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- P-ISSN 2671-8197
- E-ISSN 2733-936X
- KOREAN
- P-ISSN2671-8197
- E-ISSN2733-936X
- KCI
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North Korea’s Perception and Responses toward the May 16th Coup d’etat in South Korea
Korean Studies Quarterly / Korean Studies Quarterly, (P)2671-8197; (E)2733-936X
2010, v.33 no.1, pp.81-104
https://doi.org/10.25024/ksq.33.1.201003.81
Shin,
J.
(2010). North Korea’s Perception and Responses toward the May 16th Coup d’etat in South Korea. , 33(1), 81-104, https://doi.org/10.25024/ksq.33.1.201003.81
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Abstract
This paper is an attempt to examine and discuss how the South Korean factor has influenced North Korean politics through the case of the May 16th Coup d’etat in 1961 based on the newly obtained document from China. In contrast to what has been widely believed, the North de facto fairly considered the possibility of the South Korean military coup in many dimensions. At the outset of the May 16th incident, the North Koreans assumed the United States incited the coup. But, they soon adjusted their conclusion that there was a higher possibility of the coup being an independent action by a progressive group within the South Korean military. They were even preparing a statement supporting the coup. However, only in two days, the North’s assessment of the coup again shifts to a rebellion by ‘the most reactionary group,’ which is instigated by the U.S. only in two days. It is interesting to note that Kim Il Sung still strived to find out what Park Chung Hee’s real intents were for some time after the incident. The coup had more detrimental impacts on North Korea than what has been generally perceived. The North Korean leadership decided to postpone the declaration of the first Seven-Year-Plan due to the concerns over the coup. Especially, the North examined the details and practically adopted a ‘parallel policy for defense and economy’ at the KWP Central Presidium held instantly after the May 16th Coup. The policy was formalized in December, 1962. In short, the coup in the South was a major momentum for the policy shift of the North.
- keywords
- May 16th Coup d'etat, Anti-Communism as a Policy Guideline, Southern Triangular Alliance, First Seven-Year-Plan, Parallel Policy for Defense and Economy, 5.16 쿠데타, 반공 국시, 남방삼각동맹, 제1차 7개년계획, 국방경제병진노선
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