ISSN : 1226-9654
In the present paper, we provided a concise overview of the theoretical foundations of the Diffusion Model for Conflict tasks (DMC), a computational model that had recently gained attention as a valuable tool for explaining cognitive control mechanisms, and systematically reviewed key empirical studies that had applied the DMC to a variety of conflict tasks. In particular, by comparing the results of traditional reaction-time (RT) analyses with those of DMC-based analyses, this review explored how sub-components of cognitive control were modulated by experimental manipulations (e.g., stimulus features and task types) and individual differences (e.g., arousal levels and age). Furthermore, the paper highlighted cases in which DMC analyses enabled more refined theoretical interpretations, especially in instances where traditional RT analyses alone failed to resolve conflicting theoretical claims. These examples illustrated the explanatory power of DMC in disentangling the contributions of task-relevant and irrelevant processes. The paper also introduced the Revised Diffusion Model for Conflict tasks (RDMC), a recently proposed extension of the original DMC designed to address its structural limitations, and discussed the analytic advantages of RDMC by comparing its key parameters to those of the original model. In sum, this review underscored the utility of DMC-based analysis as a complementary approach to traditional RT-based methods in cognitive control research, and outlined potential avenues for applying this modeling framework across various domains of cognitive science.
People often encounter fortune-telling messages that frame upcoming events in positive or negative terms. Even when taken lightly, such messages can shift affect or self-expectations that guide cognitive strategy. This study explored whether the emotional direction of fortunes influences cognition. Participants received positive, neutral, or negative fortunes before completing the Mental Arithmetic Task and the Cognitive Reflection Test-Long (CRT-L). Arithmetic performance did not differ across conditions, but negative fortunes led to higher CRT-L scores and greater expected performance than positive fortunes. These findings are consistent with the feelings-as-information framework, in which negative emotion enhances analytic processing. The current study suggests that emotional cues embedded in fortune-telling messages serve as self-relevant information, thereby modulating the selection of cognitive strategies during task performance.
Image memorability refers to an intrinsic property of images that determines how well they can be remembered. Image memorability has been shown to be highly consistent across individuals. Despite its stability as a stimulus-specific trait, predicting memorability subjectively remains challenging. Previous studies have demonstrated a discrepancy between human participants' subjective ratings of their ability to remember a stimulus and their actual memory performance. We hypothesized that subjective memorability prediction is biased by consciously accessible image properties that are not directly related to memorability. To avoid such bias, in the current study, we used an indirect behavioral measure to assess image memorability. Participants were asked to encode scene images and simply press a keyboard button. Results showed that spontaneous encoding response time to an image was reliably associated with memorability. Specifically, participants exhibited faster responses to highly memorable images compared to less memorable ones. These findings indicate that the efficiency of information processing during encoding reliably predicts image memorability.
