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The Korean Experience of Social Normality and Dividing Practices

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Abstract

Applying the arguments of Michel Foucault's dividing practices, this study analyzes the discourses that emerged during the discussion over the Busan Hyeongje Bokjiwon (Brothers Home) scandal, which occurred in 1987, to weaken the epistemic premises of the principle of normalization, a primary ideology of social welfare knowledge. The principle of normalization is grounded in the notion that it is right to help the beneficiaries of welfare services to access what is considered normal by the statistical majority of society. Yet, the theory fails to provide sufficient explanation for what cultural normality is and who forms it. The results of this analysis show that the Korean experience of abnormalities had been formed not in a way towards reducing or eliminating the punishment of people defined as abnormal. Rather, such persons were exposed to claims that they should be observed through rational gazes and edified through labor ethics. Defining abnormality in Korea was another epistemological form of punishment. This is a compressed version of Foucault's argument that punishment for abnormal people inevitably entails strict judgment, exclusion, and punishment. The experience still remains, under the principle of normalization, as a primarily practical ideology in clinical medicine and social welfare.

Keywords: Hyeongje Bokjiwon, Brothers Home, vagrants, principle of normalization, Michel Foucault, dividing practices, work ethics

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This study summarized and revised author's master's thesis, "A Critical Analysis of the Discourse of Normalization: Focusing on the Mode of Punishment and Exclusion in Foucault" (S. Kim 2005).

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Introduction

The principle of normalization, which is primarily utilized in the mainstream field of social welfare, is considered to be proper for most social welfare practices concerning children, teenagers, the elderly, as well as the disabled. However, there have only been technical discussions and assessments of these specific practices, with little discussion dedicated to the question of whether the knowledge it brings pertaining to social welfare is credible. Still, the lack of discussion over the usefulness of social welfare knowledge is not limited to the principle of normalization. Epstein (1996, 114) argues that overall, both researchers and practitioners take historically rigid viewpoints without raising any questions, which delays philosophical exploration into the practice of social welfare.

Generally, the principle of normalization, a dogmatic theory of social welfare practices, utilizes culturally normal means to develop or maintain the behavior and characteristics of an individual (Wolfensberger 2004, 44) and is premised on empiricism (Wolfensberger 2004, 22; Olshansky 2004, 213–214). This is the epistemic aspect of the principle of normalization on which this study focuses. Who formed the experience of normality that forms the premise of the theory? What evidence and justifications allow us to judge an individual to be of less value and insist that we can intervene? How can a person consider himself or herself deviant? These questions are in line with other epistemic questions: How can humans be subject to problematization? What aspects of a human can be rightly considered to be the subject of knowledge intervention?

To answer these questions, this study analyzes the investigation into the Hyeongje Bokjiwon (Brothers Home) incident, which occurred in 1987, and the discussions concerning it.[1] This study tracks hidden empirical paths that

1. This case was reexamined when Han, one of the victims, held a one-man protest in front of the National Assembly in May 2012. Several victims then demanded on December 24, 2013 that the state investigate and compensate for human rights violations. There is a continuing interest in the case on the part of media and politicians. In November 2013, the show *Sisa megeojin 2580* (Current Affairs Magazine 2580) (KBS), and in 2015 *Geugeot-i algosipda* (I Want to Know It) (SBS), aired stories on the case. In addition, a bill has been proposed in the

cannot be explained by empirical normality, the epistemic premise of the principal of normalization that casts light upon the theory. Brothers Home, a private internment camp located in Busan during the 1970s and 80s, was initially founded in 1975 to protect beggars and homeless people. However, in the name of social purification, the Park Chung-hee military regime (1961–1979) forced children, women, senior citizens, and disabled persons into the facility, where for many years some were subject to violent human rights abuses, such as physical assault, rape, and even murder. The Brothers Home scandal shocked Korean society just prior to the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. This study focuses on the abuses at Brothers Home because they drew more public attention than any other incident in the history of social welfare in contemporary Korea. Moreover, the case itself provides examples of *normal* people along with the *abnormal* that Korean society intended to protect and isolate by placing them on the margins of society. However, this study not only explains the circumstances of this historical incident, but also conducts a discourse analysis to examine how both those responsible for the incident and political-economic factors manipulated what was considered normal and abnormal in the process of seeking reasonable alternatives, as well as how those responsible made certain practices possible.

