attempts to ameliorate their complaints. Going a step further, the policies were also aimed to encourage more Japanese at home to resettle in Korea. As a result, an average of about 20,000 Japanese resettled in Korea annually during the colonial period. They enjoyed considerable privileges in Korea and gradually joined the ruling class.

In that process, the population in colonial Korea was gradually dichotomized into the upper classes majorly comprised of Japanese and a minority of upper-class Koreans, and the lower classes consisting of the majority of Koreans and a minority of Japanese. In other words, a colonial dual society came into being. The Japanese making up the upper classes were mainly bureaucrats, landowners, merchants, and industrialists. On the other hand, Japanese laborers, farmers, small businessmen, and prostitutes constituted the lower classes as was the case with Koreans. An extremely small number of Korean landowners, capitalists, and Korean officials of the Government-General of Korea belonged to the upper classes, while an overwhelming majority of Korean farmers, laborers, and small businessmen belonged to the lower classes. Those Japanese belonging to the lower classes had a sense of superiority over the Koreans in the same lower class and enjoyed, in part, relative privileges as lower-class Japanese. Accordingly, national class discrimination can be said to have existed even within the same class. Colonial Korea can be regarded as a multilayered dual society in which the issues of nation and class mingled with each other in a complicated way. Similar phe-

nomena emerged in Taiwan. Aspects of colonial dual societies are considered to have been phenomena commonly emerging in Japanese colonies.

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