Abstract

After a series of domestic pacification campaigns, during the fourth lunar month of 1592, Toyotomi Hideyoshi 豊臣秀吉 launched an invasion of the continent in order to realize the next stage of his grand strategy: for Japan to become the regional hegemon. Hideyoshi’s grand strategy is best conceived of as a hegemonic “grand principle” that he consciously held and followed. It is clear that Hideyoshi needed to bring Joseon Korea into Japan’s sphere of influence-either voluntarily or involuntarily-before tackling the current hegemon, Ming China. Hideyoshi employed an oscillating approach towards Korea. He was flexible and pragmatic concerning interim measures, as long as they did not obviate the achievement of his long-term goals. The result was a pattern of escalation and de-escalation, from negotiation via coercion to violence and back again. Hideyoshi was trying to force the Koreans to rethink their place in East Asia. Hence, Korea represented the trigger, but not the primary motivation for the war. In short, Korea was central to, but not the apex of, Hideyoshi’s hegemonic grand strategy. This paper presents a fresh interpretation of Hideyoshi’s international motives, goals, and actions, and in particular, Korea’s position within his grand strategic vision.