For the analysis, this study will utilize the arguments of dividing practices, which could be seen as a form of punishment and exclusion of humans, as proposed by the French philosopher Michel Foucault. Dividing practices refers to the complicated and secret historical practices that a branch of knowledge uses to make a certain individual a specific *subject*. An examination of dividing practices as applied to this Korean case will show how people housed in social welfare facilities become *abnormal*, yet still strive to live normal lives.

To Foucault, social welfare practice is basically a substitute for education as well as a form of punishment that divides people into ranks or classes, such as the good and the bad or the superior and the inferior, and that punishes the latter by cracking down on their differences, or acknowledges but excludes them to realize economic management (Foucault 1999a,

National Assembly to clarify the truth. However, this study focuses on the epistemological problems of this event rather than recent trends surrounding the case.

92–93; 2002b, 333–371). Still, Foucault is an unfamiliar name in social welfare studies. Moreover, what little research there is on the subject mainly connects Foucault's pastoral power with social service work and suggests that social welfare practice be comprehended in the context of good and evil. These past studies also exclusively discuss Foucault's power arguments, while providing little insight into his limitations and his efforts to overcome them (for the correlation between social service work and Foucault's concept, see Margolin 1997; Wakefield 1998; Pease 2002; G. Kim 2004).

Theoretical Background

The Principle of Normalization

The principle of normalization was proposed in the late 1960s in Northern Europe as the principle of service practice for the intellectually disabled. The theory criticized the living conditions in large facilities for the mentally disabled and placed much importance on rhythm and balance in daily life (Moser 2000, 207). In fact, the International League of Societies for the Mentally Handicapped acknowledged the validity of the principle of normalization. The Society affirmed that the principle of normalization helps intellectually disabled individuals to develop normal behavioral patterns (Roos 2004, 206–207). Currently, the principle of normalization is considered a primary ideology of social welfare practice (Smith and Brown 1992, 685), and is used to advocate the rights of service clients, including not only intellectually disabled persons but also the mentally ill, vagrants, senior citizens, children, and teenagers. Indeed, in many of the courses taught in the academic departments of social welfare, the principle of normalization is presented as an ideological and theoretical foundation. Moreover, the principle of normalization is still the theoretical foundation of various social welfare practices. For example, in social welfare practice sexual rehabilitation for people with intellectual disabilities is filled with concerns about indiscreet sexual activity and countermeasures. According to the manual used in Korea's social welfare facilities (National Rehabilitation

Center 2003), the sexual practices of those with intellectual disabilities are immoral and risky due to their indiscreet nature, and therefore they need to be controlled through professional crisis intervention. Thus, their sexual pleasure is surrounded by a morality of public universality and discourse of normalization, wherein various methods by which they obtain pleasure should be thoroughly managed. In other words, their sexual desire is deeply involved in a kind of "orthodontics by discourse" (Foucault 2003c, 47). Daily-life training, sexual rehabilitation, and vocational rehabilitation of persons with disabilities are constantly being directed to turn their experience of life into a normal one.

The definition of the principle of normalization varies from region to region, but it can generally be divided into the Northern European definition and the American one. In Northern Europe, the definition might be compressed as *normal but segregate*, of which the core is the concept of rights. That is, to receive help to live a normal life is a right of the (intellectually) disabled person, and whether that help is received or not is to be decided within the boundaries of self-determination (Nirje 2004). Therefore, disabled persons should have the right to live as normal people throughout their lifetimes, as well as the right to self-determination and respect, the right to a normal sex life, and the right to economic activity and community participation. This recognition indicates that the Northern European principle of normalization holds a place in the universal philosophy on how humans should be recognized. However, it is not only the Northern European definition that combines the principle of normalization with rights. Diverse movements (human rights movements and disclosure of mental hospital records) occurred in the 1960s, significantly affecting the formation and alteration of the principle of normalization in Northern Europe.

What makes the Northern European style different from the American is that the latter internalizes environmental factors as the values of individuals. That is, the environmental factors transform from the right of an individual to acquire, to the obligation to overcome. The American definition offers diverse technologies and norms to help socially devalued individuals gain meaningful social status and value. The American definition

was proposed by Wolf Wolfensberger, who is recognized for establishing the principle of normalization in America. Wolfensberger criticized the Norther European principle of normalization for its lack of scientific validity and theoretical adequacy. From these criticisms emerged social role valorization (SRV), a key aspect of the American principle of normalization.

Wolfensberger (2004, 44) defines SRV, a scientific theory, as utilizing culturally normal means, where possible, to help an individual develop culturally normal behavior and characteristics. SRV is based largely on pathological aspects, shown clearly in the problem of deviant individuals that he refers to when asserting the importance of SRV. He defines *deviant* as a person whom one realizes is critically different from others and of whose differences one has a negative perception, i.e., a *stigma* (2004, 24–25). Therefore, it is important for deviant individuals to be treated according to the viewpoints and methods that are considered normal in their cultures and helped to achieve recognition as normal. This is why behavior modification theory is considered valid in the American style of the principle of normalization (Roos 2004).

Foucault and Normalization

1) Foucault's Epistemology

Michel Foucault, a renowned twentieth-century French philosopher, was well known for criticizing the Western history of rationality through the ideality of philosophy and scientific rationality by philosophically reflecting upon subjects that had been excluded from philosophy, such as the insane, prisons, and childhood sexuality. In particular, he studied the problem of the subject. He believed that the modern subject that functioned to form a rational society was created through exclusion, limitation, and punishment. Foucault (2002a, 16) refers to a *willingness to truth*. For Foucault, truth is not something whose characteristics never change and which, therefore, can be achieved by observation and experimentation through a subject's experience or transcendental rationality. Rather, truth is the byproduct of the complicated and offsetting intentions of those who strive to acquire

knowledge. Therefore, people's intentions reveal their desire and power. In this way, Foucault focused on subverting the modern epistemology to explain the unique relationship between the subject and the object, between knowledge and power.

Foucault's (2003b, 54–56) epistemology, which is called "archeology of thought," begins from a refutation of traditional epistemology that presupposes the absolute subject. He denies the a priori reason of the subject and introduces the epistemological space called "discourse" in the object recognition process. For him, epistemology implies exploration of the space of the possibility that made it possible for certain discourses to be historically formed and transformed.

From Foucault's (2003b, 52) point of view, we currently build common object relations within knowledge. Therefore, he realized the need to deconstruct the unity and legally bind it through new questions. This is because making a thing into an object is possible, not because it is *naturally itself* but because it is the result of a composition of the subjects who experience it; when a thing is considered to be a certain object, it entails the practice of so-called exclusion and embracement, as well as other aspects of the thing, such as ontological dissipation.

Ultimately, the object of epistemology offsets the meaning through the relationship with the subject and is produced as another meaning. This is not the byproduct of rational activity that phenomenologists or Kantianists refer to. All that changes are "the attitudes toward knowledge that combines the subject and object of telling" (1996, 18). Thus, Foucault believed that existing scientific efforts that objectify the object and include it in the scope of knowing should be replaced. In other words, it is necessary to explore how we consider the composition of discourse, which forms meanings, to be natural and reasonable. What is required for this is the dichotomous applications of power, where what is *seen* and *unseen* is indicated as *said* and *unsaid* (1996, 15–30).

To roughly summarize, Foucault considers seeing to be tantamount to being told. Thus, the rule of forming what is seen, that is, the rule of forming a discourse that regards a thing as a certain matter and systemizes viewpoints, works as the mechanism that forms the meaning of the object.

His epistemology is something that can be replaced with a viewpoint and a way of systemizing it and the space that remains after a viewpoint is formed. The objective of his work is not based on the experience of a thing, but allowing for a space between the experience and us, thus, questioning the reason for being (Rajchman 1995, 69–70).

2) The Emergence of the Normal and the Abnormal: Dividing Practices

When it comes to Foucault's epistemology, which postulates an epistemological space between the subject and the object, the matter of division follows a unique philosophical path. He philosophically explored children, women, and vagrants that had not traditionally been studied and focused on how they were considered special or different.

Foucault called ontological articulation into question (J. Lee 2002, 57). In other words, every value system conducts an epistemological process to differentiate itself from others. However, the question is where the dividing line is. For instance, when it comes to dividing the normal and the abnormal and the good and the bad, the latter always become the subjects of elimination or contempt. The standard of division itself is not absolute or unchangeable, but unhistorical. This means that the subject is divided within itself or from others. This process objectifies the subject (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1989, 297–298).

For Foucault, division is neither theoretical nor unchangeable, but social and historical. For example, in his book *History of Madness*, he explained the birth of a definition of rationality and the normal. That is, what is normal was something that was not abnormal (mad). Scholars, Catholic priests, timid citizens, moralists, and those who made a fuss about the dangers derived from madness contributed to the recognition of the existence of madness as a social threat. Therefore, to defend rationality, people who were considered not normal (vagrants, impoverished students, dismissed soldiers, patients, and deserters) were detained in masses in large facilities. In this way, the abnormal were forced to enter the field of crime by the applicable religions, laws, and work ethics of the age, and those who were judged were generally subject to punishment.

Foucault (1999b, 135) called into question such things as how sense is formed from nonsense and how sense is created, arguing that epistemology is not just the process of knowing something but the way in which an object is treated, which is decided by the subjects who wish to recognize it. Thus, just as the abnormal are treated as victims to protect a society, the act of division is the result of efforts to acquire desired recognition by objectifying it.

Analytical Concepts and Method

Foucault (2002a, 10–26) argues that dividing practices that conform to the new standard of rationality of the era inevitably imply the exclusion of others. In other words, dividing the normal and the abnormal, healthy people and patients, or law-abiding people and criminals is not a theoretic matter but a matter of evaluation and power.

However, Foucault does not believe that such dividing practices are used by only one kind of knowledge, subject, or power. He is of the opinion that the abnormal are not excluded by the normal but by many factors: the interests in dividing the behavioral characteristics of the abnormal, the focus on the traditional perception of disability, the efforts to analyze the disabled on the basis of productivity, medical considerations and the expansion of the definition of physical characteristics to include *flaws* and the judgment of the characteristics of the disabled as sins according to religious beliefs, and institutional practices that define the disabled as the objects of help and coincidental incidents such as crimes. It also includes efforts to compose and justify a series of attitudes and establish the validity of exclusions that are different from the existing ones.

That is why the discussion on normalization, in the center of social welfare knowledge, is in line with punishment. In other words, Foucault's (2002b, 274) normalization is the modern form of punishment that compares, divides, ranks, homogenizes, and excludes. It eliminates differences, personalizes the subject in the same time and space, and induces it to subordinate itself to the norm. The object of epistemology and the acquisition of various statuses to keep the status of subordination have

become the essential elements. Foucault (2002b, 338) argues that this effort includes many parties in normalization, such as philanthropic organizations and scholars in the field of human science.

Thus, this study raises a question on the experience of normal-abnormal, the premise of the principle of normalization, to see if the principle of normalization, a primary social welfare practice tool, strengthens or composes the abnormality of the main objects of help in social welfare and verifies the process of their being punished. To that end, this study will look at the history of discourse, which has recognized and formed the abnormalities in a society. By confirming the epistemological premise of the principle of normalization—what is judged culturally normal by the majority is considered socially normal—we can understand from whose experience normality derives and how the experience of the majority rules the minority. The discourse analysis focuses on the following.

a) Separation: The fundamental process of the subject recognizing the object separates certain traits from the essence of the object. The subject's recognition can vary depending on objective perceptions like certain values or knowledge, which affect the evaluation of the object. The subject's epistemology formed from this implies the exclusive formation of the truth of the object and epistemological exclusion.

b) Visibility (or gaze): The object should be visible to the subject to become the object of a certain kind of knowledge. After it becomes visible, the subject can establish regular narrative methods. Making an object visible requires solutions to the problem of epistemological validity, for which it is needed. Therefore, the visible object faces requests from certain types of knowledge. Visibility is the ultimate condition for an object to enter the field of knowledge.

c) Control and Punishment: The object, when exposed to visibility and divided by the objectiveness of knowledge, is composed of something, that is, others, different from the subject of recognition and the differences among the others, emerge as the form of sin, which is the basis for elimination (for example, the disabled). The others composed

> of differences among the subjects are controlled by the dividing lines drawn by the subjects and the different things composed by the subjects are subjected to elimination and punishment.

This is not merely a way of explaining the context of historical events, but the various actors and political and economic factors that make up this event have arbitrarily organized normal and abnormal situations in the way of seeking rational alternatives. It is discourse analysis that reveals what kind of *public* practice was made possible for those who were identified as abnormal in society. Discourse is neither an extension of a system of symbols nor an extension of text, but rather an action that systematically forms the object of language (Foucault 1999a, 58).[2]

Discourse analysis conceptually captures the social phenomena and culture in postcapitalism and helps to understand not only the social act itself, but also the symbolic mediation of materialized texts carried out by social acts, interaction with social relations, and the order and change in social structure (Shin 2011, 11). In particular, discourse forms social reality and events on a variety of tangled layers, and tightly links not only nonverbal or noncultural areas but also institutional practice. Discourse analysis thus provides a framework for a strong interpretation of particular objects or events, acts as a force for defining perceptions, and reflects unequal social relations. On the assumption of this, discourse analysis is an effective way of revealing social relations and the structure of perceptions between the subject and object (Smart 2009).

Discourse analysis sees language not merely as a text, but a social practice that justifies and reproduces domination and inequality, and expresses social discourse through the analysis of structural relationships such as power and domination or discrimination and control that are inherent in language, and reveals legalized inequality and oppression, abuse of power, and the production and reproduction of the dominant culture (Fairclough and Wodak 1997; Van Dijk 2001).

2. In this study, I try to avoid direct reference to Foucault's main concept of "power" in order to prevent dispersion of the discussion at hand; for this study is intended to examine the discursive effects of the epistemological premise of the principle of normalization.

Therefore, the analysis of the discourse of this study will be intended to clarify what process the subjects talk about to form the *truth* about the object—here, the vagabond—and convert this into general acceptance. So this study does not constitute a new interpretation of history. Discourse analysis differs from interpretation in that it analyzes what is already inherent in the language and to capture the formation or contextual background of a particular subject (J. Lee 2002). The data consulted in this paper include legal texts, official government reports, domestic and overseas research reports, statistical survey data, records of congressional meetings, debates of various organizational and individual statements, program planning and evaluation reports of social welfare facilities, daily records, educational materials, and detainee incident records.

The Experience of Abnormality and the Gaze of the Subject: The Brothers Home Incident of 1987

Social practice starts from how one recognizes and prescribes social problems. From this point of view, the countermeasures against homelessness, which has been called "a decadent and abominable existence that cannot save the country, but only consumption" (Ministry of Health and Social Affairs 1982, 354), were based on this recognition. This perception of the homeless was directly related to the contemporaneous political situation in Korea. After emergency martial law was declared on May 17, 1980, a Social Purification Committee (Sahoe Jeonghwa Wiwonhoe) was initiated. At the outset of the project, the number of people who joined this movement exceeded one million. The military, which had taken control of the government through a coup d'etat led by General Park Chung-hee in May 1961, set about reestablishing order on the streets and chose beggars and vagabonds as targets of social purification. Local police in conjunction with cooperative local residents patrolled local areas, sorted out the objects for purification, arrested them, and handed them over to social welfare facilities. In other words, in the 1980s the Korean the authorities chose to remove those social elements deemed to require purification from visibility. It was believed that in this way

society was gradually cleansed (Social Purification Committee 1988).

The year 1987, one year prior to the 1988 Seoul Olympics, is marked not only as a year of rapid political change (it was the period that saw the birth of the prodemocracy movement), but also as a year that saw widespread public interest in the murders, physical assaults, and forced labor that occurred at a Busan facility for the homeless called Brothers Home. In their collectivity, the events at this facility were the first to become the subject of jurisdiction regarding human rights abuse, as well as drawing a great deal of attention from the media and society at large, separating the facility apart from other social welfare centers (Baek, Yun, and Lee 1998, 14). To be more specific, the Brothers Home incident focused more on human rights than on the corruption of the facility director.[3] Almost every Korean media outlet reported on the incident, and numerous testimonies were recorded from those who had escaped from the facility; these reports and studies on the conditions in the facility were summarized in phrases such as, "Korean Gulag Archipelago" (Y. G. Kim 1988a), "A living hell" (Yang 1987), and the "South Korean Aoji Coal Mine [a notorious concentration camp in North]" (Won 1987). With the disclosures and investigations of incidents at social welfare facilities like Seongjiwon in Daejun and Yangjiwon in Yeongi-gun, social welfare facilities in Korea earned a stigma as places of corruption and human rights violations. It was argued that there was a need to know everything about social welfare facilities and that what is happening there should be made transparent. This is shown in the contents of the discussion meeting organized by the Korean Bar Association four months after the report of the Brother Home incident. (Kang et al. 1987).

The nonvisibility of social welfare facilities in Korea resulted in suspicion; visibility is a positive thing. This was a time when visibility served as an important tool in the promotion of human rights. Therefore, Brothers Home, which lacked visibility in that it was not run transparently, acquired the status of a blind spot on the human rights violation radar and as a facility

3. The court did accuse the administrators of Brothers Home of embezzlement. But as regards illegal confinement, the court ruled the facility to be innocent, considering the decision to confine its patients as justifiable. More serious crimes, such as murder and assault, were not prosecuted for lack of evidence (C. Lee 1998).

where citizens were illegally detained. Arguments that such facilities should be open imply another objective that is not restricted to mere openness in terms of transparency in the operation of facilities, but the need for external monitoring. That is, the two different scopes of being seen (openness) and observing with purpose (external monitoring) can be asserted in the same concept of visibility.

Thus far this paper has focused on social welfare facilities, not the people who are detained there, when talking about visibility. The assertions for visibility create the logic that public surveillance of facilities can promote human rights. In other words, in this view, the contributing factor behind such abuses was the lack of visibility of the facilities, not the visibility of the detainees, such as their medical conditions, lifespans, or their ability to work.

Dual Effects of Visibility

Visibility is not merely defined as the element that makes it possible to reasonably manage the operation of facilities to protect the human rights of the inmates. The argument for visibility involves more complicated processes, which place great importance on the dual effects of visibility. First, visibility allows for anatomical practices. For instance, the ability to check if the human rights of the inmates are being abused means not only being able to verify if the physical environments (the architecture, external environment, quality of food, and proper temperature) are guaranteed, but also if the basic needs of the inmates are being met and to check their daily routines. The logic of visibility would allow for a status where all information about the inmates' behaviors, thoughts, living habits, personal histories, and sexual lives are available to those calling for patient rights.

> Enough light and the gaze from the watcher, rather than the darkness that was used as protection, can capture the object more easily. The status of visibility is the trap. He can be seen but cannot see. He can be the object of information but not the subject of information communication. (Foucault 2002b, 295)

Yet, there is another aspect to visibility when it comes to the question of who monitors the treatment of the inmate, secretly holding the torch of securing rights. Who are the people that hide behind the gaze and are not seen? They want to see all the objects, while trying to avoid the gaze of the objects in the dark. What does this invisible power want? People hide themselves from others' view and look at everything about the detained people and enforce power using the tool called human rights for any violation of standards—what are these people attempting to see and insist upon?

To verify this, we need to search for the process by which visibility in the name of rights penetrated into the people living in facilities by looking into the Brothers Home incident more closely. This means focusing on the rather complicated aspects of forced labor and forced detention, the aspects that received the greatest amount of interest among the many features of the affair. This will shed light on labor ethics issues today, namely that the disabled and those who are unable to work (or those excluded from the labor market) should be dealt equally in terms of punishment and that rehabilitation is required to acquire the *right* to restoration of the normality of life.

Practice of Dividing: Division between the Normal and Abnormal

Who exactly were the 16,125 *social evils* that were confirmed to have been living in facilities for vagrants in Korea in 1987? According to the available statistics (Ministry of Health and Social Affairs 1987, 8), of this number 10,891 (67%) were either physically or mentally ill. Of the various diseases from which these ill persons suffered, mental weakness and mental disorders accounted for 4,578 and 1,582, respectively, while physical disabilities and other kinds of disease accounted for 1,419 and 3,312 inmates, respectively. Thus, we can see that the majority of those considered vagrants in 1987 were either physically or mentally disabled (67%), and that the mentally disabled comprised a greater percentage of the vagrants than the physically disabled.

Table 1. The Number of Disabled People Living in Facilities for Vagrants in Korea in 1987 (unit: person)

		Disabled	Those with physical disabilities	Those with mental weakness	Those with mental disorders	Deaf	Blind	General patients	Others
		10,891	1,419	4,578	1,582	417	169	1,516	1,210
Total vagrants	16,125	67%	8%	28%	10%	3%	1%	9%	7%
Disabled people	10,891		13%	42%	15%	4%	2%	14%	10%

Source: Adapted from Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (1987, 8).

Whatever the correlation between labor and disability might be, the Brothers Home incident naturally resulted in such questions as, "Why do disabled people live in vagrant facilities?" These questions were received in a mixed manner. "We are talking about why people, that is, those with physical disability and mental weakness who should not be accommodated in vagrant facilities are living in those facilities" (National Assembly Secretariat 1987, 24). Although those who agreed with this claim (Busan Metropolitan City 1987c; Ministry of Health and Social Affairs 1987; Baek et al. 1998) focused on the fact that disabled people were accommodated in vagrant facilities, they did not call the accommodation itself into question. Rather, it was believed that "those people [with mental disorders, mental weakness, and physical disability] should be accommodated in vagrant facilities" (Y. M. Kim et al. 1987, 14), and "those without vagrancy among them should be protected in relevant facilities" (National Assembly Secretariat 1987, 24).

Thus, the Korean government and experts focused more on how they could solve such mixed accommodation and the answer was, of course, separate accommodation. In other words, the abnormal (those who are not protected, such as the disabled, elderly, and children) are considered as social evils, whether or not they are vagrants. Finally, they return to the original spectrum: (vagrant) disabled persons, (vagrant) senior citizens, and (vagrant) children come under the umbrella of social evils. Therefore,

separation for the Brothers Home detainees can be a sufficient condition for *institutional* unity (Foucault 1996, 201).

One last condition should be added here. As long as wide-ranging detention remains, "without the establishment of a committee that can distinguish vagrants from others" (Y. M. Kim et al. 1987, 15), there is not enough space for a gaze to clearly intervene. Then, what choices are available to see the running of social welfare facilities more clearly and operate them more reasonably? The answer is to reduce their size. "For a social welfare facility to operate properly, the number of people subject to care should be under 300 or 500" (Kang et al. 1987, 27).

Through these discursive practices, social welfare facilities were given two conditions of visibility: the homogeneity of objects and the reduction of scale. Normal people could closely observe small facilities with homogeneous abnormalities.[4] Finally, welfare facility detainees were perfectly placed under surveillance systems established by the *normal*.

It is hard to determine whether the people accommodated in Brothers Home were disabled prior to being detained as vagrants, or whether they became disabled after detention. However, we can see that accommodation in social welfare facilities was required for rather different reasons, such as treatment or rehabilitation (Foucault 1996, 142). Now, "abnormal people who objectify themselves for [the gaze of] others will be seen not only in observation but also labor" (Foucault 1996, 244). The punishment for these people was meted out in a different way.

4. Human rights violations in Korea have mainly occurred in large-scale facilities. For this reason, there has been an ongoing debate on the miniaturization of facilities as an alternative to protecting human rights and expanding connections with local communities (NARS 2017). However, reducing the size of a facility does not guarantee human rights. According to a survey by the Korean Ministry of Health and Welfare, the smaller the facility size, the lower the percentage of workers receiving human rights education (Ministry of Health and Welfare 2016). We also need to consider the fact that small-scale facilities are relatively inferior to large-scale ones. So this study only suggests that the miniaturization of facilities is a favorable condition for securing visibility.

Work Ethics and Normality

Even before the Brothers Home incident shed light upon conditions, the vagrants were regarded as problematic. National Comprehensive Policies that took off in 1982 show how vagrants were perceived at the time:

> There is a saying that goes "poverty is beyond the cure of the nation." Vagrants are also a source of concern in developed countries. In America, welfare recipients use their living allowances to buy alcohol and drugs and still beg for money. To prevent such decadent circumstances, we have to take fundamental measures and focus on rehabilitation and independence to help vagrants to join society as healthy citizens. Vagrants not only repulse citizens, but also foreign tourists. We should make efforts to allow them to have access to opportunities to make a living. We should make efforts and focus on supporting vagrants, making public assistance of vagrants a priority. (Ministry of Health and Social Affairs 1982, 354)

The vagrant's inability to work not only produces extreme hostility toward the appearance or behavior of vagrants, but is also an important factor in determining their characters. To able-bodied workers, vagrants who do not work and who beg for money are criminals who violate the ethics of labor and production as well as being objects of aversion.

The English New Poor Laws (1834) were also in line with the perception that poverty derives from moral deformity (Park 2002, 92–99, 142–146). However, the experiences of vagrants in England and those in Korea show both similarities and differences. Labor is similarly used as a tool of punishment in both countries, but how it unfolded was different. In England, labor was used as an aspect of providing manpower to industrial areas in response to both the need for punishment of the able-bodied poor and the European economic crisis of the seventeenth century (Foucault 1996, 146). However, in addition, these poor were also the victims of a political stunt called social purification.[5]

5. More details about the cause of the social purification movement, private and public cooperation, and the then social atmosphere are closely explained in a celebration booklet released by the Social Purification Committee (1988).

According to reports on the living conditions in Brothers Home (Busan Metropolitan City 1987a, 1987c), the facility provided opportunities to learn relevant skills for handcraft industries like shoemaking, shell art, and knitting, but there was no mention that their labor was linked to factories or businesses to increase productivity. This shows that the experiences of the vagrants may have been caused by economic factors, but it also implies that punishment was imposed on those who violated the ethics of economics or religion and lacked efforts to produce economic results through them.

Nevertheless, the argument for the arrest of vagrants in the name of protection, and their subjection to labor, earned support as a means of ensuring social stability (Y. M. Kim et al. 1987, 18). Now people accommodated in vagrant facilities were subject to two kinds of punishment. One was defined as the social evil of not fulfilling the sacred labor ethic, and the other was detention in a prison-like facility. According to Foucault (1996, 157), the practice of providing accommodation and the requirement of labor are ethically combined, while the accommodated must accept the physical and psychological restraint called accommodation (1996, 144).

However, punishment does not end there. Labor, a tool of ethical punishment, was also considered a tool to bring vagrants back into society. In the case of Brothers Home, acquiring the relevant skills for labor was proposed as a path toward being discharged from the facility (Busan Metropolitan City 1987c, 6). That is, if a detainee did not have a family or relatives, the only way they could be released was to prove their potential to earn a livelihood to the investigators (1987b, 5). This means that those who did not have relatives, or those whose relatives did not wish to have them discharged, would have little chance of leaving the facility. So there was only one way left for the detainee to escape. They had to prove to the investigators that they had a workable body. After all, many disabled people with no family had to remain in the Brothers Home or move to another welfare facility. The hatred they felt toward their family and the ethical punishment of their unworkable body might have been the climax of this incident. What the incident deeply engraved in the minds and bodies of the accommodated was the necessity for absolute obedience to the sanctity of labor and the disgust at their physical inability to work. This indicates that labor ethics

as a right is another way of punishment for the abnormal. In this respect, it is hard to agree that normalization "allowed for both rights and duties by dividing humans into different categories" (H. Lee 2000, 336). Because rights were mobilized as a means of extracting duties and separated protection and labor rights are only sophisticated names of exclusion and punishment.

The Brothers Home incident not only revealed brutal violence against vagrants, but also a unique punishment for the abnormal through a combination of labor ethics and gaze in the name of rationality. The punishment of illegal captivity, restriction of liberty, and forced labor was only replaced by a discipline that combines the logic of gaze and labor ethics (Foucault 1975, 384).

Conclusion

This study mainly analyzed the Brothers Home incident to show the epistemological premise of normality and the principle of normalization in cultural mainstream experiences. Its conclusions are as follows.

First, the Korean experience of abnormality is not a method that eliminates the differences from the object that seems abnormal, but that offers the possibility of revealing the object and retaining it for thorough analysis and decomposition. The external demands for increasing visibility have given *visibility* the status of a tool to secure human rights, and openness and surveillance of abnormality were forced. Therefore, the visibility of social welfare facilities and the discourse on human rights were disclosed to the subjects who wanted a discussion without restrictions.

Second, abnormal people became objects to be removed, and those who were described as social evils were detained and punished in the name of social purification. After the Brothers Home affair became known, the mixed abnormal space where detainees resided was categorized by subjects who wanted to look at the inside more closely. However, the dividing practice revealed the desire of knowledge to penetrate their lives in the name of rights; it was not an effort to end their punishment.

Third, the work ethics that defined abnormal people as the object of

elimination were proposed as tools to punish and the only tools to normalize the abnormality. Abnormal people had to learn labor skills to be freed from detention and ethical punishment. Efforts to normalize the abnormality proceeded by determining their sins and punishing them accordingly. Those who could not work or were considered unable to work had to ethically punish their bodies in the hopes of being considered suitable for work.

Penalties for the abnormal were not reduced or abolished. Rather, they were merely converted into rational gaze and labor ethics. Through this epistemological change, the abnormal finally became able to look at themselves through the eyes of the normal. A new *discipline device* was created to punish the abnormal. In this sense, Foucault's (2003c, 170) words are meaningful: "What is ironic is the fact that the device makes us believe that our own liberty depends on it."

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